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Abstract: “An Army of Never Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of 
the Canadian Army 1944-1945” 
 
 This dissertation is a study of the Canadian Army’s ability to reconstitute battalion sized combat 
arms regiments (armour, infantry and artillery) during the last year of the Second World War in North 
West Europe.  The central thesis argues that in combination with tactical and strategic strengths, the 
Canadian Army Overseas was effective at rebuilding units that had suffered severe personnel and 
equipment losses in combat.  This ability to sustain the strength of its combat units was vitally important 
in maintaining their offensive capability.  Units that had suffered catastrophic losses were rebuilt and re-
equipped in a rapid manner that allowed them to be capable of any kind of operation.  Without 
replacement resources at the ready, offensive capability within the Canadian Army would be inhibited, 
regardless of effective tactics or strategies.  In comparison to the Germans, the Canadian Army was a 
phoenix, continually strengthening its operational units and maintaining their combat capability.  By 
examining the record of Canadian replacements, losses, available resources and overall combat force 
deployed, a picture emerges of an Army with overpowering organizational, logistic and administrative 
strengths. 
Keywords:  Canadian Army, North West Europe, Second World War, First Canadian Army, 
reinforcements, replacements, casualties 
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Abbreviations, terms and acronyms 
 
A Echelon-Grouping that encompasses all fighting personnel and equipment to accomplish a mission, 
plus all supplies for their immediate needs.  Divided into A1 (combat) and A2 (supply) echelons. 
AFV-Armoured fighting vehicle 
AGRA-Army Group Royal Artillery  
B Echelon-Supply and administrative grouping that supports the A1 and A2 echelons. 
Battalion-A unit made up of several companies of roughly 150 personnel each.  Battalion sized units in 
the Canadian Army were designated as regiments.  Some regiments had more than one battalion, but this 
was rare. 
Battle casualties-These are casualties that were caused by enemy action and fall into the categories killed, 
wounded or missing. 
Brigade-A formation made up of several battalion sized regiments. 
CAC-Canadian Armoured Corps 
CIC-Canadian Infantry Corps  
CADR-Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment 
CAO-Canadian Army Overseas 
CBRG-Canadian Base Reinforcement Group 
CMHQ-Canadian Military Headquarters, London 
Corps-This was a military formation that contained two or more divisions, plus corps-level troops. 
Division-This was a military formation that contained two or more brigades, plus divisional units. 
DP-Delivery Point 
GS-General Service 
LAA-Light Anti-Aircraft 
LAD-Light Aid Detachment  
LOB-Left out of battle 
LOC-Line of Communications 
LOD-Line of Departure  
NCOs-Non-Commissioned Officers.  In the Second World War these included Lance Corporals, 
Sergeants, Warrant Officers, Chief Warrant Officers. 
Non-Battle Casualties-Casualties beyond the Regimental Aid Post caused by other reasons than enemy 
action 
ix 
 
NRMA-National Resources Mobilization Act 
NWE-North West Europe 
Officer-A member of the Canadian Army commissioned by the King with the rank of Second Lieutenant 
and above. 
O-ORs-Army Officers and other ranks-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers and 
members. 
OMC-Ordnance Maintenance Company 
On strength-Held by, under the command of or part of an organization or unit. 
Order of Battle-The list of smaller sub units contained within a larger formation, be it a division, corps or 
army. 
Other ranks-non-commissioned members of the Canadian Army, including non-commissioned officers. 
RAP-Regimental Aid Post.  This was a battalion level medical clinic. 
RCA-Royal Canadian Artillery 
Regiment-The battalion sized unit in the Canadian Army.  Three of these made up a brigade. 
Reinforcements-These are new or returning personnel which join a combat arms unit. 
RCEME-Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
RCASC-Royal Canadian Army Service Corps 
SOS-Sent off strength 
TAF-Tactical Air Force 
TOS-Taken on strength 
War Establishment-The war establishment was what a regiment or organization was supposed to contain 
in both personnel and equipment in wartime.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, aim, structure, scope and historiography 
 Following the landings of the first Canadian soldiers on Juno Beach on 6 June 1944, a very long 
and costly military campaign in North West Europe (NWE) began for the Canadian Army.  The path that 
would lead to eventual victory over the Third Reich in NWE was divided into four distinct phases.1  First 
was the bitter campaign of attrition in Normandy, where the Canadian Army prevailed against the 
strongest German formations available during 1944.  Once these enemy forces were crushed by late 
August 1944 in the Falaise Pocket, a second phase began with a long pursuit across France that saw the 
conquest of enemy held channel ports.  This phase concluded with the bitter fighting to clear the Scheldt 
Estuary, freeing the port of Antwerp by November 1944.  Following these two costly phases of combat, 
the Canadian Army would assume defensive positions along the Maas River.  They would hold these 
static positions from November 1944 to January 1945.  Spring 1945 would consist of a final flurry of 
combat operations from February onward.  This fourth final phase would also witness the already present 
2nd Canadian Corps re-uniting with the 1st Canadian Corps, re-deployed from Italy.  The First Canadian 
Army would now consist of two complete Canadian corps.  Canadian formations within these two corps 
totalled three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, two independent armoured brigades and two 
army level artillery groupings.2  Each of these formations was near full strength in early April 1945, and 
together comprised the greatest Canadian military force ever assembled in the history of the nation.  In the 
last month of hostilities this force relentlessly advanced, sweeping aside all opposition. 
 This battlefield dominance was not always present.  Before the German collapse in mid August 
1944, Canadian formations in Normandy faced challenges they had not experienced in Italy during 1943-
1944.  In June, July and August 1944, Canadian units had heavy casualties inflicted on them by a 
seasoned foe equipped with advanced weapons systems.  Due to high losses in personnel, weapons and 
vehicles, the Army was confronted with a titanic challenge to address the demands of constant attrition.  
                                                          
1 Charles Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War.  Volume III: The Victory Campaign:  The 
Operations in North West Europe 1944-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary.  1960).  Introduction V-
IX.  These four phases are the most logical approach to dividing up the major events of eleven months of fighting, 1944-1945. 
2 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657-658.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army order of battle in NWE.   
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From 6 June through 23 August 1944, the total battle casualties of the Canadian Army in Normandy were 
18,444, with 5,021 being fatal.3  These losses equalled the full strength of one Canadian infantry division, 
its personnel war establishment in the summer of 1944 being 18,376.4  When large numbers of personnel 
were rapidly removed from the battlefield, the ability of their unit to continue was undermined.  These 
soldiers who had been killed, wounded or were missing needed to be replaced immediately.  Vehicles and 
weapons systems losses also quickly mounted during the summer of 1944.  On 11 June 1944, the 6th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment had fifty-one of its Sherman tanks totally destroyed.5  Comparing this 
figure against the total Sherman strength of the regiment, the loss rate was 83 percent .  For Canadian 
Army units to remain operational and achieve battlefield victories, adequate personnel and equipment 
levels had to be maintained.  Offensive operations could not be mounted if they were not enough soldiers 
or weapons.  Strategy, planning and tactics were not enough on their own, and had to be matched with 
adequate reserve resources and administrative systems to pay the costs of war.  Canadian military 
leadership recognized this, and had an administrative system ready to deploy resources set aside for 
exactly this purpose.6   
 This study will demonstrate that for the majority of the Canadian Army’s operational record in 
NWE during 1944-1945, it was effective at reinforcing and reconstituting units that had suffered losses.  
This ability to sustain the strength of combat units within what became the First Canadian Army was 
vitally important in maintaining their military capability.  Units that had suffered catastrophic losses were 
rebuilt and re-equipped in a rapid manner that allowed them to be capable of immediate operations. 7  If 
                                                          
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 271. 
4 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reimer Publishing.  2001), 343.  2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division. 
5 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 140. 
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,776.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-10534.  Letter detailing 
personnel reinforcements that have been dispatched by the Canadian No.2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (CMBG) 
reinforcement organization.  A key example of the Army’s efficient administrative performance was the supply of 6,984 new 
reinforcements to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy up to 4 August 1944. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada War Diary (The Black Watch) July 1944.  Losses on 
25 July, 1944 were so extreme the war diarist states that “and of the forward companies, all are missing”.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 194.  Total casualties for 25 July, 1944 in the Royal Highland Regiment of Canada totalled 307, with 123 
killed, 101 wounded and 83 prisoners. 
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units were not regularly reinforced, offensive capability within the Canadian Army would have been 
inhibited, regardless of effective tactics or strategies.   
 This system of constant reinforcement was in contrast to German units that suffered continuous 
losses and were rarely reinforced with new personnel or equipment.  Due to ongoing attrition, these 
enemy units eventually had to be withdrawn for extended periods to be totally reconstituted, re-equipped 
and retrained.  During the last year of the war, Canadian divisions were rarely withdrawn from the combat 
environment, and if so were tasked with a reserve role near the front line.  This dissertation will also 
illustrate that the Canadian Army’s performance in this area compared favourably with that of its major 
Western Front Allies, the British and U.S. armies. 
 This study will examine the efficiency of the Canadian personnel and equipment reinforcement 
systems, but will focus mainly on their effectiveness in realizing their prime objective, the defeat of the 
German military through quantitative means.  In contrast to the German focus on a qualitative approach, a 
Canadian common standard for reinforcement allowed a maximum number of units to be adequately 
maintained.  The Germans only reinforced a limited number of elite divisions at the expense of letting 
average infantry formations be reduced to nothing.  They were then forced to construct new ones from 
scratch.  Despite evidence of improper use of Canadian military manpower resources during the last year 
of the war, this study will not center on the strategic uses of personnel.  This topic will only be 
investigated in relation to the shortage of infantry reinforcements during the last year of the war.  
Canadian and German combat effectiveness at the unit level will be discussed, but will focus on how the 
Canadian Army utilized certain tactics to maximize the attrition of the enemy and correspondingly limit 
their own losses.  While some of these tactics minimized losses in certain areas, they influenced higher 
levels in others.  This in turn influenced the amount of additional resources needed in specific areas of the 
reinforcement systems to fill these gaps. 
4 
 
  This study will also limit itself to Canadian combat arm units at the regimental level under 
Canadian army, corps and divisional command. 8  These infantry, artillery and armour units were in direct 
combat with the enemy or operating major weapons systems that were critical to defeating German 
forces.  While other Canadian Army trades did suffer casualties and take on reinforcements, these three 
combat arms were in continuous combat and suffered the most.  This is not to argue that the 
accomplishments and sacrifices of other trades were not critical to victory.  Corps, divisional and brigade 
headquarters and other independent units under battalion strength are also excluded.  Also not included 
will be the subject of consumable resources such as water, petroleum products and ammunition.9   
 In tracking the replacement, losses and inventories of vehicles and equipment, the decision was 
made to restrict the types of equipment monitored in this study to the major weapons systems fielded by 
the units in question.  For an armoured or artillery regiment, this would be their heavy armoured fighting 
vehicles (AFVs) or artillery pieces.  For an infantry regiment, this would be their medium machine guns, 
anti-tank guns, tracked carriers and mortars.  The measure of how many of these items a unit held is 
indicative of the ability of the Canadian Army to replenish equipment stocks during the course of high 
intensity combat operations.   
 The theatre for this study is NWE, encompassing events and battlefields in France, Belgium, 
Netherlands and northern Germany.  This choice was not made to denigrate the campaigns of the 
Canadian Army in Italy or other theatres, but it's most powerful and complete force was not assembled in 
these locations.  Against it, especially in the period June-August 1944, were the most powerful and 
concentrated enemy formations on the Western Front.  These powerful enemy forces made their full 
weight felt against the 2nd Canadian Corps, resulting in catastrophic events that were without equal in 
Italy or Sicily.   
                                                          
8 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F.  Canadian order of battle in NWE.  There were other Canadian units 
serving with the 6th British Airborne Division, the 79th British Armoured Division and the 107th British Anti-Aircraft Brigade, but 
these will be excluded.   
9 John Ellis, Brute Force, (London, England: Andre Deutsch.  1990), 556.  Appendices, Table 50.  Allied crude oil production.  It 
is a given that these items in 1944 were extremely plentiful on the Allied side. 
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 The period of study for this project is 6 June 1944 to 5 May 1945, the cease fire date.  It was 
between these two dates that the Canadian Army massed the greatest amount of resources for the largest 
amount of time.  By choosing this time period the study can assess the amount of losses and 
reinforcements recorded for personnel and equipment in the most intense period of the war.  It also must 
be noted that there were times during the early war years when the Canadian Army was largely inactive or 
involved in training exercises.  In these periods demands were not placed on the Canadian Army to re-
build, replenish and re-equip in the face of extreme losses.   
 This study is a significant addition to Canadian military history due to it being the first work to 
examine the late war Canadian Army's ability to reconstitute its personnel and equipment losses in NWE.  
As such, this study is as much about the nature of twentieth century modern warfare as it is about the 
administrative processes of the wartime Canadian Army.  Given the lethality and destructive power of 
modern weapons, during the last year of the war the importance of an army's ability to rebuild itself was 
equal to its ability to defeat its enemy.   
 No other work currently in existence possesses a comparable level of research on Canadian 
wartime unit strengths, reinforcements, casualties and equipment levels at the battalion level over an 
eleven month period.  Detailed statistical studies of the combat records of Canadian units are rare.  
Supporting data within operational narratives is mainly relegated to limited appendices that are rarely 
analysed.  The research within this study will fill this academic gap by chronicling actual Canadian Army 
unit strengths, losses, its administrative and logistic processes, and how challenges within certain areas 
were rectified in reality.  Additional tables record total vehicle and major weapons systems holdings at the 
division or brigade level on a monthly basis.  This data allows the reader to gauge Canadian equipment 
strengths at certain points down to the last armoured vehicle or artillery piece.  Also presented is an 
overview of the operational record of the division or independent brigade to which each combat unit 
belonged.  Within Canadian Second World War military historiography, the focus is overwhelmingly on 
the regiment or combat arms corps rather than on formations such as divisions or brigades.  By including 
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data on larger formations and grouping together statistics on all their component combat arms units, the 
reader is presented with a larger picture away from the regimental focus.  In addressing these subjects a 
new contribution can be made within this historical discourse.   
 With existing Canadian Second World War historiography dominated by operational histories, 
relatively little detailed exploration has occurred into the identity and structure of the First Canadian 
Army in NWE.  As the greatest military force ever created by the Canadian nation, this organization's 
size, strength and capability was constantly evolving.  Given its wartime accomplishments, and the 
mammoth political and military struggle that went into its creation, the continued study of this army 
should be a primary goal of Canadian military historians.  Focus so far has centered on its operational 
record.  With some exceptions, the questions of what it was and how it functioned administratively have 
been largely unanswered.  This work makes a significant contribution in this area, providing detailed 
insight into the First Canadian Army's administrative systems, structure, personnel and equipment 
strengths.   
 The structure of this study consists of fourteen chapters.  This introductory chapter supplies a 
brief campaign overview, a thesis statement and a set of research parameters.  A concise plan for the 
study follows, accompanied by some notes on the administrative approach of the Canadian Army 
Overseas (CAO).  This is followed by an overview of the historiography of the Allied war effort and how 
it relates to the subject of this study.  The second and third chapters are devoted to the battlefield tactics 
and equipment operated by the Canadian Army and its German enemy.  The aim of these chapters is to 
demonstrate why certain losses in personnel and equipment occurred, rather than assess combat 
effectiveness. The fourth and fifth chapters outline the personnel reinforcement system and how some 
significant challenges during 1944 were resolved.  The sixth chapter examines the equipment replacement 
system for the Canadian Army during 1944-1945, and explains how this process maintained Canadian 
military strength.  Chapters seven through thirteen deal with the actual replenishment and re-equipment of 
combat arms regiments in the field.  Each of these seven chapters focus on a division or brigade level 
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formation and their assigned regimental units.  These chapters have their own statistical appendices 
located at the end of the study.  The content of these chapters are the result of interpreting very technical 
personnel and equipment statistics found in the matching appendix.  They also trace the major battlefield 
actions of the formations and chronicle how various personnel and equipment challenges were resolved.  
A concluding fourteenth chapter provides final thoughts on the Canadian Army’s replacement practices 
for both personnel and equipment, and how the performance of these processes was critical to Canadian 
victory in 1945.  
 A continuous theme throughout this work is that the Canadian Army's reinforcement and 
replacement systems were effective in achieving their end goals for a majority of the period studied.   
This is not to say the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO) went about this in the most efficient manner.  
Effectiveness is defined within a military environment as an organization being successful in producing 
the intended mission result.  Efficiency in the same environment is the practice of achieving your mission 
while limiting wasted or excessive effort to a minimum.  Personnel resources and the administration effort 
that went into attaining the Canadian Army's reinforcement goals were at times excessive.  As an 
example, No.2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (No.2 CBRG), a main cog in the in the Canadian 
Army personnel replacement process, was militarily effective.  When well supplied and given time to 
establish routine deliveries, it achieved its goal of the timely distribution of personnel to front line units.10  
But it was excessively bureaucratic in its operations, hurting its level of efficiency.   
 The five No.2 CBRG reinforcement battalions supplying the units at the front were holding units, 
beset by the administrative processes of receiving, holding and dispatching soldiers, all of which took 
time.  The training skills of soldiers held in these battalions eroded the longer they stayed.  The total 
administrative moves of a replacement soldier from his arrival at a 21st Army Group reception camp in 
                                                          
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.2 CBRG, 03/44 – 02/46.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 630-631.  The reinforcement battalion itself was an administrative holding organization for reinforcements, 
rather than an army battalion trained in a specific trade or mission.  It would consist usually of several hundred transient 
personnel, controlled and administered by a permanent battalion command structure.  
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NWE to his regiment consisted of seven changes between organizations, two stops of which were within 
No.2 CBRG.   
 It would have been more efficient if each No.2 CMBG battalion was specialized for a certain 
trade and their number reduced, with excess replacements kept nearby in large camp environments where 
combat skills could be maintained.  Also, the number of administrative moves needed to be reduced.  This 
is exactly what occurred in late 1944, as the First Canadian Army's personnel reinforcement system was 
re-organized to focus more on quickly supplying more infantry replacements to regiments.11  But during 
the summer and fall of 1944, needless administration consumed extra clerical personnel, time and 
resources in order to keep new personnel reaching units on a routine schedule. 
 The organization carrying out the heavy armoured fighting vehicle delivery role during the 
summer of 1944 could also have been more efficient.  Operations within the 25th Canadian Armoured 
Delivery Regiment (25th CADR) were complicated and overly administrative.  Its squadrons duplicated 
the mechanical and kit inspection process on armoured vehicles at each stop in the delivery process until a 
vehicle joined a unit.12  Upon this vehicle reaching the front, it was then re-checked over a final time by 
the soldiers operating it.  The duplication involved in this bureaucratic system was needless.  Again, once 
the machine was rolling and well supplied with vehicles, large numbers of them reached regiments on a 
regular basis.   
 As these two examples relate, the CAO had an extensive administrative component within its 
personnel and equipment replacement processes.  Once these processes were established and well 
supplied, they could achieve their main goals in a satisfactory manner.  But they were not the most 
streamlined organizations in the category of corporate efficiency. 
                                                          
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of personnel replacement and releases.  File 
215C1.045 (D12).  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 630-632. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of AFV A Vehicle Recovery, Repair and 
Replacement.  File 215C1.045 (D12).  John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 1944-45: 
Formation Organization, Staff Technique and Administration, (Lower Sackville, NS: The Regimental Historian, 1996), 93.   
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 Was there a distinct administrative mentality within the CAO that focussed on maintaining the 
strength of its combat arms units while they were deployed at the front?  The approach of the Canadian 
Army to the replacement of personnel and equipment was similar to those in the British and U.S. armies.  
As was the case in these armies, sophisticated and bureaucratic systems were present to see that 
reinforcements and new equipment reached units in the field.  In the years 1939 to 1943, the CAO was 
not committed to combat apart from two short-lived operations in late 1941 and mid 1942.  This non-
operational period led to the establishment of an extensive administrative and training base in England.  
Administrative structures and systems increased in size and sophistication within what amounted to a 
nearly peace time training environment.13   
 While the Canadian Army took on a major combat role in Italy during the years 1943-1944, it did 
so with a limited expeditionary force.  This consisted initially of one infantry division and one 
independent armoured brigade.  Due to the limited number of Canadian formations being deployed in 
comparison to the U.S. and British forces, specialized attention could be given to their personnel and 
equipment replacement needs.  This force eventually grew to a complete corps of two divisions and one 
independent brigade, but its losses were still manageable due to breaks in operations.  After gaining 
experience in Sicily and Italy utilizing existing repair and reinforcement processes already present in the 
British Army, the systems in place for the D-Day landings and beyond in NWE were effective and battle-
tested.   
 The battlefield doctrine of the Canadian Army reflected a focus on the use of equipment and 
firepower versus the expenditure of human capital in order to attain combat objectives.  The massed use 
of equipment resources in its operations was intended to save lives, while at the same time causing 
                                                          
13 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657-662.  Appendix F.  Within the Normandy beachhead by August 1944 two 
specialized reinforcement organizations were present: The No.2  Canadian Base Reinforcement Group, with five replacement 
battalions, existed for replacing personnel.  The 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment, with  four squadrons, existed for 
replacing heavy armoured vehicles. 
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extreme attrition to occur within the ranks of the enemy.14  This was a “compassionate attritionist” 
approach, intended to preserve Canadian strength while consistently whittling away at the strength of the 
enemy.  Due to the limited number of Canadian formations engaged in battle, deployed front-line 
divisions were lavishly equipped with a complete establishment of the latest weapons and equipment in 
the Commonwealth arsenal.  Losses in these inventories were rapidly made good.  This allowed these 
formations to fully utilize a large percentage of their weapons systems on an ongoing basis, continually 
hammering away at the enemy with a focus on his continued attrition. 
 It also should be mentioned that while Canada had suffered severe personnel losses at Hong Kong 
in late 1941 and Dieppe in 1942, it never endured the kind of military disaster that befell certain German 
armies on the Eastern Front during 1941-1945.  The possibility that a unit would be completely destroyed 
was an eventuality the CAO was extremely resistant to ever accept.  The reality of total war, practiced on 
a grand scale by nations literally fighting for their military survival, was not a challenge that faced the 
Canadian military in NWE.  It was never involved in a desperate, do or die struggle with a superior foe 
during the last year of the war.  The Normandy lodgement, as an example, was never in serious danger of 
liquidation past June 1944.  Personnel and equipment challenges could be administratively managed, and 
no disastrous event equivalent to the German debacle at Stalingrad upset the orderly management of the 
war in NWE.  Also, the increasing military dominance of the Allies on the Western Front post Normandy 
from September 1944 onward allowed a situation where battalion sized units could be withdrawn into 
reserve for training , rest or partial reconstitution.  This rotation was completed on a relaxed schedule as 
determined by 2nd Canadian Corps or First Canadian Army headquarters.   
 The situation was radically different within the German armies.  The process of constantly 
reinforcing a division in the field was not always seen as the most efficient way to maintain a field army's 
military strength.  Often German units would be allowed to be annihilated by attrition before they would 
                                                          
14 Angleo Caravaggio, "The Human Dimension of Compromised Command: Major General George Kitching and the 4th 
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be withdrawn for a program of total reconstitution.  National honour or unit history never prevented 
certain German formations from being completely destroyed on occasion.  Their place would be taken by 
a fresh unit that had been raised recently with new personnel and equipment.  Due to a lack of 
reinforcement, German formations were often perceived within their corps headquarters as employable 
tools with a temporary value.  This led to their ruthless combat employment by higher command with 
little regard for their welfare or status. 15 
 This study will also examine the conditions which led to the fall 1944 Conscription Crisis which 
placed significant political pressures of the War Committee of Prime Minister Mackenzie King.  This 
political crisis stemmed from a shortage of available trained infantry, and led to a November 1944 
decision to employ home defence conscripts overseas.  Prior to this during a sixty-day period in August 
and September 1944, serious personnel deficiencies existed in Canadian infantry regiments due to a 
limited supply of reinforcements.  It will be shown that this brief shortage was the result of poor planning 
for the high-intensity operations in Normandy and in the Low Countries.  Casualty projection planning at 
the Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London was influenced by the Eighth British Army’s 
recorded casualties by army trade in North Africa during 1941-1943.  Compared to combat in NWE, the 
warfare in the desert was much more fluid, with the possibility of a logistic and infantry unit suffering 
similar casualties from wide-ranging German battle groups.16  As a result, the mass of North African 
Commonwealth casualties were not borne exclusively by the infantry in this mobile armoured warfare 
theatre.  This led Canadian planners to calculate lower levels of infantry replacements than would actually 
be required to maintain 100 percent unit strengths during 1944-1945.  Low casualties estimates were also 
perceived very favourably from a Canadian Government political standpoint.  Conscription was to be 
avoided at all costs, but the manpower limits to an all volunteer force overseas were rapidly being reached 
by 1943.   
                                                          
15 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness 
(Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz.  2000), 389.  The German Panzer Lehr Panzer Division suffered nearly 7,411 casualties in 
Normandy out of a 1 June 1944 strength of 14,699.  These casualties effectively destroyed the infantry component of this elite 
division.  The division was withdrawn to be rebuilt in the fall of 1944. 
16 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army.  1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Ltd.  1956), 89-90. 
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 The number of primary documents researched to produce this study were extensive.  These 
documents included daily and weekly returns within the First Canadian Army Adjutant and Quartermaster 
(A & Q) war diaries tracked the flow of new human and major weapon system resources.  Within First 
Canadian Army headquarters there were constant returns regarding operational vehicles, vehicles under 
repair, personnel strengths and casualties.  Using these reports, it is possible to track personnel and 
material losses and their replacement, and measure the fighting strength of Canadian units at any given 
time.  There were also organizations within 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps in NWE that were specifically 
tasked with delivering new ordnance to the field units.17  Given the value of the assets they were signing 
for, be it a Sherman Firefly tank or 25-Pounder artillery piece, accurate records were needed for this 
important job.  Tanks, anti-tank guns and tracked carriers were examples of items of equipment that 
suffered the highest rates of wastage due to their vulnerability to direct enemy fire.  While personnel 
replacement was an all-Canadian affair, the material to equip the British and Canadian armies came from 
the same common stocks.  These stocks consisted of British produced or U.S. Lend-Lease war material.  
Depots of this equipment were located in the U.K or in liberated France.  Very few Canadian Army heavy 
weapons were actually produced within Canada and then shipped overseas.  All major land weapons 
systems, from artillery pieces to tanks, were found within these common stocks and used to issue 
replacements to the Commonwealth land forces.  
 Reviewing the current body of military history on the last year of fighting on Western Front, few 
military historians mention reinforcements and fewer still focus on the topic.  This study expands on the 
author’s 2005 University of New Brunswick MA thesis “The Defeat and Attrition of the 12th SS Panzer 
Division "Hitlerjugend": A Case Study June 6th - July 12th, 1944”.  By shifting focus to the other side of 
the lines, it examines corresponding levels of Canadian losses, re-equipment, reinforcement and monthly 
strength returns.18  In reviewing newer additions to the historiography of the 1944 Normandy Campaign, 
                                                          
17 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,276.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary October 1943-December 
1944.  This forward delivery squadron was tasked with bringing up new or repaired armoured vehicles to their units at the front.  
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the only two works that come near the research subject of this study are devoted to German forces.  
Hungarian author Norbert Szamverber’s Waffen SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS-
Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 12 Normandy 1944 is a very detailed work on one of 
the Canadian Army’s most effective battlefield opponents.19  This analytical unit history covers personnel 
and equipment strengths, major actions, reinforcements and details the fate of all German personnel and 
AFVs within this unit over a specific time frame.  Niklas Zetterling’s Normandy 1944: German Military 
Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness traces German divisional strengths, 
losses, their personnel and equipment reinforcements and their status at the end of the campaign.20  This 
highly detailed work illustrates how effectively German units were resupplied, the rate of attrition they 
suffered and what their combat power was at important stages of the campaign.   
 Have recent works in Canadian military history acknowledged the military importance of the 
ability of the Canadian Army to replenish itself in the face of severe losses?  Study of the Canadian Army 
in NWE 1944-1945 over the last twenty years has instead focused on the operational record, with research 
adding significantly to the historical narrative of key events and personalities.  Beginning in the 1990s, 
historians Mark Zuehlke, John English, Terry Copp, Brian Reid and others chronicled the Canadian 
Army’s fight from the Normandy beaches that culminated in northern Germany and the Netherlands in 
May 1945.21  Popular histories, academic studies and biographies of leading commanders have presented 
new detail and have offered new historical conclusions.  Many of these studies have focused on a 
particular campaign, the grand narrative and operational performance.  While not being totally ignored, 
the logistical and personnel infrastructure that enabled victory has not received the same level of 
attention.   
                                                          
19 Norbert Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager 
Abteilung 12 Normandy 1944 based on their original War Diaries (Solihull, England: Helion and Company.  2012).  
20 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944.   
21 Bryan Reid, No Holding Back: Operation Totalize Normandy August 1944 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio.  2004).  This is a 
very widely acclaimed and detailed account of the August 1944 Canadian-led operation, and a good example of excellent 
research. 
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 How important was reinforcement, equipment replacement and unit strength to the Canadian 
Army’s battlefield performance?  An investigation into this question would be very enlightening given 
contrasting views with respect to Canadian military effectiveness.  Second World War military historians 
find themselves on opposite sides of the debate on whether numerical and resource superiority won the 
war, rather than Allied strategic or tactical acumen.  With regard to the Canadian performance in the 
pivotal Normandy Campaign, proponents of Canadian tactical strengths include authors Marc Milner and 
Terry Copp, while the critics include John English and Russell Hart.22  Some feel that the Allies’ ability to 
supply reinforcements and replace materiel strength gave it a vital edge in NWE, while others feel that 
there were challenges that hampered operational performance.  There are also those who ignore unit 
personnel and equipment strengths altogether, considering it as a given that all units were completely up 
to strength.23 
 Evaluating the broader historiography of the Allied campaign in NWE 1944-1945, a unified 
academic consensus has not emerged.  The topics of Allied material strength and the tactical prowess of 
each side divide the military history community.  The immediate post-war school of thought put forward 
by authors such as Charles Stacey and Chester Wilmot argued that the German land forces suffered 
seriously from attrition to the point that their ability to form a strong, cohesive front collapsed.24  These 
early works supported a viewpoint that the force of overwhelming Allied numerical and material 
superiority attained victory.  This thesis has not lost steam over the years, and authors such as Russell 
Hart have become even more critical of Allied combat proficiency, observing that German units were 
very effective defensively.25  In contrast, a recent revisionist movement led by authors such as Terry Copp 
and Marc Milner make viable arguments that Allied forces actually were tactically proficient against the 
                                                          
22 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire (Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  2003).  John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy 
Campaign: A Study in the Failure of High Command (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Works.  1991).  Russell Hart, Clash of Arms.  
Marc Milner, Stopping the Panzers (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.  2014). 
23 Bryan Reid, No Holding Back: Operation Totalize Normandy August 1944.  John English, The Canadian Army in the 
Normandy Campaign.  Despite the detail of Reid’s work, unit strengths and equipment totals rarely enters the discussion.  
English rarely discusses unit strengths and the role logistics and administration plays within military operations.   
24 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign.  Chester Wilmot, Struggle for Europe (London: Wordsworth Military Library.  1998). 
25 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 374-377.  Discussion of effective German defensive tactics. 
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Germans.26  This is supported by the record of Allied successes in the fall of 1944.  When this factor was 
matched with a superior strategic approach, this school of thought points out that victory was assured.  
Other revisionists such as Peter Mansoor also make the observation that with the exception of elite units, 
German combat formations were largely ineffective in the late war period.27   
 Both of these approaches reach historical conclusions that are valid when certain examples are 
presented.  This study does not aim to disprove either argument.  While not evaluating its operational 
effectiveness, this study illustrates the ability of the Canadian Army to effectively replace equipment and 
personnel losses on a regular basis.  Rapid reinforcement within the Canadian Army created a constant 
state of material and personnel numerical superiority over the enemy.  This practice ensured that a 
maximum number of units were ready for any assigned mission, allowing the Canadian Army to operate 
at the highest level of its capability.  Conversely, it could also exert sheer brute force to overpower 
determined resistance and accept large losses if necessary.  
 The question of whether or not an adequate level of combat efficiency was attained operationally 
by Allied units has its origins in post-war western official histories.  German units were perceived to have 
been superior in performance despite a myriad number of logistical and leadership handicaps.  This myth 
of superiority was accepted post 1945 in the context of the immediate expectation that Western NATO 
powers would be engaging the U.S.S.R. militarily.  Secrets of so-called German successes were thought 
to be necessary to reform military doctrine to fight the massed Soviet formations.  Post-war historians 
such as Basil Liddell Hart were harsh in their assessments of Western Allied formations in combat, 
describing them as sluggish while letting overwhelming firepower do their work for them.28  Their 
academic attitudes suggested a Cold War agenda that endorsed German tactics, as they seemingly had 
been successful against the Soviets.  The Germans were credited with holding back attacking Soviet 
formations for long periods of time before succumbing, and this perception established a historical aura of 
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effectiveness.  This viewpoint neglects the fact that vast amounts of land were lost quickly due to Soviet 
armoured thrusts.  The Canadian Army has been the target of the worst of these harsh assessments of 
Allied forces on the Western Front.  Works by John Ellis and Russell Hart have described Canadian 
command and control methods as inept and clumsy.  They describe Canadian operations repeatedly 
falling prey to German combat effectiveness, defensive strength and flexibility.29 
 In response to these criticisms of the Canadian Army's performance, a revisionist school of 
thought emerged in the 1990s.  Proponents of this school illustrated how the combat power of the 
Germans was exaggerated in post-war literature regarding the 1943-1945 late war period.  Associated 
with the movement to disprove German military efficiency was the theme of dispelling the myth of Allied 
tactical ineptitude.30  Important factors that have been raised by revisionists include the Western Allies’ 
unwillingness to destroy their infantry manpower pool and the technical inferiority of several major 
weapons systems.  To the Allies credit, these obstacles were mitigated while simultaneously successful 
tactics were developed to defeat the German military in detail during 1943-1945.  Newer research has 
shown that the German ground forces were only marginally effective in the late war period.  They were 
incapacitated by ineffective higher command and control, were immobile, employed ineffective weapons 
systems and often lacked the resources to accomplish their missions.  The German war economy could 
not produce enough weapons, equipment or fuel to replace losses and sustain units in the field.  Offensive 
operations that had no chance of success were mounted against superior forces, squandering what 
resources remained for Germany in the late war period.  An example noted in recent research was the 
effects of the German tactic of the immediate counterattack to regain lost ground.31  This commonly 
employed tactic was tremendously self-destructive in the face of overwhelming Allied firepower.  The 
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German ground formations could not cope with the losses, and having no effective replacement system, 
were soon combat ineffective.    
 The topic of reinforcements and unit personnel and equipment strengths has been touched on 
intermittently in Canadian Second World War historiography.  Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns, the 
early Italian campaign 1st Canadian Corps commander, gives a very detailed analysis of manpower use in 
the wartime Canadian Army in Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945.32  As noted earlier, the 
most relevant finding within Burn’s work is that the Canadian Army was planning with casualty figures 
derived from the Eighth British Army’s experiences in North Africa during 1941-1943.  These figures 
influenced the official British Everett casualty rates, which in turn influenced Canadian estimates.33  Until 
this planning error was rectified, shortages in infantrymen were present.  Burns observes there was never 
a shortage of personnel within the nearly all-volunteer CAO in the spring of 1944.  It could have 
theoretically met the demands placed upon it and continued to operate despite casualties.  What it did 
have an issue with was recognizing future personnel demands in vital areas and allocating the proper 
number of trained personnel to be available at certain times.34  In the final six months of the war this was 
goal was accomplished, but during the summer and early fall of 1944, large demands for infantry 
reinforcements could not be instantly serviced.  While infantry units were never ineffective, some were 
forced to operate in a deficit position.  It took time to shift resources, and this was at a period when there 
was no respite from continuous losses.  Burns comes to the conclusion that certain headquarters and 
administrative functions were overmanned and duplicated.  He also suggests new and innovative ways to 
reduce poor management of manpower resources for future wars.    
 The perspective that German formations were more effective than more numerous Allied units 
surfaces in the Canadian Official history of the late war period, The Official History of the Canadian 
Army in the Second World War.  Volume III: The Victory Campaign:  The Operations in North West 
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34 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army,97-98. 
18 
 
Europe 1944-1945.35  Its author, Charles Stacey, asserts that in Normandy the Canadian Army had been 
delayed by a more experienced and efficient German enemy.  While outnumbered, this enemy used its 
meagre resources adequately to delay a victory that Allied arms should have secured sooner.  Allied 
tactical reverses were perceived as examples to support this viewpoint.  Stacey postulates that the weight 
of Allied material superiority and the cost of ongoing attrition wore the Germans down to the point they 
could no longer maintain a cohesive front.36  While noting the shortage of infantry reinforcements in 
1944, Stacey never observes that Canadian units were so weak that they were combat ineffective.  
Stacey's conclusion falls into the Cold War school of thought that Allied victory in the Second World War 
was a result of superior numbers, the application of brute force and limitless resources.  At the time of its 
publication, it was theorized that a Cold War NATO army would have to resist a Soviet onslaught in 
similar circumstances.  
 Denis and Shelagh Whitaker’s Tug of War is an account of the Canadian Army's infantry led 
operations in Belgium and the Netherlands during 1944-1945.37  In recounting Canadian losses, this work 
criticizes the performance of the Canadian chain of command in supplying trained infantry 
reinforcements.  While the calibre of reinforcements is criticized, it is important to note that there is little 
or no mention of infantry platoons or companies being so handicapped prior to offensive actions they 
could not attack.  Scheduled operations were continuously carried out, and there is no observation that 
Canadian offensives in the late war period were ever hindered due to lack of available forces. 
 Martin Van Creveld's study on battlefield operational effectiveness, Fighting Power: German & 
U.S. Army Fighting Performance, 1939-1945, is a detailed examination of the combat records of 
significantly different opposing forces during the Second World War.38  Written shortly after the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War, Van Creveld's work observes that U.S. Army doctrine during the Second 
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World War was often inflexible.  When confronted with challenges that demanded adaptability, it was 
often slow to react, as U.S. challenges in South East Asia had demonstrated. 
 Second World War U.S. Army leadership style as observed by Van Creveld stood in stark 
contrast to that practiced by the land forces of the Third Reich.  He argues that the managerial doctrine-
oriented approach of the U.S. Army was inferior to German Auftragstaktik, a mission command oriented 
approach in which junior commanders were given much more latitude to accomplish higher command's 
intent.  Despite their inferior approach to warfare, Van Creveld concludes that the U.S. military prevailed 
through the application of brute force, utilizing its material dominance in order to achieve victory.  Van 
Creveld argues the Germans, crippled by material shortages and the inflexibility of Adolf Hitler, were 
doomed to defeat despite their higher level of performance with less resources. 
 Containing a thesis very similar to other Cold War works praising German military performance 
while portraying the Allied armies as stumbling monoliths, Van Creveld fails to acknowledge important 
doctrinal failures in the German land forces.  The strength-wasting tactic of the immediate counterattack 
and the weakness of German artillery are ignored by the author as significant failings.  Also not included 
in his discussion is the German inability to consistently and effectively reinforce combat units that had 
suffered significant losses.  While the German practice of Auftragstaktik was very progressive, mission 
command orders could not bring success if an army employed faulty tactical doctrine and could not 
reinforce units in the field.  
 Carlo D’Este's work on the Normandy Campaign, Decision in Normandy, raises many points 
concerning reinforcement and manpower not present within operation histories on the Normandy 
Campaign.39  D'Este's thesis argues that 21st Army Group commander General Bernard Law 
Montgomery's statements on the overall strategic plan for the Normandy Campaign and the assigned 
battlefield roles of the British and Canadian Armies were not accurate.  He asserts that the statements 
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were adapted to fit the outcome of the fighting, and that it was not the intention of the British and 
Canadian armies to tie down significant German forces, allowing the breakout of the U.S. VII Corps to 
occur in late July 1944. 
 D'Este is one of the few military historians of the Normandy Campaign to focus a portion of his 
study to the question of personnel reinforcements.  His fifteenth chapter is devoted to the manpower 
challenges facing the British, Canadian and American armies, and the subsequent chapter raises the point 
that British formations were often cautious in their attacks due to a lack of available reinforcements.  
Another point raised is that the Normandy fighting was largely infantry oriented, with the primary victims 
of the attritional struggle being infantrymen of all armies.  Insight is also given into the manpower 
situation within the British and Canadian armies, and D'Este identifies potentially untapped human 
resources that could have been utilized.40 
 F.W. Perry’s The Commonwealth Armies displays how mobilization occurred and what sort of 
land forces were established for each of the overseas Dominion nations over the course of two world 
wars.41   Perry argues that the creation of a large Canadian military establishment was a slow process, 
only sped up at points by serious British reverses.  In addressing the 1944 issue of shortages in Canadian 
infantry personnel, Perry makes the important point that this was a problem of deployment, rather than an 
actual shortage.42  While the work is far from detailed concerning Canadian militarization, the sheer 
bureaucratic nature of the Canadian military and its political masters is well documented.  The side effects 
of this bureaucratic approach were a series of delays that hindered the ability to quickly train and deploy a 
capable force into a combat theatre.  
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 British author John Ellis in his work Brute Force makes the argument that Western Allied 
superiority in military might was the main reason for Allied victory in 1945.43  Ellis goes on to make his 
case with charts and statistics, depicting a war that was pursued at a leisurely pace due to the dominant 
position of the Allies.  This work goes to great statistical lengths to illustrate the superiority of the Allied 
war machine and the combat power that was concentrated in the 1944-1945 late war period.  Ellis 
observes that personnel reinforcements and replacement equipment was so plentiful that losses inflicted 
by the Germans on the Allies did nothing to change the overall situation.  Furthermore, he argues that the 
time it took from the Normandy invasion until Germany’s collapse nearly a year later was due to the 
plodding nature of the Western Allies.  With the scale of forces deployed, Ellis postulates the war should 
have ended much sooner.  
 Canadian military historian John English's The Canadian Army in Normandy: A Failure in High 
Command endorses Charles Stacey's views on the combat effectiveness of the Canadian Army.44  In this 
work a far more critical approach to the Canadian Army’s record is put forward.  English seeks to expand 
upon the Cold War assessment that Allied armies performed poorly when confronted by German tactical 
supremacy.  English’s thesis states that Canadian tactical defeats in Normandy and the loss of life that 
accompanied them were due to ineptitude within the highest levels of the Canadian Army.   
 For three years prior to the invasion of France, English argues that Canadian units preparing for 
service in NWE trained in a peace-time environment.  He goes further to state that the Canadian high 
command did not properly enforce tactical discipline and failed to adjust to new modern dynamics of war.  
Important matters such as doctrine for combined arms operations involving tanks, artillery, and air power 
were not finalized when the time came to deploy to France.  For example, when 2nd Canadian Corps 
became operational in July 1944, it immediately was plagued by tactical reverses at the hands of the 
Germans who exploited gaps in Canadian training and doctrine.  English states that Canadian 
                                                          
43 John Ellis, Brute Force, 356-357.  An example given are Tables 16-17 on German vs. Allied tanks strengths in Normandy, 
summer 1944.  These illustrate massive Allied superiority 
 44 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign. 
22 
 
commanders lacked the ability to employ armour effectively, took too long to prepare and mishandled the 
forces under their command.45  All of this was not true in the case of their opponents, English implies.  
While very good at summarizing the Canadian Army’s reverses, English gives little insight regarding 
reinforcements and replacing losses.  It would seem that within his account Canadian units were always 
up to strength when beginning operations or never suffered losses that could not be immediately replaced.  
His criticisms cover mainly command decisions regarding training and operational leadership, ignoring 
numerical and resource superiority as a factor.  
 The McGill PhD dissertation of Roman Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the 
Normandy Campaign:  Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout, presents perhaps the 
best analysis of the Canadian armoured battles of the Normandy Campaign.46  Jarymowycz makes the 
argument that while Canadian and British armoured formations had difficulty in exercising offensive 
manoeuvres, this was due to poor use of the armoured assets at hand.  While focusing on the Canadian 
operations, he also supplies important data as to the armoured vehicle strengths within Canadian 
armoured formations.  This data indicates that an effective repair and replacement program was present, 
allowing Canadian units to remain strong in contrast to growing German weakness due to attrition.47  
Jarymowycz’ dissertation is very detailed, but lacks specific information on the actual process of 
reinforcement and replacement. 
 Revisionist authors looking at the combat records of Allied formations on the Western Front have 
discovered that Allied units were often more than a match for their German counterparts.  This is 
illustrated in Kevin Mansoor's The GI Offensive in Europe.  The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 
1941-1945.48  Mansoor makes the important observation that continual reinforcement kept U.S. 
formations effective, and this maintenance was key to U.S. military performance.  The central thesis put 
forward within this work is that in comparing average German infantry divisions to the average American 
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infantry divisions, the American formations were superior.  While U.S. airborne and German Waffen SS 
panzer formations were considered the elite of both armies, it was the average infantry divisions that did 
the majority of the fighting.  As U.S. conscript formations continued to defeat increasingly inferior 
German conscript formations, the tide was irrevocably turned against Germany.  This thesis is applicable 
to Canadian divisions as they remained strong in comparison to decimated third-rate German formations 
in the late war period.  
 Mansoor points out that average conscript U.S. infantry divisions were kept at a high level of 
numerical strength, despite losses from constant operations.49  In contrast, German units fought to 
disintegration, were defeated, and then had to be taken out of the line to be rebuilt.  This was never the 
case with American divisions, as they kept on fighting or were in ready reserve, rebuilding near the front.  
Comprehensive training allowed for the roughest mix of conscript soldiers to become excellent 
infantrymen, a process that was accelerated by combat and the will to survive.  An effective replacement 
system kept U.S. infantry divisions combat capable, and their ability to adapt and use their ample 
resources to maximum effect brought victory.   
 Adding to this argument, British military historian David French's Raising Churchill’s Army: The 
British Army in the Second World War describes the composition of the British Army and reasons behind 
its success in the years 1942-1945.50  It also tackles the topics of technology and British Army doctrinal 
evolution.  It argues that the British made the maximum use of their strengths and did not take dangerous 
risks to make quick gains.  This allowed critics to unjustly accuse them of operating too ponderously.  
French also notes that the British Army of the late war period in NWE was very conscious of infantry 
casualties, understanding that there was no large trained pool of replacements available.51  While the 
Canadian and U.S. Armies were rather fresh going into the 1944 Normandy Campaign, the British Army 
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was reaching it manpower limits and could not afford large losses.  Its tactics soon adapted to the 
unwillingness of commanders to sacrifice men for ground, forcing a reliance on firepower, mechanization 
and innovative strategies. 
 U.S. author Russell Hart is very critical of the Canadian Army’s performance in the Normandy 
Campaign, characterizing Canadian command and control as inept.  Within Clash of Arms: How The 
Allies won in Normandy, he points out Canadian shortcomings in combined arms operations, application 
of force and the use of initiative.  Hart believes these factors combined led to the northern pincer of the 
Allied Falaise encirclement to not close properly in a timely manner, allowing German forces to escape.52  
He also argues poor training and peacetime neglect had limited the abilities of the Canadian Army.  When 
it came time to adapt to the demands of modern mechanized warfare, it failed.  As part of his criticism, 
Hart also identifies shortcomings in Canadian administrative skills.  Mismanagement of personnel 
resources led to a severe shortage of infantry when it was needed most, hampering First Canadian Army 
operations in mid August 1944.  He also points out that the poor management of armoured assets and 
their replacement system led to certain regiments being under strength during critical offensive 
operations.  Conversely, he observes that Canadian combined arms tactics and tactical flexibility 
improved during the late summer of 1944.  While combat efficiency did grow in the Canadian Army, Hart 
states the reinforcement factor hampered it from showing its true potential in Normandy.   
 Terry Copp's Fields of Fire, an analysis of the Canadian Normandy Campaign, contains a thesis 
that contrasts sharply with those critical of the Canadian Army's performance.  Copp argues that the 
record of Allied arms has been underrated, due to the overrating of a German enemy that was repeatedly 
defeated.53  Copp’s analysis of battlefield strategies practiced by Canadian commanders allows new 
insight into Canadian operations.  The artillery based doctrine facilitated by 2nd Canadian Corps 
commander Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds during the Normandy Campaign was very suitable for 
attritional warfare.  Correctly applied, Copp argues this strategy created the conditions that aided in the 
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eventual collapse of the German front.  He also points out that immediate German counter-attacks, 
constantly launched against Canadian operations, were contained by the artillery based doctrine, 
rendering the German offensive tactics ineffective.  The effects of attrition and reduced levels of infantry 
unit strength are acknowledged by Copp, but there is no mention that offensive operations were 
suspended by these shortages54.  He points out that the increasing tempo of the Normandy fighting 
demanded continuous attacks by Canadian infantry and armoured regiments, regardless of losses.  
Detailed appendixes record personnel deficits, but there is never a suggestion that these were crippling 
factors.  
 Though one of the most detailed operational histories of the Canadian Normandy Campaign, 
Bryan Reid's No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944 says very little about 
reinforcements and unit strengths, or how these factors affected battlefield performance.55  Perhaps this 
can be taken as his perception that Canadian units were nearly up to strength at all times and losses were a 
non-issue.  This very detailed account chronicles the challenges and accomplishments of the Canadian 
Army's largest armoured operation of the war.  Detailed unit vehicle holding charts are provided, but all 
with the indication that units were at 100 percent of their establishments.56  The various strengths and 
recorded losses of units involved were significant factors during August 1944, and this missing 
information would add to this account.  Like John English, Reid somewhat ignores unit strengths, losses 
and reinforcements as factors in his narrative. 
 John Buckley's British Armour in Normandy seeks to investigate the Cold War thesis that there 
were serious performance issues within the British Army's Royal Armour Corps during the Normandy 
Campaign.57  Focussing on the topics of armoured doctrine, equipment inadequacies and morale, Buckley 
highlights difficulties in the first two areas that in turn affected morale during the early stages of the 
campaign.  These challenges affected the capability of the British to successfully advance and were 
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55 Bryan Reid, No Holding Back. 
56 Bryan Reid, No Holding Back, 140-141.  Operation "Totalize" armoured columns diagrams. 
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influential factors during the stalemate portions of the fighting in Normandy during early June and July 
1944. 
 In the area of statistics, strength tables and actual British tank losses, comparatively little data is 
presented.  Focus is instead placed on examining the morale, doctrine and technology of the Royal 
Armoured Corps.  Considering the attrition aspect of the campaign and the importance of the number of 
tanks that could be fielded by each side, it is unexpected that records of losses and strength returns do not 
figure more prominently.    
 Buckley comes to the conclusion that when British armoured forces finally adapted to their new 
environment by forming part of the combined arms teams utilized in "bite and hold" tactics, reasonable 
success was achieved.  Buckley notes that all armoured forces in Normandy had trouble advancing in the 
difficult bocage terrain that favoured the defender.  The Germans, forced to abandon a mobile defence by 
Hitler, were forced into a attritional slug-match they could not win when confronted with superior tactics 
that forced them into costly counter attacks. 
 In Terry Copp’s Cinderella Army, the 2006 sequel to Fields of Fire, he reinforces his thesis 
concerning the Canadian Army’s battlefield record in NWE.  He observes that the Canadian Army 
experienced a series of successes and the occasional failure in the period from Normandy until the war's 
conclusion.  This is in contrast to Stacey’s view that after a poor start in Normandy the Canadian Army 
finished the war as very capable in all aspects.  Another important observation Copp makes is that 
Canadian formations suffered a larger amount of casualties than British units, suggesting the combat 
encountered by Canadian units was more intense.  He also points out that Canadian operations were often 
launched with meagre resources to subdue fortified enemy positions, yet still achieved their goals.58  
These two observations further support his final assessment that the Canadian Army was tactically 
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proficient while at the same time shouldering a larger share of difficult operations.  Copp does include in 
his appendixes a detailed chart of infantry manpower shortages within the 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps in 
NWE during 1944-1945.59  Copp’s observation of personnel challenges within the Canadian Army is 
never compounded by mention of any sort of equipment shortages.  While there is never a conclusion on 
whether personnel shortages were an important factor affecting Canadian combat effectiveness, Copp 
does not discount it as a non-issue. 
 Angelo Caravaggio's 2009 Wilfred Laurier University PhD dissertation Commanding the Green 
Centre Line in Normandy: A Case Study of Division Command in the Second World War is a detailed 
study of the battles of the 4th Canadian Armoured Divsion in the Normandy Campaign and the subsequent 
pursuit of the retreating German military across northern France.60  In contrast to many post war accounts 
of the division's 1944 operational record, Caravaggio's thesis argues that effective training prior to its 
deployment to France as well as its first combat operations had a positive impact.  He states that these 
experiences resulted in it developing into one of the most effective Canadian divisions by the fall of 1944.  
Despite a combination of unfortunate battlefield events that led to the dismissal of its commanding officer 
in mid August, the division's new commander and his key subordinates rebounded in spectacular fashion.  
By the end of the Normandy Campaign and during the subsequent pursuit across France, the division is 
depicted as one transformed from an inexperienced formation into a battle-tested force.   
 On the topic of reinforcements and unit strengths, Caravaggio's work does contain detailed 
appendices on unit personnel strengths, but other unit vehicle data is missing.  Also not present is insight 
on how the reinforcement organizations in Normandy supported the division.  However, the work 
importantly details the slow erosion of the infantry regiments with the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
and notes how a lack of reinforcements robbed its three regiments of their effective strength when they 
arguably needed it the most in late August. 
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 In a concluding statement on the Campaign in NWE historiography, the historical discourse 
concerning the causes for Allied victory and German defeat is constantly evolving.  But this evolution is 
toward acrimony, rather than consensus.  Opposing perspectives are becoming only more entrenched, 
with author's appreciations of their nations' military performance often being improved at the expense of 
others.  Sharp contrasts exist between historians who are polar opposites in their historical appreciations 
of military doctrines, tactics, and events.  
 In summary, the main aim of this dissertation is to illustrate the Canadian Army in NWE's ability 
to sustain and reconstitute its combat units in spite of losses.  This ability allowed for the creation of a 
perpetual state of overwhelming offensive capability.  This constant state of strength was indicative of the 
CAO's administrative and logistic military effectiveness.  The appendices found in this study also act as a 
reference.  They encapsulate orders of battle, monthly strength reports and losses and record the flow of 
replacement personnel and equipment.  Conclusions presented give the reader an appreciation of the 
administrative strengths and total combat power of the CAO, and how these factors were influential 
attributes that brought eventual victory. 
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Chapter 2: Canadian Army doctrine in North West Europe 1944-1945: 
Tactical and technological strengths, weaknesses and resulting losses 
 A theoretically perfect army has few difficulties or challenges.  It is tactically flawless in its 
operations, has clear strategic goals, cutting edge technology and is well supplied.  On the battlefield it 
will annihilate the opposing forces quickly and suffer negligible losses.  The closest real example of this 
hypothetically perfect army was the U.S. led coalition forces that liberated Kuwait and invaded parts of 
Iraq in 1991.1  This force was perfectly equipped for warfare in a desert environment, had numerical 
superiority over the enemy, plentiful resources and technological advantages.  It was competently led by 
experienced officers and supported by superb staff and logistic systems.  Satellite imagery provided 
reliable intelligence on all Iraqis positions and movements.  The ground campaign started after a lengthy 
air campaign that destroyed or reduced Iraqis fortifications, achieved air superiority and provided 
powerful tactical air support on call.  Coalition ground forces went on to execute manoeuvre warfare, 
capturing or destroying all enemy forces that opposed them in a very short period of time, without a 
single reverse.  
  Any army that is not as overwhelmingly superior to its enemy as the U.S. led coalition in 1991 
was will face challenges.  Exposure to a similar enemy force and its weapons technology will result in 
losses in personnel and equipment.  This was the case for the Canadian Army in its campaign in North 
West Europe (NWE).  Although it had significant strengths that allowed it to methodically defeat the 
German ground forces, it also possessed weaknesses.  It was these weaknesses that German forces 
exploited to cause the majority of Canadian material and personnel losses.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the Canadian Army during operations, and explain when 
and how the majority of Canadian personnel casualties and equipment losses occurred.  By describing 
Canadian artillery, armour and infantry tactics and those of combined arms teams including ground 
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support aircraft, the reader will comprehend how Canadian units fought in NWE and what challenges 
were present. 
 The majority of Canadian personnel casualties in NWE were borne by the infantry, it being 
dismounted and exposed to direct and indirect fire.  This chapter will also explore why infantry casualty 
rates were so high in comparison to other combat arms, such as the artillery, and why little could be done 
to mitigate this problem.2  Ground combat in Normandy extracted such a toll on the Canadian infantry 
that total Canadian Army other ranks (non-officer) infantry deficiencies by 27 August 1944 totalled 
3,125.  This figure was the equivalent to twenty-five 125-personnel strong infantry companies.  This was 
also after the regiments in question had received reinforcements throughout June, July and August 1944. 3   
Losses were so rapid that during the second half of Normandy Campaign there was a lack of readily 
available trained infantry replacements.  This was largely due to poor planning and the main 
reinforcement bases being in the United Kingdom (U.K.). 
 During the summer of 1944, the Canadian Army fought arguably the strongest German 
formations available.  The resulting losses at the unit level were at times catastrophic.  After Normandy, 
the German forces were never again so consistently strong.  The fall of 1944 and spring 1945 saw the 
Canadian Army facing a primarily defensive infantry opponent, short of armour and devoid of continuous 
artillery and air support.  The Germans could launch limited counter-attacks, but they did not deploy 
enough resources or have a strategic plan to conduct large scale offensive operations against the Anglo-
Canadian front after August 1944.  The Allies held the initiative and could choose when and where to 
attack, fighting the war at their own pace.   
 The First Canadian Army was the last of the great British imperial armies.  British and Canadian 
organization, doctrine and equipment were intended to be identical.  This was further enhanced by 
Canadian units being totally equipped with British and American war material.  Canadian officers were 
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also influenced by being under British corps command during operations in Sicily and in Italy during 
1943-1944.4  Prior to the invasion of France in June 1944, the divisions of the 2nd Canadian Corps had 
conducted intensive training during the spring.  These exercises were supervised by the 21st Army Group 
commander, British General Bernard Montgomery.  As part of his role as commander, he sought to 
ensure that the proper steps in Canadian Army doctrinal evolution took place.  This training sought to 
implement within Canadian corps, divisional and brigade headquarters staffs the current British method of 
warfare.  During this period he developed capable Canadian officers and culled those he found lacking.  
He was very influential in developing the most promising officers, 2nd Canadian Corps commander 
Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds being the foremost example.  
 The Eighth British Army in North Africa during the period 1941-1942 was defeated repeatedly by 
the German Afrika Korps.  These reverses were critical in fostering the conditions that allowed for its 
evolution.  Resulting changes in doctrine and the arrival of General Montgomery turned the Eighth British 
Army into a different organization.  It was these doctrinal changes that allowed future Anglo-Canadian 
armies to defeat the German Army in NWE.  Canadian doctrine on U.K. training grounds in the spring of 
1944 was correspondingly transitional.  New operational methods that stemmed from the 1943 successes 
in North Africa were implemented as Canadian training mirrored British.  The most influential change 
that occurred was the re-emergence of the supremacy of concentrated artillery as an operational 
instrument.  Following the British defeat in France in 1940, a de-centralization of artillery command and 
control had occurred.  This resulted in an increased allotment of artillery at the division and brigade level 
during 1940-1941.  This allowed more artillery to be available to divisional and brigade commanders 
during a fluid, mobile battle, similar to the German model.  British failures in North Africa showed that 
this dilution of artillery force made it a non-unified organization whose power could not be massed for a 
serious blow against enemy attacks or defensive positions.5 
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 This battlefield reality led to an urgent re-organization of the British Royal Regiment of Artillery, 
commonly known as the Royal Artillery (RA).  This parent organization encompassed all British Army 
artillery regiments.  Command structures such as Divisional Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) and 
Corps Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) were reintroduced, and tactical groupings such as the 
corps level Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) were re-formed.  Sophisticated communication nets and 
synchronized tactics were developed that were superior to anything fielded by the German Army, and 
were amazingly destructive.6  This led to the concentrated use in late 1942 of the devastating 25-Pounder 
and other British artillery pieces to destroy German counter attacks and reduce their defensive positions.  
In a departure from the tank-dominated tactics of 1941-1942 that often led to failure in the desert war, 
concentrated artillery began to be perceived by the British as essential to all operations.7  This included 
the use of anti-tank weapons and all armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) which came under the artillery 
arm.  If manoeuvring German armour could be dashed against these gun lines, their strength could be 
whittled away to nothing.  German defensive positions would then be reduced by methodical and 
concentrated artillery fire, allowing the infantry and supporting armour to invest them.   
 These reforms were mirrored within the Canadian Army's Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery 
(RCA).  In 1944 U.K. training exercises, an attacking Canadian division or brigade eschewed any surprise 
manoeuvres utilizing infantry or armour.  Their operational planning corresponded to strict timetables that 
were supplied by the divisional or corps RCA fire plan.  2nd Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant 
General Guy Simonds was himself an artillery officer, and often worked out the major features of 
operational plans in the solitary workspace of his command caravan.  This allowed him to focus on 
artillery and aerial bombardment as factors on which large operational plans often revolved.8  As shown 
in Figure 2.1, Anglo-Canadian artillery-supported operations were extremely sophisticated, well-planned 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Regiments, the 68th Medium Regiment, RA and the 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA.  This was a tremendous amount of indirect 
firepower. 
6 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 123-124. 
7 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 126. 
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,712.  2nd Canadian Corps General Staff War Diary August 1944.  T-1866.  Operation “Totalize” Air 
Programme.  The operational phases (I and II) and “Totalize” were anchored around massed four engined bomber attacks.  
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and tied to a strict time-table.  In this figure the barrage fire plan for February 1945’s Operation 
“Veritable” is illustrated.  Each line is a measurement of how far the barrage would lift and move forward 
after a timed interval.  
Figure 2.1 Operation "Veritable" 8 February 1945, 30th British Corps RA/RCA artillery barrage 
fire plan map trace, supporting a three-division attack east into the Rhineland9 
 
 Canadian artillery-centered operational planning was dependent on British weight being added in 
the way of heavier British medium RA regiments.  In Normandy the First Canadian Army had at its 
disposal three medium (5.5-Inch) artillery regiments grouped in the 2nd Canadian Army Group Royal 
Artillery (AGRA).  If more force was required, British assets would have to be brought in.  This is not to 
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say the 25-Pounder divisional field regiments were inadequate, but larger assets and more of them would 
certainly increase the odds of success.10   
 After August 1944, the lack of German artillery counter-battery capability paired with ineffective 
German Luftwaffe (German air force) ground attack assets allowed RCA artillery units to operate with 
impunity.  The ability of the enemy to attack and destroy their positions was drastically reduced.  Given 
their location on the battlefield, artillery units were rarely the target for mortar fire in the way infantry 
units were.  Properly deployed and with their fire adjusted, RCA medium and field artillery regiments 
could pound away at enemy positions with very little threat to themselves.  This allowed for an excellent 
ratio of damage done to the enemy versus casualties suffered by these units.11  During April 1945, the 1st 
Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA), suffered ten battle (related to enemy action) 
and ten non-battle (non-battle related injuries) casualties.  These were a very small number of losses 
considering the ferocious bombardments this unit unleashed on the enemy.  German forces were simply 
reduced to digging in deeper, as there was no other defence against the devastating and continuous 
artillery strikes.12  
 Due to its effective battlefield performance, Canadian views on the employment of massed 
artillery mirrored that of the British.  Employment of RCA artillery assets was perceived by Canadian 
leadership as the essential building block of any feasible operational plan in NWE.  This combat arm was 
the most effective tool to attain results while keeping casualties to a minimum.  It could simultaneously 
destroy enemy fortifications and impede all observed battlefield movement within the combat zone.  Its 
flexibility, speed and power enabled infantry, anti-tank and armoured units to gain their objectives and 
hold them against enemy counterattack.13  The employment of “Uncle”,” Victor”, “Yoke” and “Mike” fire 
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plan tactics could coordinate increasing levels of massed firepower for a single purpose in a very short 
amount of time.14   
 While the RCA field artillery regiments were equipped with superb weapons that were very 
effective, this state of affairs did not necessarily extend to the Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) and 
Canadian Infantry Corps (CIC).  While it would have been advantageous for the Canadian Army 
Overseas (CAO) to have increased allotments of a certain types of vehicles or weapons systems, or more 
effective variants, it had limited ability to influence these matters.  The British Army was largely in 
control of what and how much the First Canadian Army received in NWE, and the 21st Army Group had 
strict regulations on what was to be contained in the establishment of each type of combat arms regiment.  
The British argument for this was that uniformity in unit establishment was essential to the proper 
reinforcement of personnel and the maintenance of equipment inventories.  While the minute details of 
these unit establishments were modified virtually on a monthly basis, general orders enforced these 
changes on all units of the same type within the 21st Army Group.  An example of the enforcement of 
these regulations was the rapid re-organization of arriving Canadian formations from Italy in 1945 to 
conform with the standards in effect.15  
 Commonwealth nations such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia were extremely dependent 
on the arsenal of U.K. for some of their most advanced weapons systems.16  There were exceptions of 
course, such as the Canadian-produced Sexton 25-Pounder self-propelled artillery piece, but for the most 
part their vehicles and weapons were British or U.S lend lease in origin.  While it was very desirable to 
have more Wasp II flame thrower carriers, Ram armoured personnel carriers and more advanced small 
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arms, the availability of these items was limited.  While Canadian units most certainly wanted better 
technology and more of it, so did every other Commonwealth army.   
 The Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) had significantly more battlefield challenges than the 
artillery.  The German Army was very experienced in dealing with massed armoured attacks due to its 
experiences in Russia 1941-1944.  As evidenced in reverses such as the 6th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment’s failed attack on Le Mesnil-Patry, Normandy, on 11 June 1944, Canadian armour faced 
difficulties when assaulting prepared German defences.17  This is not to say they did not carry out assaults 
in a determined manner.  Up to the closure of the Falaise Gap on 21 August 1944, Canadian armoured 
regiments led fifteen major attacks.  Some were executed successfully when combined arms tactics were 
utilized and infantry, anti-tank, artillery and air assets were present.  But when Canadian armour took a 
more forward or independent role, it often suffered severe losses due to enemy anti-tank gun fire.18  This 
issue was especially prominent during the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment’s attempt to capture 
Carpiquet Airfield and the outskirts of Caen on 7 June 1944.  In this case the temporary loss of artillery 
support significantly contributed to armour’s challenges during the mobile tank battle.19  This was not an 
exclusively Canadian problem, and strong anti-tank defences posed a serious problem for German, U.S. 
and British armoured forces in Normandy and beyond.  Due to these challenges, the scope of Canadian 
armoured objectives in late summer 1944 was limited by the range of the guns and the infantry’s ability to 
keep up.  To go beyond the limitations of the First Canadian Army's artillery-based doctrine would risk 
disaster.   
 During the later stages of August 1944's Operations “Totalize” and “Tractable”, the armoured 
regiments of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade were asked to manoeuvre rapidly in a fluid situation that 
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demanded aggression and initiative from all squadron commanders.20  What occurred were operations that 
were temporarily blocked by weak German armoured forces and held up by traffic jams.  The 
performance of the brigade was lacklustre due to a large number of officer casualties and the effect of 
inexperience.  During Operation "Totalize" fighting near Rocquancourt-Cintheaux on 9 August 1944, a 
number of 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment command tanks were destroyed.  The loss of a Squadron 
commander and two troop leaders at the forefront of the battle significantly influenced effective command 
and control.21  This newly deployed formation was fighting its first battles in August 1944 at the vanguard 
of the First Canadian Army's' advance.  What was needed to take on this role was an abundance of 
experienced armoured regiments, not ones carrying out their first operations.22   
 Without intimate artillery and infantry support, Canadian tanks were vulnerable to all forms of 
anti-tank weapons.  Canadian Sherman 75mm and 17-Pounder Firefly variants were very susceptible to 
high-velocity German armour piercing anti-tank rounds.  The Sherman’s armoured plate was not angled 
enough, not hardened enough and not thick enough in the frontal areas of the tank.  Operational research 
reports found it took on average 1.63 hits to destroy or knock out a Sherman, and 91.2 percent of 
Shermans that had gasoline engines quickly burned out.23  German fire hitting the internal hull shell racks 
caused explosions that were catastrophic.  Also, the Sherman’s profile was too high and it lacked a 360 
degree episcope cupola for the commander to see out of in battle without exposing his head.24   
 The great majority of casualties for the armoured crews occurred on the assault or in fending off 
German counter attacks.  When not engaged in offensive operations, armoured squadrons were placed in 
defensive positions or in leaguer, an administrative grouping for refueling, maintenance and re-arming.  
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Few losses occurred during this administrative tactical grouping.  Due to the ability of the crew to use the 
tank as protection, losses from all forms of indirect fire were light.25  If the tank was hit during combat, 
CAC crews developed the ability to bail out quickly under fire and shelter behind the burning hulk.  Out 
of a crew of five, this quick exit technique allowed for only one to two casualties per Sherman destroyed.  
Despite losing fifty-one Shermans during the attack on Le Mesnil-Patry on 11 June 1944, the 6th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment lost only eighty personnel as casualties.26  Given the total crew strength of the 
knocked out tanks numbered 255 potential casualties, the results could have been more severe.  In 
response to the weakness of their tank's armour, crews began to weld on extra track links to up armour 
their tanks.27  If a firefight broke out, commanders would often be very cautious due to the German ability 
to destroy a Sherman with one round.  This led to a preference for overwatch or ambush tactics rather 
than an advance to contact, with superior numbers of Shermans arranged to effectively smother a German 
armoured counter thrust against a newly-acquired objective.28  
 The ability of the Canadian Army in the summer 1944 to field only one Sherman Firefly per four 
or three tank troop due to supply shortages was a major problem.  The 17-Pounder Firefly tank cannon 
was the only armament that had the penetration power to destroy a German Tiger or Panther tank at 
medium range.  It could also destroy a German Panzer IV or Sturmgeschütz III (self-propelled assault 
gun) easily at long range.  However, the Firefly also had some negative attributes.  It had excessive fuel 
consumption, engine issues and main gun misfires.  The lack of an effective flash suppressor or smokeless 
power led to large muzzle flashes when firing, blinding the gunner as to the location of fall of shot.  This 
made correction difficult, and this could be fatal in a tank firefight.  It also initially did not fire high 
explosive shells, only armoured-piercing anti-tank.  This made it near useless in reducing enemy infantry 
positions.  Despite these limitations, the other tanks in the troop depended on the Firefly for success in 
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9 June 1944, all operational tanks were involved in defensive tasks, and successfully inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.  
One Sherman 17-Pounder Firefly knocked out five German Panther tanks. 
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long range firefights with Sturmgeschütz or panzers, as the short barrelled 75mm gunned Sherman was 
not as effective.29   
 Offensive armoured operations in the summer of 1944 could be delayed or halted by the 
Germans’ skillful anti-tank defense and devastating counter attacks.  The apparent inability of Canadian 
armour to decisively attack and destroy German armour and anti-tank guns has led some prominent 
Canadian military historians, such as John English, to label the CAC as the weakest of the Canadian 
combat arms.30  This is an exaggeration, but this impression was fuelled by a battlefield doctrine that did 
not place large numbers of tanks in the vanguard of the attack.  Secondly, the technical inferiority of 
Allied tanks when compared to their German counterparts inhibited offensive tactics and forced a reliance 
on infantry and artillery support in certain tactical situations.31   
 As of May 1944, the Canadian Army had not fought a major armoured engagement in open 
country or desert terrain, where the advantages of long distance tank gunnery could be utilized to their 
maximum.  While Canadians had fought in Sicily and Italy, the nature of the terrain and the defensive 
advantages it brought the defender had forced armoured units to insist upon artillery and infantry support.  
Fluid armoured operations over large distances were a rarity for the Canadian Army in this theatre.  What 
combat experience was gained remained in Italy, as none of the 1st Canadian Corps armoured units fought 
in Normandy.  As a result, by spring 1944 Canadian armoured regiments in the U.K. had exactly no 
combat experience advancing as the offensive vanguard.  When this was attempted in Normandy, German 
                                                          
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213.  6th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12657.  9 June 1944 entry.  The 
most successful tank commander for the 1st Hussars (5 kills) on 9 June 1944, commanded a Firefly.  He was 26-year old 
Lieutenant Gordon Henry.  Marc Milner, Stopping the Panzers (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.), 92-294. 
30 John  English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 312. 
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anti-tank fire incurred large casualties on Canadian armoured squadrons equipped with inferior 
technology.32   
 The logical solution to this challenge was the fielding of combined-arms teams of armour, 
infantry and anti-tank forces, superbly supported by artillery and air assets.  These infantry-led groupings 
would be used to capture limited objectives, never outstripping supporting indirect assets or the ability of 
reserves to join the battle.  These tactics were more polished post Normandy, and when all elements were 
adequately represented a very high chance of success was present.  Later actions near Bergen Op Zoom, 
the Netherlands and Louisendorf, Germany in 1944-1945 are examples of successful combined arms 
tactics involving armour.  In Figure 2.2, the advance to contact formation for the 10th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment while supporting the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade during operations in the Rhineland is 
illustrated.  In one of the last tank battles of the war for the Canadian Army, significant numbers of 
counter-attacking German tanks and self-propelled guns of the German Panzer Lehr panzer division were 
destroyed near Louisendorf, Germany, during 19-20 February 1945.  In this action the Canadian 
combined arms task force seized its objective and then defeated repeated German counter-attacks33 
 While the two main supporting arms of artillery and armour could significantly influence the 
battle, its ultimate outcome depended on the infantry.  Canadian infantry forces were intimately involved 
in all aspects of capturing and holding ground during the fighting in NWE.  Allied success in offensive 
operations during 1944 was often achieved through overwhelming force.  However, the more personnel a 
commander employed in a given area, the higher the probability of casualties existed.  Canadian infantry 
actions in Normandy and beyond were often characterized by leadership utilizing minimum infantry force 
against enemy units deployed in depth.  Increased artillery firepower was seen as the solution to make up 
for the lack of infantry numbers and to reduce casualties.  Rather than a whole brigade attacking with 
numerical superiority of at least 3:1, a single infantry battalion would be used to take an objective, often  
                                                          
32LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213.  6th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12657.  11 June 1944 entry.  Large 
tank losses were suffered by the 1st Hussar “B” Squadron in the 11 June 1944 attack on Le Mesnil-Paltry, France. 
33 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 487-489 
41 
 
Figure 2.2: Fort Garry Horse (10th Canadian Armoured Regiment) two-squadron combined arms 
tactics with infantry, Louisendorf, Germany 194534 
 
held by a complete enemy battalion.  This attack would usually be made with two companies up front and 
two to the rear.  The battalion heavy weapons would be held ready should an enemy armoured or infantry 
counter attack appear.  As of October,1944, the support company of an infantry battalion was seven 
officers and 184 other ranks, and an individual infantry company comprised of five officers and 120 other 
                                                          
34 Fort Garry Horse, Vanguard:  The Fort Garry Horse in the Second World War (Doetinchem, the Netherlands: Regimental 
Association History.  1945).  
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ranks.  With only two companies up front, the actual attacking group to first make contact was not the full 
weight of the 850 strong battalion, only 18 percent.35   
 The tactic of the direct-fire “firebase”, a firm part of Canadian Army doctrine today, was often 
not utilized.  Tanks concentrated at a right angle to the infantry assault could use combined firepower to 
suppress the enemy, but circumstances often hampered this tactic.  Poor coordination, tank obstacles, 
effective German anti-tank fire, smoke from artillery fire or other factors conspired to inhibit the 
effectiveness of the firebase.  Regardless if the tanks were intimately involved, an artillery rolling barrage 
would commence at the attack, matched with concentrations on or near the objective.  The rolling barrage 
would lift and move forward at a set pace per minute towards the enemy lines.  Once the artillery fire 
commenced, the infantry, supported by armour and anti-tank assets further back, would begin to move.  
The idea was that the infantry would closely follow the barrage, just as in the First World War, and be in 
the enemy trench lines before they could react.   
 The battlefield could be very challenging for Canadian infantry if it was not part of a combined 
arms team.  Canadian tactics in NWE during late 1944 and early 1945 sought to mitigate this, but those 
used in the summer of 1944 were often found lacking.  If the infantry was on its own and the enemy 
continued to resist when the artillery barrage had ended, company and platoon tactics would be used.  All 
light machine guns and mortars would be grouped together to lay down suppressive direct and indirect 
fire, forming a firebase.  The remaining force would infiltrate onto an enemy flank under an infantry 
company commander’s leadership, forming an assault force.  Suppression of the enemy would allow the 
manoeuvring sections of this force to use fire and movement to eventually reach and destroy the enemy 
positions. 
 Speed and effective suppression of the enemy were crucial at this stage.  If the advance of the 
assault force was halted or driven back, the attack would likely fail.  The 25 July 1944 night attack by the 
                                                          
35 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  Infantry Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Infantry Battalion (Regiment) WE II/233/4  October 1944.  The support company of an infantry 
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North Nova Scotia Highlanders on Tilly-La-Campagne, Normandy was an example of the type of reverse 
that could occur.36  Before the assault force could penetrate the village it was halted by machine gun and 
tank fire and then counterattacked.  What remained of the companies were driven back their start lines.  
Canadian battle casualties in this action were very heavy, totalling 139. 37  Attacks were much more likely 
to succeed if an assault force of superior numbers could quickly break into the enemy’s trench system 
while they were suppressed by indirect and direct fire.  Using close quarter techniques, the attacking force 
would then either destroy the enemy or force them to surrender.   
 For these infantry tactics noted above to succeed, it certainly helped to have the most advanced 
weapons and armoured battlefield transport available.  It was crucial to get an infantry company or 
platoon onto its objective quickly if it was under fire.  This is an area where the Canadian Army was 
weak.  In NWE, Canadian infantry battalions were largely trucked aboard military pattern Ford and 
Chevrolet trucks.  In their assembly areas they de-bussed and mated up with armour or other supporting 
assets.  They then walked to start-line for the assault or “Line of Departure” (LOD).  At the prescribed 
time or “H-hour”, they would commence the advance to contact with the enemy.  While the battalion 
Universal (Bren Gun) Carrier platoon rode along and other carriers took the 6-Pounder anti-tank and 
mortar platoons into battle, the remainder of the battalion was on foot.  An infantry company could ride 
upon a tank squadron occasionally, but most of the time they either marched or were trucked along hard-
pack roads to their assembly areas.  If the battalion was manning the front lines in defensive positions, the 
carriers and the trucks would be deployed far to the rear of the position.    
 While Canadian infantry and reconnaissance regiments used their Universal tracked carriers to 
good effect, the vehicles were small and not designed to carry a fully-armed section of infantry into 
                                                          
36 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 189-207.  There were four failed major assaults on this village during the period 25 
July-5 August 1944. 
37 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,122.  The North Nova Scotia Highlanders War Diary July 1944.  25 July 1944 entry.  A dismounted 
night attack without tanks or heavy artillery support on Tilly-La-Campagne, Normandy failed due to intense machine gun and 
tank main gun fire with high explosive rounds.  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 190.   
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battle.38  Canadian dismounted infantry regiments did not have the equivalent of a machine-gun armed 
American White M3 or German SPW 251 half-track armoured personnel carrier.  These carriers were 
capable of carrying an infantry section with all its weapons.  The two motor battalions of the 4th and 5th 
Canadian Armoured Brigades in summer 1944 were equipped as such, but only expressly to allow them 
to follow a rapid armoured advance.  These vehicles were limited in their cross-country capability, and 
having an open top they offered poor protection from artillery airbursts and sustained heavy machine gun 
fire.  In the way of positive attributes, half-tracks could provide fire support, increased speed and some 
protection to infantry while travelling to the objective.  In a similar fashion to World War One, Canadian 
infantry took heavy casualties during their dismounted approach to the objective.  What was needed was 
something that could transport over any terrain while providing armour protection against mortar 
shrapnel, machine gun bullets and near misses from artillery.39   
 A capable infantry fighting vehicle did not exist in the Canadian inventory until August 1944’s 
Operation “Totalize”, when a number of Kangaroos (modified Priest 105mm self-propelled artillery with 
the guns removed and armour plate added) were made operational.  The Kangaroo armoured personnel 
carrier (APC) mounted battalions during Operation ‘Totalize” suffered sixty-three casualties in 
comparison to the 260 suffered by dismounted battalions.40  Due to this success, the unit was frequently 
used and expanded.  Once the Priest armoured personnel carriers were all destroyed or worn out, obsolete 
Canadian Ram tanks without turrets were utilized.  But there were a limited number of these vehicles, and 
the Kangaroo regiment was shuffled from battalion to battalion, often in support of British infantry.  In 
December 1944 the CIC dismounted regiments were still equipped with a single platoon of Universal 
Carriers per regiment.  During the same period the two motor battalions of the armoured brigades had just 
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Studio.  2000.), 250.  One of the 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment’s B Squadron troops, with fifteen Universal Carriers, 
charged through a Waffen-SS panzer grenadier position during Operation "Charnwood".  This turned the tide of a battle near 
Gruchy, France. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,020.  The Calgary Highlanders War Diary August 1944.  Entry 1 August 1944.  Canadian infantry 
assaulting Tilly-la-Campagne France on the night of 31 July-1 August 1944 were badly shelled on their dismounted approach in 
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40 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 367. 
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fifty-three armoured 15-cwt-C15TA trucks per battalion, having exchanged the M3 White half-tracks.  As 
of November 1944, there were only two squadrons of fifty-three Kangaroos each in the 1st Canadian 
Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment.41  These desperately needed APCs were not even fully 
subordinated to Canadian command, being part of the 79th British Armoured Division.   
 Supplementing the Kangaroo from fall 1944, onwards was the Universal Wasp II flame-thrower 
carrier.  This was the flame-throwing version of the tracked Universal Carrier.  This fearsome weapon 
could reduce enemy infantry positions very quickly by killing defenders or forcing them to withdraw  
Production challenges encountered in creating an effective three-man vehicle meant that there were 
virtually none available for the June-July 1944 battles in Normandy.  As of August 31 1944, the Canadian 
Army in NWE boasted one on strength while its formation’s war establishments were authorized a total of 
132.42  
 Commonwealth section level infantry weapons were functional and dependable.  However, they 
were not cutting-edge technology, and this factor arguably influenced the level of infantry casualties.  The 
sooner an infantry firefight was won, the sooner the battle could be concluded.  The British First World 
War bolt-action Lee-Enfield .303 battle rifle, the magazine-fed Bren section automatic weapon, Sten sub 
machine gun (SMG) and PIAT (projector, infantry, anti-tank) anti-tank weapon were inferior weapons 
when compared to American and German equivalents.  The section Bren guns were not the equivalent in 
the sustained fire role of a machine gun firing 100-round belts.  To protect the light machine gun, riflemen 
also needed adequate arms.  The German Gewehr 43 and American M1 Garand battle rifles were semi-
automatic, powerful and fed by clips or magazines.  The Gewehr 43 could also be mounted with a scope.  
Both of these were inferior to the newer German Sturmgewehr 44 fully automatic 7.92mm assault rifle, 
the predecessor to the present day Russian AK-47.  This weapon began to appear in late 1944 and was 
cutting-edge technology.  The Sten SMG was poorly engineered and cheaply made in comparison to an 
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American Thompson or German MP 40 9mm SMGs.  While effective, the PIAT was not the equivalent of 
the German Panzerschreck or U.S. M9 Bazooka.  Having the proper weapons to conduct close quarter 
fighting at 100 meters or less was essential.  Advancing against a German defender with multiple MG-42 
machine guns was a challenging situation.  Unless tanks, Wasp II flame thrower carriers or heavy Vickers 
.303 water-cooled machine guns were brought up, the assault could bog down.  If the assault stalled, the 
chances of increased casualties multiplied. 
 German defensive efforts focused on the destruction of dismounted Canadian infantry.  As a 
result, the bulk of Canadian infantry casualties in NWE occurred during these types of assaults or 
defending against an immediate German counterattack.  While small numbers of battle casualties would 
occur daily due to harassing mortar or artillery fire, the Germans saved the majority of their artillery 
resources to repulse Canadian attacks.  Large numbers of casualties could occur very quickly due to 
German indirect and direct-fire weapons.  Since Canadian attacks were usually infantry-led and supported 
by armour and anti-tank forces, the infantry nearly always bore the brunt of massed German defensive 
fires.  The Germans realized that if the infantry were beaten back, any armour present would more often 
than not withdraw, being naked without infantry support.  During an average month of war in NWE, a 
Canadian infantry regiment  might see four to five days of intensive offensive combat.  The remainder of 
the time would be spent patrolling, conducting training or in defensive positions.  Casualties during these 
inactive phases would be light due to the inability of the German forces post August 1944 to launch major 
offensive operations.43  
 Though Canadian armour and anti-tank forces took a subordinate role in offensive operations, it 
was important to coordinate with them prior to battle to ensure their effective participation.  Examples 
from Normandy illustrate that the failure to accomplish this would invite disaster.  Attempting to keep in 
contact with the enemy on 5 August 1944, The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) 
                                                          
43 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,663.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  In the consolidated strength 
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advanced on May-sur-Orne, Normandy without intimate tank support or enough artillery support.  On 
reaching the objective it suffered heavy casualties from German mortar, machine gun and tank fire.  The 
commander of "A" Company was killed and his company took heavy losses.  The battalion then withdrew 
back to its start point of St Andre-sur-Orne.  The role of Canadian armour designated to support the 
infantry in this action is unclear.  This action came directly on the heels of a 25 July 1944 reverse on 
Verrieres Ridge which decimated the regiment, with its casualties totalling just over 300.44  In this 
previous action the battalion had also attacked without intimate armoured support, attempting to cross a 
ridgeline which was devoid of cover.  Preparatory artillery fire at not neutralized the defences at the 
summit, which came to life and annihilated the attackers. 
 Combat losses robbed Canadian units of more than just personnel when large numbers of battle 
casualties occurred during a short period of time.  This type of casualty could total over 200 personnel in 
one day, as evidenced by the experience of the previously mentioned The Royal Highland Regiment of 
Canada.45  Its losses on 25 July 1944 were almost exclusively confined to its four forward infantry line 
companies.  Due to the experienced, highly-trained and effective infantry platoons of these companies 
being the real fighting power of the unit, it's combat effectiveness in the immediate aftermath was reduced 
to nothing.  The Black Watch would not regain its previous combat effectiveness for some time due to 
inexperienced replacements not performing at the same level as their predecessors.   
 It was very dangerous for an Canadian combat arms unit in NWE to immediately launch a new 
operation after receiving a large amount of new replacements.  If a gradual integration of new personnel 
was not completed with appropriate refresher training, further heavy losses could occur.  This is exactly 
what befell the Black Watch during its second failed operation on 5 August 1944 in the village of May-
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sur-Orne.  This action involved many new replacement personnel, and it is arguable they had not had to 
time to acclimatize themselves and lacked experienced NCO section leadership.46   
 It was most beneficial to slow acclimatize new personnel to front line conditions, regardless of 
the combat arm.  Upon arrival, a new infantry replacement would not know any of his fellow platoon 
members or his section commander.  To function as a well-oiled machine in combat, each section member 
had to possess a certain confidence in his fellow soldiers and his weapons.  This came through training 
and shared experiences, the most valuable but most dangerous of the latter being combat itself.  Prior to 
combat operations it was necessary to have new Canadian soldiers become confident in themselves and 
their teammates as soon as possible due to the often immediate need to thrust them back into action.  
While it was beneficial for this goal to be achieved on a regular basis within Canadian combat arms units 
in NWE, military necessity and a lack of forces often did not allow it to occur. 
 Failure to accomplish successful integration could result poor combat performance and increased 
casualties within the ranks of the new personnel, especially in the infantry.  While a shortage of infantry 
and constant high-intensity operations from August to November 1944 had hurt the ability of new 
Canadian infantry replacements to integrate, a period of inactivity during the winter of 1944-1945 
allowed unit training and gradual integration to occur.  The U.S. Army approach to integrating new 
personnel into infantry units had negative results in the years 1943-1944.  Replacements were thrown into 
combat with little chance to know their fellow squad members or conduct realistic training prior to 
reaching the front line.  While maintaining the strength of front line units, this practice reduced the 
combat effectiveness of individual companies within the U.S. infantry battalions.  In the fall of 1944 this 
practice changed and new replacements were received in divisional replacement camps that gave 
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refresher training.47  They were then posted to companies that were out of the front line, giving them 
additional time to acclimatize themselves. 
 Canadian armoured vehicle and heavy weapons systems losses resulted in similar reduction in 
unit combat effectiveness, regardless of how quick a replacement piece of equipment was allocated.  
Given the relative abundance of Allied armoured vehicles and heavy weapons in comparison to the 
limited numbers of replacement infantry personnel, units were rarely short of equipment.  But how 
effectively heavy weapons systems such as tanks and artillery pieces were used depended on the team 
performance of the crews operating them.  As an example, if a tank was knocked out, usually one or two 
crew members would be lost.  Given the tight knit camaraderie of tank crews, a reduction of combat 
effectiveness would be expected until new members were acclimatized to combat conditions and the 
leadership of their tank commander.  Losses of artillery pieces post Normandy for the CAO were rare due 
to the weakness of the German capability to engage in sustained counter battery fire or air strikes.  As was 
the case with U.S. artillery crews, the combat effectiveness of the RCA artillery regiments rose with  
time.48  Their team performance increased with experience, and artillery battery cohesion was not 
destroyed by heavy losses and the constant need to integrate and train new personnel. 
 Air support is an important factor to consider when reviewing Canadian military operations in 
NWE.  The operations of the RAF 2nd TAF’s 83 and later 84 Composite Groups were very successful at 
providing tactical air support of the First Canadian Army in NWE.  German logistical and operational 
movement during daylight hours was terribly inhibited.  Air support from the RAF and RCAF was also 
crucial for softening up German defensive positions.  The breaching of Dutch dikes by air power was 
critical to flooding the German Scheldt defences in September-October 1944, making the conquering of 
this area easier in later battles.   
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 The ever present Typhoon fighter-bomber was a great asset not for its rocket or bomb carrying 
capability, but for its four 20mm automatic wing mounted cannons.  It was these cannons that struck the 
rear decks of German armour in Normandy, putting tanks out of action.  Soft targets such as trucks and 
cars could be totally destroyed, sapping enemy morale and ability to move openly in column on roadways 
in daylight.  The German infantry formations were impotent against these attacks, and Canadian morale 
was boosted greatly by seeing the impact of rockets, bombs and cannon fire. 
 The designated role of the British Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF) 
was to fight the air battle and support the 21st Army Group by means of aerial reconnaissance and ground 
attack.49  For this purpose the RAF Composite Group Headquarters (HQs) and the Army HQs met 
regularly to discuss support for operations.  However, the ties between the RAF, Royal Canadian Air 
Force (RCAF) and Canadian Army in NWE were not particularly strong.  A certain amount of animosity 
existed between the services regarding the role and utilization of tactical aircraft in support of the ground 
troops on offensive operations.  Air-ground cooperation in the form of an established doctrine was not an 
institutionalized practice as it in the modern Canadian Army.  Today’s forward air controllers (FACs), the 
trained Army artillery and infantry officers who communicate with aircraft, were not something that 
existed in 1944.  Due to this, the potential effectiveness of tactical airpower in support of Canadian 
ground operations was never reached in NWE.  If a ground-controller was present, this role was usually 
taken on by a RAF Air Support Signals Unit (ASSU).  These units were RAF controlled and strictly 
retained control of RAF and RCAF air activity, regardless of what the Canadian Army wanted or 
needed.50   
 The practice of embedding RAF and RCAF ground controllers in a manner similar to the artillery 
Forward Observation Officer (FOO) in an infantry battalion was accomplished on a limited scale with the 
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use of CAC “Contact Cars” from September 1944 onwards.51  These were CAC armoured vehicles 
manned by RCAF and RAF ground signallers with a CAC crew commander and driver.  These vehicles 
would be in close contact with the most forward infantry or armoured tactical HQ, but were still 
subordinate to a nearby ASSU with regards to directing RAF or RCAF ground attack sorties.  Direct 
communication with air assets by Canadian Army personnel, which could have further enhanced the 
quality of air support in NWE, was totally lacking.52  Also, terrible instances of fratricide occurred when 
large numbers of RAF, RCAF and United States Army Air Force (USSAF) four-engined strategic 
bombers were utilized to destroy in depth German defences.  The danger of this occurring was not 
something that the Canadian Army recognized or had trained for in the months leading up to Operation 
“Overlord”.  Reduction of the risk of short bombing and target misidentification was tackled in an ad-hoc 
manner by the Canadian Army as the situation demanded.53  Offsetting the excellent support of the RAF 
and RCAF provided on the battlefield was the CAO's lack of influence in air support matters.  This state 
of affairs led to continued misunderstandings and frustration over friendly fire incidents and cancelled 
ground support missions until the end of hostilities.54 
 Victory was achieved for the Canadian Army most frequently when it employed balanced 
combined arms teams to achieve limited objectives, aided by air and artillery support.  The best example 
of this was the defeat of the German 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment in the villages of Authie and 
Gruchy, Normandy on 8 July 1944.55  In this action 3rd Canadian Infantry Division infantry units with 
supporting arms overran fortified German defences, attaining all their objectives.  They then defeated a 
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powerful German armoured counterattack, inflicting even more casualties on the enemy.  This was an 
impressive victory that reflected an improved level of tactical effectiveness as a result of combat 
experience over the month of June 1944.  It was even more impressive considering the Canadian forces 
involved utilized a combined arms method of fighting that had not been perfected during training in the 
U.K.   
 Large scale combined arms training in the U.K. for some Canadian formations of the First 
Canadian Army prior to operations in NWE was a challenge.  The process of equipping the divisions of 
the 2nd Canadian Corps with their full equipment establishments was very slow.  In March 1944, the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division and 2nd Canadian Infantry Division were deemed non-operational due to 
having not received enough weapons and vehicles.56  At this stage it was critical for both formations to be 
fully equipped and involved in constant, realistic and intensive combined arms field exercises.57  
Exercises in tank-infantry cooperation for some Canadian divisions in the U.K. had only began 
sporadically in the fall of 1943.58  During the campaign in NWE, the utilization of RCA Forward 
Observation Officers (FOOs) to call down timely artillery support was necessary to consistently defeat 
German counter attacks .59  This skill of summoning and maintaining artillery support had not been 
perfected in infantry and armoured regiments, despite the long period of time spent training in the U.K. 
from 1940 to 1944.  To make matters worse, Canadian D-Day assault formations had focused training 
solely on the one-day amphibious assault.  They were in as bad shape as the follow-on divisions regarding 
combined arms training.   
 Compounding these disadvantages was a complete lack of recent combat experience within the 
divisions about to be deployed to NWE.  Recent lessons learned from Italy and Sicily in the way of 
                                                          
56 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st Army Group A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.85 (D1).  31 May 1944 Report.  
The 4th Canadian Armoured Division at this point held none of its forty-five authorized 17-Pounder Firefly tanks.  It was 
authorized thirty-six Wasp II flamethrowers, but had only obtained two.  These weapons systems were to be some of the most 
effective for the Canadian Army in NWE.  Uselessly, this formation still contained 102 obsolete Ram II tanks.  
57 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 186. 
58 John English, The Canadian Army in Normandy, 104. 
59 John English, The Canadian Army in Normandy, 160. 
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reports on operations and enemy tactics were not passed down rapidly or effectively to U.K. based 
Canadian units in early 1944.60  Once in Normandy, the British practice of keeping units forward did not 
allow Canadian regiments to be easily removed from the line for re-training in the field.  Mated with the 
erosion of Canadian infantry strength in the summer of 1944 was the arrival of remustered inexperienced 
replacements.  These factors led to occasional performance issues in the fall.61  Problematically, 
experienced Canadian personnel remained in Italy while green, inexperienced units were used in 
Normandy.62  Mistakes would be costly against powerful German units with advanced weapons and 
veteran officers.   
 Despite initial operational challenges during June-August 1944, Canadian formations had 
achieved sufficient combat experience by September to allow offensive performance levels to rise.63  
When an all arms combat team well versed in assault tactics was employed with heavy artillery support, 
good results could be achieved.  Infantry platoons with intimate armoured support assaulted the objective 
while other tanks suppressed the enemy in a firebase role.  The tanks would move at an infantry pace, 
following the artillery barrage and using their machine guns to suppress the enemy.  Supplementary 
artillery tactics were used in addition to the rolling barrage, such as surprise concentrations, air-bursts and 
bombardments of all suspected armoured assembly areas and anti-tank positions.  Intensive counter 
battery fire was placed simultaneously on all suspected enemy artillery and mortar positions.  Once the 
assault force had reached the objective, the tanks could churn up the trenches by turning on their tracks 
and firing directly into bunkers and dug-outs.  They would knock out German anti-tank guns and machine 
gun positions, protecting the infantry until they were literally on top of the objective.  At this point the 
tanks were very vulnerable to enemy infantry anti-tank teams, so friendly infantry had to be close at hand.  
All gains would immediately be fortified by the infantry and their supporting arms, as the German 
                                                          
60 John English, The Canadian Army in Normandy, 133. 
61 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 361. 
62 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,237-14,238.  11th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary December 1942-August 1944.  T-12702.  
This Regiment, one of three within the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, performed at a very high level in all their operations in 
Italy and Sicily.   
63 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 361. 
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counter-thrust would be expected at any moment.  This was a second victory waiting to happen, as the 
new defenders would crush the German counter-attack and inflict heavy casualties. 
 Canadian Army strategy in NWE was not focused on constantly being on the offensive.  The 
transition phase between offensive operations was very defensive, with a focus placed upon creating 
"fortress" and “firm base” positions.  Both in Italy and NWE, once an objective was captured an evolved 
version of First World War “Bite and Hold” tactics were utilized.  Anti-tank, armoured and mortar assets 
were rushed in to help to create an infantry battalion or brigade “fortress”.64  In Normandy there was 
initially the very real risk that powerful German formations would attack and successfully liquidate the 
Allied beachhead.  It was onto these fortresses that the German land forces would be enticed to shatter 
themselves in failed counter-attacks.  This was the opportunity for Canadian and British artillery forces to 
expend the full weight of their defensive fires on the enemy with coordinated “Mike” and “Uncle” targets.  
These RA and RCA tactics utilized massive amounts of on-call firepower on a point or area target.  It was 
these tactics that largely pushed the German 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend onto the defensive in 
June 1944, its counterattacks and attempts to gain the initiative being crushed.65  This practice was very 
successful in destroying German counterattacks in the month of June, but with the caveat that it led to 
static warfare.  Periods of inactivity when the Allies were between offensive operations gave the Germans 
time to fortify in-depth defensive zones that could be only be conquered with major losses.  They were so 
strong in fact, the Allies turned massive aerial bombardment using four-engine bombers and naval 
bombardment on occasion.66   
 Following the collapse of the German front in Normandy due to attrition, the September 1944 to 
May 1945 period for the Canadian Army was primarily infantry orientated.  Infantry-led offensive 
operations were tied to elaborate artillery fire-plans designed to annihilate dug-in German defenders.  
While there were some operations that were led by armour, set piece attacks by infantry units with 
                                                          
64 Terry Copp, “The Bite and Hold Approach: Army, Part 80”, Legion Magazine, February 2009.  Retrieved 5 February 2016 
from https://legionmagazine.com/en/2009/02/the-bite-and-hold-approach-army-part-80/ 
65 Marc Milner, Stopping the Panzers, 301. 
66 Roman Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign”, 285. 
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supporting arms and extensive artillery support were the standard.  To be fair, flooded Dutch polders and 
peninsulas of the Scheldt Estuary restricted armour movement terribly.  Individual Canadian armour 
squadrons were assigned to support attacking infantry battalions, rather than operating together in 
regimental strength.  Limited objectives were “bitten” off and defended in a “hold” manner until 
Canadian units were ready for the next bite.  The defensive" hold" was supported by tanks, mortars and 
anti-tank guns which were hurried onto the objective to stave off the inevitable German counter-attack.  
The total destruction of the enemy by encircling mechanized pincer movements was not envisioned, and 
the terrain rarely allowed for it.  This methodical approach by Anglo-Canadian formations led to repeated 
set piece operations, even against very poor quality German forces during the last two months of the war.  
For example, despite the German defences on the Ijssel River in April 1945 being weak, lengthy 
preparations were made for attacking them.67   
 Anglo-Canadian doctrine was the polar opposite of the tactics that were present on the Eastern 
Front 1944-1945.  In this theatre armour dominated the attack, and Red Army infantry often specialized in 
riding on the engine decks of the Russian T-34 tanks.  The Soviet commander conducted the deep 
armoured battle, one of extreme penetration and manoeuvre based on available logistics, opportunities 
and attacking the enemy at its weakest point.  Strong artillery fire was present on the Eastern Front, but on 
a much smaller scale and between intervals, the guns taking a long time to catch up with the tanks.  On 
the Anglo-Canadian front the opposite was true.  Armour and infantry were always within reach of the 
guns, and a pattern of long-range mechanized manoeuvre warfare did not occur.  Troop density in 
Normandy and the Netherlands stood in stark contrast to the Eastern Front.  The limited size of the area of 
operations meant that movement was always observed by the enemy.  These factors in Normandy 
severely limited the Canadian Army’s ability to find a weak spot in German defenses and achieve tactical 
surprise.68  Periods of inactivity would allow each side to build defenses in depth, making it very difficult 
                                                          
67 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 547. 
68 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,711.  2nd Canadian Corps General Staff  War Diary July 1944.  T-1865.  During Operations 
“Atlantic” and “Spring”, no less than eighteen Canadian infantry battalions and two machine gun battalions of the 2nd and 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Divisions were active or present near the area of Verrieres Ridge.  This is not counting CAC or RCA forces.  
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for the opposing force to achieve a breakthrough.  Every factor became multiplied in an ongoing 
campaign of attrition, and artillery and armour resources from each side could quickly be brought to bear.   
 To summarize, Anglo-Canadian "Bite and Hold” tactics, with specific objectives allotted per 
infantry battalion, allowed the campaign proceed at a slow, steady grind.  This grind slowly defeated the 
Germans in Normandy and beyond with limited Canadian casualties.  The casualties that were suffered 
were mainly in the infantry regiments, and these occurred during offensive operations.  There were two 
main reasons for this: Due to their role as the vanguard of the attack, they drew the most fire.  Secondly, 
their un-armoured bodies were vulnerable to all types of German weaponry while they were advancing in 
open ground.  The non-infantry RCA and CAC regiments suffered significantly less casualties due to 
their role, tactics, position on the battlefield and the capability of the enemy to attack them.   
 The Canadian Army in NWE quickly learned to maximize it strengths and minimize its 
weaknesses while in combat.  Following initial challenges in Normandy during June-July of 1944, 
necessary modifications were made to place greater emphasis on indirect firepower and combined arms 
tactics.  Armour would take on a reduced role and operate within the limits of the infantry and artillery 
units it was working with.  Once these modifications were made, infantry led combined arms teams 
executed assaults with better cooperation, achieving improved results.  In doing this the Canadian Army 
sacrificed armoured manoeuvre in return for the set-piece limited attack with overpowering indirect fire 
support.  Weakened German formations in late 1944 and spring 1945 had limited assets in which to defeat 
these assaults.  Devastating firepower from the RCA, operating with impunity, would reduce resistance 
and crush all German counterattacks.69  Assaulting Canadian infantry with plentiful armoured and anti-
                                                          
69 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,437.  3rd 
Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.   T-15956.  April 1945 casualties for the 3rd Field Regiment, RCA consisted of 
eleven non-battle casualties and no battle casualties, despite the intensity of constant indirect fire missions to support 1st Canadian 
Corps.  The regiment received thirteen  replacement personnel during this month.  
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tank support would then capture and consolidate their objectives, taking an acceptable number of 
casualties on average in the process.70   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  The Loyal Edmonton Regiment in 
April 1945 suffered ninety-seven battle casualties and twenty-seven non-battle casualties despite offensive operations throughout 
the month.  
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Chapter 3: The German Army, Waffen SS, and Luftwaffe ground troops: 
Strengths and weaknesses of the German forces and their tactics against 
Canadian Army operations in North West Europe, 1944-1945
 
 As a sequel to the previous chapter, this section of the study will continue to address the question 
of how and why Canadian casualties occurred during operations in NWE 1944-1945.  How did the 
Canadian Army’s foes during this period, the German Army, Waffen SS (military wing of the Nazis 
party) and Luftwaffe (air force) ground forces, operate tactically to inflict casualties?  What allowed them 
to inflict casualties on some Canadian units, while failing to launch successful attacks on others?  This 
chapter will describe the strengths and challenges faced by the German forces and in the process outline 
their defensive doctrine in NWE from 6 June 1944 to 5 May 1945.  Once this is accomplished, the reader 
will comprehend why some Canadian units suffered more than others, building upon the factors presented 
in the last chapter.  
The enemy the Canadian Army faced for the majority of the campaign in NWE, September 1944 
to May 1945, was on average poorly equipped and less trained compared to German units that fought in 
Normandy.  During the June-August 1944 period, Canadian formations had faced well-equipped, semi-
mechanized units that had an adequate amount of armour and medium quality infantry.  German units 
performed well enough that there were occasions where Canadian units suffered reverses and were driven 
out of their positions.1  German Luftwaffe ground attack assets were active by day and night, seeking to 
bomb and strafe Canadian units.2  Enemy artillery units occasionally attempted counter-battery fire and 
sustained bombardments of targets of importance.3  Large groupings of German tanks, with mechanized 
infantry support, launched coordinated counterattacks that inflicted significant casualties on Canadian 
                                                          
1 LAC RG 24 Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (“The Black Watch”) War Diary July 1944.  Entry for 
25 July 1944.  Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 175.  The most significant example was The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada, 
("The Black Watch").  Set upon by tank fire from a reverse slope position, its advancing companies were destroyed on 25 
July1944, during Operation "Spring".  
2 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16740.  Airstrikes on 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division positions occurred on 11 and 12 July 1944.  These involved twelve Bf 109s in the first strike and six 
Bf 109s in the second.  The Luftwaffe suffered a total of eight Bf 109s shot down in these raids.  
3 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16740.  The period 11 to 12 
July 1944 also saw constant German artillery strikes on 2nd Canadian Division positions, with rear deployed light anti-aircraft  
units such as this one suffering constant casualties.  
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units.  As shown in chart 3.1, the Germans had the resources to inflict significant losses on attacking 
Canadian Army units in short periods of time.  The Canadian Army during this period was facing a well-
equipped enemy that sought to destroy and later contain the Normandy beachhead. 
Chart 3.1: B Squadron, 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment tank losses in 8 July 1944's Operation 
“Charnwood”.  Squadron war establishment strength: 19 tanks4 
 
In later battles to liberate the Low Countries and invade Northern Germany, Canadians 
encountered sub-standard enemy forces.5  There were exceptions, but German formations in contact with 
the Canadian Army post 21 August 1944 were short of heavy weapons and staffed with a mixture of 
conscripts that were not highly motivated.6  As illustrated in Chart 3.2, the defenders in some of the 
difficult Scheldt battles of fall 1944 were a mixture of unit remnants, alarm battalions, Kriegsmarine 
                                                          
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armour Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12757.  B Squadron report on 
Operation “Charnwood” fighting 8-9 July 1944. 
5 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 203.  Against the upcoming February 1945, Operation "Veritable" which saw five Anglo-
Canadian divisions attack along a very limited frontage, the Germans initially only deployed a few formations.  These were the 
under-strength 10,000 personnel strong 84th Infantry Division, one parachute (Fallschirmjager) regiment and an under strength 
battalion of assault guns.    
6 LAC RG 24, Volume 14,560.  2nd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16453.  19-20 February 
1945 saw the 2nd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA engage German tanks for the first time since October 1944.  These tanks 
were Panthers and Panzer IVs of Panzer Lehr Regiment 130.  At this stage the German Panzer Lehr panzer division could only 
field twenty-two tanks for operations against the 2nd Canadian Division during Operation “Veritable”. 
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(Navy) personnel and cut-off Luftwaffe and supply troops.  These cobbled together forces were not the 
equivalent of the panzer divisions of July 1944.  Mated with this difference was a marked departure from 
the rolling fields of eastern Normandy, which were suitable for armoured warfare.  The Canadian Army 
area of operations in fall 1944 was interspersed with dikes, flooded fields, canals and rivers.  Dry areas 
were often filled with thick forests.  It was not terrain for large scale armoured operations, and the 
fighting soon devolved into a series of separate infantry battalion-level operations, many being 
amphibious.  It was a different war in all respects. 
Chart 3.2: Strength of Walcheren, North & South Beveland German forces  
October 19447 
 
Despite the chaotic state of the German ground forces, a stiffening of German resistance occurred 
in mid September and early October 1944.  Within military history circles debate still occurs whether the 
war could have ended sooner if a more complete encirclement of the Falaise Pocket had occurred.  If the 
encircled German forces had been totally destroyed and a concerted effort had eliminated scattered 
remnants fleeing France, the German military would have had trouble establishing a cohesive front line.  
Instead, a fall 1944 recovery took place after a majority of the reduced German formations managed to 
                                                          
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,646.  First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary October 1944.  T-7079.   
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escape the Falaise encirclement.8  None of the formerly encircled German Army or Waffen SS panzer 
divisions ceased to exist, and reconstitution began immediately with the remnants.  That this occurred was 
largely due to German administrative and organizational qualities rather than an abundance of 
replacement resources or personnel.  Remnants of the escaped units were determinedly re-organized, 
reinforced and employed as small delaying battle groups near the German border.  Others were hastily 
rebuilt from scratch and re-equipped as a final dredging of the manpower bucket in Germany occurred.9  
In the wake of fierce German resistance against the September 1944 Allied airborne Operation “Market 
Garden”, a semi-cohesive front line had been established.  Further aiding the Germans were Allied supply 
difficulties that stranded advancing Allied armoured formations.  The fluid tactical situation of late 
summer 1944 had disappeared. 
As the First Canadian Army’s front moved north from Antwerp in September 1944, the 
previously mentioned multiple natural obstacles made their presence felt.  Canals, rivers, dikes and thick 
forests dotted the landscape.  Concentrated armoured attacks ceased as deliberate set-piece infantry 
operations were needed to overcome entrenched opposition in a partially amphibious environment.10  It 
was against these infantry led operations that the German forces deployed weak infantry defences.  These 
were backed up at times with a sprinkling of static coastal artillery, concrete fortifications and support 
from Sturmgeschütz (self-propelled assault guns).  Heavy weapon support for the German infantry forces 
mainly consisted of mortars, MG-42 machine guns in the static role and dug in flak (anti-aircraft) 
weapons.11  These forces that sought to establish a cohesive front were limited in their abilities due to 
many factors.  The leadership within German units tried in vain to minimize these factors, but some 
limitations were so powerful the Germans could not mask them.  Being a massively superior force, the 
                                                          
8 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 392.  Though equipment losses were nearly total, a large percentage of personnel that made it to 
the Seine River in August 1944 were incorporated into the defences on the border of the Reich in fall 1944.  
9 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 295. 
10 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7093.  Casualty figures for The 
Algonquin Regiment during the fighting 13-14 September 1944 in the village of Moerkerke on the Leopold Canal totalled 168 
killed, wounded or missing. 
11 LAC RG 24 Volume 14,234.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary October 1944.  T-12648.  Entries 7-9 October 
1944.  Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 136.  In fighting near Hoogerheide on 7-10 October 1944 only small numbers of tanks (one 
Panther) and self-propelled assault guns were encountered.  The German defences largely depended on mortars as well as 88mm 
and 20mm flak weapons.  
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Canadian Army could not be held back and continued to advance by launching successive well-planned 
and supported infantry-led operations.  Regardless of German efforts, as British historian John Ellis 
points out, the Allied superiority in all categories was stupendous.12 
The most serious weakness within the German Army, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe ground forces in 
1944-1945 was the scarcity of reinforcements, supplies and new equipment flowing to front line units.  
Powerful German formations in Normandy had attempted to conduct armoured maneuver warfare to 
eliminate the invasion force.  Thwarted by Allied firepower and crushed by superior strength in an 
attritional campaign, these divisions had been bled dry.  German commanders facing the Canadian Army 
maximized their efforts and husbanded their resources, but were constantly hampered by the inability of 
the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) high command to supply them with what was urgently required.  
Cumulative effects of gradual attrition during June and early July 1944 led to a complete collapse of the 
western Normandy front, allowing the U.S. VII Corps to achieve a decisive breakthrough on 27 July 
1944.  This breakthrough, part of the larger U.S. Operation “Cobra”, marked the beginning of the end for 
German forces in Normandy.13  The best equipped and manned armoured divisions, the absolute cream of 
the German ground forces in the summer of 1944, were then destroyed in the Falaise Pocket battle.  The 
Western Front increased in size after the Normandy breakout and with it the number of Allied divisions.  
Facing this onslaught across France were poorly equipped German remnants.  The post-Normandy 
conditions of September 1944 were in stark contrast to those present south of Caen, Normandy in July 
1944.14  There a very large number of elite panzer divisions had been concentrated to conduct a 
competent defence in depth.  Across France and Belgium in September 1944 reduced German formations 
struggled to hold a static defensive line.   
                                                          
12 John Ellis, Brute Force, 395-396, 398. 
13 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 254-255. 
14 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,645.  First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary July 1944.  T-7077.  Intelligence 
summaries 23-26 July 1944 indicate contact with no less than four German panzer divisions facing the 2nd Canadian Corps.  This 
strength was not present on the Allied western flank, leading to a disintegration of the defence under the onslaught of  the U.S. 
Operation “Cobra”.  Losses to key German units were not replaced, and local reserves had not been built up as they had on the 
eastern flank. 
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German resources that were available post-September 1944 often went to forces facing American 
or British troops, not those facing the Canadian Army.  The main threat to the German border and the 
Siegfried Line defences was rightly perceived to be the advances of the Americans and British.  German 
light infantry paratroop regiments fighting north of Antwerp in October 1944 were not panzer divisions, 
and were not equipped as such.15  While the denial of the Channel ports was seen as strategically 
important, it was not the main German defensive focus.  American and British armour driving hard for 
German territory, in particular the Rhine bridges, was the main threat.  As a result, the meagre remains of 
German armoured formations did not face Canadian troops.16  The overall scarcity of German armoured 
forces post Normandy was highlighted during the Allied Operation “Market Garden” of September 1944.  
In spite of the urgent threat of this Anglo-American airborne-armoured assault, all that could be 
committed was fragmented quarter-strength battle groups. 17   
The ongoing reinforcement situation for the German military post Normandy was the exact 
opposite to that in the Canadian Army.18  While the situation markedly improved for the Canadians in fall 
1944, it got progressively worse for the German ground forces.  Losses during the fighting in Normandy 
and later in the Netherlands were not offset by a continuous reinforcement system, in contrast to the 
Canadian Army.19  A German unit would have to be bled white before it was withdrawn to reconstitute 
itself.20  German armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and heavy weapons would not be replaced if they 
were destroyed or damaged, their number within units dwindling until there were few left.  As a result, in 
the fall of 1944 units of the German 15th Army opposing the First Canadian Army were not equipped for 
                                                          
15 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 137-140. 
16 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,647.  First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary October 1944.  T-7080.  Intelligence 
Summary for 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Front 1650 hours.  Entry 16 October 1944.  Facing the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division was a mixture of weak German Army infantry battalions and Luftwaffe ground force parachute training and regular 
parachute battalions.  
17 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 125.  German forces committed to trying to recapture Eindhoven in late September were under 
strength and facing serious equipment shortages.  
18 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,699.  Report: Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry, Other Ranks: NWE 27-August-28 April 
1945.  On 10 November 1944, all combined infantry regiments within 2nd Canadian Corps divisions were only 1,070 other ranks 
short of their war establishment strengths.  Averaged out per regiment, this was an insignificant number. 
19 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 385.  By 6 August 1944, the German ground forces had taken 144,265 casualties, but received 
only 19,914 replacements.  This was only 19 percent of what was needed to replace their losses.  
20 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,647.  First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary October 1944.  T-7080.  0200 15 October 
1944 intelligence report entry refers to a prisoner of war stating the 1st battalion of the 1037 Grenadier Regiment facing the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division had been dissolved, leaving only the 2nd. (I. and II./Grenadier Regiment 1037.) 
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modern war.  Infantry units were not mechanized and were equipped with bicycles or horses to add 
mobility.21  Vehicles and AFVs present were often immobile due to a lack of spare parts or gasoline.  
Chart 3.3 displays the difficulty the German Army had inflicting tank losses on the advancing Allies as 
they swept through France post Normandy.   
Chart 3.3: Causes of 4th Canadian Armoured Division Sherman tank casualties between 28 August-
7 September 194422 
 
The ability of the German ground forces at this stage to conduct limited armoured counterattacks was 
very low due to a lack of AFVs and resources to fuel and supply them.  If it was deemed essential that a 
weakened German formation keep fighting, it would be designated as a reduced battle group and 
delegated only missions it could accomplish.   
One of the most challenging aspects of the reinforcement situation for the German ground forces 
in 1944 was the calibre of the replacement infantry personnel.  Apart from elite units, the average 
                                                          
21 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,647.  First Canadian Army General Intelligence War Diary October 1944.  T-7080.  Intelligence 
Summary for 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Front 1650 hours 16 October 1944.  A counterattack on RHLI positions was 
supported by three self-propelled guns, but no half-tracks or regular tanks.   
22 British Tank Museum Archives, Bovington.  No.2 Operational Research Section, Report No.18.  Report on tank Casualties 
during the exploitation phase after crossing the Seine River, August-September 1944.   
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conscript infantry unit did not perform to a high standard.23  Elderly or unfit conscripts, former Russian 
prisoners of war (POWs), Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) and Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine transfers 
were not veteran infantry.  These men were not politically committed and lacked the high level of training 
the German grenadier of 1942 or the Waffen SS soldier of 1944 possessed.  It was truly a case of hit or 
miss for Canadian units as to which group they would bump up against, hard-fighting Waffen SS and 
Fallschirmjager (Luftwaffe paratroops), or former Russian POWs and medically unfit conscripts.   
During the German defensive campaign of 1944-1945 in NWE, the average German Army 
grenadier (infantryman) was a conscript often forced into tactically untenable positions with none of the 
advantages afforded a Canadian soldier.  In many cases German troops were surrounded with no way to 
withdraw, and had no reserves behind them to bolster their positions.  To achieve a strategic goal the 
German high command had no reservations about condemning a low-quality formation to destruction or 
surrender.  Examples of this practice were the defense of the Channel ports and the Scheldt Estuary.  
During the Scheldt battles, elements of the German 70th  and 64th Infantry Divisions were left behind to 
buy time, strategically delaying the opening of the port of Antwerp to the Allies.24  These decisions 
seriously affected German morale, as no soldier happily looks forward to certain death, wounds or 
capture.  Since no resources were deployed to support them, they were helpless against sustained air and 
artillery strikes that pounded their positions.  Surrounded, the realization hit that they would have to pay 
with their lives to achieve the German high command's dubious goals.  When unsupervised by officers or 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), conscript German line infantry would often surrender if they were 
unsupported, hungry, cut off or had little chance of survival.25  Chart 3.4 displays the total amount of 
prisoners that had been captured in various locations along the channel coast by the Canadian Army by 
                                                          
23 Denis and Shelaugh Whitaker, Tug of War, 350.  The German 70th Infantry Division was composed of soldiers exclusively with 
various stomach ailments. These men were not healthy and were of a much lower calibre that their 1942 equivalents. 
24 Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre.  2014), 326-327. 
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,234.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary September 1944.  T-12698.  Contained within is 
the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Intelligence dated 17 September, 1944.  Report on the defences of German Calais Harbour 
positions.  Grand total estimates were of nearly 4,450 to 5,550 well-equipped, entrenched German Army, Kriegsmarine and static 
fortress troops in excellent fortifications.  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 352-354.  Total German prisoners taken from 
the Calais port and Cape Griz Nez fortifications were 9,128.    
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fall 1944  These soldiers, equalling three complete 1945 German infantry divisions, could have played an 
important role in defending Germany’s borders. 
Chart 3.4: German prisoner of war totals from surrendered German garrison positions, 
September-November 194426 
 
In this way the German high command was writing off its own soldiers to gain time for the 
remainder of the Reich.  This was at a time when there were a finite number of available infantry soldiers 
available to the German military.  The manpower crunch was seriously beginning to bite due to the 
catastrophic defeats Germany had suffered in 1944.  Decisions to simply dispose whole infantry divisions 
to Canadian prisoner of war cages were highly questionable.  The fighting within the Normandy 
Campaign, the Scheldt and the final defence of the Netherlands and northern Germany was characterized 
by severe German infantry casualties.27  This was largely due to the numbers that surrendered in contrast 
to those that were annihilated by artillery, air strikes or infantry ground combat.  While other arms trades 
also suffered, the grenadier casualties were out of proportion to armoured and artillery personnel 
                                                          
26 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 355.  Total amount of prisoners was just under 30,000 for the three French ports.  
Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 400.  The Breskens Pocket yielded 12,707 prisoners. 
27 Charles Stacey,. The Victory Campaign, 270.  Close to 200, 000 German soldiers had been placed in prisoner of war cages in 
the period 6 June to 21 August, 1944.  This was out of a total of 400,000 killed, wounded or captured. 
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operating in the same area.  On the other side of the spectrum, despite near total Allied air superiority, 
rear services and supply troops suffered little.  The" tail" could be intact in a German formation, while its 
front-line infantry "teeth" strength could be reduced to less than 100 men per grenadier battalion.28 
 The second most challenging factor concerning the German land forces was the inadequacy of 
their divisional and corps level artillery.  While armoured, assault gun, anti-tank and some infantry units 
fought with skill that made up for numerical inferiority, the artillery arm of the German forces was 
consistently inferior.  It was totally outclassed by the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) due to it being 
starved of advanced weapons, modern transport, effective command and control and ammunition itself.29  
The level of doctrine, communication and organization that allowed the RCA to concentrate massive 
force was not present in the German artillery structure.  While devastating to Canadian morale, German 
Nebelwerfer rocket units were inaccurate and their rocket ammunition supply was limited.  The launching 
site was easily recognizable, and Canadian counter battery fire soon arrived.  There were some impressive 
artillery emplacements in channel coastal fortifications, but these were often pointing the wrong way or 
neutralized by air strikes or counter battery fire.  Largely horse drawn within the average German infantry 
division, artillery units could not redeploy quickly in the manner of Anglo-Canadian artillery units.  Lack 
of ammunition and fear of counter battery strikes saw German artillery activity drop significantly by 
September 1944.  Correspondingly, Canadian artillery battle casualties dropped significantly as Germans 
made fewer and fewer attempts at sustained counter-battery fire. 30  German grenadier regiments found 
themselves depending on their own organic mortar units to smother Canadian infantry attacks.  It was 
these indirect assets that sought to make up for the failures of divisional and corps level German artillery 
units.  
                                                          
28 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 39.  The 12th SS Panzer Division suffered 730 casualties, mainly within the battalions of the 
26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, on 26 June 1944 .  
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16360.  Analyzing the war diary, there 
are five days (10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th August) in August, 1944 which regimental positions were hit by German artillery counter-
battery fire.   Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 378-379.  German batteries were consistently starved of ammunition in Normandy. 
30 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16360.  Analyzing the war diary, there 
are five days (10-14 August) in August, 1944 which regimental positions were hit by German artillery counter-battery fire.    
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The complete lack of an effective intelligence picture was a third obstacle to the effectiveness of 
the German ground forces.  By mid 1944, German Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe operations were curtailed 
to point where they were insignificant.  The complete lack of aerial and maritime intelligence and timely 
code-breaking of Allied encoded signal traffic put German ground forces completely in the dark.  Apart 
from signals intelligence at the divisional level, prisoner interrogations and reconnaissance patrol reports, 
the average German divisional headquarters had little knowledge of enemy intentions.  When Canadian 
units began moving to assembly areas or artillery barrages began, it would be too late for a German 
commander to meet the demands of the situation.31  
A fourth important failing was the German ground force’s utter impotence in the face of Allied 
air superiority.  Despite an abundance of towed Luftwaffe-manned flak weapons, the absence of air 
support from mid-1944 onwards was devastating to the German military situation.  The Luftwaffe was 
now a largely spent force whose remains were hamstrung due to a lack of fuel and poorly-trained 
replacement pilots.  Any operation it mounted was immediately met with numerically and tactically 
superior Allied air assets.  The result of this immediate crushing of any air operation mounted in strength 
was an inability to launch effective ground attack sorties.32  A difficult battle of attrition in Normandy was 
decisively lost by the Luftwaffe, with the result that Canadian anti-aircraft units had much less in the way 
of targets by September 1944. 
Despite a lack of Canadian Army direction, the ground attack tactics of the RAF and RCAF were 
a decisive factor against German operational movement, counterattacks and the defence of fortifications.  
Though devastating to German ground forces, an Allied strategic carpet bombing attack was a rare 
occurrence.  It was the ever-present Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) 
Typhoon fighter-bombers that greatly inhibited all German operations.  As mentioned in the previous 
                                                          
31 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 381-382.  German front line units were forced to rely on signals and patrol intelligence to gain a 
picture of Allied intentions. 
32 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16360.  Analyzing the War Diary of 
the 12th Field Regiment, RCA for the September 1944 period when it was fighting to clear the channel ports, there is no entry 
recording an enemy air attack or Luftwaffe activity (30 days). 
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chapter, these fighter-bombers struck trains, convoys, AFVs, and even dismounted troops in the open.  
Daylight enemy movement was made nearly impossible in good weather.   
Allied airpower did not have to directly attack German military units on the ground to severely 
impair their performance.  Attacking the means of transportation and production would starve them of 
what they needed most.  These targets were to suffer the most from incessant Allied strategic and tactical 
airpower attack.  Spare parts, gasoline, ammunition, medical supplies and new reinforcements had a very 
difficult time reaching the front.  This was due to the damage done to bridges, railways and the German 
transport motor pool.33  Damage was so severe to railroad sidings, junctions and crucial bridges that the 
Reichsbahn (German Railroad authority) and the railroad systems of the Netherlands, France and Belgium 
began to malfunction.  The already low performance of the German artillery units was further inhibited by 
the lack of munitions.  The ammunition supply to German batteries in action had to be constant, day and 
night.  It was not an effective option for these batteries to husband their rounds for a limited number of 
strikes against pre-arranged targets, yet this is what occurred.  The second biggest victim of the aerial 
destruction of the transport network were the German heavy tanks units, those fielding the Panther and 
Tiger.  Each had a monstrous appetite for gasoline, and the lack of fuel deliveries for these behemoths 
limited their capability to be quickly switched to new combat zones.34  In addition to the damage done to 
the transport system, the impact of Allied strategic bombing of all industrial war production facilities in 
Germany began to have an impact mid-1944.  At this point the Germans were reaching the zenith of their 
production capability, and after this Allied bombing would force production levels to decline.35  In the 
early fall of 1944 production of AFVs and munitions was still being completed that could replace losses 
from Normandy, but getting these resources to the front was a difficult challenge.36   
                                                          
33 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 388-389, 403.  Notes.  German transport truck losses in Normandy were up to thirty per day from 
air attack. 
34 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12764.  Analysing the War 
Diary of the regiment for the period 18-31 August 1944, there is one noted contact with enemy armour.  Russell Hart, Clash of 
Arms, 390.  The 2nd. SS Panzer Division Das Reich was forced to abandon two companies of Panther tanks in late July 1944.   
35 Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (London, England: Allen Lane.  2013).  Overy makes the point at length 
throughout his work that aerial bombing only became effective when the U.S.A.A.F. established air superiority in mid 1944. 
36 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 387.   
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Having no alternative, the German ground forces facing the Canadian Army sought to adapt to 
their limitations and still attempt to conduct a successful defensive campaign.  They decided to attempt 
this by capitalizing on their remaining strengths to inflict maximum damage.  One of the most effective 
strengths of the German ground forces over the course of the last year of the war was the skilled use of 
light indirect fire.  The resources for sustained heavy artillery programs such as lifting barrages or counter 
battery fire were not present in 1944.37  The response to the inconvenience of weak supporting artillery 
was the concentrated use of mortars.  German doctrine perceived the medium mortar as a mobile light 
weapon that could bring immediate combat power to bear on an enemy.  The resulting extensive use of 
the German 80mm Grenatwerfer mortar was responsible of an inordinate number of Canadian infantry 
casualties.  The tactic of bombarding lost defensive positions as Canadian infantry consolidated on them 
was easy since the target was pre-registered.  Mortar crews could conduct intermittent harassing fire or 
fire an intensive barrage to mark the beginning of a counterattack.  A mortar crew’s location was also 
very difficult to pinpoint and suppress.  The weapon itself could be broken down and transported by a 
four man crew.  A 1944 German Grenadier regiment of two battalions contained twenty-four 80mm 
mortars and six 75mm infantry guns in the way of light indirect assets.38  These totals did not include the 
heavy 120mm mortar battery that was often present in some grenadier regiments.  Mortar ammunition 
was plentiful and the boxes of mortar bombs were easy to move forward from the rear.  The mortar crew 
were able to disperse out of sight near the front line, which was difficult for the heavy divisional 150mm 
and 105mm howitzer crews to do.39 
A second source of strength for German ground forces was the abundance of high velocity anti-
aircraft (flak) weapons.  The use of flak weaponry against Canadian infantry and tanks was not the best 
                                                          
37 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 378. 
38 Gary Kennedy, “The German Grenadier Battalion 1943-1945.”  Battalion Organization during the Second World War.   
Modified in 2010. http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/German/Infanterie/german_grenadier_battalionpercent 201943percent 
20topercent .  Retrieved 15 October 2015.   
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,226.  The Royal Regiment of Canada War Diary July 1944.  Diary entries for 18-19 July 1944 relate 
the assault by the regiment on the village of Louvigny, against elements of the 272nd German Infantry Division.  During this 
whole period intensive mortaring by the Germans inflicted 111 casualties on elements of the Canadian assault force that reached 
the village.  
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use of these weapons, as these guns were not designed for a ground role.  But due to their high velocity 
and capability to engage ground targets, they were effective.  Due to the increasing number of strategic 
bombing missions over Germany in 1942, a significant effort had been made to increase the number of 
Luftwaffe flak emplacements.  What this meant was that there were plenty of flak batteries in the Low 
Countries that could be employed in a ground role by the local area commander.  As the Canadian Army 
advanced in August-September 1944 and gaps in the German lines needed filling, available Luftwaffe 
flak units were pressed into service.  A Canadian infantry attack with a squadron of tanks supporting it 
would often be fighting dug in 88mm flak and quadruple 20mm Flakverling anti-aircraft guns.  These 
weapons could damage or destroy a Sherman tank and could start a fire-fight at ranges in excess of 2000 
meters.40  Weapons such as these often had high profiles and were easy to locate on the battlefield.  This 
led to a limited combat life expectancy of hours, but they could slow down Allied advances, and this was 
the goal.  Since they were not anti-tank guns they often had no shields, and could be silenced with one 
high explosive (HE) shell from a Sherman or sustained fire from a .50 caliber tank machine gun. 
The third strength of German ground forces was the performance of AFV crews in combat.  
Aggressive tactics by German armoured units in Normandy were often in contrast to Allied practices.  
Often without infantry support, German tanks would seek to outflank Canadian armoured and infantry 
advances.  They also had no inhibitions about conducting road moves and combat operations at night.  
Engaging targets from long range, they used their armament to its fullest potential.  These aggressive 
tactics could lead to disaster for the German tanks if they ran up against Allied AFVs or anti-tank guns in 
ambush.41  They were also very vulnerable to infantry anti-tank weapons in poor light or urban 
conditions.  This did not stop them from doing their utmost to stop Canadian attacks and support 
grenadier battalions.  The German tank crews were fully cognizant that they were the force holding 
                                                          
40 LAC RG 24 Volume 31,056.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) War Diary October 1944.  Diary 
entry of 31 October 1944 regarding the assault on the Walcheren Causeway.  A high-velocity anti-tank or anti-aircraft (88mm) 
weapon was used to fire down the causeway.  
41 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 74.  The 3rd Company of SS Panzer Regiment 12 lost six Panthers as complete write-offs on 9 June 
1944 to a M4 Sherman 75mm and Sherman Firefly 17-Pounder ambush.  
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together a cohesive front and had to act accordingly.  This aggressive attitude and disregard for losses 
could often bring impressive results, delaying numerically superior forces.42   
The Canadian Army fielded technologically inferior tanks and relied on other nations to supply 
them.  The German Panther and Tiger tanks, despite fuel consumption and reliability issues, had highly 
advanced armour and armament.  Some of this armour was sloped, which provided a defensive advantage 
when faced with anti-tank guns and other tanks.  German AFVs were equipped with high velocity 
weapons, which allowed for a devastating first hit advantage when it came to tank vs. tank duels.  German 
tanks could also engage targets effectively at much longer ranges than a 75mm-gunned M4 Sherman, 
which made up the majority of Canadian armoured regiments in Normandy.43  All a Tiger or Panther 
gunner needed was one successful shot, while a Canadian gunner might need several shots, preferably in 
the flank, to get a decisive hit.  Allied tanks often came with gasoline engines, whose fuel burned easily.  
The Tigers and Panther's engines were also gasoline, but they carried more armour in this area of the hull.  
The German AFV crews could thus operate tactically with less restrictions than Allied tanks, whose 
tactics were curtailed by technology and the need to have other arms in support.   
Supporting the German infantry in a manner similar to the tanks was the most functional and 
effective arm of the German artillery, the Sturmgeschütz (self-propelled assault gun) units.  In fall 1944 
all forms of German AFVs became scarce on the Canadian front.  What remained from September 1944 
onwards were limited numbers of Sturmgeschütz III and other self-propelled guns.44  This was due to 
panzer and assault gun units being employed elsewhere against British and American operations, some of 
which had reached German territory.  The Sturmgeschütz III and 88mm gunned Jagdpanther vehicles had 
                                                          
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,260.  22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12727.  Diary entry 8 August, 
1944 relates Canadian tank losses inflicted by panzers in the vicinity of Cintheaux, bringing their advance to a halt.  Brian Reid, 
No Holding Back, 312.  One Panther and one Tiger tank platoon were responsible for destroying two squadrons of the 28th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment) on 8-9 August, 1944, by manoeuvring around the Canadian 
defensive position. 
43 Brian Reid, No Holding Back, 374.  Comparative German tank effective ranges to kill a Sherman chart.   
44 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,568.  96th Battery, 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16718.  For the month of 
March 1945, not one enemy AFV is recorded in war diary entries as contacted, despite the 4th Canadian Armoured Division's  
participation in Operation “Blockbuster”. 
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low profiles, effective armament and the crews were proficient at working with German infantry.  This 
last attribute was not always the case with the German tank units.  
Despite their best efforts and aggressive tactics, nothing could make up for strength of numbers or 
the lack there of in the German armoured units.  In Normandy and the Low Countries, armoured units 
were constantly hindered by the lack of replacement vehicles and spare parts.45  As long as the front line 
was somewhat stable they could recover damaged or broken down vehicles at night and repair them.  
However, if the front was in a state of flux and German units were withdrawing, damaged AFVs or those 
out of gasoline would be lost.  An aggressive defence had to be continuously mounted by armoured 
forces, as the German infantry units were very weak without AFV support.  This resulted in ongoing 
losses due to Allied anti-tank efforts.  If a unit that was constantly fighting, withdrawing and receiving no 
replacement AFVs or spares, their numbers would quickly ebb away. 
A fourth strength was the rare emergence of the exceptional infantry unit in late 1944 and early 
1945.  These would often consist of motivated soldiers who had been given adequate training and were 
well equipped to conduct limited defensive tasks.  Despite the calibre of the German infantry at this stage 
of the war, their training system was still intact and attempting to do its best.  By utilizing young but 
motivated recruits, such as the Fallschirmjager (paratroop) light infantry facing the Canadian Army in fall 
of 1944, adequate combat performance could be expected.  This was the case during the fall 1944 combat 
performance of “Kampfgruppe Chill” south of Bergen Op Zoom, the Netherlands, against attacking 
Canadian units.46  Despite the Fallschirmjager being numerically inferior and having limited self-
propelled (SP) gun and artillery support, they delivered a reasonable combat performance in defence.  
However, ill-advised counter-attacks wasted their strength and combat power.  These units were a rarity 
                                                          
45 Pier Battistelli, Panzer Divisions 1944-45 (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing.  2009), 173.  Of the 480 Panzer IV tanks 
produced in August-September, 166 were sent to the Western Front to replace 610 Panzer IVs lost in France and the Low 
Countries.  
46 LAC RG 24 Volume 14,234.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary October 1944.  T-12698.  In the fighting south of 
Bergen Op Zoom, The Netherlands on 7-10 October 1944, serious resistance was offered by the German 6th Parachute 
(fallschirmjager)Regiment .  Despite defensive successes, their strength was wasted in ill-advised counter-attacks. 
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in late 1944 and early 1945, and were often thrown away due to “hold to the last round” defensive 
directives issued by OKH and Adolf Hitler. 
The fifth strength that was crucial to the German recovery post-Normandy was strong 
organizational skills within division and corps level headquarters.  German units that had reached an 
extremely low level of personnel were withdrawn in order to be reconstituted.  Weak units that were not 
chosen to be re-built were consolidated to make one strong unit.  Alarm units were also raised to offset 
the effects of attrition among the front line grenadier companies.  Supply and rear area troops no longer 
required were immediately designated infantrymen and pushed forward into the company platoons as 
replacements.47  While reinforcement personnel were few and rarely arrived, maximum use of what 
personnel that were available was achieved by German commanders.   
A sixth strength was the effective use of limited resources.  Fuel and ammunition became scarce 
as the Allied bomber offensive became effective in mid-1944.48  Apart from withdrawals and forced 
retreats, the German ground forces were not highly mobile and did not consume major resources by 
conducting constant offensive movement.  Once German forces were back near the borders of Germany 
in late 1944 their supply lines were shortened, making the supply situation better.  When formations did 
deplete resources, reinforcements and supplies could arrive quickly due to the geographic proximity of 
supply depots.49  The German ground forces had none of the long distance challenges to logistics that the 
advancing Canadian Army had, and they could use their meagre resources to their maximum within a set 
defensive zone.   
                                                          
47 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 386. 
48 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 389.   German forces facing the U.S. Operation “Cobra” in July 1944 had less than two days fuel 
at average consumption rates.  
49 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,061.  The Essex Scottish War Diary February 1945.  WW2 Talk Forum online article "Veritable, the 
Canadian Finale" (Moyland Wood & Goch-Calcar Road)" by online WW2 forum member Stolpi.  Modified 2015.  
http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/47307-veritable-the-canadian-finale-moyland-wood-goch-calcar-road/page-2.  Retrieved 31 
October 2015.  Battle-groups of the 116th and Panzer Lehr panzer divisions were brought in by rail via Germany to bring the 
Anglo-Canadian Operation "Veritable" to a halt.  Armoured elements included roughly forty-five Panthers, Panzer IVs and 
Jagdpanther self -propelled guns.  This was a large amount of armour for the Canadian front in 1945. 
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A seventh strength of the German ground forces were the employment of effective defensive 
tactics to slow down Canadian Army advances in 1944-1945.  From July 1944 onward, apart from local 
counterattacks, German ground forces were on the defensive.  They had to adapt their tactics to the new 
situation, and attempt to defend large areas of territory with limited resources.  In this situation it became 
imperative to utilize whatever advantages were present.  While lacking the initiative, the Germans could 
analyse where and when the Canadian Army would possibly strike.  They would then decide where and 
when to seek to hold Canadian forces off, and when to withdraw.  If their forces were skilful enough, they 
could successfully ambush advancing Canadian reconnaissance, armour or infantry forces.50   
The defending German ground forces utilized obstacles, anti-tank guns and machine gun bunkers 
that were sited to create suitable “kill zones”.  These defences were backed up by dug in mortar positions.  
The often ponderous Allied advance, coupled with four years of German military occupation, allowed for 
the construction of impressive defensive works.51  These advantages often negated Allied armoured, 
artillery and air support combat force multipliers.  The norm of 3:1 attacking odds was often minimized 
by the strength of these defensive positions, and attacking Canadian infantry units worn down by past 
battles often had to attack at 1:1 odds.  Canadian forces would often attack on a narrow front to 
concentrate their combat power.  In turn, this allowed the Germans to concentrate all possible fires on this 
restricted area, increasing attacker casualties.  
When a German defensive victory was achieved, it was often not due to a lack of Canadian 
determination, effective tactics, or sufficient firepower.  The German method of defence was not 
unsophisticated.  German defences began with a line of thinly manned outposts, with riflemen, small 
infantry mortars and MG-42 machine guns.  These outposts were 400 meters from enemy forward 
positions.  In front of the outpost line would be anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, on obvious routes of 
                                                          
50 Roman Jarymowycz, "The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign" , 290.  50 LAC, RG 24 Volume 
15,262.  The South Saskatchewan Regiment War Diary July 1944.  Entries 19-21 July 1944.  A well-timed combined arms 
counterattack by Waffen SS tanks and infantry inflicted 222 casualties killed, wounded or missing.  Rather than a wasteful 
counterattack against fortified Canadian positions, this attack caught Canadian infantry in the open and without tank support.  
51 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 201.  The defences facing the First Canadian Army for Operation "Veritable" in February 1945 
consisted of three belts, each 500-1000 meters wide.  
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approach.  Further in front of the outpost line would be pre-registered targets for mortars and artillery.  
This line of outposts would be held as long as it took to ascertain the direction and strength of the 
Canadian attack.  If radio communications or field phones were not installed, flare guns could be used as 
a signal for tanks or infantry.  The tell-tale Canadian moving artillery barrage would alert the defenders 
regardless.  The non-stop tactic of “sniping”, as it is referred to within Canadian unit war diaries, was 
often the work of these outposts.  This was not done by dedicated snipers, but by infiltrating German 
soldiers using their weapons at their maximum range.  This tactic had the potential to impair Canadian 
infantry platoon movement and inhibit a battalion attack.   
Behind this outer perimeter were stronger German advanced positions at the company level that 
interlocked with each other and contained MG-42s on tripod mounts and more riflemen.  These positions 
were located 1,500 to 2,000 meters from the enemy.  Behind these at the battalion level was the main line 
of resistance, located up to 5,000 meters from the enemy.  This distance illustrates the German belief in 
depth, and how they utilized the concept.  In these positions were 80mm mortars and 75mm anti-tank 
guns from the mortar and anti-tank gun platoons.  Further behind these positions were camouflaged 
Sturmgeschutz IIIs or panzers in ambush positions.  The armour could assume the counter attack role 
immediately and begin to manoeuvre to hit Canadian forces in the flank.  The mortars and anti-tank guns 
would be sighted so they could fire at targets attacking the company-level positions, and have free fields 
of fire so that they could use their maximum range.  Tripod-mounted MG-42s in the sustained fire role 
would also be sighted with interlocking arcs in order to cut down the attacking Canadian infantry 
following its moving artillery barrage.52   
Due to the depth of German positions, German commanders could enact a mobile or elastic 
defence as the battle progressed.  This defence caused continuous damage to the attacker as the defenders 
would withdraw before becoming decisively engaged.  Ground would be surrendered, but in exchange for 
damage done to the enemy.  If the defending German units needed to withdraw a small distance tactically, 
                                                          
52 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 375. 
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they could.  With the attacker sufficiently weakened over time, the defence would “bounce back” with a 
counter-attack at the right moment with reserves set aside for this purpose. 
There were two practices that inhibited the success of the above defensive tactics.  The Festung 
(fortress) orders of Hitler was the first.  These orders (Fuhrerbefehls) and similar ones emanating from 
within Berlin's OKH headquarters hamstrung German divisional commanders from executing an elastic, 
or mobile defence.53  By forcing overwhelmed units to try to hold on to a fixed position rather than fight a 
mobile battle, the defenders were forced into a decisive struggle they could not win.  In 1944 it was very 
likely the ground would be lost regardless.  Units forced to fight to the last round against the Canadian 
Army rarely did, and readily surrendered when they faced annihilation and no way to withdraw.  The 
manpower losses were irreplaceable and were the last thing needed by German commanders such as 
Oberbefehlshaber West, (Commander-in-Chief West) Feldmarschall Walter Model, in 1944.  Model as a 
commander did carry considerable political prestige with Hitler, and could exercise resistance against the 
worst of his orders.  In some cases resistance to the Fuhrer’s directives was futile, and significant infantry 
losses were the result. 
Secondly, the tactic of the immediate counterattack to regain a small area of lost ground or 
prominent map feature was a wasteful exercise that rarely succeeded.  This was a practice that sought to 
evict Canadian infantry companies and supporting assets that were consolidating on a newly-conquered 
former German position.54  The German infantry often did not have the support nor numbers to expend 
what little strength they had to re-capture lost ground.  Canadian artillery, anti-tank, machine gun, mortar 
and tank fire would crush these attacks.  This was due to the Canadian Army anticipating the now routine 
German counterattacks and fortifying their new positions.  Canadian defensive assets were rushed into 
newly occupied objectives to seize the opportunity of destroying the attacking Germans in the open, 
                                                          
53 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 368.  General Wilhelm Daser, commander of the German 70th Infantry Division, 
received the order to hold to the last round on Walcheren Island.  
54 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,217.  The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry War Diary February 1945.  Entries 19-21 February 1945.  
Nine Panther tanks, two Jagdpanthers and two SPW-251 half-tracks were recorded as knocked out by Canadian  infantry and 
supporting 2nd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment tank destroyers.  This occurred during German counter-attacks on Canadian 
positions during the February, 1945 Operation "Veritable" fighting near Louisendorf, Germany. 
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utilizing a maximum number of weapons systems.55  The immediate counter attack was the wrong move.   
The correct choice was to utilize powerful reserves at the right moment against a weakened enemy on the 
move. 
In summary, German ground forces in the mid 1944 to spring 1945 period possessed some 
strengths, but were handicapped by damaging limitations.  The small numbers of available mortars, AFVs 
and trained infantry units were skilfully used to conduct effective defensive tactics where possible or 
permitted.  Effective administration in the way of personnel and resource management allowed operations 
to continue despite shortages of everything.  Major limitations included a lack of replacement personnel 
and equipment, a poor intelligence picture, no air support and a reduced heavy artillery capability.  Due to 
these challenges, the majority of Canadian casualties during the campaign in NWE were borne by front-
line units receiving direct fire and light indirect fire.  Attacking Canadian infantry units suffered large 
losses due to in-depth German defensive tactics and their vulnerability to all forms of defensive fire.  
Chart 3.5 illustrates the limited abilities of the German forces, and how they could only inflict limited 
damage on the Canadian armoured and RCA artillery regiments in the spring of 1945.   
Poor leadership at the strategic level increased the impact of the limitations already affecting the 
weak German ground forces by regularly making two unrealistic demands.  Higher headquarters 
demanded that certain locations or localities be held until the last round, and that immediate 
counterattacks with insufficient forces be launched to regain lost strong points.  Rather than conduct a 
mobile elastic defence, German forces were often forced to execute these two wasteful tactics that gained 
nothing.  With poor quality infantry and little in the way of fire support in comparison to the Allies, these 
missions had little chance of success.  Canadian artillery was so powerful it could defeat all but the most 
determined counter-attack.  If these operations did not immediately succeed, there was little point to 
                                                          
55 Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 316-319.  During a battalion level German paratroop (Fallschirmjager) attack supported by 
three Sturmgeschutz III's on The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Woensdrecht, the Netherlands, a RCA "Victor" Target was 
called in by a Forward Observation Officer(FOO).  Three divisional RCA field regiments, three RCA AGRA medium regiments 
and three heavy anti-aircraft regiments fired 4,000 shells to utterly destroy the German infantry in the open.  
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continuing the fighting as losses would only mount.  Units that were surrounded or facing annihilation 
quickly surrendered rather than "fight to the last round".   
Chart 3.5: March 1945 Battle casualty totals for the 4th Canadian Armoured Division: Figures for 
the Algonquin Regiment (infantry), the 22nd Armoured Regiment and all four divisional RCA 
regiments.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,663.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  
4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-10551.  All RCA personnel battle casualties for the division 
combined. 
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Chapter 4: The Canadian Army’s system for deploying personnel 
reinforcements to combat arms units in North West Europe 1944-1945 
 
 This chapter will describe the process for deploying Canadian combat arms reinforcements to 
positions within an assigned infantry, armoured or artillery unit.  Charts within this chapter will illustrate 
this reinforcement system, provide data on the Canadian Army’s reinforcement abilities and give 
comparative insight on German replacement capabilities.  Comparisons with the records of the U.S. and 
British armies are included in the subsequent chapter dealing with personnel challenges in the Canadian 
Army Overseas (CAO).  With regard to the total reinforcement system, this study will limit itself to the 
analysis of the deployment of reinforcement personnel on the European continent through the Canadian 
Base Reinforcement Groups (CBRG).  Information on the extensive reinforcement structures located in 
the U.K and Canada, taking on for the most part a personnel holding and training role, will not be 
included. 
 The personnel replacement system within the Canadian Army was designed to be a constantly 
ongoing process, maintaining formations over the long term.  It was designed to be effective, but 
responsive at every level of its operation.  The several layers of bureaucracy necessary to properly 
administer and control the process came at the expense of simplicity and speed.  This allowed resources to 
be diverted or increased at any juncture, giving the machine flexibility.  The process of deploying a 
replacement soldier to his designated unit was not instantaneous, due to the route being lengthy.  But once 
the process was started, reinforcements would arrive at units as needed and at regular intervals, as long as 
there was a pool of trained soldiers to feed the machine.  In June 1944, the staff officers within the 
Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) London were reasonably confident that they had created an 
adequate system that was well stocked for any challenges that lay ahead in North West Europe (NWE).1   
                                                          
1 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 284-285.  Despite evidence of higher infantry casualty rates in Italy and totally different 
geographical terrain, North African level wastage rates were utilized by CMHQ for NWE.  Using these projections, it appeared 
that enough Canadian reinforcements were present in U.K. during the spring of 1944. 
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 Personnel matters were the responsibility of the Adjutant General’s Branch within the Canadian 
Army, and were referred to as “A” branch staff concerns.2  Logistic matters concerning supplies and war 
material were “Q” branch staff concerns and the domain of the Quartermaster General Branch.  "Q" 
matters were more complicated due to the large amounts of war material and consumable supplies 
required to sustain the Canadian Army in the field.  Two Canadian staff echelons, or groupings, one each 
for “A” (Adjutant General) and “Q” (Quartermaster General) concerns were created at 21st Army Group 
headquarters prior to June 1944’s Operation “Overlord”.  This was accomplished to free up First 
Canadian Army headquarters of all future administrative and logistic matters not immediately related to 
operations.  The larger grouping, encompassing all "Q" branch staff, was titled 1st Echelon, and the 
smaller grouping containing all "A" branch staff was titled 2nd Echelon.  The leadership of Canadian 1st 
Echelon at 21st Army Group also oversaw and directed 2nd Echelon activities.  The 2nd Echelon's primary 
focus was personnel administration and replacement.3  The larger grouping was commanded throughout 
1944 by Brigadier B.A. Beament.  Following his tenure, Major-General E.L.M. Burns took command in 
January 1945 following his relinquishment of command of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy.  Both men were 
very experienced administrators who understood the importance of their responsibilities.  The 
commanding officer of Canadian 2nd Echelon during 1944-1945 was Colonel V. S. C. McClenaghan.  He 
was also an officer who had gained experience in administration and planning duties while serving in the 
Mediterranean theatre. 
 The principal headquarters for the Canadian personnel reinforcement organization that directly 
supplied Canadian divisions in NWE during 1944 was No.2 Headquarters, Canadian Base Reinforcement 
Group (CBRG).  This headquarters controlled the distribution of reinforcement personnel for all army 
trades in NWE from 6 June 1944 to the appearance of No. 3 CRBG in March 1945.  The newer No.2 
CRBG was decidedly smaller than its twin reinforcement organization in Italy, the No.1 CRBG.  While 
                                                          
2 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 623. 
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 630. 
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No.1 CBRG had a total of eight reinforcement battalions, No.2 CBRG had only five.4  It was felt that 
because of the effect of training level deterioration over time, it was better to have a smaller organization 
that would hold reinforcements for a shorter period.  It was planned to hold two to three weeks supply at 
"intense" casualty rates for the assault forces that would immediately take part in the invasion, the 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.  In contrast to this relatively small 
number of reinforcements immediately available for Normandy, two full months worth of reinforcements 
had been set aside for the July 1943 invasion of Sicily, Operation “Husky”.  The next chapter of this 
study will discuss in more detail Canadian Army calculation errors concerning projected casualty rates 
and other personnel challenges. 
 The No.2 CBRG was under the direct command of 21st Army Group and its Canadian echelons, 
yet worked closely later at all junctures with the headquarters of 2nd Canadian Corps, First Canadian 
Army and CMHQ in London.  Its five reinforcement battalions were numbered nine through thirteen.5  As 
soon as the Normandy landings occurred, a forward base was established on the continent.  The first 
battalion to establish itself in France was the 10th, landing on 9 June 1944.  Next was the 9th battalion, 
which was ashore on 13 June 1944.  These battalions were soon followed by the 11th and 12th.  All four 
fed a British advance reinforcement battalion which in turn supplied the 1st British Corps reinforcement 
company with Canadian replacements until mid July 1944.  It was at this time that the 2nd Canadian Corps 
became operational, taking over the leadership and administration of all Canadian formations ashore from 
the 1st British Corps.  The 2nd Canadian Corps was placed under command of the Second British Army, 
but this was short-lived.  Early August 1944 saw the First Canadian Army become operational, utilizing 
the 2nd Canadian Corps as one of its two corps.  With this act Canadian control of the personnel 
reinforcement process became nearly total, with only the 21st Army Group headquarters maintaining 
administrative oversight. 
                                                          
4 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 630. General Order 297 21 June 1944 relating to the establishment of No.2 CBRG..  
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.2 CBRG, 03/44 – 02/46.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 631. 
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 The last No.2 CBRG battalion in France, the 13th, landed on 3 August 1944.  Once the 13th was 
ashore, it based itself forward at the newly operational First Canadian Army road head staging area.  This 
unit's task was to act as the advance reinforcement battalion, replacing a British Army equivalent 
battalion in this role.  It oversaw the flow of personnel to the 2nd Canadian Corps reinforcement company 
and the divisional reinforcement companies, and sought to ensure a consistent reinforcement supply to the 
combat units as operations continued from August 1944 onward.6   
 The 1944 Canadian reinforcement battalion would usually consist of several categories of 
personnel in addition to new overseas Active Service Force volunteers.7  The battalion’s title gives the 
impression that it consisted of all brand-new reinforcement personnel, and this was not the case.  
Personnel could be returning battle or non-battle casualties, re-musters from another trade or volunteer 
former National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) soldiers.  Some were new to the Canadian Army, 
while others had been in it for a longer period of time.  To address limited transportation concerns and the 
necessity of placing personnel where they were needed quickly, a single administrative process was 
essential.  Thus all personnel, both returning and new reinforcements, were mixed together in one pipeline 
that stretched from the reinforcement battalion to the divisional reinforcement company.8 
 There was one Canadian Army trade that had its own separate reinforcement process.  In contrast 
to the path of other reinforcements in 1944-1945, all reinforcement Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) 
personnel were split away halfway through the process.  This was done at the corps level reinforcement 
company stage or earlier, depending on the situation.  They were then attached to 25th Canadian 
Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th CADR) squadrons.  This separation was done in accordance with 
CAC policy.  The 25th CADR took control of all CAC replacements and ferried them, often as complete 
                                                          
6 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 631.  
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.2 CBRG, 03/44 – 02/46.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 630-631.  The reinforcement battalion itself was an administrative holding organization for reinforcements, 
rather than an army battalion trained in a specific trade or mission.  It would consist usually of several hundred transient 
personnel, controlled and administered by a permanent battalion command structure.  
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,001.  Algonquin Regiment War Diary April 1945.  An April 1945 war diary entry makes reference to 
only 25percent of the reinforcements having combat experience, illustrating the mix they were receiving in way of replacements.  
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armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) crews, to the Canadian armoured regiments.  In this way they were 
guaranteed to remain with the AFVs and not have their skill sets lost due to emergency re-mustering.  
Also, if the tanks and the tank crews were isolated from each other, they would both lose their combat 
power.   
 In January 1945, the No.2 CBRG was re-organized to improve its effectiveness.  One large pool 
of reinforcements was collected in Ghent, the Netherlands, to be distributed within First Canadian Army 
formations.  By this time in the war the transport time for reinforcements to reach the front was lessened 
considerably by the opening of the port of Antwerp in Belgium.  The re-organization began with the 
disbandment of all companies except one within the 12th Battalion.  Next, the 10th and 11th battalions were 
specialized to feed infantrymen to infantry regiments.9  The 9th battalion was re-configured to feed 
replacements to divisional level units, and the 13th took responsibility for replacements to Canadian corps 
and army level units.10  This re-organization placed a focus on the processing of infantry reinforcements.  
This was necessary due to the majority of all battle casualties occurring within the Canadian Infantry 
Corps (CIC) and relatively few replacements being needed within other trades in comparison. 
 In April 1945 the 1st Canadian Corps was declared operational and it commenced combat 
operations in the Netherlands.  Due to the arrival of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, the 1st Canadian 
Armoured Brigade and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, the need arose to have a separate 
reinforcement organization to feed these formations.  The headquarters of the disbanded 12th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, formerly part of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, was configured to form a 
headquarters for this new replacement structure.  This group consisted of three reinforcement battalions 
and was designated the No. 3 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (No. 3 CBRG).  With the creation of 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.2 CBRG, 03/44 – 02/46.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 632. 
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.2 CBRG, 03/44 – 02/46.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 632. 
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this organization, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps each had their own reinforcement systems.  No. 3 
CBRG's battalions were numbered 14 through 16.11 
 The process of arranging for the delivery of required reinforcement personnel was administrative.  
The regimental headquarters (RHQ) of an infantry regiment would request its personnel reinforcements 
needs through weekly officer and other ranks field returns.  After an evaluation of the reinforcement pool 
and how many reinforcements other regiments required, a decision would be made on what could be 
spared, when and to what regiment.  This decision would often be influenced by the corps level general 
staff, as certain units slated for operations had to be as strong as possible.  Reinforcements arriving on 
Juno Beach in Normandy or Antwerp in Belgium during 1944 were often just a short distance from the 
front lines.  Despite this short distance, there were many administrative steps involved for reinforcement 
soldiers to get to their final destination.   
 Chart 4.1 illustrates the route reinforcement personnel would take after their arrival on the 
continent to get to their combat arms unit.  As an example, Canadian general duty infantry reinforcements 
on arrival in France in July 1944 would be first processed through a 21st Army Group reception camp's 
Canadian section.  From there the soldiers would be posted to a No.2 CBRG reinforcement battalion.  
Then they would move to the No.2 CBRG advanced reinforcement battalion.  The next step was a move 
to the corps level reinforcement company.  Following this, the soldiers would then arrive at the divisional 
level reinforcement company.  Personnel would then be transported to a regiment within a brigade, but 
not to their designated infantry company immediately.  The new arrivals would spend time in the 
regimental B (Supply and administrative) Echelon or Left out of Battle (LOB) grouping in order to 
acclimatize to conditions at the front.  Following this short period, the reinforcements would then be 
                                                          
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 12,448.  Organization and Administration of No.3 CBRG 04/45 – 05/45.  T-20276.  Charles Stacey, The 
Victory Campaign, 632. 
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posted to a platoon within a rifle company.  Including shipboard transport from the U.K. to Normandy, 
reinforcement infantry soldiers had a the total of eight moves between different camp organizations.12   
Chart 4.1: First Canadian Army personnel delivery system chart13 
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 At various way-points within the reinforcement process a soldier could be redirected if 
requirements or the situation changed.  During the general duty infantry reinforcement shortage in the 
summer of 1944, soldiers from other trades were re-mustered into infantry regiments after a period of re-
training.  Nothing else could be done to address the problem in the immediate short term.  During the fall 
                                                          
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of personnel replacement and releases .  File 
215C1.045 (D12).  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 630-632. 
13 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of personnel replacement and releases.  File 
215C1.045 (D12).   
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of 1944, re-mustering of excess non-infantry personnel continued and reinforcements in the U.K. and the 
continent were re-trained to upgrade what infantry skills they had.14 
 Rapid mass transfers were not an everyday occurrence for the No.2 CBRG.  This organization 
had to consistently maintain a float of personnel, should an unforeseen disaster occur that would place the 
majority of one or several infantry battalions in large deficit positions.  If the reinforcement battalions had 
given away all their personnel at this point it would be impossible to respond to such a disaster.  They 
always had to be ready for the possibility that a military reverse could occur.  With the period near the 
war’s end being the exception, this factor influenced their behaviour with regards to releasing 
reinforcements.  On top of this were administrative and travel time waiting periods that were imposed on 
the requesting regiment, extending the time before the regiment actually had the men arrive at its B 
Echelon.15  Transfers of over 200 personnel reinforcements in one day were extremely rare and the entire 
process was very bureaucratic.16  To qualify for a large immediate transfer, a regiment’s immediate future 
performance in an upcoming operation would have to be in doubt.   
 Despite various integration challenges, once reinforcements joined their units, they were taken on 
strength (TOS) by the regimental adjutant.  They would then appear as part of the unit on returns for the 
next day to the higher chain of command.  Thus a unit's status could change very rapidly, from a 
weakened state to one of being potentially capable of accepting losses in high intensity combat.  It is 
important to note that a transfer of new reinforcements often did not alter the capability of the receiving 
regiment immediately.  Despite urgent requests for new personnel by a receiving regiment, the same unit 
would often unwittingly slow down the “arrival” process.  This action could make the regiment look 
strong on paper when it had not fully re-organized itself to absorb its new strength.  Theoretically, the 
                                                          
14 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 294-295.  Copp relates the infantry re-mustering and re-training of Lieutenant Walter Keith, a 
Signals Corps officer, in the U.K. over the winter of 1944-1945. 
15 “Glossary –E.  Echelon” article.  Canadiansoldiers.com  http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/glossary/glossarye.htm.  Retrieved 
20 February 2016.  Combat arms regiments consisted F, A and B Echelons.  F was the fighting component of the unit, containing 
everything needed for the combat mission, while and A and B echelons were for supply and administrative roles.  
16 LAC, RG24 Volume 18,616.  Reinforcement Drafts from U.K. by date and amount.  The 2 September 1944 draft from the 
U.K., SP INF 4, consisted of ninety-one officers and 562 other ranks.  Divided amongst the infantry regiments of the 2nd and 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Divisions and 4th Canadian Armoured Division, it was not a huge amount.  
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reinforcement personnel would reach the unit and report to the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) or 
Adjutant, then swiftly make their way to their infantry companies, armour squadrons or artillery batteries.  
As noted previously, the new arrivals would often be given time to acclimatize themselves within a 
regiment’s B Echelon or LOB contingents.  This was done to avoid unnecessary errors in the field that 
might make them casualties within hours of arriving.17  
 An important secondary function of the personnel reinforcement system was not one that its 
designers envisioned.  Separate from new personnel but part of the incoming reinforcement stream were 
medical casualties returning to their units.  The return of battle and non-battle casualties without 
psychological problems was fairly straightforward, and these rehabilitated personnel utilized the system 
to rejoin their units with minimal delay.  However, after intense combat operations a portion of the 
resulting non-battle casualties within combat arms regiments were psychiatric.  A segment of these cases 
could be rehabilitated through a short but intense rest period close to the front line in the battalion 
regimental aid post (RAP), but others needed further rest.18 
 As part of their medical rehabilitation, these soldiers were reverse fed directly into the 
reinforcement companies.19  The 2nd Canadian Corps reinforcement company during 1944-1945 often 
acted as a tool to extend the rehabilitation period for battle exhaustion cases.  Its bureaucratic process 
could be used to give soldiers who needed extra time an additional waiting period.  Within the system, the 
battle exhaustion casualty would have to transit from the corps level reinforcement company to the 
divisional level reinforcement company.  This valuable time was used for rest, therapy and rehabilitation.  
Also, if an emergency was to occur, the soldier in question was not far away from the regimental or 
brigade area of operations.  Appendix 9 within this study supplies a breakdown of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division neuro-psychiatric casualties that occurred in the fall of 1944.  Tables within this appendix 
                                                          
17 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 631-633.  Reinforcements coming though took a average of three-four days transit to 
show up on the nominal rolls of the receiving regiment.  In October 1944, before the Port of Antwerp opened, reinforcements 
took seven days to arrive. This was due to the increased distance from the Normandy beachhead to the front line in the Scheldt.   
18 Terry Copp, Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army 1939-1945.  (Kingston: 
McGill-Queens University Press.  1990.), 57. 
19 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army.  Appendix E, 308-311.  LAC War Diary ADMS 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. 
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illustrate that the corps reinforcement company was utilized as the treatment option for 67.5 percent of all 
battle exhaustion casualties within division.  These neuro-psychiatric casualties constituted 15 percent of 
total divisional casualties.  This was a large percentage and highlights the importance of the reinforcement 
company in this additional role. 20 
 The capacity of the reinforcement system to deliver personnel was impressive.  Chart 4.2 
illustrates total Canadian reinforcements dispatched to the 21st Army Group in the months August 1944 to 
February 1945.  Considering the number of Canadian formations in NWE in contrast to British and U.S.  
Chart 4.2: Total Canadian reinforcements dispatched to the 21st Army Group in NWE from the 
U.K. August 1944-February 194521 
 
forces, the monthly totals are significant amounts.  The one blemish on the overall record is the number of 
personnel sent in August 1944, which did not match demands for reinforcements.  This occurred due to 
poor planning on the part of Canadian Army leadership, and is discussed in detail in the subsequent 
chapter.  The strength of Canadian units was adequately re-built in September 1944 and all units on the 
                                                          
20 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army.  Appendix E, 308-311.  LAC War Diary ADMS 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. 
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 18,616.  17 March 1945 report on Canadian reinforcements dispatched to 21st Army Group 
in NWE, 5 August 1944-28 February 1945.  File 133.035 (D92).   
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eve of the Scheldt fighting were close to their war establishment figures.  This rebuilding occurred again 
in November 1944 post Battle of the Scheldt.  The First Canadian Army was largely operationally 
inactive during December 1944 and January 1945, resulting in low demand for reinforcements other than 
for ongoing non-battle losses.  These reinforcement numbers spike again with the resumption of high 
intensity operations in February 1945. 
 This reinforcement ability of the Canadian Army was superior to that of the German land forces.  
As shown in Chart 4.3, the German Army, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe ground units were bled white in 
Normandy and their losses were not replaced.  The two points for every date in Chart 4.3 chronicle the 
gulf between losses and replacements.  With new losses occurring every day, German units on the front 
line never had a break to build up their strength.  The failure to provide large numbers of replacements to 
a least halt the haemorrhaging meant that units got progressively weaker. 
Chart 4.3: Cumulative figures of German battle losses in Normandy and total replacements issued, 
July-August 194422 
 
 Chart 4.4 addresses the question of whether sufficient replacement Canadian Army personnel 
were provided to cope with ongoing losses.  Reviewing the chart, it would appear that the number of 
                                                          
22 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 385. 
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reinforcements dispatched to keep units at 100 percent of their war establishments was excessive.  This is 
due to other causes of losses that were unrecorded at the division level on a monthly basis, and not 
included in this chart.  These included non-battle casualties, transfers, imprisonment and AWOL (away 
without leave) cases.  These categories combined constituted a ongoing drain to personnel levels, 
removing soldiers from units just as effectively as battle losses.  
Chart 4.4: Dispatched Canadian reinforcement draft totals from the U.K. (blue) versus battle 
casualties (red)for major Canadian Army formations in NWE, 6 June-8 December 194423 
 
 In summary, despite its limited speed and bureaucratic complexity, the reinforcement systems 
production at the CBRG level was continuous, making weekly or twice weekly deliveries at regimental 
unit B echelons.  It was also flexible and could be manipulated, albeit slowly.  Once in operation, 
deliveries of new personnel would continue on a regular basis until either the machine ran out of 
replacement soldiers or it was ordered to stop.  In this way the ongoing problem of wartime personnel 
losses could be serviced.   
                                                          
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 18,616.  17 March 1945 report on Canadian reinforcements dispatched to 21st Army Group in NWE: 5 
August 1944-28 February 1945. File 133.035(D92).  Canadian Army Historical Section Report: Comparison battle casualties 
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Chapter 5: The growth of the Canadian Army Overseas and infantry 
reinforcement challenges
 
 For a sixty day period in August and September 1944, the Canadian Infantry Corps (CIC) had a 
reduced number of personnel reinforcements available to it.  This occurred due to poor strategic planning 
that failed to properly account for future personnel needs of infantry regiments over the long term.  Due to 
this miscalculation, a sufficient reserve of reinforcement infantry other ranks (non-officer) personnel was 
not created by spring 1944.  The size of the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO) had grown exponentially 
over the period 1942-1944, but was still an all volunteer force.  What existing reinforcements it had 
access to were limited in number.  As a result of the shortage of infantry replacements, the No.2 Canadian 
Base Reinforcement Group (No.2 CBRG) had a reduced ability to rebuild infantry units engaged in 
ongoing combat operations during the late summer of 1944.  The mistakes that led to the issues of August 
and September were serious, and for a sixty day period impaired the combat effectiveness of the First 
Canadian Army.  For two weeks of this period, 8 to 21 August 1944, it was engaged in some of the most 
difficult fighting of the Normandy Campaign.1  This period is a blemish on a otherwise satisfactory record 
of personnel replacement.  Due to this episode’s brief but significant impact on the strength of the 
Canadian Army, it is important that this event and the conditions that influenced it be included within this 
study.  
 After a slow start, by early October 1944 Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) London had 
significantly reduced personnel deficits within the infantry regiments by the large scale re-mustering 
surplus personnel from other trades.  The number of re-mustered personnel totalled 10,000 by December 
1944.  The shortage lasted for only two months out of the eleven month campaign in North West Europe 
(NWE), and the other combat arms trades in this study, armour and artillery, were unaffected.  From early 
June to late July 1944 and from October 1944 to May 1945 all infantry regiments engaged in combat were 
kept at adequate personnel strength levels.   
                                                          
1 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,517.  Daily record of casualties for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division from 6 June 1944.  File 
215A21.009 (D167).  The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division suffered 564 battle casualties in the period 1-16 August 1944.  
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 This shortage was separate from the November 1944 political Conscription Crisis in Ottawa over 
the uncertain future supply of infantry reinforcements, but its severity certainly influenced the latter event.  
After the infantry regiments were rebuilt and a reserve of 16,825 personnel was created by late October 
1944, the larger problem of maintaining this reserve proved challenging.  The War Committee of 
Mackenzie King's Liberal Government was divided on how to accomplish this goal.  Conscriptionists 
believed the use of National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) home defence conscripts was 
inevitable while anti-conscriptionists, the Prime Minister among them, hoped that all future needs could 
be met with Active Service Force volunteers.  The Canadian Army could not present a viable plan that 
would utilize only volunteers already overseas or personnel converted from NRMA status to cover its 
reinforcement needs into 1945.  Further political impasse and pressure from the Prime Minister led to the 
resignation of the Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston.  Left with no other option, the King 
Government made the decision on 23 November 1944 to deploy NMRA personnel overseas to ensure the 
reserve was maintained.2   
 The origins of the infantry personnel challenge the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO) suffered in 
mid 1944 are located within earlier decisions to radically expand it, yet retain its all volunteer status.  The 
CAO grew in size tremendously from 1939 until 1944, when the focus of this study begins.  Initially only 
one infantry division in 1940, by September 1944 it consisted of five divisions and two independent 
brigades, along with all the necessary support units to sustain them.  In the fall of 1944 these formations 
formed one complete corps in Italy and a second corps made up half the strength of the First Canadian 
Army in NWE.  Yet evolution within the CAO went past its sheer size.  By early 1944 it had also created 
a completely new trade, the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME), 
and had embraced the latest combat, command and logistical doctrine of the Commonwealth armies.  
These practices had evolved out of combat experience during campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy 
over the years 1941-1944. 
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 While the Canadian Army maintained control over military matters, its leadership, organization 
and battlefield doctrine, it did not have access to the Canadian population or its government's treasury in 
order to increase its size.  During wartime, the Minister of National Defence managed the size of the army 
in accordance with the decisions made by the Prime Minister and rest of the War Committee.  Political 
and financial considerations as well as the needs of the other two services forced the government to 
tightly control army expansion.  It is important to note that during the early war years there was a focus 
on minimizing Canada's wartime contribution.  While the pre-war Canadian Army had many plans for 
expansion, none was firmly endorsed the government when war broke out.  Such was the disarray that 
emerged from the interwar period that the army was near its nadir as an organization by 1939 with regard 
to personnel and equipment.  As a result, there was no strategic plan that clearly and strictly defined what 
the full size of the CAO was to be, how it was to be reinforced and who exactly was going to equip it.3   
 During the early war years the other two services, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF), were also competing for resources, personnel and funding.  The Battle of 
the Atlantic was in full swing during 1941 and the Luftwaffe was still a powerful force within Western 
Europe.  With these two services fully engaged in escorting convoys and embarking on the bomber 
offensive over occupied Europe, the King Government was in no rush to expand the role of the Canadian 
Army.  Furthermore, while defence of the United Kingdom (U.K.) was seen by the Canadian public as 
important, it was felt public opinion would not endorse the employment of Canadian forces in North 
Africa or further abroad.4  Heavy combat on land might also force the introduction of conscription, which 
at the outbreak of war was politically unacceptable to the Liberal King government.5 
 The use conscription in Canada during the First World War made a large political impact on the 
nation.  It was extremely damaging to national unity, and the Liberal Government in 1939 viewed even 
the proposed use of conscription as a serious matter.  During the First World War the enforced overseas 
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service of Canadians had been enacted by the passing of the Military Services Act by Prime Minister 
Robert Borden's Unionist Government in August 1917.6  This legislation was tabled to maintain the 
strength of Canadian forces overseas at a time when the war was going badly for the Allies and the supply 
of volunteers had dried up.  Over 45,000 personnel conscripted from mid 1917 onward reached the front 
lines by war’s end.7  These men were taken directly from their civilian environment and placed in military 
training camps.  The cost of this decision was national disunity along provincial lines.  The country was 
bitterly divided, with Anglophone Canada overwhelming pro-conscriptionist and Quebec’s population 
being vehemently opposed.  Unrest resulted in riots and numerous revolutionary acts in Quebec.  
Politically, it significantly damaged the Liberal party’s standings in English Canada, reducing Wilfred 
Laurier’s federal Liberal Party to seats largely within Quebec after the election of 1917. 
 Following the fall of France, Canadian Parliament passed the National Resources Mobilization 
Act (NRMA) in June 1940.  This act created national service, but with very different aims than the 
conscription legislation of the First World War.  The act registered men and women nationwide, moving 
them into proper employment to aid the war effort.  It also mobilized Canadians for military service, some 
for only a limited thirty day period.  The act established twin Canadian armies, one for home defence 
consisting of conscripts and another composed of volunteer Active Service Force personnel designated 
for overseas service.  The Liberal Party proponents of this legislation stressed that there would never be 
enforced overseas service.  While appeasing conscriptionists, it did not arouse the political ire of anti-
conscriptionists nationwide who opposed overseas military involvement.  Liberal Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King was extremely aware of the damage done to both national unity and the Liberal Party 
during 1917-1918, and was determined not to let the same events reoccur.8    
 When P.M. King was forced to eventually reverse his political decision not to employ conscripts 
overseas during the fall of 1944 out of military necessity, the resulting damage to national unity did not 
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equal that of 1917-1918.  The servicemen sent were NRMA personnel who had been in the Army in some 
cases for several years, instead of new recruits violently stripped from the civilian population.  Civilian 
men who were not in the Army in late 1944 did not have their lives affected by this decision.  This factor 
was extremely influential in reducing negative political reaction within Quebec. 
 Army growth from 1941 to 1944 occurred against a backdrop of political infighting over the issue 
of conscription.  This battle pitted the pro-conscription Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, against 
the anti-conscriptionist forces within the War Committee, most notably the Prime Minister and T.A. 
Crerar, Minister of Mines and Resources.  Those in the Prime Minister's camp consistently held onto the 
main goal of resisting conscription in order to achieve three main goals: to retain the Liberal Party's hold 
on power and political fortunes, to avoid nationwide unrest over conscription; and, to maintain Canada's 
contribution to the war effort at a manageable minimum level.  This was made clear by the War 
Committee's 29 July 1941 rejection of Canadian Army demands to increase the size of the CAO by a full 
two divisions. 9   
 By 1941, there were signs from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa that Canadian 
Army leadership was not fully committed to the current recruitment program for overseas Active Service 
Force volunteers.  Canadian historian Richard Walker argues that this resistance was intentional in order 
to facilitate the King Government being forced by military necessity to utilize conscription.10  
Conscription would give the CAO the military might needed to achieve its goals and at the same time 
make a large force, such as a complete field army, sustainable.  Senior Canadian Army leadership did not 
endorse the concept of the twin armies, one of overseas personnel and one of NRMA home defence 
conscripts.  At this time the Canadian Army had the highest standards for acceptance in the world, and all 
men under nineteen and over thirty-seven were declared ineligible.  Furthermore, many thousands of 
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civilians were rejected due to physical standards that would have unacceptable in the United States and 
British military recruitment processes.11  
 In August 1941, Major-General H.D.G. Crerar, Canadian Army Chief of the General Staff, 
completed a plan to construct an overseas Canadian Army of two corps.  To realize this plan, his 
successor, Major-General Kenneth Stuart, forwarded on 18 November 1941 the proposal Army 
Programme 1942-1943.  This proposal sought to radically enlarge the army and fully utilize available 
Canadian manpower.  Defence Minister J.L. Ralston endorsed this proposal and supplied data in the form 
of the Walker-Robinson Report to illustrate that it was feasible.  This report reflected that Canada could 
supply the necessary manpower without damaging national industry.  The NDHQ General Staff also 
stated that this programme could be completed without resorting to conscription, the main issue of 
resistance in the Liberal Government.  Ralston at this point was proving very susceptible to the advice of 
the General Staff on matters of army expansion.  A former Colonel, he began to be perceived by his 
Liberal Party colleagues as a mouthpiece for army demands and would in time, they believed, eventually 
endorse conscription to utilize available personnel for overseas service.12   
 Prime Minister Mackenzie King relented to the demands for a larger army on 6 January 1942.13  
Political pressure against King from all sides had been growing within Canada for a more robust war 
effort.  The Conservative party was pushing for a coalition government, and powerful Toronto business 
leaders were lobbying for conscription and a more "total war" approach to Canada's contribution.  There 
was also the disturbing trend of senior Canadian Army officers speaking to the press regarding perceived 
challenges the Army the facing in sustaining the war effort.  These transgressions were not stopped by the 
Minister of National Defence, and continued throughout the war.  At this point Ralston perceived army 
expansion to be so important to the war effort that it was worth resigning over should the program be 
rebuffed by King and others.  Threatening King with this politically damaging act and acting fully in 
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cooperation with the Army's long-term corporate interests, Ralston divorced himself from his Liberal 
colleagues to form a pro-conscription camp within the Ottawa War Committee.   
 By late 1942 the foundations for what would eventually be the First Canadian Army were laid.  
What was missing was a strategic reinforcement plan to sustain this colossus, the political will to create a 
reserve of reinforcements through conscription and finally the means to equip a large army.  Concerning 
the last point, Canada totally lacked the diversified arms industry to supply all its needs in the way of 
modern weapons systems.  Within the army all-volunteer personnel pool at hand, a sufficient 
reinforcement reserve did not exist to deal with all possibilities, military disaster on a massive scale being 
among them.   
 A primary presupposition held by NDHQ at this point would be that it would be politically 
impossible for the Canadian Government to not to sustain a larger army once it was operational in a 
combat zone.  The political opponents of the Liberal Party would not tolerate it "withering on the vine".  
It was also clear to senior Canadian Army leadership that it would be impossible for this large army to be 
sustained during combat operations without the implementation of conscription, a strategic, if 
undisclosed, goal of NDHQ.  This point was never clearly passed onto the Minister of National Defence 
or the Prime Minister in 1942.  NDHQ was also sure that the British Government, grateful for the 
formations, would equip it with their most modern weapons to ensure success.  There were also long-term 
plans afoot to maintain this creation post war.  Once a larger army was constructed, it was quite plausible 
that it would be politically difficult to disassemble.  Part of Crerar's intent in his plans for a "Big Army" 
included never revisiting Canada's military insignificance of the 1930s.14   
 A factor that made it even more impossible to sustain the then current all volunteer CAO was its 
approach to utilising personnel.  Personnel resources were managed poorly and all administrative 
organizations within the CAO were bloated prior to the Normandy Campaign.  As pointed out in E.L.M. 
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Burns Manpower in the Canadian Army, only 34.2 percent of all personnel were combat arms.  A 
disturbing total of 28.2 percent of personnel made up Canadian headquarters, compared to 11.6 percent in 
the U.S. Army.  The army took no corrective action to re-organize itself during 1943-1944 to cope with a 
possible future shortage of infantry replacements.  Compounding matters, the CAO was fully committed 
to maintaining this bloated establishment.15  In March 1944, Major-General A.E. Walford, Deputy 
Adjutant and Quartermaster General of the First Canadian Army, stated it was over strength and could not 
be sustained.  His recommendations that its structure be altered were ignored.16   
 What presuppositions did P.M. King and the remainder of his War Committee colleagues possess 
in January 1942?  A main assumption was that the "Big Army" program was so massive a request it 
would be the last of its kind foisted upon them for the remainder of the war.  King also accepted Major-
General Stuart's dubious assurance that it would not be necessary to utilize conscription to supply the 
enlarged CAO in the future.  Though not a military man, it cannot have escaped King's comprehension 
that to support such a large organization in wartime meant large numbers of replacement personnel would 
be needed.  That this point was not clearly conveyed by NDHQ to the War Committee is troubling, but 
understandable.  If it had been more clearly stated, this factor would have undermined gradually easing 
King and other anti-conscription committee members into accepting conscription.  Secondly, it would 
have badly damaged the whole bid for an enlarged army.  It is also plausible that King was considering 
purely political problems at the time of his decision to accept the rapid expansion of the army.  His 
current main goal, the placation of the conscriptionist and "total war" forces, including some within his 
own War Committee, had to be achieved presently.  
 Having dealt with immediate problems, King in late January 1942 looked to address future issues 
following the decision to expand the army.  Anticipating the possible need to use conscripts overseas to 
maintain the war effort, the Liberal Government made the decision to conduct a plebiscite to release the 
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government from its previous promise that enforced overseas service would never occur.  The 27 April 
1942 plebiscite passed, and though the province of Quebec largely voted against it, political resistance 
was much reduced compared to that of 1917-1918.17  To mollify Quebec, it was stressed that conscription 
was not necessary at present, and might possibly never be needed.18  King had again succeeded 
politically, regardless of what the future was to contain for the CAO.  Following the early January 1942 
approval for the rapid expansion of the army, new divisions were raised from large numbers of volunteer 
Active Service Force members.  The construction of these divisions will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters in detail.   
 Near the end of this expansion process, the CAO's period of relative inactivity in England would 
end with the deployment of one infantry division and one armoured brigade to Sicily in July 1943.  Until 
this point, the CAO had not had any experience with large numbers of battle and non-battle casualties 
over an extended period of combat operations.  Battlefield experience is an essential factor in the 
successful projection of casualty rates.  When operations began in Sicily, projected Canadian Army 
casualty rates for infantry were extremely unrealistic.  
 The inaccurate projection of casualty rates within the  Canadian Army had first begun with the 
establishment of projected losses tables by the Ottawa War Office in 1939.  These tables had been sent to 
CMHQ London shortly after the outbreak of war.19  These rates erroneously projected monthly infantry 
losses that maxed out for other ranks at 20 percent for "intense activity" (intense combat).  Since the war 
had just begun, these rates were purely hypothetical because no one really knew what effects modern 
weapons or tactics would have on the Canadian Army.  The plan devised for reinforcements was to keep a 
three month reserve of “intense” rates on standby in the U.K.  This amount was to equal 60 percent of 
whatever infantry personnel were present in operational units.  This reserve would be drawn upon as 
                                                          
17 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 400-401. 
18 J.L. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War: 1939-1945, 47-48. 
19 Terry Copp Papers (Waterloo, ON: Laurier Military History Centre Archives.  2015.),  Colonel C.P. Stacey, Canadian Army 
Historical Report No.134.  Historical Sketch, Rates of Wastage of Personnel.  Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1945.  Canadian 
Military Headquarters, London, U.K.  5 April 1945,3. 
101 
 
needed, and would be supplemented by one month's worth of personnel placed forward in the immediate 
theatre of operations, for a total of four months at "intense" rates.20   
 After the fall of France in 1940, CMHQ London perceived that Canadian forces in the U.K. 
would take on a defensive rather than offensive role in the immediate future.  This meant that there would 
be correspondingly smaller projected casualties.  The figure utilized for “intense” monthly losses was 
recommended to be lowered to 10 percent , the same figure then utilized for "normal" monthly losses.  
These new levels were approved by NDHQ in Ottawa in August 1940.  It was ordered that three months 
worth of reinforcements at "normal" rates would remain in Canada so as not to build up an excessive 
amount in reinforcement personnel overseas.  Within the U.K. itself, it was believed that should an 
invasion occur, the estimated period of fighting would only last a month in a worst case scenario.   
 The U.K. reserve of infantry reinforcements was then re-organized to contain only three months 
worth at the new "intense" rates of only 10 percent losses.  Anything beyond that would have to be 
transported from Canada.21  These rates continued to be in effect until July 1943.  As a result of this 
reinforcement strategy over the years 1940-1943, there was no major influx of reinforcements from 
Canada to build up a large reserve.  In both January of 1941 and January of 1942 the question of rates 
were examined with reference to the most recent British casualties figures from North Africa.22  After 
researching this data, it was decided that the rates would remain unchanged and the amount of 
reinforcements kept in the U.K. would remain the same. 
  With Canadian forces set to participate in offensive operations in Sicily and Italy during the 
years 1943-1944, measures were taken to revise the casualty rates in the face of impending combat.  
Canadian rates were brought in line with British casualty projections of intense rates being 20 percent for 
other ranks infantry.23  These new rates were brought into effect as of July 1943.  Due to the relatively 
                                                          
20 Terry Copp Papers, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134, 4. 
21 Terry Copp Papers, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134, 5.  Chart depicting projected wastage by Army trades. 
22 Terry Copp Papers, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134, 6. 
23 Terry Copp Papers, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134, 10.   
102 
 
small number of forces initially engaged in operations in the Mediterranean, one infantry division and one 
armoured brigade, any casualties that were incurred were easily replaced.  Despite the number of infantry 
casualties being out of proportion to other trades, total losses for all trades were manageable and within 
the July 1943 wastage rates.  The eight reinforcement battalions of the No.1 Canadian Base 
Reinforcement Group (No.1 CBRG) were well supplied with two months worth of replacements, and 
easily replaced losses.24  But due to the higher infantry casualty rates encountered in these operations, it 
became obvious that 20 percent was not a sufficient number.   
 The number of reinforcements that were present in each combat arms trade pool in Italy and the 
U.K. in the spring of 1944 was influenced by the projected casualties figures authorized in July 1943.  It 
was important that these projections be correct, or the Canadian Army would be left with surplus 
reinforcements in one trade and a shortage of replacements in another.  The current calculations adopted 
from the British and had been influenced by the records of the Eighth British Army in North Africa.25  
Due to the fluid nature of the mechanized war in the desert, enemy armoured forces could appear in 
places that were unexpected.26  Artillery, armoured and infantry casualties had been roughly equal, with 
no trade that took significantly more casualties.  Rear area supply services were often just as vulnerable, 
and could be caught off guard by an enemy advance which happened to break through.   
 The use of these British figures was a miscalculation that ignored the most recent Canadian Army 
casualty returns from operations in Sicily and the boot of Italy in 1943-1944.  In this type of warfare the 
armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) was not the determinant of battlefield strength.  The constricting terrain, 
rivers, mountains, weather conditions and other obstacles made it easy for anti-tank defences to halt 
armour's forward movement.  Operations became dependent on the use of artillery and innovative infantry 
tactics to root out determined German defenders.  The fighting was often static, with the Germans 
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conducting successful defensive operations that blocked Allied forces from advancing. This led to 
increased casualties in the infantry battalions, and a noted decrease in armoured and artillery casualties.  
 Attempts were made by certain staff officers within CMHQ London and the Canadian Army in 
the Mediterranean to raise the issue of miscalculations concerning the number of infantry reinforcements 
available.  In December 1943, Brigadier A.W. Beament, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the 1st Canadian 
Echelon in the Mediterranean, noticed that combat casualties were significantly higher for infantry other 
ranks and officers than the projected figures for normal rates of wastage. 27  He came to the conclusion 
that this wastage would result in a significant shortcoming in available infantry officer and other ranks 
reinforcements in the foreseeable future.  This deduction led him to argue that personnel in other trades 
should be forcibly re-mustered into infantry as soon as possible.  NDHQ and CMHQ London refused to 
validate these views, and stuck to the recent July 1943 revisions.28  For the time being Brigadier 
Beament's concerns were dismissed.  This officer recognized that there were enough personnel in the 
CAO to supply a suitable number of infantry reinforcements, but only if they were managed correctly. 
 In the fall of 1943 the pool of reinforcements within the CAO was not being managed properly, 
both in the U.K. and the Mediterranean.  Within non-infantry trades there were miscalculations regarding 
future casualty figures which in turn retarded the growth of a reserve of available infantry reinforcements.  
Projected "intense" rate losses for Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC) and what would become 
Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) personnel was projected to be 
nearly 9 percent in July 1943.  This was a gross overestimate of what reinforcements would be required.  
Actual casualties for the RCOC and RCEME troops in the three worst months in 1944 turned out to be 1 
percent of total personnel.29  During early 1944 RCOC and RCEME reinforcement personnel continued to 
train within their trades when the time could have be used to effectively re-muster them into infantry 
regiments. 
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 Total Canadian Army reinforcement personnel of all trades within the U.K. as of 16 March 1944 
consisted of 3,597 officers and 36,145 other ranks identified as fit soldiers.30  These totals reflected a 
surplus of 890 officers and 1,790 other ranks over what was authorized as reinforcements in accordance 
with the July 1943 casualty projection rates.  The number of available reinforcement personnel was never 
the issue for the CAO in the spring of 1944.  The challenge was allocating the proper number of personnel 
to the correct trade, in this case infantry.   
 British Army pressure on CMHQ London prevented the August and September 1944 infantry 
reinforcement shortage from being far worse.  21st Army Group commander General Bernard 
Montgomery had taken an increased interest in the Canadian reinforcement situation in March 1944.  
During the same month his headquarters communicated the possibility to CMHQ that casualties on the 
initial beachhead assault of Operation “Overlord” could possibly be higher than the official forecasted 
rates.31  This caused alarm within CMHQ London and NDHQ.  Canadian leadership at this point was 
slowly becoming cognizant to the fact that there were potentially far fewer infantry reinforcements than 
what was required.  Rapid plans were made to enact a large re-mustering program as the need for an 
improvised solution became urgent.  It is troubling that CMHQ London was driven into action by the 
perception that the one day Normandy beachhead assault would be a cause for an upsurge in future 
casualties, and not an extended period of high intensity warfare afterwards. 
 During further investigations by Montgomery it was revealed that within the Canadian 
reinforcement units present in the U.K., there was a massive shortfall of infantry other ranks 
reinforcements present when available totals were compared with authorized levels.32  Also observed by 
Montgomery were the large number of personnel attached to ad-hoc and training units, and this state of 
affairs made them less ready to be deployed to fulfill their reinforcement role.  At the time of 
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Montgomery's observations, Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart, the CMHQ London Chief of Staff, was in 
hospital.  He responded to Montgomery’s inquiries by stating that the matter of identifying and 
preselecting suitable personnel for re-mustering was being addressed.33   
 In response to his anxious inquiries, a report was forwarded to General Montgomery by CMHQ 
London in late March 1944 that verified that the U.K. reinforcements on hand were satisfactory.  The total 
number was satisfactory, but the content of the reinforcement pool was not.  Of an authorized level of 
23,000 infantry reinforcements, three months holdings at "intense" 20 percent rates under the erroneous 
1943 tables, the reinforcement organization in the U.K. contained only 14,500 personnel.  Of these 
14,500, 43 percent were serving in ad-hoc units in non-infantry roles, unfit, soldiers waiting to be re-
mustered or discipline cases.  Thus the real number of Canadian infantry reinforcements ready to be 
deployed quickly was less than 8,000 out of an authorized total of 23,000.34  Also, the practice common to 
all armies of dumping unfit or problem soldiers in temporary holding units was rampant in the CAO.   
 The late March 1944 report forwarded to Montgomery stating all was well masked the great blow 
that had been done to the capability and strength of the CIC.  This corps was on the eve of some of the 
most challenging fighting the Canadian Army would face within the Second World War.  The demanding 
tests of the D-Day assault, Verrieres Ridge and the battles to close the Falaise Gap all lay on the horizon.  
By robbing it of a large fluid reserve of infantry other ranks replacements, the high ranking officers in 
CMHQ London were condemning it to temporary weakness if large losses occurred at a rapid pace. 
 The emergency re-mustering program begun in late spring 1944 to enlarge the U.K. reserve of 
infantry reinforcements was hamstrung by the ill-timed creation of further operational units.  The 2nd 
Canadian Corps was still forming the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade for the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division.  As of spring 1944 it was still filling out the brigade's three infantry regiments with required 
personnel.  In Italy, the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade was being created for the 5th Canadian Armoured 
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Division.  The authorized ceilings for infantry personnel in the CAO had thus grown to 57,592 from 
51,083 in January 1944.  These building projects, necessary as they were, greatly impaired the creation of 
an untouched infantry reinforcement reserve pool.35 
  Options never exercised in this time period included possible disbandment of certain combat 
units to reinforce others, the reduction of the establishment of existing combat units, the reduction in size 
of headquarters and support units, utilising excess RCAF personnel or relaxing the overly strict recruiting 
standards for volunteers in Canada.  Concerning this last point, large numbers of able-bodied men were 
being refused entry on dubious grounds, the age exclusion limits of anyone above thirty-seven and below 
nineteen being the worst practices.36 
 As Operation "Overlord" approached, a greater sense of urgency took hold.  By the end of March 
1944 over 2,000 men had voluntarily or forcibly been re-mustered as infantry.37  April and May 1944 saw 
the deployment of 5,565 personnel to the U.K. from Canada, and a further 2,000 were transported in early 
June 1944.38  Montgomery and other senior British generals were well aware of the potential 
consequences of inaction and categorized the deficit in allocated Canadian infantry reinforcements as 
“most serious” in communications to CMHQ dated 16 March 1944.39   
 In the days following the D-Day landings, Canadian combat arms units were in need of personnel 
replacements to cover losses suffered during the amphibious assault and the combat inland.  No.2 CBRG 
units deployed to France immediately began providing reinforcements.  Initially there were no personnel 
shortages within the Normandy beachhead due to the relatively small number of Canadian units involved.  
In the month of June 1944 only the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
were deployed, employing a total of three infantry brigades with nine regiments.  Replacing losses within 
                                                          
35 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 428.     
36 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 451. 
37 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis.  Canadian Infantry Reinforcements during the Second World War”.  Canadian 
Army Journal.  (February 2012): 73-89. 
38 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 88-89. 
39 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 425-427.  
107 
 
these regiments was a relatively small task and the system appeared to be working with few issues.  
Casualties to the end of June 1944 were significant but not unacceptable.40  What was disturbing was the 
percentage of losses that were taken by the infantry.  As shown in Chart 5.1, the infantry as of 10 July 
1944 had taken the majority of total battle casualties.  As this chart indicates, the need for a large 
reservoir of infantry replacements for future losses was quite apparent at this time. 
Chart 5.1: Infantry and other trades battle casualties versus July 1943 wastage rates forecasts 6 
June-10 July 1944 41 
 
 Once other units such as 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
became operational to join the original two formations, shortages in the number of liquid infantry 
reinforcements began to appear.  The scale and intensity of offensive combat operations increased 
significantly in July and August 1944.  All four Canadian formations could not be sustained at once with 
the number of infantry reinforcements on hand.  Delays occurred as troops ships had to sail from the 
U.K.to reach the bridgehead, and then the personnel reinforcements had to go through the bureaucratic 
                                                          
40 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 434.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,517.  Daily record of casualties for the 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division from 6 June 1944.  File 215A21.009 (D167).  The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as of 30 June 
1944 recorded 2,978 battle casualties 
41 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 435. 
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process of the No.2 CBRG battalions.  No.2 CBRG did not divest itself of all infantry reinforcements it 
had at this point, and sought to retain a small reserve if some large event occurred.   
 At 21st Army Group Headquarters, Canadian 1st Echelon's OIC Brigadier A.W. Beament, 
transferred from Italy, observed that his forecasts of December 1943 were coming true.  By mid July, 
exactly as he had predicted, there were indications of a shortage of immediately available general duty 
other ranks reinforcements.  By 15 July 1944 it was certain that there were not enough meet future 
demands from all formations.42  Despite his urgings that the situation be resolved quickly by CMHQ, this 
could not be accomplished overnight.  Beament’s recommendations for mass re-mustering were passed to 
Major-General Montague, in charge of administration at CMHQ London on 17 July 1944.  He had to then 
communicate them to Lieutenant-General Stuart, who was in Italy.  Ironically, he was involved in 
discussing the creation of the new infantry brigade for the 5th Canadian Armoured Division.  A full five 
days passed before Stuart returned to the U.K. and then flew to First Canadian Army Headquarters to 
speak with its commander, General H.D.G. Crerar.  On 25 July 1944 Stuart finally took drastic corrective 
action.  On this date he issued orders to begin a large scale re-mustering of general duty personnel in other 
trades.  A full 25 percent of all Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) reinforcements and 60 percent of all 
Royal Canadian Service Corps (RCSC) reinforcements were to be remustered as other ranks infantry.  
This was the correct course of action, but he had arrived at it far too late.  On 2 August 1944, Stuart spoke 
with NDHQ Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J.C. Murchie, during a trip to Ottawa.43  While not 
appearing alarmist, General Stuart did not competently communicate the urgency of what the problem 
was and how it was to be solved.  Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston would later claim 
that at this point he was not fully informed of events.  
 At the same time casualties were continuing to be incurred at a rapid rate.  On 25 July 1944 alone, 
Operation “Spring" cost roughly 1,500 battle casualties.44  Despite receiving reinforcements, the strength 
                                                          
42 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 92.  
43 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 435. 
44 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 194. 
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of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had dropped by 1,211 personnel by 31 July 1944.45  On 4 August 
1944, General Crerar stated in a report that the reinforcement problem was the most serious problem 
facing the First Canadian Army at that time, the deficit on this date hovering at over 1,900 personnel.  He 
went on to state "it would seriously impair our breakout exploitation tasks" if it were allowed to 
continue.46  On 8 August 1944, on the eve of Operation "Totalize", the largest Canadian armoured attack 
of the Second World War, Crerar again pressed for urgent action on reinforcements from his 
headquarters.47   
 On 10 August 1944, Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale of CMHQ visited First Canadian Army 
headquarters to further discuss the situation.  It was decided here that Canadian infantry training standards 
would in no way would be compromised, and there would be no dilution or shortening of training for re-
mustered soldiers.  In the following weeks a significant number of infantry reinforcements did reach the 
First Canadian Army, but on 15 August 1944 the regiments were still 2,644 personnel short.  By 19 
August 1944 over 3,773 reinforcements had been dispatched, but casualties continued to mount faster that 
the No.2 CBRG could dispatch replacements.  Total infantry reinforcements sent to Normandy from the 
U.K. in August 1944 numbered 375 officers and 2,831 other ranks.48  Infantry other ranks deficiencies by 
31 August 1944 had grown to 4,318, and this was after monthly reinforcements had been accepted.  These 
numbers illustrate that the August replacements had not made a dent in the overall infantry shortage.49   
 The shortage situation reached its nadir on 31 August 1944, when the average personnel deficit 
within Canadian infantry regiments was 206.  As of 4 September 1944, there were only 731 other ranks 
infantry reinforcements present in the No.2 CBRG holdings.50  From 12 August to 1 September 1944, a 
                                                          
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  T-1871.  31 July 1944 return. 
46 Charles Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 437.   
47 Charles Stacey, Arms, men and Government, 438. 
48 LAC, RG 24 Volume 18,616.  Reinforcement Drafts sent to NWE from U.K. Reinforcements dispatched to 21 A.G. from U.K., 
UKAG 1 to 30 inclusive August 1944. File 44/Svy Rfts/1 A.G. Stats.  17 March 1945. 
49 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,699.  Deficiencies and holdings of Canadian Infantry, Other Ranks; Northwest Europe, 27 August, 
1944-28 April 1945. 
50 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,699.  Deficiencies and holdings of Canadian Infantry, Other Ranks; Northwest Europe, 27 August, 
1944-28 April 1945. 
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total of 4,088 men were re-mustered and began training to become qualified infantrymen.  This did 
nothing to solve the problem quickly, because these personnel had to complete their training before they 
could be sent to the front.  Chart 5.2 illustrates the infantry other ranks shortage in the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division for the period July to September 1944.  This formation was the one hardest hit by the 
failure to rapidly replace its losses.  The totals were spread among its nine infantry regiments and one 
machine gun battalion, all of which were largely composed of other ranks infantrymen.   
Chart 5.2 Infantry other ranks shortages in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division July-September 
194451 
 
 The infantry reinforcements shortage was particularly difficult for the three francophone infantry 
battalions in NWE.  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, Le Regiment de la Chaudière and Les Fusiliers Mont- 
Royal had all experienced high losses during the July-August 1944 battles in Normandy.  By late August 
1944 their losses still had not been replaced.  The total of francophone infantry other ranks reinforcement 
soldiers within the U.K. on 6 June 1944 had numbered only 348, or nearly three infantry companies.  For 
three infantry regiments about to be engaged in high intensity combat, this was not nearly enough.  On 23 
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October 1944, despite some reinforcements being taken on, these three regiments were still 340 other 
ranks short, the equivalent of an infantry company each.52  Chart 5.3 reflects the challenges facing 
francophone regiments at the beginning of September 1944 due to a severe shortage of francophone other 
ranks reinforcements.   
Chart 5.3: Infantry other ranks shortages in francophone infantry regiments by 1 September 194453 
 
 On the same date that the infantry other ranks situation reached its low point, 31 August 1944, an 
accurate set of casualty projection rates for the Canadian Army was produced.  As shown in Chart 5.4, 
these new realistic wastage rates were in line with the cost of warfare in NWE.  They accurately indicated 
what should be set aside for monthly reinforcements, and large reserves could be created to cope with 
losses in the CIC.  September 1944 witnessed a continued re-mustering effort and the beginning of the 
end of the other ranks infantry shortage within the CAO.  The situation improved rapidly throughout the 
month, but during this period weak rifle companies were given the same tasks as full strength companies 
on the battlefield.  During September a total of 4,720 troops from other trades had begun infantry training.   
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Chart 5.4: New monthly infantry loss rates, percentages of total strength effective 31 August 1944.54 
 
The shortage continued to be reduced as weeks passed, and by 24 October 1944 it was down to fifty-four 
soldiers per regiment.55  By 5 November, due to the losses in the Battle of the Scheldt fighting, it had 
jumped back up to 100 personnel.  While this seemed a high figure, no infantry battalion involved in 
combat operations during the Second World War was maintained at 100 percent of its war establishment.  
Unless daily reinforcements were made to counteract losses, it was impossible to keep them at exactly 
100 percent of their establishment totals.  By November 1944, the number of personnel that had been 
remustered was approaching 7,850 troops.  The crisis at this point for all intensive purposes had passed.  
Returns for December 1944 reflected that a total 10,000 soldiers had been re-mustered.   
 How did the personnel replacement record of the Canadian Army compare to that within the 
British and U.S. armies?  Like the Canadian Army in the last year of the war, both allies had significant 
manpower challenges that centered on infantry replacements.  While the U.S. Army successfully 
combated the effects of attrition in the last year of the war in NWE, the British Army could not continue 
to make good its losses.  The British possessed a similar replacement system to that of the Canadian 
Army, and it was also very effective at reinforcing units that has suffered personnel losses.  But like the 
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Canadian system, it was only effective if the process was well supplied with new personnel.  By mid 
1944, the number of new infantry recruits and re-mustered Army personnel designated as deployable 
infantry was dwindling within the U.K.  The British Army at this point had two complete field armies 
fighting the Germans, one engaged in Italy and the other in France.  Making matters more challenging, 
these two armies did not encompass numerous British units that made up parts of other British armies in 
the Far East and Middle East.  In 1944 infantry units were taking 80 percent of all combat losses within 
the British Army.  High losses sustained by the British between September 1939 and August 1942 in the 
Low Countries, France, the Mediterranean and the Far East had been severe.  Over 326,877 troops had 
become casualties or prisoners of war.  British infantry units had accepted 51 percent of this total.56 
 During the Normandy Campaign, the British Army rapidly consumed what was left of its 
deployable infantry other ranks personnel reserve.  By the end of August, the majority of one complete 
British infantry division, the 59th, had to be broken up to provide reinforcements to other formations.  The 
break-up of this division was followed by a second, the 50th, in late November 1944.57  The disappearance 
of these two complete divisions led the British Army to depend increasingly on Commonwealth 
formations during the last year of the war.  The CAO, despite its challenges, never faced similar personnel 
shortages to the extent that it had to have even a single infantry regiment, never mind a full division, 
broken up to provide replacements.   
 Military historians such as Carlo D'Este have posed questions whether the British military of the 
late war period successfully managed what personnel resources it.58  Evidence exists of large numbers of 
personnel attached to training and territorial infantry units within the U.K. that could have utilized for 
replacements.  However, the fitness and age of these personnel may have limited their combat capability.  
Other untapped areas consisted of surplus RAF and Royal Navy personnel that could have been ruthlessly 
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57 Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy, 262. 
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re-mustered as infantry.  Also, a British strict adherence to the territorial and bureaucratic regimental 
system impaired the employment of personnel where they were needed in the shortest amount of time. 
 The U.S. Army also suffered heavy infantry losses in NWE, with infantry battalions in Normandy 
suffering 90 percent of its total battle casualties in the bocage terrain.59  However, it possesses a record of 
being far more effective than the British in maintaining the strength of infantry battalions engaged in 
combat operations.  Infantry and armoured divisions still forming in the U.S. were cannibalized 
ruthlessly, destroying what progress they had made in their training programs to make them combat 
ready.  Despite this, the number of operational U.S. combat divisions in Europe grew exponentially in the 
last year of the war.  Large surplus reserves of personnel in other trades were raided on a regular basis.  
Also, there was no adherence to a regimental system that would take personnel from certain U.S. states to 
supply certain regiments.  This approach was completely alien to the corporate personnel management 
style of the U.S. military.60  A former casualty returning from hospital from one infantry battalion could 
also easily wind up in another after re-entering the replacement pipeline.61  The U.S. Army also had no 
qualms about rapidly utilizing replacements whose infantry skills had eroded due to inactivity following 
their initial training.  This practice resulted in heavy losses, but the main goal of consistently high 
personnel levels within U.S. infantry line companies was achieved, despite heavy combat.   
 Following the successful reconstitution of all its infantry regiments by October 1944, the next 
hurtle for the CAO to stabilize its infantry personnel situation was the creation of a sizeable reserve of 
reinforcements.  This reserve would be maintained in order that all ongoing and future infantry attrition 
could be serviced.  Despite the large number of re-musters, as of 30 November 1944 the CAO was having 
trouble creating an infantry reinforcement reserve in the U.K. containing the number of personnel it was 
authorized.  As soon as infantry personnel arrived in the reinforcement system they were being dispatched 
to the regiments.  This resulted in a gulf between the authorized reinforcement strength and the actual 
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total reinforcements on hand within bases in the U.K. and Belgium in late 1944.  Chart 5.5 illustrates the 
challenge facing the CAO in the creation of a large reserve of infantry reinforcements.   
Chart 5.5: Real infantry reinforcement holdings versus authorized target figures November 194462 
 
 When the shortage of available reinforcements for infantry units ended, the political conscription 
crisis of 1944 began in Ottawa.  In October 1944, the Minister of National Defence returned from visiting 
the CAO in the Netherlands and Italy.  Meetings during his travels had raised the concern that if infantry 
casualties in NWE continued at their current pace or that a large military event occurred, the available 
reinforcement pools for the CAO could be extinguished by 31 December 1944.63  His concerns were 
based on uncertainty within the CAO that an adequate reserve of trained infantry replacements could be 
created from the all volunteer Active Service Force.64  On 13 October 1944, the Chief of Staff of CMHQ, 
Lieutenant General Stuart,  informed the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa that 60,000 to 40,000 more 
losses could be expected in the coming months.  Stuart made the immediate request for a further 16,000 
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men above those already in the reinforcement stream.  At this stage in the war it took the Canadian Army 
nearly four months to give an infantryman basic training.  Due to the time needed to get what could only 
be the trained NMRA personnel to the front from Canada, the question of whether they could be used 
needed an immediate answer.  
 Ralston felt that his hand was forced to argue within the War Committee that there was no other 
option but to supply NRMA soldiers to fill the gap.  The real possibility that the CAO would run out of 
personnel it could re-muster into infantry reinforcements was unacceptable to him.  The reason it was 
unacceptable in the Minister's and many Canadians minds was that there was a large trained NMRA 
conscript force that was untapped.  It had not been touched due to the Liberal Government's aversion to 
the overseas deployment of conscripts.  P.M. King at this time was very attuned to the fragility of national 
unity and the need to avoid conscription in order to preserve the political status quo with Quebec.  After 
some investigation, it was determined by Minister Ralston that it was impossible for the Army to testify 
that it could fulfill all its overseas missions utilizing only volunteer personnel.65  It was felt by members 
of the pro-conscription forces within the War Committee that the CAO's needs in wartime were second to 
the P.M.'s desire to maintain national unity.  A perception also existed that the P.M. and others within the 
government refused to come to grips with the reality that NRMA military personnel would have to be 
used.  A schism was created within the Ottawa War Committee on the subject of the use of conscripts, 
and this led to Ralston's resignation on 1 November 1944 due to pressure from the Prime Minister.  While 
King and elements of his cabinet were willingly to take Ralston’s resignation, the reality of the possibility 
of heavy combat in spring and summer 1945 remained.   
 Under the new Minister of Defence, former General Andrew McNaughton, a decision was taken 
to send 16,000 NRMA personnel overseas on 23 November 1944.66  5,000 were to be sent in December, 
                                                          
65 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,699.  Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry, other ranks: NWE, 27 August 1944-28 April 
1945.  In October 1944 daily casualties were continuing to be high.  On this date, there was no way of knowing the casualties 
figures for November, December and January would be very low.   
66 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 633. 
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with another 5,000 in January and 6,000 per month in succeeding months.67  In the end only a small 
amount of this number reached infantry regiments.  A total of 12,908 personnel reached the U.K., 9,677 
went to the continent and 2,463 soldiers found their way to the front line in time to see battle.  Split 
evenly between regiments, this would have been seventy soldiers each, or roughly two platoons worth.  
The total amount of NRMA casualties suffered in combat was 313.  Of these, sixty-nine were fatal.68  The 
performance of the NRMA men within the infantry regiments was good.  If more conscripted men had 
reached the front, it is highly probable that they would have performed adequately in whatever role was 
selected for them.   
 There is no way the leadership of the CAO could judge in October of 1944 whether or not a large 
number of infantry reinforcements would be needed for future operations.  Given the challenges 
encountered while trying to create an reinforcement reserve out of re-mustered personnel in fall 1944, the 
only feasible option was to dip into the NMRA personnel supply.  Furthermore, there were many military 
uncertainties in late 1944 that made the utilization of NRMA personnel appear to be a necessity.69  Had 
Allied operations in the Rhineland not been postponed, had the German military fought on until mid 1945 
and had the Netherlands been aggressively liberated, it is likely that large numbers of NRMA personnel 
would have been needed.  A large infantry reinforcement pool needed to be created to sustain all 
Canadian combat arms units for a possible long-term struggle, and previous attempts using only 
volunteers had not been successful.  The reserve that was so difficult to establish contained 24,500 
personnel by late April 1945.  It was never needed due to the surrender of Germany being imminent, 
despite the great administrative and political struggle to create it.70 
 In conclusion, while the Ottawa War Committee had approved the rapid growth of the CAO after 
1942, both it and NDHQ in Ottawa had ignored the need for a detailed plan to reinforce it when it 
engaged in combat operations.  Both parties understood that the costs of modern warfare would demand 
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potentially large numbers of new personnel to sustain this military entity.  The need for conscription was 
a topic that was politically unacceptable to the Liberal Government and one the Canadian Army did not 
wish to force because it would have endangered its expansion plans.  Richard Walker also argues that the 
Canadian Army put no particular emphasis on the need to be efficient in its use of manpower or pursuing 
a successful volunteer recruitment campaign in Canada.  It if did it would be endorsing the then current 
all volunteer status of the CAO, a situation it did not approve of.  During the months leading up to 
Operation "Overlord", CMHQ Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Stuart failed to heed clear indications 
that a shortage infantry other ranks reinforcements could occur.  NDHQ and CMHQ London significantly 
failed in their responsibility to accurately forecast future infantry casualties for the campaign in NWE.  
These two headquarters accepted 1943 British infantry loss projections as accurate when ample 
operational evidence suggested otherwise.  The final failure was a long term inability to create an 
adequate reserve of reinforcement infantry in the months leading up to the invasion of Europe, despite 
having sufficient excess Active Service Force personnel.  Due to these failures, infantry units engaged in 
ongoing combat operations were weakened by a lack of reinforcements to make good their rapid losses.  
 The shortage of infantry other ranks reinforcements only significantly affected the CIC in the 
months of August and September 1944.  The situation was resolved in late September 1944 due to the 
earlier implementation of a large scale re-mustering program.  While this re-mustering program was 
temporarily effective, it effects were not rapid and the shortage persisted over a sixty day period.  It is 
arguable that a more ruthless management of personnel in the all volunteer Active Service Force could 
have minimized the events of the summer 1944.  The crucial decision to create an adequate reserve of 
infantry reinforcements in spring 1944 was never made, and only half-measures were taken to resolve the 
situation, allowing the events of August and September 1944 to occur.  This reserve, incompetently 
pursued by the Army during 1944, was only successfully created after the political decision to insert large 
numbers of conscript NRMA personnel.  Due to a limited number of these personnel reaching the front, 
the First Canadian Army maintained its nearly all volunteer status to the war's conclusion. 
119 
 
Chapter 6: The Canadian Army’s system for the recovery, repair and 
replacement of A and B vehicles and major weapons systems
 
 The constant repair and replacement of A (combat) vehicles, B (non-combat) vehicles and major 
weapons systems was critical to keeping Canadian unit's offensive and defensive capabilities at a high 
level during 1944-1945.1  If a unit's equipment inventories were below 75 percent of their war 
establishment levels, it did not possess its full capability to accomplish its objectives.  Canadian units 
suffered equipment losses due to all causes, and often at a rapid rate within infantry, armoured and anti-
tank regiments.  How rapidly losses such as this occurred was determined by unit activity and exposure to 
enemy action.  Accidents and normal wear and tear was also unrelenting, so an effective system was 
required to constantly supply new and repaired vehicles and weapons.   
 The total amount of equipment removed from the strength of combat arms units on the front line 
because of mechanical failure or enemy action usually amounted to 100 percent of the unit establishment 
within a short period of time.  This was due to excessive use, enemy action and harsh combat conditions.  
Combat for the Canadian Army in Normandy was more intense and occurred for a longer period of time 
than subsequent battles in NWE that took place in the Netherlands and the Rhineland.  A greater amount 
of German heavy weapons and armoured vehicles were present within multiple German panzer divisions, 
the Canadian Army's primary opponent in the months of June through August 1944.  The fighting power 
of these German formations made a sizeable impact on the monthly totals of Canadian equipment losses.  
These losses drop off markedly once the campaign in Normandy came to a halt in late August, and are 
relatively low on average for the reminder of the war, as remaining German armoured forces were mainly 
engaged to the south against the British and U.S. Armies.   
 Of the sixty-one Sherman tanks the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) fielded on D-
Day, nearly all were lost to enemy action or mechanical failure by the end of June 1944.  The Hussar M4 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Monthly returns 
from May 1944 to May 1945 detail exactly what was considered an A or B vehicle, and how many were held at the divisional, 
corps and army level.  Within the British Army, all combat vehicles were classified as “A” vehicles, while non-combat soft-
skinned vehicles were classified as “B” vehicles. 
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Sherman tank “Holy Roller”, now a monument in London, Ontario, was the only one to survive in the 
regiment’s possession from D-Day until the end of hostilities.2  Enemy action was not often the real 
threat.  Tanks sent away for heavy maintenance would often return with another unit, or not at all, being 
replaced by a newer variant that was more technologically advanced.  The fate of "Holy Roller" was very 
much the exception rather than the rule.   
 This chapter will provide an outline of Canadian Army repair and replacement services for A and 
B vehicles and major weapons systems in NWE.  The process of delivering new and repaired items will 
be discussed first, followed by an outline of the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineers (RCEME) repair system.  As the larger twin to the personnel replacement organization, the 1st 
Canadian Echelon within 21st Army Group headquarters controlled these parts of the First Canadian 
Army's operations.  However, Canadian command, control and administration had its limitations.  Like all 
Commonwealth armies, the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO) was dependent on the will and ability of the 
British government to supply it with large amounts war material.3  By late 1943, a majority of Canadian 
units designated for the 1944 invasion of the continent were properly equipped and training intensively.4  
As the campaign in Normandy raged in the summer of 1944, the continued stockpiling of large amounts 
of war material on the continent was not a great challenge.  This was due to the Battle of the Atlantic 
being largely won by late 1943, Allied economies reaching their full production capacities by mid 1944 
and the Normandy beachhead being securely established in June of that year.  British political will and 
ample cooperation with the Canadian government was also present, and this allowed the Canadian 
military to be equipped and re-supplied as needed.  As a result, the Canadian Army enjoyed full access to 
a well-stocked common pool of American Lend-Lease and British produced equipment. 
                                                          
2 The Family of Captain Proctor Clifford Neil.  "Captain Neil's Story ~ Bio & Military Cross Award." Captain Proctor Clifford 
Neil.  Honouring the life and accomplishments of a WWII Hero.  Retrieved 5 July 2016 from http://www.captainpcneil.com/holy-
roller.html 
3"4th Canadian (Armoured) Division” article.  “Canadiansoldiers.com”.  As of October 1942, the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division only had 255 Universal Bren Gun Carriers with which to train with.  It did not receive tanks until later.  Retrieved 14 
January , 2016.  http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/casf/4thdivision.htm 
4 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 104. 
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 As illustrated in Chart 6.1, there were a total of five administrative areas within the First 
Canadian Army’s area of operations.  From the front lines to the rear areas, these zones consisted of the 
Divisional Administrative Area, the Corps Troops Area, the Corps Administrative Area, the Forward 
Maintenance Area and the Line of Communications Area.5  Canadian 1st Echelon control of major 
Chart 6.1: Path of new major weapons systems and A & B vehicles (excluding heavy armoured 
fighting vehicles)6 
 
 
weapons systems and vehicle logistics began with the Canadian Army Ordnance Maintenance Company 
(OMC), which was actually much larger strength than a company.  It consisted of a headquarters, a 
regulating station section, a stores section, an ammunition section and a tank section.  It received all 
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manner of supplies, vehicles and equipment from British controlled vehicle and ordnance depots located 
within close transportation distance to the First Canadian Army rail or road head.   
 Rail and road heads were located in the Line of Communications Area and were the logistical 
start points for the Canadian Army in NWE.  There were often multiple First Canadian Army rail and 
road heads in existence during 1944-1945 as the front moved forward.  At these rail and road heads 
various Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC) units and numbered supply depots were present.  
The Canadian Army OMC then distributed what it received from the British Army to Canadian army 
level equipment storage locations, fuel and ammunition dumps and vehicle parks.  Before anything 
moved or entered storage, the OMC and road and rail head personnel worked to prepare all war material 
for these possibilities as required.  In a reverse flow, these road and rail heads also received damaged or 
obsolete equipment that had been removed from the front.7   
 If railroad transport was not available, new vehicles and ordnance was driven forward by 2nd line 
transport from the Line of Communication Area depots to the corps-level Ordnance Field Park.8  2nd line 
transport consisted of trucks and other assets operated at the corps and army level, 1st line being those in 
the fighting divisions and their formations.  There were eventually a total of two Ordnance Field Parks 
within the First Canadian Army in April 1945.9  The corps level Ordnance Field Park would contain 
everything in order to support a complete army corps, with the exception of rations, water and petroleum 
products.  All forms of heavy and light weapons and quantities of all types of ammunition and spares for 
all weapon assemblies were present.  Smaller stores such as small arms, optics, engineer, signals and 
workshop equipment were also held.  Large parking areas were present new and repaired vehicles, with 
row upon row of A and B types.  Only light A vehicles were present, the heavier armoured fighting 
vehicles (AFVs) having their own separate transport and replacement system.  On top of all this, 
                                                          
7 John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 92-93. 
8 John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 92.  2nd line transport was corps and army level transport, and 1st line transport was 
attached to divisional units.   
9 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661.  Appendix F.  Order of battle for all Canadian Army units in NWE.  
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quantities of specialist A and B vehicles (command vehicles, wireless trucks, recovery vehicles and 
specialist tracked carriers) were present.10   
 This park then fed the forward division level Ordnance Field Parks and respective armoured or 
infantry Sub Field Parks.  From these parks, deliveries were made to further supply points or the items 
were directly picked up by regimental level units that required them.  To receive a new piece of weaponry 
or a light A or regular B vehicle, an authorized unit transport party would arrive to help itself.  For smaller 
deliverable items that could be pushed forward, these parks supplied divisional Delivery Points (DPs).  At 
these DPs, unit B echelon (supply and administrative) troops of the combat arms regiments showed up to 
receive equipment.   
 The weapons systems delivered to the Canadian Army OMC that required the largest logistical 
resources to transport them to the front were heavy armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).  As depicted in 
Chart 6.2, these were cut away from the remainder of the logistic process at the OMC and began their 
own transport path.  These vehicles were the major weapons systems of the armoured, armoured 
reconnaissance, self-propelled field artillery and anti-tank units.  Prior to large scale operations, Canadian 
armoured regiments saw it as imperative to have the number of operational tanks be close as possible to 
the war establishment tables.  The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s strength as of 31 January 1945, 
immediately prior to February’s Operation “Veritable”, was 214 tanks against a war establishment figure 
of 226.11  Units containing armour would report their replacement needs through an AFV or tank state 
that would be reported on a daily or weekly basis.  These daily and weekly returns from the regimental 
headquarters (RHQ) of each unit were forwarded up the chain of command.  For example, an armoured 
regiment’s AFV state would be a daily summary of fit/not fit/written off status of 75mm cruiser tanks 
(M4 Sherman), 17-Pounder Fireflies (Sherman Ic or Vc with the longer gun) and 37 mm reconnaissance  
                                                          
10 John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook ,92-93. 
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 January 1945 
return.   
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Chart 6.2: First Canadian Army system of armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) replacement: Paths of 
new/repaired AFVs to combat arms regiments12 
 
 
 
(M3 Stuart) light tanks.  “Fit” would refer to a AFV being fully combat operational.  As of 1 November 
1944, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division fielded 247 "fit" tanks of all makes and seventy-nine "fit" 
scout cars.13  For RCA field artillery and anti-tank units, self-propelled (SP) M-10 tank destroyers and SP 
Sexton howitzers would be reported as part of their gun state.14  At the armoured brigade level the 
combined states of all armoured regiments would be forwarded to higher command from the brigade 
headquarters.  If an armoured unit was short tanks in any of its troops or squadrons, it would be tasked to 
                                                          
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of AFV A Vehicle Recovery, Repair and 
Replacement.  File 215C1.045 (D12).  John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 93.   
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary November, 1944.  T-10550.  Return on 
AFVs within the division, 1 November, 1944. 
14 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). The final report at the 
Army level was the above monthly returns of all controlled stores, such as 25-Pounder Howitzers and 17-Pounder anti-tank guns 
on a divisional basis.   
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receive new AFVs at a certain date.  These repaired or new replacement tanks would be driven to the 
front, transported by low-bed trailer or loaded onto rail cars and then received at the B Echelon of the 
receiving regiment.   
 The key component of the replacement process for armour was the 25th Canadian Armoured 
Delivery Regiment (25th CADR), previously mentioned in Chapter 4.  This regiment was divided into a 
total of eight functioning squadrons, titled A through H.15  The 25th CADR squadrons in NWE operated a 
very sophisticated and efficient system for supplying new and repaired AFVs to all Canadian Army units 
that operated them.  They also supplied British, Polish and Czech units operating within the British 
Second Army and First Canadian Army.  The first 25th CADR squadrons to land in France during June-
July 1944 were initially under the command of the 1st British Corps.  These were then incorporated into 
the 2nd Canadian Corps and the First Canadian Army after both became operational in mid July and early 
August 1944.  "C" Squadron landed in Normandy on 7 June 1944, and immediately began transferring 
tanks to the three armoured regiments of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.16  On 10 July 1944, "E" 
Squadron arrived within the beachhead.  This squadron was responsible for tank deliveries at the 2nd 
Canadian Corps level.  These two squadrons were followed by "F" Squadron landing on 23 July 1944.  
This squadron was to aid in railhead acceptance of AFVs and be responsible for delivery of vehicles at the 
First Canadian Army level once the army became operational.  In this role it was also the squadron 
responsible for sending tanks to British, Czech and Polish armoured units under First Canadian Army 
                                                          
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,276.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12748.  The 
25th CADR squadron war diaries are very detailed regarding actual deliveries of tanks to the units.  The only caveat is that often 
there are discrepancies between the numbers reported being delivered to a regiment and the receiving regiment’s strength 
increase. This was largely due to breakdowns in transit, delays in reporting and tanks being sent back to delivery squadron to 
correct kit deficiencies.  It was also noted in the course of this research that early in the campaign due to a shortage of AFVs there 
was some “borrowing” between armoured regiments.  Also, when a regiment was in action they often did not have time to report 
their strengths and losses.  It would take a day or two afterwards for all tanks and crews to be accounted for. 
16 Leonard Curchin, The Elgins: A Regimental History, (St. Thomas: The Sutherland Press.  1977),78.  These regiments had 
suffered large losses in the period of fighting 6-7 June 1944. 
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command.  "D" Squadron of the 25th CADR landed on 26 July 1944, and was responsible for all units 
within the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.17   
 British stocks of replacement AFVs were delivered to large vehicle depots on the continent near 
road heads and rail heads by transport units of the British Army.  The Canadian Army receiving 
procedure to accept these vehicles into service was quite comprehensive.  Working together in tandem 
during this process from August 1944 onward was the OMC's (RCOC) Tank Railhead Section and the 
25th CADR's “F” squadron.  These two groups would receive a shipment of AFVs from the British 
Army’s Vehicle Company, Army Ordnance Delivery organization.  Once they had arrived, the new AFVs 
would have their documents examined and kit removed and re-checked at the "F" Squadron tank park.  
Next, the armament would be degreased and a general cleaning of the fighting compartment would take 
place.  After this, the sprockets, road wheels and tracks would be adjusted and repaired as required.  
Following this, a general servicing of weapons, radios, and the power traverse would occur.  Any 
modifications needed would be completed by the Canadian Army’s 3rd Canadian AFV Support Unit and 
the 4th Canadian Armoured Troops (3rd line Maintenance) Workshop, working alongside “F” Squadron.  
Once this was concluded, optics, radios and fragile equipment would be installed or boxed for transport.  
Next, all onboard stowage of ammunition would be completed in accordance with authorized tables.  
Finally, the light aid detachment (LAD) attached to “F” Squadron would then recertify all the AFVs to 
make sure they were mechanically fit.  Once this was completed, the tanks were ready to be sent out.18  If 
“fit” tanks were not issued right away, they would be maintained by 25th CADR personnel in the "F" 
Squadron tank park.   
 Once an order was received for tanks to be sent forward, the appropriate number would then be 
driven, transported by rail or loaded onto tank transporters for the trip from "F" Squadron to the 25th 
                                                          
17 Leonard Curchin, The Elgins, 78.  Once D Squadron disembarked it immediately turned over twenty-two tanks with full crews 
to 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade to cover losses suffered 9-10 August 1944. 
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,279.  F Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Squadron War Diary, October 1944.  On 2 
October 1944, several Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers slated for delivery to the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Regiment by “F” Squadron, 25th CADR, were instead re-routed back to RCEME maintenance units due to mechanical issues.  
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CADR corps delivery squadron.19  This squadron would then feed the two forward delivery squadrons of 
the 25th CADR present in NWE in August 1944.  Within their operating bases, 25th CADR squadrons 
operated "tank circuits", with each stop in the circuit checking over an area of the tank.  This repetitive 
inspection and receiving process at each squadron could take time.  While of questionable efficiency, it 
was effective at resolving issues vehicles had arrived with and prevented these problems from reaching 
armoured regiments in the field.  At any point repaired vehicles which had come from RCEME facilities 
could join a 25th CADR squadron.   
 In order to meet demands for new AFVs quickly, 25th CADR squadrons usually had an AFV 
“float”, or balance that they could draw from, similar to the Canadian Army reinforcement CBRG units.  
This float was a percentage of the total AFVs in service with the front line units that a 25th CADR 
squadron was designated to support.  Though this percentage went up and down with supply and demand, 
there was always an effort made to maintain the desired inventory level to deal with emergencies.  This 
allowed the 25th CADR to be able to respond very quickly to a recipient unit’s requests for large 
reinforcements.  The best example of this rapid response capability is the 10 August 1944 delivery by “D” 
Squadron, 25th CADR of twenty-two fully-crewed M4 Sherman tanks to the 28th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment.20  This regiment had lost forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader anti-aircraft tank and 
one scout car totally destroyed in battle on 9 August 1944. 21  This immediate resupply, plus four tanks 
the regiment had as a reserve Left Out of Battle (LOB) contingent, gave it a total reinforcement of 
twenty-six new tanks.  This number would theoretically make it capable of immediate combat operations.  
On 12 August 1944, a further sixteen tanks were delivered, bringing up the regiment’s new tank deliveries 
                                                          
19 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,457.  Tank Replaces and Releases.  File 212C1.1009 (D28).  Chart detailing the actions of a rear 
delivery squadron of the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment.   
20 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12748.  9 
August 1944 entry. 
21 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured  Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12764.  War Diary entry for 9 
August 1944 notes the one-day loss on Hill 140 of forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader anti-aircraft tank and one 
scout car.    
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to thirty-eight for the period 10-12 August 1944.22  The number of tanks delivered in this example and the 
speed in which they arrived is very impressive.   
 The process of AFV replacement and repair within an average Canadian armoured regiment over 
a eighteen day period during August 1944 is depicted in Chart 6.3.  In these two and half weeks, the 27th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment lost a significant number of vehicles due to enemy action and mechanical 
failure.  It had participated in Operations “Totalize”, “Tractable” and the initial battles of the Falaise 
Pocket.  Though significantly weakened, after the delivery of new and repaired vehicles the regiment 
fielded thirty-eight “fit” tanks on 18 August.  With an additional two tanks in the light aid detachment 
repairable within two days, forty would be “ fit” by 20 August.  Though not perfect, this was enough to 
theoretically field three squadrons of four troops.  Each troop could field three tanks each, plus four for 
the headquarters squadron.   
 Within the German Army, tank losses due to combat and mechanical failure were not replaced as 
efficiently as within the Canadian Army.  As an example, the second battalion of the German Panzer Lehr 
Regiment 130 in Normandy was sent only eleven replacement Panzer IV tanks on 8 July 1944, having 
received none in June.23  As illustrated in Chart 6.4, the effects of combat, mechanical failure and battle 
damage on the battalion’s strength in the period 1 to 26 June 1944 were severe.  Repairs were also slow, 
as they occurred within the panzer units rather than in specialized separate repair units.  As of 26 June, 
there were forty-seven Panzer IVs in short and long term repair near the chaos of the front lines. 
 Over the course of the campaign in NWE, the 25th CADR was successful at re-supplying all 
Canadian units operating heavy AFVs.  This was due to large levels of production from repair workshops 
                                                          
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12748.  
12 August 1944 entry. 
23 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 386. 
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Chart 6.3: 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment M4 Sherman 75mm and Firefly 17-Pounder losses, 
replacements and “fit” status 1-18 August 194424 
 
Chart 6.4: German II./Panzer Lehr Regiment 130’s Panzer IV tank strength returns and losses due 
enemy action and mechanical failure 1-26 June 194425 
 
                                                          
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armoured Regiment tanks state report.  File 1044. 
25 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 390. 
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and 25th CADR forward delivery squadrons being able to maintain large “floats”.  As an example, “D” 
Squadron, 25th CADR delivered a total of 295 new and repaired AFVs to the 4th Canadian Armoured 
Division during the month of October 1944.26  This was enough to nearly re-equip the entire division.  As 
illustrated in Charts 6.5 and 6.6, Canadian armoured regiments maintained their strength while opposing 
German units withered.  It also certainly helped that Allied forces in NWE during 1944-1945 possessed 
total air superiority, had large amounts of replacement equipment and vehicle movement and recovery 
was unimpeded.   
 The delivery of non AFV major weapons systems and other equipment did not utilize any special 
delivery squadrons to transport it to a fighting unit.  Once past army level ordnance parks, it was 
deposited or driven to corps level ordnance field parks by 2nd line transport.  From these locations it was 
then moved to the divisional level field parks.  At the division level there was a divisional ordnance field 
park and a corresponding armoured or infantry ordnance sub-park.  One of each was allocated to each 
Canadian armoured or infantry division.27  The field parks were numbered by the division number, and 
the sub-parks were numbered 201-205.  For example, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s ordnance 
depots consisted of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park and the 205th Canadian 
Armoured Ordnance Sub-Park.28  In these large parks all manner of equipment, vehicles and stores were 
located in a manner similar to the corps level parks.  From these points divisional units would be 
authorized on a need basis to help themselves in order to retain their wartime establishments.   
 RCA field artillery, anti-tank and light anti-aircraft regiments reported their status in a very 
similar manner as the armoured units.  For artillery regiments, the guns were their primary piece of  
                                                          
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary October 1944.  T-12748. 
27 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661.  Appendix F.  Order of Battle for Canadian Units in NWE.   
28 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661.  Appendix F.  Order of Battle for Canadian Units in NWE.  
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Chart 6.5 Operational tank strength of 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment’s M4 Sherman tanks 
June 1944.  War establishment = 50 M4 Shermans.29 
 
Chart 6.6:Operational tank strength of the German II./SS Panzer Regiment 12’s Panzer IV tanks, 
June 1944.  War establishment = 101 Pz IVs.30 
 
                                                          
29 Roman Jarymowycz, ““The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign”, 336.  Appendix E.  Strength returns 
for the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade in June 1944.  Because of the quick practice of back loading tanks with any problems 
past the abilities of the light aid detachment, all these Shermans must be considered operational.  
30 Norbert Szamveber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy, 234. Appendix VII.  Tank strength of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 1 June-11 
August 1944.  
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equipment and the number of operational guns and guns under repair was constantly monitored.  A gun 
state of ordnance holdings accompanied by an ammunition usage report was forwarded each day by an 
artillery regiment’s RHQ to higher RCA command.  These returns were very important, as their data was 
used to calculate supply requirements and to gauge ammunition usage.31  The returns would make their 
way up the chain of command, and army level field ordnance parks would then authorize the release of 
new equipment to make up for combat and mechanical losses.  New replacement artillery equipment was 
held by army group level British Army ordnance field parks.  The Canadian army level ordnance park 
would then receive new equipment from the OMC and move it to the corps level ordnance field parks.  
Repaired and reconditioned equipment would be also be transported by RCEME personnel to the division 
field ordnance parks and sub-parks, where it would be taken on strength (TOS).   
 The divisional ordnance parks would contain everything in the way of new and repaired towed 
artillery pieces, replacement artillery vehicles and radios.  While all artillery equipment and weaponry 
was very sophisticated, maintaining and operating it was less complicated than an AFV with its motor, 
running gear, transmission, power turret traverse, sights and radios.  Compared to a 17-Pounder anti-tank 
gun, a Firefly tank was much more challenging from a maintenance and delivery perspective, hence the 
lack of a 25th CADR type organization exclusively for artillery regiments.  The approach to maintaining 
sophisticated artillery systems in 1944-1945 was very similar to that for an A or B vehicle.  The 
successive "lines" within the RCEME repair system, to be discussed shortly, could handle increasingly 
difficult artillery repairs.  Guns constantly required maintenance, but this could largely be completed at 
the regimental level by the LAD.  If a gun was worn out or damaged, it could be easily replaced.  A new 
one would be picked up at the field ordnance or sub parks by a gun crew with an artillery tractor or tower.  
New or repaired guns were drawn as needed to replace weapons under repair or that were lost in battle.  
An example of a mass draw of new equipment occurred in early August 1944.  All three RCA field 
                                                          
31 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Ammunition usage and 
receipts return.  1st British Corps and 2nd Canadian Corps, 16 December 1944.  The guns state was also needed in order to arrange 
for the supply of the required amount of ammunition that was needed to keep it combat capable.  Continuous delivery was needed  
for regular operations and extra on an irregular basis for larger operations. 
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regiments within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division drew an entirely new complement of seventy-two 
towed 25-Pounder howitzers, turning it their old self-propelled M-7 Priest 105mm howitzers.32 
 In NWE during 1944-1945 there were many heavy AFVs operated by non-Canadian Armoured 
Corps (CAC) regiments within the Canadian Army.  These were mainly artillery observation post (OP) 
tanks, self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers and artillery towers operated by RCA units.  These vehicles 
were delivered by the 25th CADR in exactly the same manner as a Sherman Firefly tank was delivered to 
an armoured regiment.  Universal Carriers, T-16 and M-14 gun tractors were also A vehicles, but the 
delivery of these smaller vehicles was accomplished via unit drivers due to their low weight, mechanical 
reliability and high speed.    
 In contrast to the German Army during 1944-1945, the Canadian Army was totally mechanized in 
all areas that required soft-skinned B vehicles.  This very large motor pool was one of the First Canadian 
Army’s greatest strengths.  It allowed Canadian forces to be very mobile and carry out all logistic tasks, 
increasing their military effectiveness.  As opposed to occasional A combat vehicle shortages, there was 
never a shortage of soft-skinned transport in Canadian units.  The 31 August 1944 B vehicle return for the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division shows 125 General Service 3-ton lorries on strength as opposed to its war 
establishment number of 104, making it significantly over-strength. 33  In comparison, the German 12th SS 
Panzer Division as of 1 June 1944 had only 65 percent of its authorized number of trucks operational, and 
only 33 percent of its gun tractors.34   
 Unsophisticated general service (GS) vehicles could be used in multiple roles by virtually any 
type of unit.  Some examples of GS B vehicles within the Canadian Army were 2½-ton troop transports, 
3-ton lorries and jeeps.  Many were produced in the U.K. with a right hand drive, while others were of 
                                                          
32 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16371.  7 August 1944.  The British field 
ordnance park in question for this exchange was designated a “Royal Artillery re-organization centre”. 
33 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 August 1944 
return.  B vehicle state for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as of 31 August 1944.   
34 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 225.  This state of affairs reduced the mobility of the division and its ability to quickly move to 
Normandy.  
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North American manufacture.  Not being AFVs, they could only sustain low amounts of damage and had 
a limited capability to mount weapons.  Canadian Army specialist technical B vehicles such as petrol 
tankers and command caravans were very sophisticated and came with vehicle technicians to operate 
them.  Documentation for these vehicles had to follow the vehicle from point to point, and their 
employment and status was monitored constantly.  
 As shown in Chart 6.7, the British 21st Army Group vehicle depots would release B vehicles as 
authorized by 2nd Canadian Corps and later First Canadian Army headquarters.  Released B vehicles 
would travel directly to either to the Canadian corps level ordnance field park or a delivery point near the 
division level ordnance field park.  Unit drivers would take possession of the new vehicles at the DP near 
the divisional ordnance field park.  GS category B vehicles that were repaired by RCEME maintenance 
units would also go directly to the DPs near the divisional ordnance field park, where they would also be 
picked up by unit drivers.  New and repaired specialist vehicles such as wreckers, radio vehicles and 
ambulances would be assembled at the corps-level ordnance field park.  From this point these specialist 
vehicles could be dispersed to unit DPs, but only with the proper documentation and the assigned 
technician.  Only 2.5 percent of the respective corps total unit holdings of various technical vehicles 
would be held in divisional field ordnance parks and DPs as reinforcements.   
 The Canadian Army's recovery and repair system for maintaining its inventories of vehicles, 
weapons and equipment in 1944-1945 was administered by units of RCEME.  Its creation and the systems 
utilized by its units were directly influenced by the introduction of the British Army equivalent, The 
Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), which officially came into being in 
October 1942.  In early 1941, the British Beveridge Report had identified the need to properly employ 
large numbers of skilled tradesmen, engineers and technicians which had hurriedly been put into uniform 
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Chart 6.7: First Canadian Army vehicle path chart for B vehicle replacement35 
 
in the mobilization of 1939.36  This recruitment had stripped a section of British industry that desperately 
needed their skills.  At the same time these personnel were not being correctly employed within the 
military to utilize their capabilities.  It was deemed necessary to release some of these some personnel for 
civilian wartime production and re role those still needed within the British Army to utilise their technical 
expertise for maintenance duties. 
                                                          
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of  B vehicle delivery/replacement.  File 215C1.045 (D12).  
John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 93.  Canadian Army System of Supply of Ordnance Stores in the Field Chart 1944, 
Appendix D. 
36 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: the Story of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Armed 
Forces (Borden, ON: The Guild of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch Charitable Trust.  2008.  Electronic 
Edition), 267. 
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 The British Sinclair-Seeks-Dunkly Report of February 1942 went further to recommend the 
creation of a new corps of electrical and mechanical engineers.  This corps would encompass British 
Royal Ordnance Corps (ROC) and combat arms personnel then currently responsible for repair, recovery 
and replacement duties.  After Royal Assent, this corps became REME and it was officially incorporated 
into the British Army as of October 1942.37  New processes came into effect simultaneously to allow the 
recovery and repair of all British Army vehicles, weapons and equipment in the shortest amount of time.  
In May 1942, the commander of the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO), Lieutenant-General Andrew 
McNaughton, pointed out the importance of keeping CAO systems for recovery, repair and maintenance 
as similar as possible to the British while minimizing organizational change.  As a result British REME 
processes were introduced into Canadian Army operations in Italy during 1943, but personnel remained in 
the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC) or part of combat units.  Despite having still not created a 
new corps, by January 1944 REME processes had been fully adopted by the CAO.  Overflowing 
divisional workshops were transformed into multiple brigade workshops and light aid detachments 
(LADs).   
 Official organizational change that created the Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineers (CEME) finally came into effect on 1 February 1944, one year and six months after the official 
incorporation of REME into the British Army.  With Royal Assent CEME became RCEME on 2 April 
1944, just in time for the Normandy invasion.38  With this act, large numbers of RCOC personnel and 
others were rebadged to become the first members of RCEME.  A second reorganizational phase after this 
initial change claimed the light aid detachment personnel from combat arms units, also rebadging them as 
RCEME personnel.39  While difficult for the former RCOC and combat arms regiment personnel to 
accept at the time, this transformation made the CAO much more effective in the field.  It was now more 
capable than ever of keeping a major percentage of its vehicles and major weapons systems operational.  
                                                          
37 Murray Johnston, Canada's Craftsmen at 50, 268. 
38 Murray Johnston, Canada's Craftsmen at 50, 269. 
39 Murray Johnston, Canada's Craftsmen at 50, 270. 
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This transformation provides evidence of a learning culture within the CAO.  The creation of an entirely 
new army trade and adoption of new repair and recovery processes were significant mileposts in the 
evolution of the Canadian Army during the Second World War.  Its leadership had displayed a 
willingness to adapt in order to be more effective in a specific area. 
 The Canadian Army recovery and repair system was divided into levels so that no one area was 
overstressed by its workload.  If there was an over load at one level, or the task was too complicated, it 
would be passed to the next successive level.  As illustrated in Chart 6.8, RCEME had a total of four lines 
of maintenance to repair mechanical faults or battle damage.  1st line was the organic repair services 
attached to the combat arms regiments.  Further lines (levels) after this took on successively more 
difficult and complicated repair and rebuilding assignments.  The majority of the work in the RCEME 
workshops and LADs was done prior to or after combat operations.  Enemy action was responsible for 
only a very small percentage of 2nd line workshop’s tasks.  Their workload was divided as follows: Over 
95 percent of jobs related to mechanical breakdowns, 2 percent stemmed from battle damage and 3 
percent involved road accidents.40    
 The Canadian Army RCEME recovery and repair system that evolved from Anglo-Canadian 
operational experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy was centered on the concept of 
the Advanced Workshop Detachment (AWD).  This was a sub-unit of the main body of the brigade-level 
workshop.  It could be made as large or small as the tactical situation demanded.  This grouping was 
tasked with providing advanced recovery and repair services in cooperation with RCEME 1st line 
maintenance LADs at the regimental level.  The AWD was the link between the 1st and 2nd lines of 
maintenance.  These two lines took the lion’s share of repair, recovery and maintenance duties. 41 
                                                          
40 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 42. 
41 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 42. 
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Chart 6.8: First Canadian Army lines of maintenance for the repair of A and B vehicles and major 
weapons systems42 
 
 The 1st line maintenance capability within the combat arms regiments consisted of the LAD 
workshops.  One was attached to each RCA and CAC regiment, and infantry LADs were held at the 
brigade level.  For example, the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s three regiments had the following 
LADs, each manned by RCEME troops:43  The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment contained the No.54 
LAD, the 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment was assigned the No.55 LAD and the 27th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment was issued the No.85 LAD. 
                                                          
42 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50,42-44.  
43 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 327.  Appendix 5. 
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 These detachments were designed to be extremely mobile and had a minimum number of 
personnel, vehicles and equipment.  They dealt with easily correctable problems that AFV and gun crews 
could aid in resolving within a certain time limit.  They put maximum effort into these easier problems 
and “backloaded” (sent to the rear) what could not be handled quickly or was beyond their capabilities.  
The main duties of the LAD were light welding, mechanical repairs and assisting in maintenance 
questions.  They were spread evenly throughout the A1 (combat), A2 and B (supply and administrative) 
echelons of the regiment they were assigned to.  AFVs, vehicles and ordnance sent back by the LAD for 
2nd or 3rd line maintenance would be collected by the AWD’s recovery assets and back loaded to the 
brigade collection point.  This collection point was within the AWD base of operations or very near to it.  
The AWD of the brigade workshop worked closely with the three regiments of each brigade, but also with 
divisional troops, such as the field artillery, machine gun and anti-tank regiments.  The LAD’s from these 
divisional units would be designated to feed a certain brigade workshop AWD in exactly the same manner 
as one of the armoured or infantry brigade’s regimental LADs.  There was no major differences in the 
duties of an armoured or infantry brigade workshop AWD.  For an infantry brigade, its brigade workshop 
AWD would collect, repair or back load all infantry AFVs, vehicles and ordnance in exactly the same 
manner as the armoured brigade workshop AWD.   
 Canadian Army 2nd line RCEME repair assets consisted of the main body of the brigade 
workshop, which in turn oversaw the operations of its AWD.  As an example, the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade had the 2nd Armoured Brigade Workshop assigned to it.  Despite the misnomer, the brigade 
workshop operated in what was considered a divisional level repair area if the workshop in question was 
part of an infantry or armoured division.  The 2nd line brigade workshop’s main bodies in armoured or 
infantry divisions were to be located no more than two hours from the location of the LAD.  These main 
bodies were not very mobile, and had trouble keeping up with the rapid advances of the First Canadian 
Army in August and September 1944.  This was especially the case with workshops operating within the 
4th Canadian Armoured Division.  In response, its brigade workshops from September 1944 onwards were 
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sited very near the front.  These workshops formed Rear Workshop Detachments (RWDs), and these less-
mobile elements moved forward when they could.  In this case the need for an AWD was removed and 
the main body of the brigade workshop took on its role, totally reversing the standard procedure.  The 
three infantry brigade workshops in an infantry division post August 1944 continued to have AWDs, but 
one workshop’s entire main body was always placed forward.  The other two infantry brigade workshops 
were located to the rear.44  Also within the 2nd line maintenance structure was the 2nd Canadian Corps 
Troops Workshop.  This facility provided repair services for corps level units.  The LADs of corps level 
combat units would feed the corps workshop AWD in exactly the same process as the infantry and 
armoured LADs fed their brigade workshop AWDs. 
 If an AFV or other equipment was sent off strength (SOS) as a repair casualty to a 2nd line 
maintenance unit, it was taken off the strength of its original regiment.  It was now on the strength of the 
respective RCEME unit, and all further repair work would be completed by RCEME personnel.45  The 
repair process was quite flexible, and there was no rule that a certain squadron’s tank had to return to its 
respective squadron or regiment.  As a new or repaired similar tank emerged from the repair and 
reinforcement pipeline, it would instead take its place and be delivered by the 25th CADR forward 
squadron.   
 Despite the infantry and armoured titles, the armoured and infantry brigade workshops also 
worked on AFVs and other ordnance that was employed by the RCA field artillery and anti-tank units.  
Artillery OP tanks, self-propelled howitzers, tank destroyers and artillery towers all broke down and 
suffered battle damage at the same rate as infantry and armoured unit AFVs.  If a RCA artillery AFV was 
finished repairs, the designated 25th CADR squadron would deliver this vehicle to an RCA unit in exactly 
the same manner as it would to an armoured unit.  As part of its role, the corps level “E” Squadron, 25th 
                                                          
44 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 65. 
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  21st AG 30 November, 1944-
31 January 1945 returns.  Divisional vehicles strengths in this time period do often go down, but this is not to enemy action but 
due to mechanical repairs.  
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CADR was responsible for delivering tracked artillery A vehicles directly to the RCA regiments.  The 
"B","C", "D" and "G" squadrons of the 25th CADR were responsible for the tank equipped Canadian 
armoured brigades.46 
 The 3rd line of RCEME maintenance was designated to complete the rebuilding and 
reconditioning of equipment.  This was not a service available within the 1st and 2nd lines as shown in 
Chart 6.9.  Rebuilding and reconditioning took a very long period of time and had to be completed in a 
static factory-like environment.  In these locations detailed and complicated work could take place out of 
the way of the elements and enemy action.  This was their designated role, but the majority of their work 
was overflow from 2nd line maintenance.  The corps troops, armoured brigade and infantry brigade 
workshops could all feed overflow repair cases directly to 3rd line units.  The No.2 Tank Troops 
Workshop was an example of a 3rd line RCEME asset in the summer of 1944.  This facility was used as 
an overflow catch point for overworked 2nd line brigade workshops.47  The 3rd line maintenance units were 
not very mobile, but sought to remain at a fixed distance from 2nd line bases.  If one was ordered to move 
forward, others stayed in place as long as they could to remain effective and take on the moving unit’s 
workload.  All 3rd line maintenance facilities were under the command of the First Canadian Army 
Deputy Director of Mechanical Engineering (DDME) as of 1 September 1944.48 
 Canadian Army 4th line maintenance was a capability that existed in the form of the No.1 and 
No.2 Advanced Base Workshops.  The No.1 Canadian Base Workshop, as the parent organization of  
these 4thline facilities, remained in the U.K.  These organizations were commanded by the Director of 
Mechanical Engineering (DME),  21st Army Group.  These 4th line assets were designed to be available at 
the rate of one per Canadian corps.  They provided factory-like rebuilding and reconditioning services for 
                                                          
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278.  E Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary December 1944.  Multiple 
entries regarding the delivery of RCA self-propelled artillery pieces and Ram tracked gun tractors (towers) exist. 
47 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 70-71. 
48 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 65. 
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Chart 6.9: First Canadian Army process for A & B vehicle and major weapons system recovery 
and repair (Armoured Division example)49 
 
vehicles and other major pieces of equipment on a higher level than 3rd line.  These groups could also be 
utilized for special missions in addition to their designated roles.  For example, No.1 Advanced Base 
Workshop inspected and performed maintenance on over 400 guns prior to Operation "Totalize" in early 
August 1944.  It also rebuilt and repaired large numbers of submerged vehicles that had been recovered 
from the Juno and Sword Beach landing areas in Normandy.50  If 3rd line maintenance assets could not 
handle a job or were overloaded, these two facilities could assist in completing complete rebuilding and 
                                                          
49 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663.  First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of AFV A vehicle Recovery, Repair and Replacement.  File 
215C1.045 (D12). 
50Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 74. 
143 
 
reconditioning tasks.51  Specialized recovery assets in the army level Line of Communications Area also 
existed.  The RCEME Canadian Army No.2 and later No.1 and No.3 Recovery Companies operated in the 
strategic route clearing and recovery role past the corps and divisional areas of responsibility.  Prior to 
August 1944, there was little vehicle and equipment back loading above regimental and brigade level due 
to the small area within the Normandy beachhead.  As the breakout from Normandy developed in August 
1944, these activities increased as broken down vehicles were littered across northern France.52  
 Once repairs were completed, the vehicle or piece of ordnance would be sent on its way.  Using 
an AFV as an example, once it was deemed “fit” by a repair line of maintenance it was immediately 
shipped back to the relevant squadron of the 25th CADR.  At that point it would be sent off strength (SOS) 
of the RCEME unit that had worked on it and was now on the strength with the 25th CADR squadron.  
Once the 25th CADR squadron delivered it, the AFV would join the strength the armoured or RCA 
artillery unit, and the circle was complete.  The RCEME repair organization at its height in May 1945 was 
large and extremely capable.  A total of 150 RCEME units and sub-units existed, from the LAD 
detachments within combat arms units to 4th line maintenance facilities located in static locations.  
 In summary, this chapter has provided a short overview of the repair and replacement procedures 
for A and B vehicles and major weapons systems within the First Canadian Army during 1944-1945.   
The Canadian Army during the late war period was very lucky to adopt what were largely British Army 
practices which had evolved by trial and error during 1939-1943 into a very sophisticated system.  During 
the Italian campaign in 1943-1944, the Canadian Army had opportunity to practice these methods in the 
field.  On its arrival in NWE, familiar practices were put into action with good results.  Canadian combat 
arms regiments were never hindered in their operations due to a shortage of any type of operational A or 
B vehicle or major weapons systems. 
                                                          
51 Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 64. 
52Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 62. 
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Chapter 7: The 1st Canadian Infantry Division: Major actions, 
casualties, reinforcements and strength returns for its combat 
arms regiments in North West Europe, April-May 1945
 
Formed from both permanent force regiments and militia units, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
was authorized to begin forming soon after hostilities broke out in September 1939.  Deployed to the 
U.K. later in that year, it performed garrison duties and conducted training exercises until mid-1943.  
From 1943 to early 1945, the division fought in Italy as part of the Eighth British Army, forming part of 
the 1st Canadian Corps.  In January 1945, the entire corps began a planned re-deployment to North West 
Europe (NWE).  The overall aim of Operation “Goldflake” was the uniting of the corps with the First 
Canadian Army.  The 1st Canadian Infantry Division began the move to Belgium in late February 1945 by 
first travelling by sea from Leghorn, Italy to Marseilles, France.1  From there it moved north by road 
through the Rhone Valley through France.  It took until late March 1945 to re-organize, re-equip and 
concentrate the infantry brigades and other divisional units.2   
 As of April 1945, the division’s commanding officer was Major-General H.W. Foster.  Infantry 
formations within the division comprised of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigades.  The 1st 
Canadian Infantry Brigade consisted of The Royal Canadian Regiment, The Hastings and Prince Edward 
Regiment and The 48th Highlanders of Canada.  The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade consisted of The 
Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry, The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and The Loyal Edmonton 
Regiment.  The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade consisted of Le Royal 22e Regiment, The West Nova 
Scotia Regiment and The Carleton and York Regiment.  Divisional troops consisted of the 4th Canadian 
Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) and The Saskatchewan Light Infantry 
(Machine Gun).  The reconnaissance regiment had been converted to an infantry regiment during its 
service in Italy in 1944.  Its parent 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade had been disbanded, and on its arrival 
                                                          
1 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 529-530. 
2 "Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Report No.181.  Operation "Goldflake", the move of the 1 
Cdn Corps from Italy to North-West Europe, February-March 1945." Canadian Forces Personnel Headquarters.  
Retrieved March 2016 from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq181.pdf 
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in NWE this unit was ordered to re-convert back to a reconnaissance regiment.  It would carry out this 
task throughout April 1945, and not be committed to operations.  Divisional artillery units consisted of 
the 2nd and 3rd Field Regiments, RCA, the 1st Field Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA), 
the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA and the 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA.3   
 War establishments tables for the personnel and equipment that the division’s regiments were 
authorized to contain are provided in Appendix 1.  All data regarding personnel casualties, reinforcements 
and strengths as well as combat A vehicle and equipment states for all regiments is provided in Appendix 
2.  Data is provided for April-May 1945, the thirty-five day period in which combat operations occurred.   
On 7 April 1945 the division’s returns first appeared on the daily Consolidated Casualty and 
Strength State return within the First Canadian Army Headquarters.  On this date the division’s strength 
was 880 officers and 15, 819 other ranks, totalling 16,699 personnel.4  The transit period from Italy had 
allowed these regiments to be rested and refitted, and their personnel levels were high.  The 48th 
Highlanders of Canada’s strength stood at thirty-eight officers and 830 other ranks, 2 percent over 
strength.5  The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada consisted of thirty-nine officers and 837 other ranks, 4 
percent over strength.6  The non-infantry regiments within the division were also at satisfactory personnel 
levels prior to combat operations in mid-April 1945.  The strengths of two regiments of divisional troops 
taken as examples were as follows: As of 7 April 1945, the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment’s 
strength was forty-two officers and 759 other ranks, 97 percent of its authorized strength.7  The Saskatoon 
Light Infantry’s (Machine Gun) strength on the same date was recorded as thirty-seven officers and 693 
other ranks, 99 percent of its war establishment.8   
                                                          
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657-662.  Appendix "F".  Canadian Army Units in NWE. 
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  7 April 1945 return. 
 5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  7 April 1945 return.  The war 
establishment of a Canadian Infantry Corps battalion at the war’s conclusion was thirty-eight officers and 812 other ranks, for a 
total of 850 personnel.  
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  7 April 1945 return.  
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 12,649.  4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary April 1945.  T-12649.  7 April 1945 return. 
8 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  7 April 1945 return. 
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It is only partially possible to assess how successful the First Canadian Army was in re-equipping 
the division with vehicles and weapons in March 1945.  It's data was not included in the 21st Army Group 
Consolidated Vehicle Position Report return for 31 March 1945.  During this time period its A vehicle 
returns would have been in flux due to the re-equipment process.  The division’s vehicle return was 
present for 30 April 1945, but the earlier non-reporting makes it impossible to compare pre and post-
combat A vehicle states.9  The division’s data was present on the 21st Army Group Equipment State return 
of 30 April 1945, which covered all types of non-vehicle major weapons systems such as artillery pieces, 
mortars and medium machine guns.10   
 Apart from some minor shortages, as of 31 March 1945 the division’s inventory levels of 
authorized major weapons systems was satisfactory.11  On this date the division contained 527 heavy 
weapons, 93 percent of its war establishment.  Some minor challenges in this area were present.  There 
were only thirty-five medium .303 machine guns against the authorized level of forty.  Only 252 infantry 
2-Inch mortars were on hand against the establishment strength of 283.  The division contained only fifty-
four 3-Inch mortars against its authorized level of sixty.   
While the Canadian Army in NWE during spring 1945 had no major difficulties in equipping its 
units with weapons and vehicles, opposing enemy formations facing it did.  The state of equipment levels, 
repair services, fuel supplies and replacement capability within the enemy units was far below acceptable 
levels.12  The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was lavishly equipped in comparison, and this gave it a large 
degree of superiority over defending German units with regard to the number of weapons systems it could 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945 
report.   
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  31 
March 1945 report.   
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  31 
March 1945 return.  
12 Martin Block, “Panther Allocations 1945”, Panther1944.de, retrieved January 2016 from 
http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/en/sdkfz-171-pzkpfwg-panther/truppenteile/panther-zuweisungslisten/panther-
zuweisungsliste-1945.  180 Panther tanks were issued to German units in February 1945.  A mere twenty were issued to a 
formation that faced the Canadian Army in that month, the Panzer Lehr panzer division.  
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deploy and their effect.  Against low-quality entrenched German infantry with little access to heavy 
weapons, this factor was devastating.13  
 Under the temporary command of 2nd Canadian Corps as of 3 April 1945, the division was 
deployed in an assembly area in the Reichswald Forest.14  Its first operation was to attack west into the 
Netherlands as part of the 2nd Canadian Corp’s Operation “Cannonshot”.  The lead elements of the 
division successfully consolidated a bridgehead over the Ijssel River on 11 April 1945. 15  German 
command and control was disorganized and the quality of enemy forces facing the division was on 
average low.  Rapid progress was made by the attacking infantry regiments with minimal casualties.  
Further advances resulted in the capture of Apeldoorn and the high ground near Arnhem.  At the 
conclusion of this phase of fighting, the division reverted to the command of 1st Canadian Corps.  
Subsequent advances in mid April took the division to the vicinities of Amersfoort, Nijkerk and 
Harderwijk.  Attached units in support of the division aided its rapid advance.  The most notable example 
was 33 Battery , 6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA.  It’s M-10 tank destroyers provided mobile fire support 
throughout the division's April 1945 operations.16  During its brief period of combat operations the 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division performed well against an enemy that was disintegrating. 
 Once these operations were completed by 19 April 1945, the division halted offensive operations 
in the western Netherlands.  This halt at the Grebbe River line was arranged in order for relief supplies to 
be delivered to the starving Dutch civilians.  The German occupation forces would allow these deliveries 
as long as the Allies advanced no further west.  Due to the end of war being imminent, this temporary 
agreement would halt the starvation of the civilian populace and spare the country further possible 
flooding and destruction. 
                                                          
13 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada.  The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery Volume II: 1919-1967, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited.1972), 431.  There were no German AFVs present to combat the amphibious assault.  
14 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 529.  On 1 April 1945 the division began to deploy to the Reichswald Forest area. 
15 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 551-552. 
16 LAC RG24 Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16449.  Eighteen Valentine Archer 17-
Pounder tank destroyers were delivered on 10 April 1945.  All eighteen had defective recoil buffers and saw extremely limited if 
any action. 
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Despite the short period of time that the division was in combat and the low strength of the 
defending German formations, the enemy still managed to inflict battle casualties.  Divisional casualties 
for this period of fighting were largely confined to the infantry regiments, and their losses were much 
higher than in the other combat arms.  While casualties were at an acceptable level, they were still severe 
on occasion due to German forces being dug in and prepared for a Canadian assault.   
For the month of April 1945, the three regiments of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade suffered a 
total of 155 battle casualties.  The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade suffered 197 and the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade suffered a total of 164.  The two regiments hardest hit were The Loyal Edmonton 
Regiment, with ninety-seven battle casualties, and Le Royal 22e Regiment with sixty-seven.  Despite the 
war being nearly over, small pockets of determined German defenders were encountered.  These groups 
would even mount an occasional counterattack on a Canadian objective that had been captured.   
Casualties in the April-May, 1945 period were very low amongst the non-infantry regiments.  For 
example, the 1st Anti-tank Regiment, RCA had one battle casualty.17  This points to a scarcity of enemy 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) in this sector of the front.  The Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine 
Gun) suffered only ten battle casualties.18  While the anti-tank regiment, the machine gun battalion and 
the reconnaissance regiment were deployed near the infantry positions, the remaining RCA field 
regiments were deployed to the rear.  This grouping encompassed the light anti-aircraft regiment and the 
three RCA Field regiments.  At this stage in the conflict there was almost no enemy air activity and little 
in the way of sustained counter battery fire on RCA field artillery positions.  Accordingly, the 1st Field 
Regiment, RCHA, suffered only thirteen battle casualties for the months of April and May 1945.  The 2nd 
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, suffered only four.  These losses within the RCA regiments were 
negligible and these units were never impeded from carrying out their missions.   
                                                          
17 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diaries.  T-16449.  April-May, 1945 entries.  This was of 
course minus the batteries and troops that contained the defective Valentine Archer 17-Pounder tank destroyers.  They did not see 
combat. 
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-709-7096 for battle and 
non-battle.   
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Like any other formation in the Canadian Army, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had a constant 
stream of personnel taken off strength to receive medical care for non-battle related causes.  Injuries, 
illness and battle exhaustion cases were all combined within the category of non-battle casualties.  Battle 
exhaustion cases within the division did occur in the spring of 1945, but were not heavy due to a 
decreased level of enemy resistance.19The highest levels of divisional non-battle casualties were in the 
infantry regiments.  If infantry units were living in outdoor dug-outs the soldiers were very susceptible to 
disease and physical injuries.  The cold, wet conditions of the flooded landscape provided the worst 
environment possible for keeping personnel healthy.   
 The following data reveals the constant drain of non-battle casualties on infantry regimental 
strengths.  Taking three infantry regiments as random examples, the following non-battle and battle 
casualties occurred over the April-May 1945 period.  The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
suffered fifty non-battle casualties against fifty-five battle.20  The Royal 22e Regiment suffered thirty-one 
non-battle casualties versus sixty-seven battle.21  The 48th Highlanders of Canada suffered sixty-two non-
battle casualties in comparison to sixty-two battle.22  Chart 7.1 reflects the constant wastage of non-battle 
casualties within the 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade that were not the 
result of direct enemy action.  These figures were significant over the long-term.  
 Rear-deployed RCA units had better living conditions in comparison to the soldiers dug in on the 
front lines.  They were also not subjected to sustained shelling in the way of counter-battery fire in April 
1945.  The battle and non-battle casualties of two RCA regiments taken as examples are very low:  The 
                                                          
19 See Appendix 3 for 2nd Canadian Infantry Division summer and fall 1944 non-battle casualty statistics.  They are higher than 
1st Canadian Infantry Division spring 1945 statistics.  
20 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665 First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May, 1945.  T-7095-7096 for battle and 
non-battle.   
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096 for battle and 
non-battle.   
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096 for battle and 
non-battle.   
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3rd Field Regiment, RCA suffered twenty-eight non-battle and zero battle casualties during that month.23  
The 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA suffered zero non-battle casualties compared to four battle.24   
Chart 7.1: Battle and non-battle casualties in the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 194525 
 
 Non-battle casualty rates could have potentially been higher if the 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
was an inexperienced formation.  It is likely its Italian deployment over 1943-1944 positively affected its 
non-battle casualty rates, as the experienced and rested personnel knew how to operate in the field.  These 
casualties are a largely unknown or unrecorded cost of war, and were a constant drain on the strength of 
Canadian regiments in the field.  Every month a percentage of personnel would become casualties via 
battle exhaustion, accidents or illness.  These percentages would depend on the combat arms trade of the 
unit, its proximity to the front-lines, its activities and the intensity of enemy action. 
Reinforcements were not a concern for the division in spring 1945.  All Canadian formations in 
March-April 1945 were recipients of newly-available National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) 
                                                          
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,437.  3rd Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-15956. 
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13, 709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May, 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,589.  2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-1639.    
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  
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reinforcement personnel.  The fall 1944 political reinforcement crisis in Canada had resulted in large 
numbers of NRMA personnel being sent overseas to fill the reinforcement pools.  These 12,908 new 
conscripts ensured there was no shortage of personnel in the last stage of the war.26  Due to this bountiful 
personnel state, regiments were allowed to send soldiers on compassionate leave to Canada and regular 
leave on the continent and U.K.27  Three infantry regiments within the division taken as examples 
received the following reinforcements over the April-May 1945 period:  The Seaforth Highlanders of 
Canada received 155 reinforcements against seventy-eight total battle and non-battle casualties.28  Le 
Royal 22e Regiment received 187 new personnel over the same period against ninety-eight battle and 
non-battle losses..29  The Royal Canadian Regiment received 118 reinforcements against 127 losses in this 
time-frame.30  The RCA regiments also received regular reinforcements, but were not the high priority 
that the infantry regiments were due to their low losses.  Replacements for the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, 
RCA consisted of forty new personnel against five losses.31  The 2nd Field Regiment, RCA took on 
seventeen reinforcements in April and May 1945 against a loss of five casualties.32   
On the last day of hostilities, the personnel levels within the division’s units were satisfactory.  
Losses had occurred during the period of combat operations 11-19 April 1945, but sufficient 
reinforcements had been received to fill the gaps.  A larger effort had been put into reinforcing the 
infantry at the expense of other regiments.  This was due to the importance of keeping these units up to 
strength.  While not at 100 percent of their war establishment strengths, the non-infantry regiments were 
at adequate levels.  Their strengths had not been drastically affected by the combat operations of April 
1945.   
                                                          
26 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 633. 
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,206.  4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary April 1945.  T-12649.  On 1 April 1945 the 
Officer Commanding of the headquarters squadron and fourteen other ranks left for rotational leave in Canada.  
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096. 
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096. 
30 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,664-13,655.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.   
31 RG 24 Volume 13,708, 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May, 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 Volume 
14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April-May 1945.  T-16449. 
32 RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863. LAC, RG 24 Volume 
14419.  2nd Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April-May 1945.  T-15936 
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Evaluating three infantry regimental returns for 5 May 1945, it appears that each had been 
reinforced effectively during April 1945.  The Royal Canadian Regiment’s strength stood at thirty-five 
officers and 781 other ranks, 4 percent under strength.33  The West Nova Scotia Regiment’s contained 
thirty-nine officers and 818 other ranks, 1 percent over strength.34  The Saskatoon Light Infantry’s 
(Machine Gun) personnel levels stood at thirty-seven officers and 666 other ranks, only 4 percent under 
strength.35  
Reviewing the non-infantry regiments, the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment’s strength was 
thirty-six officers and 758 other ranks, 3 percent under strength.36  The 1st Field Regiment, RCHA, taken 
as an example of the three field artillery regiments, posted a strength of thirty-seven officers and 596 
other ranks.  This was 6 percent under its authorized strength.37  The weakest regiment in the division was 
the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA.  With a strength of thirty-five officers and 549 other ranks, it was 10 
percent under strength38.  During combat operations in April it had only a minimal role, and parts of some 
batteries were non-operational.  
In reviewing the heavy weapons and combat A vehicle returns for the end of April 1945, the 
division’s inventories of heavy weapons are adequate, but those of combat A vehicles appear low.39  
Against an establishment of 627 combat A vehicles, only 427 are listed on strength, 68 percent of the 
authorized amount.  This was largely due to two factors.  A total of 120 T-16 tracked gun tractors were 
listed on the war establishment tables, but not issued, the division making do with wheeled gun tractors.  
Secondly, the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment’s complete inventory of A vehicles is missing from 
the returns.  This regiment was detached from the division to carry out training during April 1945.  
                                                          
33 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
34 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
36 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  30 April 
1945 report..  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 
April, 1945 report.  The 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment’s totals are noted as missing from the division's total vehicle 
return. 
153 
 
Divisional combat A vehicle strengths are much higher as of 30 April 1945 if these two factors are 
considered..40   
The majority of the units involved in combat operations had adequate inventories of equipment at 
the end of hostilities, but some shortages did exist.  All eleven authorized Valentine Charger command 
tanks had still not been issued to the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA by 5 May 1945.  Present but non-
functioning within the same regiment were eighteen Valentine Archer 17-Pounder tank destroyers, whose 
mechanical issues were never resolved during hostilities.  In contrast to these problems, the division did 
contain some valuable unauthorized tracked A vehicles it should not have had.  Twenty-four Wasp II 
flame-thrower carriers and twelve Windsor tracked carriers were on strength within the division, but not 
authorized.  The division continued to be well-supplied with non-vehicle heavy weapons at the end of 
hostilities.  Inventories at this time were very similar to the 31 March 1945 returns, with 97 percent of 
authorized heavy weapons being present.   
 In conclusion, if combat had continued past 5 May 1945, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
would have been capable of any future offensive or defensive operation.  Infantry and other 
reinforcements were plentiful, and the number of heavy weapons and A vehicles were sufficient for the 
units that were operational.  There were some equipment challenges, but these were limited to the area of 
heavy AFVs within the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA.  
 Combat operations by the division in April 1945 were entirely successful.  Any missing assets, 
such as the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment, had their combat power replaced by attached combat 
arms units from other formations.41  The enemy opposition the division faced was on average was weak.  
While the capability to do so was present, there was no urgent need to address minor shortages present in 
                                                          
40 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1). 30 April 1945 
report..  The 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment war establishment tables show twenty-eight armoured cars, sixty-three 
Universal Carriers, six 3-Inch mortar carriers and twelve T-16 anti-tank gun tracked gun tractors as A (combat) vehicles.  See 
Appendix 1 for January 1945 Infantry Division Reconnaissance Regiment tables for equipment and vehicles.  
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,205.  4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary April-May 1945.  T-12649.  Battle and non-battle casualties 
for the unit in April-May 1945 totalled twenty-three losses. 
154 
 
the division in late April 1945, as the end of  the war was imminent.  The division finished the war 
adequately equipped in a majority of equipment categories, and was near its authorized strength in 
personnel, similar to all Canadian units at this point in the campaign. 
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Chapter 8: The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: Major actions, 
casualties, reinforcements and strength returns for its combat arms regiments 
in North West Europe, July 1944-May 1945
 
 Formed in May and June of 1940, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was organized on regional 
lines from militia units located in Ontario, Quebec and the Prairie provinces.  Prior to 1942, the division 
had seen limited action, conducting garrison duties in Iceland before being deployed to the U.K.  Two of 
its three brigades had taken part in the disastrous July 1942 raid on Dieppe, France.  The regiments 
involved suffered catastrophic losses, and had to be completely rebuilt.1  The division trained 
continuously from 1943 to spring 1944 in preparation for its upcoming role in the Allied invasion of the 
continent.  It did not land on D-Day as part of the initial assault force, arriving during the first week of 
July 1944.  With other Canadian formations, it would form part the 2nd Canadian Corps.   
 Organizational war establishment tables for the division’s combat arms regiments are present in 
Appendix 1.  Monthly personnel strength returns, casualties and reinforcements for all units are listed in 
Appendix 3.  Combat A vehicle and major weapons systems monthly strength returns for all divisional 
regiments during 1944-1945 are also provided in Appendix 3.   
 The strength of the division once it was deployed to the front lines as of 16 July1944, stood at 933 
officers and 17,425 other ranks.2  It’s commanding officer was Major-General Charles Foulkes.  The main 
combat fighting components of the division were the 4th, 5th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades.  The 4th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade consisted of The Royal Regiment of Canada, The Royal Hamilton Light 
Infantry and The Essex Scottish Regiment.  The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade's main components were 
The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch), Le Regiment de Maisonneuve and The 
Calgary Highlanders.  The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade was made up of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, The 
                                                          
1 Terry Copp, The Brigade: the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade 1939-1945 (Willowdale: Fortress Publications.  1992), 32.  Losses 
to the division during the Dieppe Raid had totalled 214 officers and 3,153 other ranks.  Units in the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry 
Brigades had to be completely re-built.  
2 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  T-1870.  Casualties had been taken at this 
point, but the division still had yet to embark on its first offensive operation. 
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Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada and The South Saskatchewan Regiment.  Divisional units 
consisted of the 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars) and The Toronto 
Scottish (Machine Gun) Regiment.  Artillery units consisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th Field Regiments, Royal 
Canadian Artillery (RCA), the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA and the 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 
RCA.3   
 Despite some minor shortages, all combat arms regiments within the division were at or very 
close to their authorized personnel strengths in early July 1944.  The strengths of two of its infantry 
regiments taken as examples were as follows:  Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal on 1 July 1944 contained thirty-
six officers and 809 other ranks, 99 percent of its authorized strength.4  The Calgary Highlanders 
personnel strength on 9 July 1944 was also very high, with thirty-seven officers and 806 other ranks, also 
99 percent of its unit war establishment. 5  All divisional RCA artillery regiments were also strong.  The 
4th Field Regiment, RCA as of 15 July 1944 contained thirty-eight officers and 633 other ranks, 99 
percent of its authorized strength.6  The 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA consisted of forty-three 
officers and 802 other ranks on 1 July 1944, 98 percent of its war establishment.7   
 The division was not the equivalent to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with regard to vehicles 
and weaponry.  Most noticeably, in July 1944 it did not contain any self-propelled artillery pieces or tank 
destroyers.  The 21st Army Group A & B Consolidated Vehicle Position Report does not contain a return 
for 30 June 1944, but one exists for 31 May 1944.8  At this point the division was entering its final work-
up phase before deploying to the continent to join the invasion forces.  As of 31 May 1944 the division 
contained 643 combat A vehicles versus a war establishment of 593, making it 8 percent over strength.   
                                                          
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army order of battle in NWE 1944-1945.  
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,065.   Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal War Diary July 1944.  1 July 1944 return.   
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,020.  The Calgary Highlanders War Diary July 1944.  9 July 1944  return.   
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,441.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-15963.  15 July 1944 return.   
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16740-16741.  July 1944 would 
see the regimental war establishment of a light-anti-aircraft regiment drastically reduced. 
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 31 
May 1944.  It is important to note that the war establishment for a division was constantly changing as its regiment's 
establishments constantly changing.   
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 Some A vehicle shortages did exist at the beginning of June 1944.  Only thirty-six of the sixty 
authorized Medium Machine Gun (MMG) tracked carriers had been issued the machine gun battalion.  
There were only seventeen Humber armoured cars present against the authorized number of twenty-nine.  
This shortcoming was offset by the unauthorized presence of the nine Fox armoured cars, but the division 
was still three short.  There were thirty-two tracked 4.2-Inch mortar carriers on the war establishment 
tables, but none had been issued.  Against an authorized number of fifty-four Wasp II tracked flame 
thrower carriers, none had been issued.  This last A vehicle was a very valuable infantry support weapon.  
Their later employment with other Canadian divisions would prove to be very effective, especially against 
entrenched infantry.  As noted previously, a significant problem within the division was a lack of self-
propelled (SP) anti-tank capability.  In contrast to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, the division was not 
authorized any SP tank-destroyers.9  Taking into consideration its future combat encounters with enemy 
armour in July 1944, these armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) presence was very important.  In the spring 
of 1944 it was vital that all divisional units have their full complement of combat A vehicles to conduct 
exercises.  This shortage may have affected the division`s training capability pre-Normandy.  21st Army 
Group monthly non-vehicle equipment state returns for the division do not exist for 31 May or 30 June 
1944.10  The first return with the division’s equipment present is for 31 July 1944.  This date was after a 
significant period of combat had occurred.  However, in evaluating the war diaries from the division’s 
regiments there is no mention of severe shortages in any major weapons systems.   
 After its component brigades with all their vehicles and weapons were concentrated on the 
continent by mid July, the division participated in Operation “Atlantic” between 19-21 July 1944.  In its 
first combat operation since the Dieppe raid of 1942, the division’s infantry regiments were badly mauled, 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 31 
May 1944.   
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 215C1.083 
(D6).  Monthly Equipment States returns.  These series of returns state the inventory of all major non-vehicle weapons systems 
within each Canadian formation. 
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suffering large losses from German armoured counterattacks.11  Poor execution of combined arms tactics 
left the battalions highly vulnerable to direct German AFV fire.  The dismounted infantry were not 
adequately supported by other arms during assaults, particularly by armour, and this led to catastrophic 
losses.  Operation “Atlantic” was followed by the division’s participation in 25 July 1944’s Operation 
“Spring”.  During this operation the division again took heavy casualties for very limited gains.12   
 Despite its weakened state, on 8 August 1944 the division successfully supported the initial 
breakthrough of the armoured advance of Operation “Totalize”.  Later in the month the division 
conducted a successful assault crossing of the Laize River at Bretteville-sur-Laize.  It then re-crossed the 
same river at Clair-Tizon prior to 14 August 1944's Operation “Tractable”.13  It’s next large offensive 
operation was the clearance of the Foret de la Londe forest on the Seine River by the 4th and 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigades.  This operation lasted from 27 to 29 August 1944.14  For the six battalions involved, a 
total of 577 casualties were recorded in the three days fighting.15 
 Though there were significant personnel losses in August, the bulk of the casualties inflicted on 
the division during the Normandy Campaign occurred in July 1944.  As a result of Operations “Atlantic” 
and “Spring”, by 31 July 1944 the overall strength of the division had fallen by over 1,261 men.  To 
compound the damage, this figure was recorded after all of the month of July's personnel reinforcements 
had been accepted.16  The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The 
Black Watch) suffered 307 battle casualties on 25 July 1944, alone.17  The extent of the month’s damage 
                                                          
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Battle casualties for The Essex Scottish Regiment totalled twenty-two officers and 326 other ranks up to 2 
August 1944.  
12 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 188. 
13 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 234. 
14 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 290. 
15 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 292. 
16 LAC, RG 24 Volume 1870.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  31 July 1944 return minus the 16 July 1944 
return. 
17 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 194.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) casualties totalled 
307 for 25 July 1944: 123 killed, 101 wounded and eighty-three missing.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 
2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-battle casualties.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada 
totals 29 June-2 August 1944 show 291 battle casualties.  This is obviously an error.  
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to the regiment is reflected in a 27 July 1944 strength return.  The regiment on this date contained thirty-
two officers and 415 other ranks, 53 percent of its war establishment.18  
 Due to the division’s back to back participation in two major operations in late July 1944, its 
infantry brigades had lost a large amount of personnel in a short amount of time.  These deficits would not 
be significantly reduced until the just prior to the Battle of the Scheldt in mid September 1944.  The 
infantry regiments were still combat ready, but they had reduced capabilities.  Every time they received 
reinforcements they were immediately engaged in new combat operations, losing even more personnel.  
In this manner the strength of the regiments was slowly reduced during late July and August 1944. 
 In response to these heavy losses, replacements were sent to the division.  But not enough were 
dispatched and they did not arrive quickly enough to mitigate ongoing losses.  The main challenge was 
that personnel losses were occurring in much higher volumes and much more quickly than the 
reinforcement system could deal with.  Immediately following Operation “Atlantic”, there were not 
enough replacement infantry officers and general duty infantrymen allocated for the division to instantly 
rectify all shortcomings.  A 22 July 1944 letter to the 2nd Canadian Corps General Officer Commanding 
(GOC), Lieutenant-General G. Simonds, from the corps Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster General (DA 
& QMG) spells out the main obstacles to rapidly reinforcing the division:19 
“1.  GOC 2nd Infantry Division phoned me at approximately 2100 hours that he anticipated the following 
shortages as a result of operations of the last 24 hours. 
 Replacements required: Officers 8, Other Ranks 750-1,000. 
                                                          
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) War Diary July 1944.  27 July 
1944   field return.   
19 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  T-1870.  Letter to GOC 2nd Canadian Corps 
regarding 2nd Canadian Infantry Division reinforcement shortages.  
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2.  The above mention reinforcements are applicable very largely to the infantry of the division, and in 
particular, to the SSR, the Essex Scottish and the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, but to the latter battalion only to a 
small degree.  
3.  The reinforcement situation in the Rft Battalions, according to the latest information given to the 
DAAG (Deputy Army Adjutant General) on the 21 July, 1944, is, in brief, that there are approximately 26 
officers and 150 other ranks available , the ORs being, of course, general duty. 
4.  In the division forward battalion there are 6 officers and 120 other ranks.20” 
 It also should be noted that the division had just received an allotment of reinforcements on 20 
July 1944, depleting the float of available reinforcements set aside for it.  General Duty infantry were 
available, but in mid-July 1944 a large number of them were located in reinforcement organization bases 
in the U.K..  The personnel shortages could be remedied, but not instantaneously.  In the meantime, 
ongoing losses due to combat conditions continued.  In these circumstances the division could not meet 
the challenge of maintaining its war establishment personnel strength in the months of July and August 
1944. 
 The same letter later states:21 
“8.  It is understood that 550 general duty personnel were to have sailed from the U.K. on 21 July 1944, 
and that 2,000 are scheduled to sail on the Tuesday next  This should make 550 available by Sunday and 
the balance by the Thursday next – in both cases, provided the sailings and landings are carried out as 
scheduled.” 
 From 27 July to 16 August 1944 the Canadian Army in NWE received 3,589 reinforcements.22  
This appears to be an impressive number, but it was insufficient to cope with the rapid demands of 
                                                          
20 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 630-631.  Each division had a forward battalion which received replacements from the 
No.2 CBRG advance reinforcement battalion. 
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  T-1870.  Letter to GOC 2nd Canadian Corps 
regarding 2nd Canadian Infantry Division reinforcement shortages.  
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infantry regiments for new personnel.  Not all of these reinforcements were infantry.  What was infantry 
was divided between the needs of two infantry divisions, an armoured division, multiple smaller units and 
headquarters.  Non-battle casualties resulting from battle exhaustion and normal occurrences of accidents, 
illness and disease increased the flow of evacuees.  The 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s The Royal 
Regiment of Canada suffered ninety-seven non-battle casualties in August 1944.  This was in comparison 
to 250 battle casualties suffered during the month.23  A total of 259 non-battle casualties occurred within 
the three regiments of the brigade for the month of August.24    
 Combat for non-infantry units within the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had also been difficult, 
but they had not suffered similar casualties.  While inflicting large losses to enemy armour, the 2nd Anti-
Tank Regiment, RCA had suffered only 187 battle casualties during July and August 1944.25  The field 
artillery units also suffered very low casualty rates due to their rear positions on the battlefield.  Battle 
casualties for the 4th Field Regiment, RCA, totalled twenty-two for August 1944.26  
 The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s weapons and vehicles losses from 20 to 23 July 1944 had 
been considerable.  A large effort was made replace these losses, listed in a report of 25 July 1944.27  
These items included eleven T-16 tracked gun tractors, twenty-three tracked Universal Carriers, three 3-
Inch tracked mortar carriers, twenty-one 6-Pounder anti-tank guns, four 17-Pounder anti-tank guns, three 
25-Pounder howitzers, forty-seven 2-Inch mortars and 153 Bren .303 light machine guns.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 18,616.  Canadian reinforcements dispatched to 21st Army Group 8 June 1944-9 February 1945.  Total 
for 16 August 1944 minus the total as of 27 July 1944. 
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total non-battle and battle for the Royal Regiment of Canada 3-30 August 1944. 
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties by week.  Totals for 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade units for weeks 3-30 August 1944. 
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.     
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,441.  4th Field Regiment, RCA, War Diary August 1944. 
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,718.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary July 1944.  T-1870.  25 July 1944 report of 2nd and 3rd 
Canadian Division equipment losses 20-23 July, 1944 during Operation "Atlantic". 
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 The division was successfully re-equipped by the end of the month, as evidenced by its 31 July 
1944 returns for both major weapon systems and combat A vehicles.28  At this point it contained 627 
combat A vehicles compared to a war establishment level of 616, 2 percent over its authorized strength.  
There were no serious shortages in non-vehicle weapons at the end of the month.  The division at this 
point possessed 90 percent of its war establishment inventories for these items.  This percentage was 
largely the result of a temporary shortage in the area of 2-Inch infantry mortars.  There were only 226 on 
hand versus an authorized strength of 283.  
 As the division advanced across France in August and early September 1944, German channel 
garrisons formed the majority of its enemy opposition.  During this period the division continued to carry 
out operations despite a shortage of infantrymen within its regiments.  The worst period for the division 
lasted from late August to mid-September 1944.  All of its infantry regiments were under strength due to 
their summer losses.  The nadir was reached on 3 September 1944, when the division’s infantry regiments 
were short 2,645 other ranks infantry soldiers.29  The division’s strength was weaker than that of the 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division, despite this division being in combat for an additional fifty days in 
Normandy.   
 Apart from the unopposed liberation of Dieppe, France on 1 September 1944 and some minor 
actions near Dunkirk, the division saw little action during early September.  The heavily fortified port of 
Dunkirk was originally designated to be captured by the division, and some of the surrounding towns 
were liberated by 9 September 1944.  After some deliberation by 21st Army Group Headquarters, this 
operation was called off and the city was to remain surrounded by other forces.  This action freed up the 
division for future operations north of Antwerp.  The majority of the division arrived in its assembly area 
near the city by 16 September 1944.  It had taken a large amount of losses in the period 15 July-30 
                                                          
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 31 
August 1944.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 
215C1.083 (D6).  Monthly Equipment State return for 31 August 1944.   
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,699.  Report on Deficiencies and Holdings of Canadian Infantry, Other Ranks: NWE, 27 August1944- 
28 April 1945.  Entry 3 September 1944. 
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August 1944 and needed a period of rest in order to receive and train new replacements.  This unexpected 
transit and rest period provided an opportunity to carry out refitting.  
 During the brief halt in liberated Dieppe, reinforcements equivalent to eight new infantry 
companies reached the infantry regiments.30  Further transfers continued all month.31  Many of these men 
had been re-mustered from other trades.  This compromise solution to the shortage of readily available 
infantry utilized personnel already in the reinforcement stream.  These personnel often did not have a high 
level of infantry training.  The transformation of a RCA anti-aircraft gunner to a infantryman could not be 
accomplished instantaneously.  Luckily for the division, combat operations north of Antwerp did not 
begin until early October 1944.  Thus by the time the Battle of the Scheldt began, reinforcements 
accepted early in the month had had some time to train and acclimatize themselves.  
 In Charts 8.1 and 8.2, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division’s strength is compared against a more 
powerful German formation in the months June-September 1944.  The chart illustrates that despite losses 
from intensive combat, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division actually gains strength.  The amount of 
reinforcements had been insufficient at times, but their flow to the division had been continuous.  Though 
there were still some shortages in mid-September, the re- building effort launched at Dieppe had helped 
the division exceed its July 1944 strength.  This strength stood at 988 officers and 17,477 other ranks on 
30 September 1944, making it very combat capable on the eve of the Battle of the Scheldt.32  As displayed 
in Chart 8.2, the larger German formation's combat elements dwindled away to nearly nothing by 
September 1944, leaving only rear-echelon troops.   
 With its new strength the division plunged into combat operations in eastern Belgium and the 
southern Netherlands in fall 1944.  Initial operations had begun in late September to clear the area west of 
Antwerp in preparation for a drive north on the left flank of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division.  The 
                                                          
30 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 55.  During the division's halt at Dieppe, France, it received more than 1,000 reinforcements.  
These were not sufficient and merely a first instalment.  See Graph 8.1. 
31 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,718.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-1871.  Consolidated Strength and 
Casualty daily returns for September 1944. 
32 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries September 1944.  T-1871.   
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division crossed the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal on 22 September 1944, and regrouped for an advance 
north.  The eventual aim was the clearing the northern bank of the Scheldt Estuary to free up the  
Chart 8.1: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division strengths (thousands) July-September 194433 
 
important port of Antwerp.  The Battle of the Scheldt Estuary began in earnest for the division on 2 
October 1944 when it attacked northward towards the South Beveland isthmus.  In subsequent combat the 
division crossed the isthmus, fought its way west and linked up with elements of the 52nd British Infantry 
Division.  Soon all the progress that had been made in rebuilding the division was partly erased as 
infantry losses mounted in the difficult Scheldt Estuary fighting.34  Forests, flooded fields, canals, rivers 
and built up areas proved to be a challenge for attacking Canadian infantry regiments.  These difficult 
                                                          
33 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries July-September 1944.  T-1870-1871.  War Diary 
consolidated strength reports July-September 1944. 
34 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 140-141.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) suffered 145 casualties 
on 13 October 1944.  
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infantry operations in largely flooded terrain ended in early November 1944 with the clearance of the 
north bank of the Scheldt Estuary.35   
Chart 8.2: German 12th SS Panzer Division strengths (thousands) June-September 194436 
  
 Casualties were heavy during the Scheldt Estuary fighting, and infantry strengths in late October, 
1944 again became an issue.  The fall 1944 casualty totals for three infantry regiments within the division 
illustrate the extent of the damage: The Essex Scottish Regiment suffered 396 battle and 134 non-battle 
casualties during the September-November 1944 phase.37  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve took 130 battle 
and 117 non-battle casualties during the same period.38  Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal sustained 329 battle 
and eighty-three non-battle casualties.39  Lighter casualties were suffered by non-infantry regiments in the 
                                                          
35 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 424. 
36 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 355.  12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend.  Hubert Meyer, 12. SS Panzer Division 
Hitlerjugend. (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing.  1994.), 227. 
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  The Essex Scottish Regiment returns 31 August-1 November, 1944. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve 31 August-1 November. 1944. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10.527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal totals 31 August to 1 November 1944. 
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division.  The 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment suffered only 105 battle and eighty-one non-battle 
casualties during these three months.40   
 As in Normandy, there was never a shortage of heavy weapons or combat A vehicles in the 
division, despite the high infantry casualties.41  The difficult terrain in the Scheldt limited mechanized 
movement to a large degree and placed the emphasis on dismounted infantry tactics.  As of 30 November 
1944, the division contained 103 percent of its war establishment strength in combat A vehicles.  At the 
end of the month it was also in a satisfactory state for major weapons systems, possessing 99 percent of 
the number it was supposed to contain. 
 Despite high infantry casualties in the time period September to November 1944, the division 
rapidly re-built itself once again after offensive operations ended.  As of 30 November 1944, it had few 
weaknesses apart from a possible lack of training for new replacement soldiers.  The infantry divisions of 
the German 15th Army opposing the division in the Netherlands were very weak in comparison.  During 
the fighting in the fall of 1944, no German panzer divisions had been deployed against Canadian 
advances, only weak infantry formations.42  This made a tremendous difference with regard to the number 
and kind of weapons systems that could be brought to bear by the enemy.  If there had been any 
significant weaknesses within the division during the fall of 1944, the Germans would have been hard 
pressed to exploit them in manner similar to July 1944.  
 Late November 1944 saw the division holding part of the static northern flank of the Nijmegen 
salient, a bulge in the line created by British-American Operation “Market Garden” in September 1944.  
Due to the First Canadian Army temporarily ceasing offensive operations, the division remained in these 
positions from November 1944 to January 1945.  During this phase the infantry regiments were fully 
                                                          
40LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,13,659-13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries September-October 1944.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,225.  War Diary 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment.  T-12689.  September 1944.  
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 31 
May 1944.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 
215C1.083 (D6)  Monthly Equipment States return 30 November 1944.   
42 Die Deutsche Wehrmacht website, "15. Armee (A.O.K. 15)" article. Order of battle as of 09.28.44.  Retrieved December 2015 
from http://diedeutschewehrmacht.de/15percent 20armee.htm.  The German 15th Army consisted of ten infantry divisions on this 
date, supplemented with self-propelled assault gun and parachute infantry units later. 
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rebuilt, the reinforcement shortage having ended by this point.  An average Canadian infantry regiment 
within the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, The Essex Scottish Regiment, contained thirty-eight officers 
and 818 other ranks.43  These figures placed it 1 percent over its authorized strength.  This regiment, as 
well as many others, was completely re-built in the period 10-30 November 1944 and were close to their 
establishment strengths by month's end.  The reinforcement system during this time had been allowed to 
function without the steady outflow of casualties working against it.  During the period of 10 November 
1944 to 31 January 1945, the infantry regiments had accepted reinforcements, rested and conducted 
important training and patrolling.44   
 Combat during the winter phase consisted of patrolling activity and indirect fire missions carried 
out by each side as they faced each other along the Waal and Maas rivers.  Weekly casualties were very 
low.  Prior to its February 1945 deployment to Germany and the battles in the Rhineland, the division had 
no obvious weaknesses.  It's strength as of 31 January 1945 stood at 970 officers and 17,092 other ranks, 
for a total of 18,062 men.45  The January 1945 war establishment for a Canadian infantry division was 
915 officers and 17,176 other ranks.46  These figures placed the division at 99 percent of its authorized 
strength.  The cutting edge of the division, its infantry regiments, were very strong.  The South 
Saskatchewan Regiment had a strength of thirty-four officers and 814 other ranks on 31 January 1945.47  
The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) contained thirty-eight officers and 817 other 
ranks on the same date.48  Divisional artillery units were also up to strength.  The 6th Field Regiment, 
RCA, contained a strength of thirty-eight officers and 629 other ranks on 27 January 1944 against an 
authorized strength of thirty-eight officers and 638 other ranks. 49  The 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA on 
                                                          
43 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  
44 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944-January 1945.  T-16144.  Troops regularly 
saw films and took trips to Antwerp.  
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-1871.  31 January 1945 field return. 
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  War Establishment Tables 
for a January 1945 Canadian Infantry Division.  
47 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094. 
48 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945. T-7094. 
49 LAC,RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  27 January 1945 field return. 
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the 27 January 1945 contained a strength of thirty-six officers and 646 other ranks against a war 
establishment of thirty-five officers and 614 other ranks.50   
 The equipment and combat A vehicle state for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division on the verge of 
Operation “Veritable” in February 1945 was satisfactory. 51  The division contained a large inventory of 
heavy weapons, 1 percent over what it was authorized.  Combat A vehicle inventories within the division 
totalled 745 as of 31 January 1945 versus the 638 it was authorized.  The former total placed the division 
at 117 percent of its authorized A vehicle strength.  The vehicle return for the end of January also records 
the arrival some of the most advanced weapons systems to be operated by the division .  As of 31 January 
1945 the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA had received the first six of its authorized number of Valentine 
Archer 17-Pounder tank destroyers.  With the addition of these tank destroyers, this regiment's anti-tank 
capability had never been stronger.   
 Combat resumed on 8 February 1945 with the division's participation in Operation “Veritable”.  
This operation was a drive to clear the western bank of the Rhine in preparation for a deeper invasion of 
Germany itself.  The division was very active during this offensive and 8-19 February 1945 saw Vyler, 
Kranenberg and the area near Louisendorf, Germany fall to its infantry brigades.52  The period of 16-20 
February 1945 saw bitter combat near Louisendorf as German armoured forces counter attacked, battering 
the division’s infantry regiments and causing some local reverses.53  With armoured support the division 
eventually turned the tables on these attacks, and the German forces were forced to withdraw due to 
heavy losses.  By 21 February 1945 the operation was complete.  During this mid-February fighting the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division had suffered high personnel casualties on several occasions.   
                                                          
50 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,559.   2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary January  1945.  27 January 1945 field return.  
51 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 31 
January 1945.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 
215C1.083 (D6).  Monthly Equipment States return 31 January 1945.   
52 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 490. 
53,Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 484. 
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 In late February and early March, 1945 the division assaulted the Hochwald Gap in Germany as 
part of Operation “Blockbuster”.54  Severe resistance was encountered in later phases of this fighting.  
Despite this resistance, the prime objective of Xanten, Germany fell to the division on 10 March 1945.  
Late March 1945 saw the division redeploy west towards the enemy-occupied Netherlands.  It attacked 
out of bridgeheads over the Rhine River won by the 51st British Highland Division in mid March and 
advanced northwest.  In a rapid advance it liberated the Dutch towns of Silvolde, Terborg, and 
Doetinchem in quick succession.  These operations led to a further advance in early April that ended with 
the capture of Gronigen, the Netherlands, on 13 April 1945.55  In its final operations of the war, the 
division was moved east into Germany, capturing Grossenkneten, crossing the Hunte River, capturing 
Oldenburg and finally taking up positions on the Weser River.  These were the last combat actions of the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division, the cease fire taking hold on 5 May 1945.  
 During this last phase of fighting from 1 February to 5 May 1945, the division's infantry units 
again bore the weight of the division's casualties.  Battle casualties for three of the division's infantry 
regiments relate the extent of the losses.  The Essex Scottish Regiment in the period February to May 
1945 suffered 619 battle casualties.56  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve for the same time frame suffered 367 
battle casualties, it enduring less fierce combat.57  The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 
suffered 300 losses, this unit also being more fortunate than The Essex Scottish Regiment.58   
 Non-battle casualties continued unabated at roughly the same rate that they had occurred in the 
period July 1944-January 1945.  The closer a unit was to the front lines, the more it suffered from these 
types of casualties.  A rear-deployed regiment's personnel had better mess facilities, shelters and access to 
regimental aid post (RAP) medical care in a relaxed environment.  During the February-May1945 time 
                                                          
54 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 496-497. 
55 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 555. 
56 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
57 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
58 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
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frame the 4th Field Regiment, RCA suffered fifty-five non-battle casualties according to their war diary.59  
In the same period The Royal Regiment of Canada infantry regiment suffered 283.60 
 The strength of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at the war’s conclusion was 974 officers and 
16,947 other ranks, for a total strength of 17,921 men.61  All regiments in the division had very high 
personnel levels.  The 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade's The Royal Regiment of Canada had a strength of 
forty-one officers and 834 other ranks, 3 percent over strength. 62  While being very strong, The Royal 
Hamilton Light Infantry was 2 percent under strength with thirty-six officers and 796 other ranks on 5 
May 1945.63  RCA units were less strong, with the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, fielding thirty-four 
officers and 590 other ranks, it being 4 percent under strength.64  The 6th Field Regiment, RCA was 5 
percent under strength, it containing thirty-five officers and 608 other ranks.65  
 These totals were the result of a sustained effort at reinforcing the division in the February-May 
1945 phase of the campaign in NWE.  In this period the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was the recipient 
of large numbers of infantry reinforcements.  Many were newly-available National Resources 
Mobilization Act (NRMA) conscript reinforcement personnel from Canada.66  While the other combat 
arms were less of a priority, every effort was made to keep Canadian Army infantry regiments at their full 
authorized strengths.  During this period 417 new personnel were transferred to The South Saskatchewan 
Regiment.67  Total reinforcements in the same period for the Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, a regiment 
that had been weak post-Normandy, totalled 669 personnel.68 
                                                          
59LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February-May 1945.   
60 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February-May, 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
61 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,719.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary.  T-1871.  5 May 1945 return. 
62LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096. 
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096. 
64 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16452. 
65LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  5 May 1945 field return. 
66 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 633.  These conscripts were formerly only eligible for service in Canada. 
67 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
68 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096. 
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 As of 30 April 1945 the division had satisfactory inventories of A vehicles and major weapons 
systems.69  The division contained 542 combat A vehicles against an authorized war establishment of 513, 
placing the division 6 percent over its war establishment in this category.  The returns for the end of April 
were also satisfactory with regards to the division's non-vehicle major weapons systems.70  The division 
contained 102 percent of its authorized number of heavy weapons, and had no serious shortages.  
 In summary, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division would have been capable of any further 
operations if the war had progressed past 5 May 1945.  It had suffered some very difficult reverses at the 
hands of the Germans in July 1944, but had emerged as a capable and battle-tested formation.  The 
performance of its infantry regiments was critical in clearing the Foret de la Londe Seine River crossing, 
the Scheldt Estuary and the forests of the Rhineland in 1945.  The field artillery regiments of the division 
were extremely effective.  The division's infantry operations utilized this strength, employing large 
artillery support programs for all their operations.  One area in which the division had significant 
equipment challenges during 1944 was SP tank destroyers and flame thrower carriers.71  This area of 
weakness was mitigated throughout 1944 by the support of attached Canadian armoured regiments.  Apart 
from some poor examples of combined arms tactics in July 1944, CAC support from August 1944 
onwards was effective. 
 In order to survive its reverses of July 1944 and the attrition of August and October 1944, the 
division was rebuilt repeatedly in an efficient manner.  The monthly returns from 31 July 1944 onwards 
for both heavy weapons and combat A vehicles relay a picture of a formation that was adequately 
resupplied on a regular basis.  The shortages it had within its infantry regiments in August and September 
                                                          
69LAC, RG 24 Volume 10, 553.  21st Army Group Consolidated Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Return for 30 
April 1945.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 
215C1.083 (D6).  Monthly Equipment states return for 30 April 1945.   
70 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Units in the First Canadian Army, 21st A.G.  File 215C1.083 
(D6).  Monthly Equipment state return for 30 April 1945.   
71LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report (Non-Vehicle/AFV)  File 215C1.083 (D6). 
LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 July 
1944 divisional returns.  The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as of 31 July 1944 contained fifteen of its sixteen 
authorized M-10 3-Inch tank destroyers, while the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was authorized none.  On 31 July 
1944, the division was authorized sixty-six Wasp II flame-thrower carriers, yet had none. 
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1944 were of a temporary nature.  The infantry losses of late July 1944 had occurred quickly and in such 
large numbers that the reinforcement system could not keep up due to its temporarily limited resources.  
As of October these personnel shortages were no longer a major concern.  While comparable German 
formations were destroyed by attrition and withdrawn for rebuilding, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
stayed at the front.   
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Chapter 9: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: Major actions, 
casualties, reinforcements and strength returns for its combat arms regiments 
in North West Europe, June 1944-May 1945. 
 
 The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was activated in Canada in the spring of 1940.  It spent the 
following year assembling its component brigades.  The regimental units were drawn from the prairie, 
central and eastern provinces of Canada.1  During the winter of 1940-41 one of its regiments, the 
Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun), formed part of the Allied garrison in Iceland.  
Transported to the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the fall of 1941, the division embarked upon a three year 
period of training and further garrison duties.  While the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division participated in the 
1942 Dieppe Raid and the entire 1st Canadian Corps deployed to Italy in 1943-1944, the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division remained in Britain.  In July 1943 the division was designated as one of the amphibious 
assault formations for Operation “Overlord”, the Normandy invasion, which was planned for June 1944.2  
As a result, its training revolved around the role of successfully assaulting the beaches and defending the 
initial lodgement.  This specialized training for a temporary role was conducted arguably at the expense 
of offensive combined arms training to defeat German armoured formations post-invasion.3 
 As of 31 May 1944, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s commanding officer was Major-General 
Rodney Keller.  It’s main infantry formations were the 7th, 8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades.4  The 
regiments of 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade were The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Regina Rifle Regiment 
and The Canadian Scottish Regiment.  The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade consisted of The Queen’s Own 
Rifles of Canada, Le Regiment de la Chaudière and The North Shore Regiment.  The 9th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade’s was made up of The North Nova Scotia Highlanders, The Stormont, Dundas and 
Glengarry Highlanders and The Highland Light Infantry of Canada.  Divisional field artillery units 
consisted of the 12th,13th and 14th Field Regiments, Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA).  An additional field 
                                                          
1 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657-662.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army units in NWE. 
2 John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 104. 
3 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 182.  The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade began to train 
together in April 1944. 
4Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657-662.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army units in NWE. 
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artillery regiment, the army level 2nd Canadian Army Group Royal Artillery’s (2nd Canadian AGRA) 19th 
Army Field Regiment, RCA was temporarily attached.  This addition gave the division a total of four 
field artillery regiments.5  Anti-tank and anti-aircraft units consisted of the 4th Light Anti Aircraft 
Regiment, RCA and the 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA.  Non-artillery divisional units comprised of the 
7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (The 17th Duke of York's Royal Canadian Hussars) and The 
Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun).   
 On the eve of the invasion every unit in the division was fully equipped in accordance with its 
war establishment tables for personnel and equipment.6  The division was significantly better equipped in 
personnel, vehicles and weaponry than the other two Canadian infantry divisions overseas at this point, 
and thus had a greater level of combat power.  The major difference in manpower and weaponry stemmed 
from the attachment of the 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA.  In addition, all four field artillery regiments 
were equipped with M7 105mm “Priest” self-propelled (SP) artillery pieces rather than towed variants.7  
Within the RCA anti-tank regiment, an authorized battery of M-10 3-Inch self-propelled tank destroyers 
was present.8  These additions gave the division an extensive mobile SP artillery and anti-tank component 
that could rapidly support an armoured advance if required.   
 Organizational war establishment tables for the division’s combat arms regiments are present in 
Appendix 1.  Detailed statistics on the division's unit personnel strengths, casualties, reinforcements as 
well as equipment and vehicle strength returns are provided in Appendix 4.  This information is provided 
for each of the divisional regiments with some exceptions.  There is a lack of surviving data for the RCA 
artillery regiments.  Casualties for RCA regiments were very low in comparison to the monthly totals in 
                                                          
5 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 May 1944 divisional returns.  
The divisional RCA field artillery regiments had an authorized level of ninety-six M7 105mm Priest self-propelled howitzers in 
accordance with the war establishment tables. 
6LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,533.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division A & Q War Diary July 1944.  As of 1 July 1944, when the 
division had fully assembled and had received reinforcements to replace those lost in the June 1944 fighting, its strength stood at 
20,213 men.  The divisional A & Q War Diary for May 1944 is recorded as lost.  
7Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 37.   
8 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 May, 1944 divisional returns.  
The division had fifteen M-10 3-Inch tank destroyers on charge. 
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the infantry and some armoured regiments.  To save space within reports, the division and corps level 
Adjutant and Quartermaster (A & Q) war diaries recorded only consolidated figures for all RCA units 
within the division.  These consolidated records are the only reliable source of data for RCA battle and 
non-battle casualties as well as reinforcements for the months June 1944-May 1945.  As a result, only 
consolidated divisional RCA monthly casualty and reinforcement figures are provided within this study's 
Appendix 4.  For individual RCA regiments, only monthly strength returns are provided. 
 On D-Day, 6 June 1944, four infantry regiments of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
successfully assaulted Juno Beach.  They conducted their landing with significant armoured, air, naval 
and engineer support.  In difficult fighting, the parts of the division engaged in combat cleared the 
beaches of German defenders.  The regiments involved suffered a large number of battle casualties.  The 
two regiments with the highest figures were The Regina Rifle Regiment with forty-five personnel lost and 
The Queens own Rifles of Canada with sixty-one.9  The division immediately pushed inland, 
consolidating its area of the beachhead and landing the remainder of the division in the next few days.   
 The fighting of 7-11 June 1944 resulted in a consolidated, static front for the Canadian invasion 
force.  An important defensive success had been achieved in this period, and all German armoured 
counter attacks against the beachhead had been defeated.10  However, Canadian infantry and armoured 
forays to the south against Le Mesnil-Patry and Carpiquet had failed with heavy losses as the enemy also 
had its defensive successes.  Attempting to take Carpiquet airfield on 7 June 1944, a 9th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade task force had initially made good progress.  However, a sharp reverse occurred when a powerful 
German armoured counter attack was unleashed in the afternoon.11  The ensuing Canadian defensive 
effort brought the Germans to a halt, but heavy infantry and armoured losses were sustained.  The 8th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade’s operations to the east during 8-9 June 1944 had better results.  The villages 
of Bretteville L'Orgueilleuse and Putot were captured and held against frequent armoured and infantry 
                                                          
9 Charles Stacey.  The Victory Campaign, 650.  Appendix B.  Canadian Army casualties, Normandy D-Day 6 June, 1944. 
10 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 130-140.   
11 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 344. 
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attacks.  These series of see-saw battles saw the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade prevail due to excellent 
defensive combined arms tactics and effective artillery support.  These successes were tempered by the 11 
June 1944 reverse that saw The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada take heavy losses while supporting a 
failed 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade armoured attack against Le-Mensil Patry.12  
 Following these initial battles and the successful defence of the beachhead, the fighting turned 
static for the remainder of the month.  During this time the division accepted reinforcements to bring its 
regiments back up to strength.  In early July 1944 the division’s infantry brigades again assaulted 
Carpiquet and the German defences north of Caen.  Operation “Windsor”, the 4 July 1944 renewed 
assault on Carpiquet village and airfield, was only partially successful.  Operation “Charnwood”, the 8 
July 1944 operation against German forces north of Caen, met all its objectives.13  Significant infantry 
casualties were sustained in each operation.  Moving south to support the British Operation “Goodwood” 
on 18 July 1944, the division took the southern industrial portion of Caen in its part of the Canadian 
Operation “Atlantic”.  Following this initial success, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division took over the 
advance and attacked southward towards Verrieres Ridge.  Its assaults were repulsed with heavy 
casualties in return for very limited gains.  Following the mixed results of Operation “Atlantic”, the 
division participated in 25 July 1944’s Operation “Spring”.  During this operation the 9th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade took severe casualties attempting to take the village of Tilly-La-Campagne.  All these 
reverses on or near Verrieres Ridge had stemmed from the aggressive use of German armour against 
assaulting Canadian infantry.  The opposition against the Canadian forces was too strong in armour for 
any breakthroughs to take place or significant objectives to be taken.14 
 These costly battles in July 1944 were followed by the division’s participation in 8-13 August 
1944’s Operation “Totalize”.  The removal of some German formations from the front and a massive 
airstrike by strategic bombers allowed for a successful night attack by Anglo-Canadian divisions on 7-8 
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August 1944.  After this night attack a further large bomber airstrike occurred that saw some regiments of 
the division take losses from inaccurate Allied bombing runs.15  Making contact with the enemy on 10 
August 1944, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade advanced towards its objective of Quesnay Wood.  Two 
regiments of the brigade attacked on the left flank of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, but failed to 
capture the wooded area in difficult fighting.  Further participation in 13-21 August 1944’s Operation 
“Tractable” saw the division reach the outskirts of Falaise on 16 August.16  The final Falaise Gap fighting 
up to 22 August 1944 witnessed large German personnel and equipment losses as the encirclement closed 
around them.  Intense combat with German forces seeking to break out resulted in more casualties for the 
division as all remaining escape routes were cut off.17  
 Battle casualties up to 26 July 1944, had been very high within the division.  Killed, wounded and 
missing personnel losses had totalled 6,481.18  Despite these losses and others in August 1944, the 
reinforcement capability of the Canadian Army had prevailed in keeping the infantry regiments of the 
division combat-ready.  The 30 August 1944 strength returns of two infantry regiments give an indication 
of the infantry strength within the division.  The North Nova Scotia Highlanders strength stood at forty 
officers and 757 other ranks, 93 percent of its war establishment.19  The regiment had suffered 
considerably, with a total of 881 battle and 241 non-battle casualties occurring during the campaign.20  
Estimated reinforcements issued to the regiment had numbered 1,069.  This was an amount sufficient for 
roughly eight complete new infantry companies.21  The North Shore Regiment in late August was also 
reasonably strong, with thirty-five officers and 725 other ranks on strength, 89 percent of its authorized 
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strength.  This regiment had sustained 821 battle and 233 non-battle casualties to this point.22  It had been 
very well reinforced by approximately 964 replacements during the June-August 1944 fighting.23  Both of 
these regiments had suffered 100 percent losses during this period and had been completely re-built back 
up to near their authorized strengths. 
 Battle casualties for the RCA units in the division during the period July-August 1944 had been 
light.  Total RCA battle casualties for all five regiments in the division totalled 561 personnel killed, 
wounded or missing.24  On a day to day basis it was very rare for any one regiment to suffer a large 
number of casualties.  As an example, the war diary for the 12th Field Regiment, RCA reported only light 
casualties during its involvement in 8-13 August 1944’s Operation “Totalize”, despite some German 
shelling.25  
 Personnel reinforcements for the division dispatched up to 4 August 1944’s Operation “Totalize”, 
revealed that the cost of battle was being borne by the infantry to a large degree.  Total Canadian Infantry 
Corps (CIC) reinforcements sent to the division numbered 269 officers and 5,618 other ranks.  This was 
an astounding total that was the equivalent of forty-nine new infantry companies.  Other arms within the 
division received to 4 August 1944 a total of fifty-two officers and 1,045 other ranks.26  Not only was the 
3rd Canadian Infantry Division exceptionally outfitted for battle in Normandy, it was also exceptionally 
reinforced while in the field. 
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 Major weapons systems and armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) losses suffered by the division had 
continually been made good during the course of the campaign27  On 31 August 1944 the division was in 
a satisfactory state with regard to its combat A vehicles and weaponry.  However, it was in a state of 
transition with regard to the number of combat A vehicles within its RCA field artillery regiments.  The 
three field regiments had exchanged their SP artillery vehicles for towed artillery, which was superior for 
indirect fire tasks.28  The fourth army level field artillery regiment that was temporarily attached to the 
division in June 1944 was removed by July 1944.  This move immediately subtracted its vehicles and 
weapons from the division’s totals.   
 As of 31 August 1944, the inventory levels of combat A vehicles operated by the division was 
satisfactory.29  A total of 737 A vehicles were present within the division versus its authorized war 
establishment level of 707, making it 4 percent over strength.  The division was significantly over 
strength in some A vehicles categories, but this was to compensate for shortages in other types.  For 
example, of the 120 T-16 gun tractors carriers authorized as anti-tank gun towers and ammunition 
carriers, only thirteen were present.  As of 31 August 1944, the non-vehicle weapons state of the division 
was also satisfactory.30  The division contained 569 major weapons systems versus an authorized level of 
563, making it slightly over strength in this category.  The only significant shortage was in the area of 
anti-tank guns.  The division was authorized sixteen of the very effective 17-Pounder towed anti-tank 
guns, but none had been issued.  In their place eighteen extra 6-Pounders were on strength. 
 The division was in good shape in comparison to average German infantry formations post-
Normandy.  As displayed in Chart 9.1, German infantry divisions had very low strength compared to their 
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wartime establishment post-Normandy.  These German formations were burnt-out shells due to non-
reinforcement.  The Canadian Army’s competent reinforcement and replacement systems for  
Chart 9.1: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division versus German infantry divisions, post Normandy.  
Strength returns versus authorized strengths.31 
 
personnel, vehicles and weaponry had performed to a satisfactory degree.  While a complete British 
infantry division had to be broken up to re-equip and refurbish others in August 1944, this never occurred 
within the Canadian Army post-Normandy.32  This is not to say the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had 
not taken severe losses.  Following some further fighting in the pursuit of the enemy across France, the 
state of two of its infantry brigades was adequate, and the third was rather weak.  Returns for the 8 
September 1944, reflect a division that was still combat capable, but required some reinforcements for its 
infantry companies.  
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 The average strength of the three infantry regiments within the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was 
thirty-six officers and 763 other ranks, 94 percent of the authorized strength of an infantry battalion.  The 
8th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s average battalion strength was even better, standing at thirty-six officers 
and 769 other ranks, 95 percent of its authorized strength.  The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, composed 
of the of The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Regina Rifle Regiment and The Canadian Scottish Regiment, 
was the weakest of the three.  It had an average battalion strength of thirty-seven officers and 653 other 
ranks, 81 percent of its war establishment.  This meant that three regiments in this brigade were missing 
an average of roughly 160 personnel each, one and one-third of a complete infantry company.33   
 Following the Falaise Gap battles the division crossed the Seine River at Elbeuf , operating with 
parts of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division.  On 3 September 1944, the division crossed the Somme 
River and moved north-east towards the channel ports up to the Belgian border.  After advancing to the 
vicinity of Boulogne, France by 5-6 September 1944, the division embarked on a series of siege 
operations to capture enemy-held channel ports.  Its objectives were the isolated garrisons of Boulogne 
and Calais.34  These were not militarily dangerous operations as these ports posed no offensive threat.  
The biggest challenge to Anglo-Canadian forces at this stage were logistical concerns due to the rapid 
pace of their advance.   
 The division managed to take these ports with support from naval and air assets.  The period 17-
22 September 1944 saw 8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigades seize Boulogne and the surrounding areas.  
In co-operation with British forces, the port was taken after a short siege.  Due to the concrete 
fortifications and heavy artillery available to the surrounded German units, some infantry regiments 
suffered casualties in these operations.  The period of 25 September to 1 October 1944 saw the division 
move onto its next objective, Calais.  The division successfully forced the surrender of the German 
garrison after briefly assaulting some of its fortified defences.  Allied aircraft again conducted multiple air 
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strikes, which aided in compelling the Germans to surrender the port and the outlying German batteries at 
Cape Gris Nez by 1 October 1944.35   
 As part of 2nd Canadian Corps, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was then ordered to move east 
to the vicinity of Antwerp, Belgium.  From late September 1944 onward the division was to take part in 
operations to clear the Scheldt Estuary.  This clearance was necessary for the vital port to be opened for 
Allied shipping.  The strength returns of the infantry regiments during early October reflect the fact that a 
significant reinforcement of the division had taken place in late September 1944.  The 7th Canadian 
Infantry Brigades’ average battalion strength as of 5 October 1944 was thirty-nine officers and 754 other 
ranks, for a total of 793 personnel.  The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s average was the strongest at 
thirty-seven officers and 774 other ranks for average total of 811 personnel.  The 9th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade’s average unit strength was the weakest, but still adequate, at thirty-eight officers and 746 other 
ranks.36  
 The division’s task for October 1944 was the liquidation of the Breskens Pocket, an area 
surrounded by the Leopold Canal forming the south bank of the Scheldt Estuary.  The surrounded 
Germans in the pocket were defending the area from prepared positions and well stocked with supplies.  
On 6 October 1944, the division launched Operation “Switchback”, which consisted of amphibious 
assaults across the Leopold Canal to begin clearing the pocket.  During land and amphibious assaults 
throughout October 1944, it liberated Hoofplaat, Biervliet, Schoondijke, Groede, Retranchement and 
Knocke-sur-Mer.  This last town was one of the last areas of Belgium to be liberated.37  Due to the 
infantry-centric nature of these operations, infantry casualties were high and the brigades needed 
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considerable reinforcements.  The fighting was very difficult due to the flooded terrain, dikes and 
entrenched enemy.38  The final German positions fell on 3 November 1944.   
 How well the division’s infantry regiments had been re-supplied with new personnel during the 
Battle of the Scheldt can be ascertained from their 31 October 1944 strength and casualty returns.  The 
Regina Rifle Regiment of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade had suffered 384 battle and seventy-four non-
battle casualties during the course of the month.39  It had received 387 reinforcements, the equivalent to 
three complete new rifle companies.  Its strength as of 31 October 1944, was thirty-six officers and 766 
other ranks, 94 percent of its authorized personnel strength.  The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s Queen’s 
Own Rifles of Canada was not as strong.  It had suffered 146 battle and twenty-nine non-battle casualties 
during the course of the fighting.40  It had received 222 reinforcements, bringing its strength at month’s 
end to thirty-four officers and 721 other ranks, 88 percent of its war establishment. 
 Casualties among divisional troops and RCA regiments continued to be much lighter compared to 
the infantry regiments which bore the brunt of German defensive fire during the Battle of the Scheldt.  
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun) suffered thirty battle and thirty-three non-battle 
casualties during October 1944.  It received 231 reinforcements during the course for the month, 
rebuilding its machine gun and mortar companies.41  The 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment suffered 
thirty-nine battle and thirty-three non-battle casualties during October 1944.42  It received eighty-three 
reinforcements during the course of the month, bringing its strength up to forty-two officers and 742 other 
ranks.  RCA casualties within the division were very low due to the enemy having a difficult time 
attacking their gun positions.  Massive retaliation occurred if the Germans made any attempts at sustained 
counter battery fire.  Due to these conditions the number of non-battle casualties in the RCA regiments 
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during October exceeded the number of battle losses.  Total October casualties for all RCA regiments in 
the division numbered forty-eight battle and sixty non-battle.  A total 127 reinforcements were dispatched 
to the RCA regiments, maintaining their strength during the month. 43 
 Divisional inventories of combat A vehicles and heavy weapons had remained high due to 
operations being focused on infantry led-attacks, some of which were amphibious.  Also, there were a 
very limited number of routes and non-flooded terrain that could be used for mechanized warfare in the 
Breskens Pocket area.  Also missing were a viable number of German AFVs or anti-tank weapons which 
could be used to destroy carriers, anti-tank guns and tank-destroyers within the division.  
 Combat A vehicle losses had been light during the October 1944 fighting. 44  As of 31 October 
1944 a total of 674 vehicles were on strength versus the division’s war establishment figure of 612.  It 
was 10 percent over strength in this category.  Unauthorized extra A vehicles within the division included 
four of the valuable Wasp II flamethrower carriers.  As always, there were some shortages.  Against an 
authorized level of twenty-eight Daimler armoured cars, only twenty-two were present.  Of the seventeen 
M-10 17-Pounder SP tank destroyers that the division was authorized, none had been issued.  The 3rd 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, was still making do with the older M-10 3-Inch variants.  Of the 120 T-16 
tracked gun tractor carriers on the war establishment tables, only twenty-four were on strength.  Extra 
Universal Carriers within the division were assuming their role.  Non-vehicle major weapons systems 
inventories within the division were also at high levels as of 31 October 1944.45  The division contained 
96 percent of its heavy weapons, with 536 heavy weapons present compared to its war establishment of 
561.  Shortages included a total lack of towed 40mm anti-aircraft (AA) guns, an increased number of 
40mm AA self-propelled variants doing their job.   
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 Following the conclusion of Operation “Switchback”, the clearance of the Breskens Pocket, the 
3rd Canadian Infantry Division ceased offensive operations.  It assumed a static position on the Maas 
River as part of the 2nd Canadian Corps defensive line within the Nijmegen salient.  During this time the 
division’s activities consisted of manning defensive positions, training and sending out regular combat 
patrols.46  Few battle casualties were suffered by the division during the period of November 1944-
January 1945 as there was limited contact with the enemy.  The opposing German forces in the 
Netherlands were weak, lacking the capability to launch sustained offensive operations.  The main 
German focus on the Western Front during this time was its offensive operations in Belgium and 
Luxembourg, where the largest percentage of its divisions and resources were being utilized. 
 Prior to combat operations in the Netherlands and Germany in the spring of 1945, the division 
had very few personnel deficiencies.  Its strength as of 31 January 1945 stood at 990 officers and 18,346 
other ranks.47  The program of re-mustering general duty reinforcements had been successful from 
September onward in generating an increased number of infantry reinforcements.48  Immediately prior to 
combat operations in February 1945, there was no lack of combat capability within the division’s three 
infantry brigades and divisional units. 
 The division’s infantry regiments had suffered few battle casualties and received adequate 
reinforcements to cover non-battle losses in the November 1944-January 1945 period.49  The number of 
non-battle casualties for all combat arms units had increased in the winter months due to the personnel 
living in dugouts or ruined buildings.  The Royal Winnipeg Rifles lost forty-three personnel to battle and 
254 to non-battle causes in the three months.  During this time it received 323 reinforcements, bringing its 
strength up to thirty-eight officers and 837 other ranks as of 31 January 1945.  Le Regiment de la 
Chaudière suffered forty-nine battle and 176 non-battle casualties during the winter period.  Over 410 
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soldiers rejoined the regiment or were posted as reinforcements, bringing its strength up to forty-three 
officers and 795 other ranks as of 31 January 1945.   
 The RCA regiments also contained high levels of personnel at the end of January 1945.  The 3rd 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA’s strength stood at thirty-six officers and 632 other ranks as of 26 January 
1945.50  This figure put it 3 percent over its authorized strength.  Casualties were low among the RCA 
regiments due casualties to the limited capability of the enemy and their battlefield position to the rear of 
friendly infantry regiments.  The artillery regiments were active in supporting infantry patrolling activities 
and engaging targets of opportunity.  RCA anti-aircraft and anti-tank crews were also involved in the 
engagement of enemy positions and occasionally took small infantry roles.  Total casualties for all RCA 
regiments within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in January 1945 were three battle and 156 non-battle.  
The RCA regiments received a total of 146 replacements during the month.51   
 The equipment and weaponry inventories of the division as of 31 January 1945 were very similar 
to the numbers on strength in October 1944.  Little had changed apart from the acquisition of more potent 
combat A vehicles and heavy weapons.52  New weapons systems on hand included twelve towed 17-
Pounder anti-tank guns, acquired at the expense of a similar number of 6-Pounders.  New combat A 
vehicles as of 31 January 1945 included twelve new Valentine Archer 17-Pounder SP tank destroyers, the 
M-10 3-Inch tank destroyers being exchanged.  Unauthorized vehicles held by the division at this point 
included nineteen of the valuable Wasp II flame thrower carriers and fourteen Humber Scout cars.  
 Combat commenced for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in mid-February 1945 with 
involvement in the Anglo-Canadian Operation “Veritable”.  The time period of 8-14 February 1945 saw 
the division clear the southern banks of the Waal and Rhine rivers.  These areas were flooded and the 
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operations were largely amphibious.  Advancing south east, the assaulting infantry brigades reached the 
Rhine at Emmerich by 14 February 1945.  Between 16 and 17 February 1945 the lead regiments of the 
division assaulted Moyland Wood in their part of the Hochwald Gap battle.  This forest fighting against 
dug in enemy positions was difficult and progress was slow.  Follow on forces then assaulted west past 
the German town of Louisendorf, taking heavy casualties when subsequently counterattacked by German 
armoured forces.53    
 At the conclusion of these operations, the division was redeployed back to the Netherlands in mid 
March 1945 to prepare to conduct offensive operations there in early April 1945.  Combat re-commenced 
on 5 April 1945 and the following week saw the division capture of the Dutch towns of Wehl and 
Zutphen.  It attacked again on 14 April 1945, rapidly liberating the northern Dutch towns of Meppel, 
Steenwijk, Akkrum and Leeuwarden.  Elements of the division reached the sea at Harlingen during the 
same period.  The division then switched its advance to the east, relieving the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division and advancing from Gronigen to Delfzijl.  In what was the division's last significant battle, The 
Canadian Scottish Regiment of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade took the village of Wagenborgen in a 
two-day battle with armoured support.54  Crossing into Germany for the last weeks of the war, the 
division captured the German city of Leer and advanced north to the vicinities of Emden and Aurich 
against disintegrating opposition.  It was in these positions that the war ended for the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division. 
 The limited capabilities of the German forces in the last months of the war had allowed the 
divisional RCA regiments to operate with a reduced level of danger from enemy action.  The RCA field 
artillery regiments continued to use their full offensive capability to bombard enemy positions with little 
danger of counter-battery fire occurring.  Apart from mined routes and the dangers of infantry combat for 
their forward observation parties, the enemy had little capacity to retaliate.  RCA anti-tank and anti-
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aircraft crews utilized their weapons systems on ground targets from long range, also significantly 
limiting the danger to themselves. 
 The number of battle and non-battle casualties within the division’s five RCA regiments in the 
spring of 1945 had changed little from those suffered in the fall and winter.  Total casualties in the these 
five regiments during February 1945 totalled forty-four battle and 108 non-battle.  A total of 116 
reinforcements had been dispatched, combating ongoing attrition.55  The artillery-based doctrine of the 
Canadian Army ensured a constant level of damage was done to the enemy by the division’s three field 
regiments.  This was achieved at very low cost of artillery personnel casualties.  The German forces were 
bombarded constantly by an unseen enemy, the RCA, whom they could do very little about.56 
 The infantry brigades of the division had borne the brunt of the fighting in the months of 
February to April 1945.  Two infantry regiments taken as examples relay that casualties in the spring of 
1945, while heavy, were lighter than those of the summer of 1944.  The Canadian Scottish Regiment of 
the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade sustained a total of 443 battle casualties during these three months, 
matched with 234 non-battle casualties.  Reinforcements to keep this regiment up to strength totalled 
705.57  Despite receiving reinforcements totalling five and a half complete infantry companies, the 
regiment could only muster thirty-four officers and 761 other ranks as of 30 April 1945.  Le Regiment de 
la Chaudière, part of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, suffered 239 battle and 159 non-battle casualties 
in the same period.  Total reinforcements dispatched to offset losses totalled 416.  The strength of the 
regiment as of 30 April 1945 was forty-three officers and 806 other ranks.58   
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 Both regiments mentioned here received reinforcement personnel from the newly available pool 
of National Resource Mobilization Act (NMRA) conscripts.59  Reinforcements for all Army trades at this 
stage of the war were plentiful, and leave was regularly approved on a rotational basis for soldiers to take 
leave in the U.K., the Netherlands and other locations.  Deserving long service members were also 
eligible for leave to Canada, a welcome respite for some soldiers that had been overseas since 1940 or 
1941.60 
 In summary, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had a satisfactory performance level in all the 
operations it participated in during 1944-1945.  This was due in large part to it being well supplied with 
reinforcement personnel and equipment over the majority of its service in NWE.  The division was 
reinforced for part of the Normandy Campaign with an extra artillery regiment and had SP tank destroyers 
attached to its anti-tank regiment.  This provided it with more combat power than a regular Canadian 
infantry division throughout June and July 1944.  For the duration of its operations in NWE, the division 
never lacked for a sufficient number of combat A vehicles or heavy weapons.61  It utilized these items 
extensively in virtually every operation, thus arguably reducing battle casualties within its infantry 
regiments.  Shortages in personnel did occur, but these were of a temporary nature.  Prior to high intensity 
offensive operations the infantry regiments were always above 80 percent of their authorized strengths.  
Chart 9.2 illustrates that the effective strength of the division never dipped below 17,600 personnel.62   
 This division did lose some of its strength in August 1944, but this was largely due to factors  
                                                          
59 Charles Stacey.  Arms, Men and Governments, 479.  Following the fall 1944 political parliamentary conscription crisis in 
Ottawa, a small amount of NRMA conscripts had been sent overseas to serve as reinforcements. 
60 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  War Diary 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA January-April 1945.  T-16455.  The entries are filled 
with information on personnel going on leave to the U.K., the continent and Canada. 
61 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 30 April 
1945 returns for A vehicles.  The 4th Canadian Armoured Division possessed a battery of the M-10 17-Pounder tank-destroyers as 
of 31 August 1944. 
62 LAC, Volume 13,776.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T- 10533.  Letter to General officer 
Commanding (GOC) 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.  The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders had taken a up to 7 July 
1944 a total of 470 battle casualties.  This equalled a loss of 55 percent of the division’s effective strength and did not include 
non-battle casualties.  
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Chart 9.2: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division strengths (thousands) 31 July 1944-30 April 194563 
 
other than casualties.  The division’s authorized strength in the summer of 1944 was 18,374 personnel.64  
When additional units attached to it during June and July, it was significantly over strength.  In July 1944 
the temporarily attached 647 personnel strong 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA was detached from the 
division.65  The 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA was also re-organized in the summer of 1944, 
reducing its establishment strength from over 866 personnel to 585.66  As shown in Chart 9.1, comparable  
                                                          
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,775.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division A & Q War Diary June 1944. T-10533.  LAC, RG 24 Volumes 
13,719-13,720.  2nd Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries July-September 1944, March-May 1945.  T-1870-1871.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 13,660-16,663.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October-December 1944, January-February 1945.  T-7092-
7094.  The detachment of the 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA by August 1944 is very evident in this graph, and should not be 
indicative to the reader of a increased level of casualties. 
64 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 343.  PRO War Office 179/2574, “Composition of the CAO” WD GD Canadian GHQ, November 
1944.  Authorized levels of personnel in all Canadian formations in Normandy during summer 1944 are listed.  
65 LAC, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries.  January 1944.  Armoured Division War Establishment Staff 
Tables for a Field Artillery Regiment, (self-propelled) RCA.  War Establishment II/190A/22 effective January 1945.  T-7093. 
66 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,591.  3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16740.  This 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division unit’s war establishment was identical to that of the 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA.  It was reduced to 
585 by September 1944. 
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German infantry formations wasted away to nothing after a short exposure to combat.  Chart 9.2 
illustrates that the exact opposite occurred with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.  Though the division 
did suffer significant casualties, it did not lose as many personnel as quickly as the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division did.  As a result of this, the division was not put in a major personnel deficit situation that the 
reinforcement system had to rectify while casualties were continuing to mount.   
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Chapter 10: The 4th Canadian Armoured Division: Major actions, casualties, 
reinforcements and strength returns for its combat arms 
regiments in North West Europe, August 1944-May 1945
 
 The 4th Canadian Infantry Division was ordered to begin forming in spring of 1940.  It was 
established from units located in central and western Canada.  In early 1942 it was re-organized as an 
armoured division.  Prior to its deployment overseas, it’s development had been slowed by the diversion 
of some units to what would become the 5th Canadian Armoured Division.  In the fall of that same year 
the division was deployed to the U.K, arriving in several convoys.  Like the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division, it did not to take part in combat operations prior to its 1944 deployment to Normandy.  
Administrative and supply problems during the winter of 1942-1943 caused some delays in equipping the 
division with armoured fighting vehicles and other pieces of equipment.  This interrupted its training 
schedule and the division did not conduct battalion-level exercises until the fall of the latter year.1   
 The main combat formations within the division as of spring 1944 were the 4th Canadian 
Armoured Brigade and the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade.2  The armoured brigade was composed of the 
28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment), the 21st Canadian Armoured 
Regiment (The Governor General’s Foot Guards) and the 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment (The 
Canadian Grenadier Guards).  Its infantry component was The Lake Superior (Motor) Regiment.  This 
last regiment was mechanized in order for it to keep up with the tanks as motorized infantry.   
 The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade was the dismounted infantry force of the division, and 
identical in composition to an infantry brigade within an infantry division.3  While the armoured brigade 
was designed to make armoured breakthroughs through the enemy’s main line of resistance, the infantry 
brigade could hold these gains as well as launch attacks of their own.  It consisted of three infantry 
regiments and an independent machine gun company.  The three regiments within the brigade were The 
                                                          
1 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 98, 104.  The spring 1943 exercise “Spartan” in the U.K. did 
not include the 4th Canadian Armoured Division due its lack of advanced training.  
2 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign, 177.  Figure 9.2: 2nd Canadian Corps order of battle.  
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army order of battle for units in NWE 1944-1945.  
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Lincoln and Welland Regiment, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada and The Algonquin 
Regiment.  An independent machine gun company, rather than a full battalion as in an infantry division, 
was present for support.  This unit was the 10th Independent Machine Gun Company (The New 
Brunswick Rangers).  The role of reconnaissance within the division was taken by a fourth armoured 
regiment, the 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment).  
Divisional anti-tank and anti-aircraft assets consisted of the 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Canadian 
Artillery (RCA), and the 5th  Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA.  The RCA divisional field artillery was 
made up of two regiments, the 15th Field Regiment (self-propelled), RCA, and the 23rd Field Regiment, 
RCA, which operated towed 25-Pounder howitzers. 
 Organizational war establishment tables for the division’s combat arms regiments are present in 
Appendix 1.  All monthly data on personnel strengths, casualties and reinforcements for the combat arms 
regiments within the division during its service in North West Europe (NWE) are found in Appendix 5.  
These are followed by combat A vehicle and heavy weapons monthly strength returns and records of 
delivery for heavy armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).  While the division did land in France in mid-July 
1944 it did not begin offensive operations until 1 August 1944.  As a result, the month of July is excluded 
from the statistical totals and the divisional records within this study.  
As of 1 August 1944, total divisional strength stood at 829 officers and 14,757 other ranks.4  At 
this point all the regiments within the division were at or very close to their war establishment personnel 
strengths.  The three armoured regiments within the armoured brigade had very high personnel levels.  
The 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment, taken as an example, contained thirty-seven officers and 654 
other ranks as of 29 July 1944, 1 percent over strength.5  The other two armoured regiments had similar 
returns.  The Lake Superior (Motor) Regiment also contained satisfactory personnel levels.  Its strength 
                                                          
4 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 343.  PRO War Office 179/2574.  “Composition of the CAO”, War Diary General Staff Canadian 
Army GHQ, November 1944.  Comparing this figure to the division total war establishment figures given for November 1944 of 
750 officers and 14,069 other ranks, we can see the division was very powerful.   
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,255.  21st Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12722.  29 July 1944 return.  War 
establishment strengths are provided in Appendix 1’s war establishment tables. 
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stood at thirty-six officers and 811 other ranks as of 29 July 1944, 98 percent of its war establishment.6  
The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s three regiments were also very close to their establishment numbers 
in late July 1944.  Taking two regiments as examples, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment as of 29 July 
1944 contained thirty-seven officers and 810 other ranks, 99 percent of its authorized strength.7  The 
Algonquin Regiment was just as strong, with thirty-seven officers and 803 other ranks present as of 29 
July 1944, 98 percent of its war establishment.8  The personnel levels within all four RCA regiments was 
adequate, with a combined strength of 187 officers and 3,181 other ranks.9  Some shortages were present, 
however.  The strength of the 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, as of 29 July 1944 stood at thirty-seven 
officers and 692 other ranks, 93 percent of its authorized strength.10   
A Canadian armoured division did not contain nearly as much personnel as an infantry division 
due to its reduced infantry component.  However, it possessed a large number of heavy weapons and 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), giving it increased combat power.  There were adequate inventories 
of combat A vehicle within the division as of 31 July 1944.11  As of this date the division contained 830 
combat A vehicles versus its authorized strength of 783.  Of this number 333 were Sherman medium or 
Stuart light tanks.  A shortage of 17-Pounder equipped Sherman Firefly tanks did exist.  Against an 
authorized strength of forty-five Sherman Vc Fireflies, only eight had been issued as of 31 July 1944.  Of 
the forty-eight Wasp II flame thrower carriers that were authorized, none had been issued to the division 
as of 31 July 1944.  With regard to heavy weapons, the division’s inventories were satisfactory as of 31 
July 1944.12  It contained 315 heavy weapons, exactly the number it was authorized.  Due to it being an 
armoured division and much of its strength being combat A vehicles, the division had less heavy weapons 
                                                          
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,098.  The Lake Superior (Motor) Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,104.  The Lincoln and Welland Regiment War Diary July1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000.  The Algonquin Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return.   
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-10550.  1 August 1944 
return.  
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,567.  5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16717.  29 July 1944 return. 
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1.)  Reference 31 
July1944, divisional return for A vehicles.   
12 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). Report for 31 July 
1944.   
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than an infantry division.  This was more than compensated for by the large number of AFVs, many of 
which were self-propelled (SP) artillery pieces.  
 Designated as one of the follow on divisions which would form the 2nd Canadian Corps, the 
division’s first elements landed in Normandy in mid July 1944.  It concentrated its formations in the area 
near Caen, France, over the next several days.  Placed under the command of the 2nd Canadian Corps, the 
division’s infantry units relieved those of  3rd Canadian Infantry Division on 31 July 1944.13  Once it took 
its place in the line, the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade continued a chain of costly infantry attacks on the 
tactically important Verrieres Ridge.  Two operations by the brigade to capture the village of Tilly La 
Campagne on 1 and 5 August 1944 were failures, the attacks bogging down.14   
 Following these minor actions in early August 1944, the division prepared itself for further 
offensive operations.  This month would witness the most difficult fighting of the war for division, 
ironically at a time when it was lacking combat experience.  The First Canadian Army’s aim was to exert 
pressure on the German’s right flank at the same time as the enemy’s left  flank was collapsing due to the 
First U.S. Army’s “Cobra” and the British Second Army’s “Bluecoat” operations.  To help realise this 
goal, the division played a major role in 8-10 August 1944’s Operation “Totalize”.  This armoured assault 
to break the main line of German resistance, capture Verrieres Ridge and exploit to the south towards 
Falaise was only partially successful.  The 4th Canadian Armoured Division did not capture its objectives 
on 9 August 1944 as part of the second phase of the operational plan.  Its advance was halted by traffic 
jams and strong German opposition which inflicted a significant amount of personnel and equipment 
losses.  The heaviest of these occurred within the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment battle group, the 
majority of the regiment being annihilated with parts of The Algonquin Regiment by counterattacking 
German armoured forces.   
                                                          
13 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 206. 
14 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 206. 
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 Despite these challenges during ‘Totalize”, the division re-grouped for a further push on Falaise.  
The operational plan for 14 August 1944’s Operation “Tractable” called for the division to attack from 
Soignolles, cross the Laizon River and capture the three objectives of Rouvres, Perrieres and Versainville.  
In the actual attack, Perrieres and Rouvres were captured, but Versainville was not reached.  This last 
town would not be liberated on 16 August 1944 due to difficulty crossing the Laizon River and continued 
German resistance.  At this point the German forces were weakened and conducting a fighting 
withdrawal, moving east in large columns to escape the encirclement near Falaise that was being created.   
 The 4th Canadian Armoured Division would continue its drive on 15 August 1944.  On this date 
the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade captured Epaney.15  The 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade reached the 
vicinity of Point 159 near Versainville on the same day, but was driven back by strong German 
opposition.  On the morning of the 16 August 1944, the division was ordered to cross the Ante River and 
then advance east to Trun to meet units of the Third U.S. Army.  Attempting to cross the Ante River at 
Damblainville on 17 August 1944, elements of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade were forced back with 
heavy losses.16  Diverted to a bridgehead on the Dives River at Couliboeuf on the same day, the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade successfully crossed the river.  It then attacked east, capturing Les Moutiers 
en Auge and Louvieres en Auge with assistance from other units of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade.17  
 During the period 18-21 August 1944 the division would attempt to block escape routes out of the 
Falaise Pocket, suffering losses as the German forces tried to fight their way out.  Operating with Polish 
and U.S. forces, the plan for the division was for it to help secure the line Chambois-St Lambert-Trun 
along the river Dives, blocking German movement east.  In chaotic fighting, lead elements of the division 
captured Trun on 18 August 1944 and established a blocking position.  Due to heavy Allied air attacks 
and the sheer number of escaping enemy, the division slowly lost contact with the neighbouring 1st Polish 
                                                          
15 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 248. 
16 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 252. 
17 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 236-237. 
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Armoured Division.18  In the meantime, this division had captured Points 252 and 262 to the east, 
establishing a hilltop blocking position against fleeing German forces and relief attacks.  The morning of 
19 August 1944 saw the 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment battle group attack and 
capture part of St Lambert, creating another blocking position there.  Due to increasing enemy pressure, 
the often outnumbered Polish and Canadian forces could not maintain a solid defensive perimeter.  A 
large number of German units escaped the pocket on 20 August 1944, despite the efforts of the defenders.  
The nearly encircled German forces fought very hard in their attempts to keep viable escape routes open 
at this stage.  These actions inflicted considerable Canadian and Polish casualties.19  Elements of the 
isolated 1st Polish Armoured Division were relieved by the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade on 21 August 
1944 after fierce fighting.20  On this date the pocket was finally firmly closed and no further German 
forces escaped.  
 The effects of combat on the division from 1 August 1944 onward had taken a considerable toll.  
From the outset it had been assigned demanding operational tasks that had perhaps been excessive for an 
inexperienced formation.  The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade suffered considerable casualties in August 
1944.  The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada had taken 218 total battle casualties between 27 
July and 30 August 1944.  In this period The Algonquin Regiment had taken 244 and The Lincoln and 
Welland regiment had taken 258.21  Non-battle casualties were less of an issue, with The Algonquin 
Regiment taking twenty, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment losing seventy-one and The Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders of Canada having sixty-one evacuees.22  Though these personnel were not killed, 
wounded or missing, they were subtracted from the infantry companies just as effectively as combat 
casualties. 
                                                          
18 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 259. 
19 Russell Hart, Clash of Arms, 357. 
20 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, 250. 
21  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total battle and non-battle casualties 27 July-30 August 1944. 
22 22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total battle and non-battle casualties 1 June-30 August 1944. 
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 The number of reinforcements dispatched to the infantry regiments had been insufficient to cope 
with the speed at which losses mounted during August 1944.  During June 1944 the Canadian 
reinforcement pool of trained infantrymen had not been strained due to only one infantry division, the 3rd, 
being in action in Normandy.  As of 1 August 1944, the infantry components of both the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division had joined in combat operations.  Faulty planning 
on casualty rates by Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) staff in London had led to an insufficient 
pool of infantry replacements being established.  This error was compounded by the performance of a 
bureaucratic personnel supply system whose starting point was in the U.K.  As a result a large percentage 
of the available infantry replacements which could have been posted to Canadian formations were located 
in the U.K. during crisis points and not immediately available.  The challenge of providing rapid infantry 
other ranks reinforcements for all three Canadian divisions, at the rate they were demanding them, proved 
to be impossible.  A crash program of re-mustering was taking place during the summer and early fall of 
1944, but it could not occur fast enough to solve the problem instantly.   
 This shortage of infantry replacements for the 4th Canadian Armoured Division occurred at a most 
inopportune moment.  During the critical August 1944 battles to secure the Falaise Pocket the division 
was asked to advance in a dynamic fashion using its armoured and infantry forces.  For these operations 
to succeed it was important that the division's infantry strength be maintained.  The exact opposite 
occurred and temporary shortages existed.  The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada received 
twenty-four personnel reinforcements during August. 23 By 30 August 1944 their strength had shrunk to 
twenty-four officers and 528 other ranks.24 The Algonquin Regiment recorded thirty-six new personnel 
                                                          
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,005.  The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada War Diary August 1944.  Pt I orders detailing 
new personnel posting details.  
24 LAC, RG 24 volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
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joining the regiment during the same month.  Its strength was reduced to thirty-six officers and 571 other 
ranks by the end of August.25   
 The divisional RCA regiments had suffered considerably fewer casualties and their personnel 
levels were still at acceptable levels at the end of the summer.  Total consolidated battle casualties for all 
RCA regiments within the division for the month of August totalled 257.26  Most of these were 
concentrated in the front-line 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA.  Its strength had shrunk to thirty-four 
officers and other 634 other ranks as of 26 August 1944, 86 percent of its war establishment.  Some 
regiments were largely unaffected by the fighting.  The 8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA’s strength 
on the same date was forty officers and 821 other ranks, 99 percent of its authorized strength.27 
 The divisions inventories of combat A vehicles had been reduced by heavy losses in August, but 
were still very large at the end of the month.28  The division fielded 809 combat A vehicles as of 31 
August 1944 against a war establishment of 840, 96 percent of its authorized strength.  Despite a constant 
repair and replacement effort, some vehicles missing due to mechanical failure or enemy action had not 
been replaced.  The number of Sherman Vc and Ic 17-Pounder Firefly tanks had increased to twenty-eight 
by month’s end.  This was a marked increase from the 31 July 1944 totals, but the armoured regiments 
were still short thirty-two.  There was also a shortage of armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) tanks, with 
only eight Sherman III ARVs on hand versus the authorized strength of fourteen.  There were also 
shortages of AFVs in the RCA regiments as of 31 August 1944.  The RCA field regiments were short 
                                                          
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000.  The Algonquin Regiment War Diary August 1944.  Estimated figure for reinforcements taking 
strength returns and subtracting casualties.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  
T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-10550.  Consolidated 
divisional strength and casualty return.  
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,609.  8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16761.  This regiment, along 
with all of its type, were re-structured to a thirty-four officer s and 551 other ranks personnel establishment  as of September 
1944. 
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report..  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 
August 1944 divisional return for combat A vehicles.   
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artillery observation post (OP) tanks, having only eighteen Ram II OP tanks instead of the twenty-seven 
Sherman III OP variants that were authorized.  29 
 While some ongoing shortages did exist, the division had been extensively resupplied with 
replacement AFVs and heavy weapons to cover the losses of August 1944.  D Squadron of the 25th 
Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th CADR) delivered 123 Sherman, Firefly and Stuart tanks to 
the division during the month of August 1944.  This supply kept the armoured regiments operational in 
the face of severe losses due to anti-tank fire and mechanical failures.30  This figure was enough to nearly 
re-equip two Canadian armoured regiments, and reflects the high rate of losses during this period.  
 Losses inflicted by enemy action or mechanical failure on non-vehicle weaponry were not severe 
and the division contained no shortages in this area as of 31 August 1944.  Any weapons systems that had 
been lost or broken during this period had been replaced.  The infantry and artillery regiments continued 
to contain near perfect levels of all of their authorized non-vehicle heavy weapons.  Unauthorized 
overages in anti-tank guns included one extra 6-Pounder and one extra 17-Pounder.31 
 Despite the heavy infantry losses of the breakthrough battles in early August 1944 and the Falaise 
Pocket battles in mid-month, operations continued for the division without a break.  The division swept 
across northern France as part of the 21st Army Group’s pursuit of the retreating Germans.  Advancing 
towards the Seine River as part of the 2nd Canadian Corps, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division crossed 
the river at Elbeuf on 26 August 1944.  Operating on the right flank of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 
it liberated St Omer, France on 5 September 1944.  By 8 September 1944 it had reached Bruges, Belgium 
and arrived at the Ghent Canal.  The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade captured a bridgehead over the canal 
at Moerbrugge between 13-14 September 1944, but was forced to relinquish it after heavy German 
                                                          
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 
August 1944 divisional return for combat A vehicles.   
30 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary August 1944.  T-12748.   
31 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  Report for 31 August 
1944.   
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counterattacks.32  Further operations led to the liberation of Moerkerke and Eecloo.  Subsequent tasks 
during September included patrolling the Leopold Canal perimeter of the German Breskens Pocket before 
being redeployed in October 1944 to take part in fighting to the north of Antwerp.33 
 The three infantry regiments of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade had been significantly 
reinforced throughout September 1944.34  As of 30 September, the strength of the Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders of Canada stood at thirty-seven officers and 834 other ranks.  It had received an estimated 
579 new personnel, placing it 2 percent over its authorized strength.  The Lincoln and Welland Regiment 
was not as strong, containing thirty-seven officers and 785 other ranks.  It had received an estimated 408 
replacements, bringing it to 97 percent of its war establishment.   
 The three regiments of the armoured brigade also received new personnel in September 1944, but 
not as many as the infantry regiments.  As of 30 September 1944, the 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment 
contained thirty-six officers and 563 other ranks.  It had received sixty-three reinforcements in September 
1944, bringing it to 91 percent of its authorized strength.35.  The 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment's 
strength as of 30 September 1944 was thirty-four officers and 511 other ranks.  This was 79 percent of its 
authorized strength.  It had received only seventy-four new personnel during the month.36 
 Operating under command of the 1st British Corps, the division moved to the vicinity of Antwerp 
in early October in preparation for combat operations north of the city.  On 9 October 1944 its armoured 
reconnaissance regiment and a company of infantry began operations to support the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division.  From 17 October 1944 onward the majority of the division’s combat strength was concentrated 
against the German forces confronting the Canadian Army’s right flank in this area.  While the 2nd 
                                                          
32 Mark Zuehlke, Terrible Victory, 7, 12-27. 
33 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 367. 
34 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  Strength returns 30 
September 1944.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing 
battle and non-battle casualties by week.  Totals for 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade units for weeks 31 August-4 October 1944.  
Reinforcements were estimated by subtracting casualty figures from strength returns at the end of August and September. 
35 LAC, Volumes 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,255.  21st Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary September 1944.  Part I orders for September 1944. 
36  LAC, Volumes 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,261.  22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary September 1944.  T-12727.  Part I Orders.  
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Canadian Infantry Division moved west to attack the South Beveland peninsula, the 4th Canadian 
Armoured Division guarded its flank and pushed north.  Advancing on the left flank of the 49th British 
West Riding Division, the division liberated Essen on 22 October and Bergen Op Zoom on 27 October 
1944.  Steenbergen and Hollandschdiep were both liberated on 4 November 1944.   
 The division’s four infantry regiments took heavy losses during the Scheldt fighting.37  The 
strength returns at the end of October give an appreciation of each regiment's condition during the mid-
point of their combat operations, rather than at their start or conclusion.  In contrast to August, all infantry 
units had received constant reinforcements throughout the month.  These reinforcements allowed the 
regiments to retain a higher level of combat effectiveness than in Normandy.  The Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders of Canada suffered 186 battle and sixty-four non-battle casualties during October, and 
received 118 reinforcements to make up these losses.  At the end of the month this regiment consisted of 
twenty-nine officers and 649 other ranks, 79 percent of its authorized strength.  The Algonquin Regiment 
took a total of 180 battle and fifty-eight non-battle losses during the same month.  These losses reduced it 
to thirty-three officers and 670 other ranks.  It had received 164 reinforcements during this period, enough 
to keep it at 82 percent of its war establishment.   
 The division had faced determined opposition in the Scheldt in the way of German airborne 
Fallschirmjager regiments, but these light infantry formations were poorly equipped in comparison to 
panzer divisions.  As evidence of this, total enemy equipment destroyed by the 29th Canadian Armoured 
Reconnaissance Regiment in October 1944 was one 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun, one 81mm mortar, one 
75mm anti-tank gun, one 75mm Sturmgeschutz assault gun and one obsolete Panzer III medium tank.38  
While the infantry combat was intense, the enemy did not have the same capability to inflict high losses 
on the non-infantry units.  As an example, the 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment suffered twenty-two 
battle and thirty-nine non-battle casualties during the month of October 1944.  It received 129 
                                                          
37 LAC, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Daily consolidated casualty and 
strength returns.  These are difficult to calculate since they took place over the course of parts of two months. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,295.  29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary October 1944.  T-12767.  31 
October end of month entry.  
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reinforcements during this time, raising its strength to thirty-seven officers and 577 other ranks.  This 
total was 89 percent of its war establishment.39  In reviewing documents on reinforcements allocated to 
armoured regiments, the totals are often large without a corresponding increase in regimental strength 
returns.  This was due to the practice of dispatching personnel belonging to the regiment to the armoured 
delivery squadron for further training or to pick up new tanks.  The personnel would then return to the 
regiment as reinforcements when they had already been part of the regiment previously.40  
 The four RCA regiments combined casualty totals for October 1944 illustrate a reduced casualty 
rate.  All four regiments recorded thirty-six battle and forty-nine non-battle casualties during this month.  
Against these losses, 102 reinforcements had been dispatched, maintaining the strength of these units.41  
The 8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA's strength at the end of the month stood at thirty-five officers 
and 559 other ranks, 1 percent above its new September 1944 war establishment of thirty-four officers 
and 551 other ranks.42  Compared to Normandy, enemy AFV, artillery and aerial activity on the Canadian 
front had dropped off considerably during October and early November 1944.  This change had resulted 
in far fewer battle casualties in the RCA regiments.   
 On 1 November 1944, midway through its Scheldt combat operations, the division reported a 
total "fit" AFV strength of 247 medium and light tanks.43  Returns for 31 October 1944 show the division 
to be over strength in combat A vehicles.44  On this date 839 combat vehicles were on strength against an 
authorized total of 777, placing the division 8 percent over its war establishment.  Any shortages in 
certain vehicles types had been made up by extras in others.  Some shortages in the armoured and RCA 
regiments continued to persist.  Against a war establishment figure of sixty Sherman Vc 17-Pounder 
                                                          
39 LAC, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Daily consolidated casualty and 
strength returns.   
40 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary September 1944.  T-12764. 
41 LAC, RG LAC, Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division  A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-10533.  Daily 
consolidated casualty and strength returns.   
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,609.  8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16761.  31 October 1944 
return.  
43 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary November, 1944.  T-10550.  AFV state for 
1 November 1944.  
44 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G.  Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1) 21st AG.  Reference 
31 October 1944 divisional return for both A and B vehicles.   
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Firefly tanks, only eighteen were on strength.  Seventeen unauthorized Sherman Ic variants, which also 
had the 17-Pounder gun, had been issued to partially fill this shortage.  This addition gave the division a 
total of thirty-nine 17-Pounder equipped tanks, 65 percent of its authorized strength.  A shortage of ARV 
recovery tanks was still present at the end of the month.  Against the war establishment of twelve 
Sherman V ARVs, only eight were on hand.  None of the twenty-seven authorized Sherman V OP tanks 
had been delivered to the RCA field regiments as of 31 October 1944.  Fortunately, seventeen 
unauthorized Ram OP variants had been issued to cover this shortage.  As of the end of the month the 
twenty-four Crusader gun tractor towers that were allocated for the anti-tank regiment still had not been 
issued.  The division had also not received a sizeable quantity of Wasp II flame thrower carriers at this 
point, having only one on strength. 
 With the division constantly advancing and rarely suffering reverses, very few heavy weapons 
were lost in the period of October to early November 1944.  Midway through the Scheldt fighting, the 
division had excessive inventories of heavy weaponry.45  Against an authorized level of 198 heavy 
weapons, 308 were on strength as of 31 October 1944.  These totals indicated a possible change over of 
equipment for the division or an administrative reporting error.  For example, against an authorized total 
of eighty 2-Inch mortars, the infantry regiments contained 142.  Against its authorized war establishment 
of eighteen 6-Pounder anti-tank guns, fifty-one were on strength.   
 All three regiments of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade were re-built following the conclusion 
of the Scheldt fighting, as reflected in their 30 November 1944 strength returns.46  The Algonquin 
Regiment, as an example, contained thirty-eight officers and 787 other ranks at the end of the month.  It 
had received 278 reinforcements during November, raising it to 97 percent of its authorized strength.  The 
other two regiments within the brigade received even more reinforcements, placing them very close to 
their war establishments.  In chart 10.1, the strength returns of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of 
                                                          
45 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). Report for 31 October 
1944.   
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7092.  October 1944 consolidated 
casualty & strength returns. 
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Canada in August and October 1944 reflect the cost of high-intensity offensive operations in these 
months.  Large losses occurred very quickly, often stripping a regiment of a complete company within the 
space of day. 
Chart 10.1: Strength returns for The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (January 1945 
war establishment of 850 total personnel). 47 
 
 Like all formations in the First Canadian Army, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division spent the 
winter of 1944-1945 located in near-static positions.  It held part of the western sector of the Nijmegen 
salient and was subordinated to 1st British Corps.  As of 25 December 1944, it was designated army 
reserve for First Canadian Army and garrisoned at Breda, the Netherlands.  On 26 January 1945 the 10th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade attacked the German harbour bridgehead of Kapelsche Veer on the southern 
bank of the Maas River.48  This limited operation was completed by 30 January 1945 after significant 
infantry casualties due to some temporary reverses.  After this difficult operation, combat for the division 
consisted of patrols and raids, often with armoured and artillery support.  
                                                          
47 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,658-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-7091-7096.  
Consolidated daily casualty and strength returns.   
48 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 450-454. 
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 Combat A vehicle inventories within the division prior to offensive operations in spring 1945 
were satisfactory.49  As of 31 January 1945, the division was over strength in some categories, had 
shortages in others and contained a considerable contingent of unauthorized vehicles.  Returns for this 
date show 741 combat A vehicles on strength, 95 percent of its January 1945 war establishment of 781.  
The non-vehicle weaponry inventories of the division was also satisfactory at this time, the totals 
changing little from their fall 1944 levels.50  During January 1945, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
received a combined total of forty-seven new and repaired M4 75mm Shermans, Firefly 17-Pounders and 
M3 Stuart light tanks.51  This number was more than adequate considering the division had been inactive 
operationally from November 1944 to late January 1945.   
 From August to December 1944, the division had been adequately reinforced with new and 
repaired AFVs via D Squadron of the 25th CADR.  As illustrated in Chart 10.2, the deliveries of new and 
repaired tanks for the division were often equal to a third of new German Panzer IV medium tank 
production.  The Panzer IV was the backbone of Germany’ armoured force in 1944, equipping one out of 
every two battalion panzer regiment in the Germany Army and Waffen SS.  This chart illustrates the 
massive superiority of the Allies in their ability to supply large quantities of new and repaired AFVs to 
front-line units.  
 During the winter the division had received an adequate number of personnel reinforcements.52  
While the armoured and RCA regiments remained near their October 1944 strengths, the infantry 
regiments were at much higher levels as of 31 January 1945.  The reinforcements dispatched not only 
replaced battle losses, but mitigated the ongoing drain of non-battle casualties.  The Lake Superior 
Regiment, taken as an example, lost 146 personnel to non-battle causes in the months November 1944 to 
                                                          
49 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 31 
January 1945 divisional return for A vehicles.   
50 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). Report for 31 January 
1945.   
51 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary January 1945.  T-12748. 
52 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,660-13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries November 1944-January 1945.  T-7093-7094.  
Consolidated strength and casualty returns November 1944-January 1945.  
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Chart 10.2: Canadian Army new & repaired tank (Sherman, Firefly and Stuart) deliveries to the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division (Blue) versus total new monthly industrial production of the German 
Panzer IV medium tank (Red), August-December 194453  
  
January 1945.  The same regiment received 351 reinforcements in this period, bringing its strength up to 
thirty-six officers and 801 other ranks as of 31 January 1945.  The Algonquin Regiment had received 500 
replacements over the winter, giving it a strength of thirty-seven officers and 812 other ranks on the eve 
of combat operations.  The Lincoln and Welland Regiment was also significantly reinforced, receiving a 
total of 672 new and returning personnel.  Despite this total it was still weak at month's end, consisting of 
twenty eight officers and 764 other ranks.  This was the result of recent heavy casualties in the operation 
to clear the port village of Kapelsche Veer in late January 1945.   
 Combat operations for the First Canadian Army in spring 1945 began with participation in 
Operation "Veritable", which was launched on 8 February 1945.  The 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
had no involvement in this operation apart from providing support from its divisional artillery.  This 
advance through the Reichswald Forest between the Maas and Rhine rivers brought the 2nd Canadian 
Corps to the vicinity of the German city of Goch.  Preparations for a continued drive east in 22 February-
                                                          
53 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diaries August-November 1944.  
T-12748.  Thomas Jentz, Panzertruppen Volume 2: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s 
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10 March 1945’s Operation “Blockbuster” saw the division assemble in Cleve, Germany during mid-
February 1945.54  On 26 February 1945 the division attacked east from the town of Wemmershof between 
the lines of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions.  Divided into five battle groups, the division 
successfully attacked the Calcar-Udem ridgeline.55  On 27 February 1945 a further assault to push through 
the Tuschen and Balberger Wald forest areas, south of the larger Hochwald Forest was begun.  The 10th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade was relieved on 1 March 1945 after some limited gains.  Going back into 
action the next day, it continued its drive east.  Only after bitter fighting and slow progress did the 
division reach the Sonsbeck-Xanten Road by 3 March 1945.56  A further advance towards the German 
city of Veen on 6 March 1945 was halted by stiff German resistance.  The division was re-grouped and 
then mounted further assaults which encountered additional resistance.  On 9 March 1945 the town finally 
fell when German forces withdrew.  The following day the infantry of the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
assaulted Winnenthal, successfully capturing the town.   
 The next operational phase for the division was its role as an exploitation force after the success 
of Operation “Plunder”, the 23 March 1945 Anglo-American assault crossing of the Rhine River.  
Operations began on 24 March 1945 with the divisional artillery supporting Canadian forces advancing 
north of the river.  Redeploying north into the British bridgehead over the Rhine at Rees, the division 
prepared to advance into enemy-occupied Netherlands.  This assault began with some elements advancing 
north from Terborg on 1 April 1945.  Further advances from Zelhem, the Netherlands, as the right flank 
of 2nd Canadian Corps resulted in the capture of a bridgehead over the Twente Canal at Delden by 4 April 
1945.57  The Dutch town of Almelo was subsequently liberated by the division the next day after a brief 
period of fighting.  
                                                          
54 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 494. 
55 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 500.   
56 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 241-242. 
57 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 262. 
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 Other parts of the division then advanced north and crossed back into Germany, capturing 
Emlichheim on 5 April 1945.58  German resistance at this point was becoming disorganized.  Meppen and 
a bridgehead over the Ems River was subsequently captured by the division on 6 April 1945.  Attacking 
from the vicinity of Sogel, the town of Friesoythe fell to the division on 14 April 1945.  German 
resistance at Edewechterdamm between 15-17 April 1945 delayed the division's crossing of the Kusten 
Canal.  A bridgehead was eventually secured at the cost of heavy infantry casualties.59  This fighting was 
followed by further serious resistance north of the canal.  Despite this bitter resistance at the end of the 
war, the division continued to achieve its objectives and successfully crossed of the Aue River on 21 
April 1945.  The cease fire on 5 May 1945 found the 4th Canadian Armoured Division sixteen kilometers 
north of Oldenburg, Germany. 
 The losses suffered by the infantry regiments for the period February to April 1945 were not as 
high as in the summer of 1944, but were still considerable.60  The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of 
Canada suffered 398 battle and 205 non-battle casualties during these three months.  The Lincoln and 
Welland Regiment had 512 battle and 222 non-battle casualties during the same period.  The strength of 
each regiment at the end of April reflected that an effective reinforcement system was in place.  With 
newly available stocks of National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) Canadian conscript soldiers 
reaching the division, there were no shortages of personnel.61  The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of 
Canada’s strength as of 30 April 1945 was forty officers and 854 other ranks, 5 percent over its 
authorized strength.  It had received a total of 707 replacements over the last three months.  The Lincoln 
and Welland Regiment had received 808 replacement personnel during this period.  This brought its unit 
strength to thirty-eight officers and 816 other ranks, 100 percent of its war establishment.   
                                                          
58 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 557. 
59 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 560. 
60 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries February-April 1945.  T-7094-7095.  
Consolidated casualty and strength returns. 
61 E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 125. 
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 The RCA regiments suffered very few casualties between February and April.62  Total losses in 
the four regiments within the division were 112 battle and 382 non-battle casualties.  A total of 630 
replacements were dispatched to these regiments during this time.  The field personnel returns of two 
RCA regiments as of 30 April 1945 reflect that each had received an adequate number of reinforcements.  
The 23rd Field Regiment, RCA, fielded thirty-seven officers and 601 other ranks, 98 percent of its 
authorized strength.  The 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA contained thirty-three officers and 680 other 
ranks, 92 percent of its effective strength.   
 The regiments of the armoured brigade and the armoured reconnaissance regiment also suffered 
low levels of casualties in the last three months of war.63  Between February and April 1945, the 28th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment suffered a total of 132 battle and twenty-one non-battle casualties.  The 
29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment had sixty battle and 102 non-battle losses during the 
same period.  These low losses indicate evidence of a reduced enemy anti-tank defence capability.  Also, 
an increased number of Canadian tank crews at this stage were equipped with more effective AFVs than 
had been available in Normandy.  This gave the crews a fighting chance during tank versus tank 
engagements and lowered the number of battle casualties.   
 The strength of the division as of 5 May 1945 was 977 officers and 17,619 other ranks.64  Its 
infantry regiments were all near their authorized strengths.65  During the last three months of the war no 
lack of reinforcements were spared in maintaining these units.  At the end of hostilities The Lake Superior 
(Motor) Regiment contained thirty-four officers and 830 other ranks, 1 percent over its establishment 
strength.  The armoured and RCA regiments personnel strength returns were also very high.  The 21st 
Canadian Armoured Regiment contained thirty-seven officers and 648 other ranks, 100 percent of its 
authorized establishment.  The 5th Anti-tank Regiment, RCA was the weakest of the divisional RCA 
                                                          
62 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary February-April 1945.  T-10551,  
Consolidated casualty and strength states February-April 1945. 
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary February-April 1945.  T-10551,  
Consolidated casualty and strength states February-April 1945. 
64 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division  
65 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
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regiments.  This unit was not a high priority for reinforcements and suffered far lower casualties than the 
infantry regiments.  At the war’s conclusion its strength was thirty-eight officers and 741 other ranks, 92 
percent of its war establishment. 
 The division contained a large number of combat A vehicles on 30 April 1945.66  On this date it 
had 909 combat A vehicles on strength versus its authorized number of 845.  The division was 8 percent 
over strength in this category.  Despite the excessive total number of vehicles, some shortages persisted.  
The number of 17-Pounder Firefly tanks within the division had increased, but still did not match the war 
establishment figures.  Against an authorized strength of ninety-six tanks, only eighty Sherman Ic and Vc 
Fireflies were present.  Unauthorized vehicles on strength included thirteen of the very valuable Wasp II 
tracked flamethrower carriers.  The number of non-vehicle weapons systems within the division was also 
high as of 30 April 1945.67  A total of 277 heavy weapons were on strength versus an authorized total of 
283, 98 percent of the war establishment figure in this category.  
 In summary, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division was adequately re-supplied with both personnel 
and equipment during the majority of its service in NWE, 1944-1945.  The exception to this record with 
regard to personnel were the months of August and September 1944.  The division’s losses shortly after 
its combat debut were heavy and occurred with such speed that a reinforcement effort proved insufficient 
with the resources that were available.  Poor planning by CMHQ London prevented an adequate number 
replacement infantry being set aside to deal with high losses.  These temporary shortages seriously 
weakened the infantry component of the division at a time when it needed all of its combat capability.   
 A successful rebuilding effort coupled with a secondary role during the first two weeks of Scheldt 
Estuary fighting allowed the division to regain its strength.  During this period the division took on 
reinforcements and conducted training to incorporate them in the division.  Adequate numbers of new A 
                                                          
66 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  Reference 30 April 
1945 divisional return for A vehicles.   
67 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). Report for 30 April 
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vehicles and heavy weapons were also received, bringing the inventory levels considerably closer to their 
authorized levels.   
 From mid-October to the beginning of November 1944, improved combined arms tactics and the 
growing weakness of the enemy allowed the division to be continuously successful in its operations.  The 
CAO’s effective personnel and equipment reinforcement processes allowed the division to maintain its 
strength during this period.  When major operations resumed in February 1945, the division had a high 
level of combat capability due to it being well-equipped, well trained, rested and experienced.  During its 
advances in the last two months of the war it captured a very large amount of enemy territory.  While 
excellent training, tactics and operational planning all contributed to success of the division, its military 
effectiveness was dependent on more than these factors.  Its adequate number of personnel and sufficient 
inventories of vehicles and weaponry provided it the tools to defeat the enemy consistently during in its 
operations in NWE. 
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Chapter 11: The 5th Canadian Armoured Division: Major actions, casualties, 
reinforcements and strength returns for its combat arms regiments in North 
West Europe, March-May 1945. 
 
Raised in February 1941 and initially named the 1st Canadian Armoured Division, this formation 
was comprised of units from across Canada.  During the summer of the same year it was renamed the 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division.  After building up its strength by incorporating units of the then still 
forming 4th Canadian Infantry Division, the division deployed to the U.K in the fall of 1941.  It was 
initially organized with two armoured brigades in accordance with the 1941 British armoured division 
organizational structure.  In January 1943 it was re-organized with one infantry brigade and one armoured 
brigade.  The division saw action in Italy as part of the 1st Canadian Corps from January 1944 to early 
January 1945.  Operating with an additional infantry brigade from July 1944 onward, the division in Italy 
had a much different structure than armoured divisions fighting in North West Europe (NWE) at the same 
time.  Ordered to NWE as part of Operation "Goldflake", the division moved by road to Livorno, Italy in 
early February 1945.  It then was transported by ship to Marseille, France and then moved by road and 
rail to Belgium.  The division began to arrive in Belgium in the last days of February 1945.  After re-
organizing itself and being re-equipped as necessary, the division took part in combat operation in NWE 
from 31 March 1945 until the end of hostilities.1 
The two main fighting components of the division were the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade and 
the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade.  The armoured brigade consisted of the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Regiment (Lord Strathcona’s Horse, (Royal Canadians)), the 5th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The 8th 
Princess Louise’ (New Brunswick) Hussars), and the 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The British 
Columbia Dragoons).  The mechanized infantry component of the brigade was The Westminster 
Regiment (Motor).   
                                                          
1 "Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Report No.181.  Operation "Goldflake", the move of the 1 Cdn Corps 
from Italy to North-West Europe, February-March 1945.", Canadian Forces Personnel Headquarters.  Retrieved 2 March 2016 
from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq181.pdf 
214 
 
The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade contained The Perth Regiment, The Irish Regiment of Canada 
and The Cape Breton Highlanders.  The 11th Independent Machine Gun Company (The Princess Louise 
Fusiliers) was available to provide support of the infantry regiments.  Unlike an infantry division, the 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division did not possess a Machine Gun battalion.  Divisional reconnaissance was 
provided by a fourth armoured regiment, the 3rd Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The 
Governor General's Horse Guards).  The two Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) field artillery regiments 
within the division were the 17th Field Regiment, RCA and the 8th Field Regiment (Self-Propelled), RCA.  
Anti-tank and anti-aircraft assets were provided by the 5th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA and the 4th 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA. 
 Organizational war establishment tables for the division’s combat arms regiments are present in 
Appendix 1.  Detailed tables on regimental strengths, casualties, reinforcements as well as divisional 
equipment and vehicle strengths for units discussed in this chapter are provided in Appendix 6.  This 
information is provided for each of the divisional regiments during the April-May 1945 period with some 
exceptions.  There is a significant lack daily data for the divisional RCA regiments in the period of 22 
April to 5 May 1945.  Weekly strength returns are present for the period 22 April to 5 May, but data on 
reinforcements and daily casualties per regiment is incomplete.  Daily records are available for each RCA 
unit in the period 1 to 21 April 1945.  
On arrival in NWE in the last days of February 1945, the division was ordered to conform to 21st 
Army Group staff tables of organization for a Canadian armoured division.  These staff tables only 
allowed for one infantry brigade, and the division had been allocated two during its service in Italy.  As a 
result, the division`s 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade was disbanded and its units were re-distributed.2  The 
Lanark & Renfrew Scottish Regiment reverted to its original role and title as a 1st Canadian Corps level 
asset, the 1st Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA.  The Westminster Regiment (Motor) re-joined the 5th 
                                                          
2 "5th Canadian Armoured Division", Canadiansoldiers.com, retrieved on 20 February 2016 from 
http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/casf/5thdivision.htm. 
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Canadian Armoured Brigade as its motor battalion.  The 4th Princess Louise`s Dragoon Guards reverted 
back to its original title, the 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (The 4th Princess Louise`s Dragoon 
Guards).  This unit then rejoined its original formation, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.  Like the 1st 
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, it had to conduct training and be re-equipped to resume its previous 
role.  While this re-organization was taking place with these units, the remainder of the division continued 
the process of re-equipping and accepting new personnel reinforcements.   
As of 4 April 1945, the division’s personnel strength on its third day of combat operations in the 
Netherlands was 750 officers and 19,659 other ranks.3  At this point the division had additional units 
temporarily attached and it was 40 percent over the establishment strength of a January 1945 Canadian 
armoured division.4  At the end of March 1945 all combat arms regiments within the division had high 
personnel levels.  The 2nd Canadian Armoured Regiment's strength stood at thirty-eight officers and 679 
other ranks, 99 percent of its wartime establishment.  The 3rd Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance 
Regiment on the same date had a strength of thirty-eight officers and 644 other ranks, 99 percent of its 
authorized strength.5  Units in the infantry brigades also had satisfactory strength levels, and had 
benefitted from an influx of available National Resource Mobilization Act (NRMA) conscript 
reinforcements.  The Perth Regiment contained thirty-eight officers and 821 other ranks as of 31 March 
1945, and was 1 percent over strength.6  On the same date The Irish Regiment of Canada had a similar 
return of thirty-seven officers and 822 other ranks, making it also 1 percent over strength.  The RCA field 
artillery regiments of the division were both very strong.  As of 31 March 1945, the 17th Field Regiment, 
RCA contained thirty-eight officers and 625 other ranks, 98 percent of its authorized strength.7  The other 
three RCA regiments had similar returns which were close to their authorized strengths. 
                                                          
3 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-1862.  Divisional strength return 4 April 
1945.  The division at this point had the 7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA and 15 Anti-Tank Battery, RCA under command.  
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Staff Tables organization for 
a standard Canadian Armoured Division in January 1945.    
5 LAC, RG Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps War Diary March 1945.  T-1862.  30 March 1945 return. 
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,663.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
7 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian  Corps A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-1862.  31 March 1945 RCA return.   
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The re-equipment process of the division was still only just complete as of 31 March 1945, and 
the Canadian Army's A and B vehicles situation report at the end of the month did not contain the 
division’s returns.  However, the non-AFV equipment report of 31 March 1945 did contain the division`s 
returns, and the totals reflect adequate inventory levels of heavy weapons, these being 5 percent over the 
authorized amounts.8  As part of its re-equipment, the division received deliveries of new and repaired 
AFVs through the months of March, April and May 1945.  Chart 11.1 displays the number of battle tanks 
that were delivered to the division in this period versus corresponding Panther tank deliveries to the entire 
German military.  The disparity in figures within the chart is not large, illustrating the superiority of 
Allied vehicle replacement system.  It also should be noted that the division was not committed against 
any sizeable formation of German armour during its time in NWE, and never suffered heavy AFV losses.  
The first operational task of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division on 31 March 1945 was to 
relieve the 49th British Infantry Division in its positions in the Oosterhout bridgehead over the Waal 
River.  This bridgehead over the Waal was within a rectangle of land south of the Neder Rijn River.  
Enclosed by waterways and flooded areas, it formed an “Island”.  Beginning offensive operations on 2 
April 1945, the division pushed north in cooperation with the British to clear the “Island” area and reach 
the Neder Rijn River.  By 3 April 1945, the area was cleared with relatively low casualties.9  On 15 April 
1945 the division advanced from the British bridgehead over the Neder Rijn at Arnhem and attacked west 
on the left flank of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division.  In quick succession the towns of Deelen and 
Otterloo were liberated by the division on the same day.  These victories were followed by the liberation 
of Voorthuizen, Putten and Ermelo by 18 April 1945.   
Casualties in these operations over the 1-21 April 1945 period were light and mainly concentrated 
in the infantry and armoured regiments.  Adequate reinforcements were dispatched to replace any losses 
that had occurred.  The 22 April 1945 strength return for The Irish Regiment of Canada reported 
                                                          
8 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  31 March 1945 return. 
9 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 567-568. 
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Chart 11.1: Delivery of heavy AFVs by G Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment 
to the 5th Canadian Armoured Division versus total monthly delivery of new Panther tanks to all 
German armoured units, March-May 194510 
 
 thirty-six officers and 824 other ranks within the regiment, 1 percent over its establishment strength.  The 
RCA regiments had also suffered little in this phase of operations.  RCA casualties had totalled four battle 
and eighty-eight non-battle during the division's drive into the central Netherlands.  Reinforcements 
dispatched to RCA units in this period totalled 129.11   
 Operations by 1st Canadian Corps to continue liberating the area west of Utrecht, the Netherlands, 
ceased on 19 April 1945.  A negotiated agreement with the German occupation forces had allowed for 
food supplies to be delivered to the starving Dutch population.  The German occupation forces allowed 
these shipments on the condition the Allied advance cease at the Grebbe River line.  The 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division relieved the 5th Canadian Armoured Division on this demarcation line and the latter 
prepared for redeployment east to the Gronigen area of the Netherlands.   
                                                          
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,280.  G Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary March-May 1945.  T-
1275.  Martin Block, “Panther allocation sorted by date of allotment”, Panther1944.de .  Retrieved February 2016 from 
http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/en/ 
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Entries for the 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division abruptly stop as of 21 April 1945.   
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 On 21 April 1945 the division began its move to the eastern part of the Netherlands.  On its 
arrival near the German border it relieved the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division outside the German occupied 
port of Delfzijl.  The division’s assigned task was to clear the port in cooperation with 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division operations across the border against Emden, Germany.  From 23 April to 2 May 1945, 
elements of the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade and the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade assaulted the port 
from the north and south, encountering stiff resistance.12  With the surrender of German forces in the port 
area on 2 May 1945, combat operations for the division ended and the cease fire came into effect three 
days later. 
The 5th Canadian Armoured Division's regiments had adequate personnel levels at the end of 
hostilities.  Its strength return for 5 May 1945 was 784 officers and 14,188 other ranks.13  During its short 
phase of combat it was sufficiently resupplied with personnel to keep the majority of its combat arms 
regiments above 90 percent of their war establishments.  During the March-May 1945 period an adequate 
number of reinforcements were available due to large numbers of NRMA personnel arriving in Europe.  
As illustrated in Chart 11.2, the four infantry regiments were slightly weakened by combat but remained 
over or very close to 800 personnel mark.  This was a satisfactory figure for an infantry battalion engaged 
in operations. 
The infantry had suffered the brunt of battle and non-battle casualties for the period of time the 
division was in combat.  The regiment that suffered the highest losses within the infantry brigade was The 
Perth Regiment, with eighty-five battle and fifty-three non-battle casualties for a total of 138.  It had 
received sixty-five replacements during April and May 1945, bringing its strength up to thirty-two 
officers and 767 other ranks.  This figure was 6 percent under its authorized strength.  The regiments of 
the armoured brigade and the armoured reconnaissance regiment had suffered considerably less losses in  
                                                          
12 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 282. 
13 LAC. RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  Consolidated casualty and strength 
return 5 May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  The 
January 1945 war establishment of a Canadian Armoured Division was 744 officers and 13,879 other ranks.. 
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Chart 11.2: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s infantry regiment strengths pre and post combat 
operations, 31 March 1945 versus 5 May 1945.14  
the same period.  The 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment had twenty-two battle and twenty-six non-battle 
casualties, for a total of forty-eight personnel.  In this period it received forty-seven replacements to bring 
its strength up to thirty-six officers and 635 other ranks as of 5 May 1945, 97 percent of its war 
establishment.  RCA casualties had been very low for the period of combat operations.  The 8th Field 
Regiment (SP), RCA`s return on 5 May 1945 shows thirty-nine officers and 584 other ranks on strength.  
In the period of operations from 1 to 21 April 1945 the regiment suffered seven battle and twenty-seven 
non-battle casualties.   
 The 5th Canadian Armoured Division`s returns are present on the A vehicle returns of the First 
Canadian Army for 30 April 1945.  It contained 849 combat A vehicles versus its authorized level of 927, 
91 percent of its establishment strength in this category.  A majority of this shortage was due to eighty-
three T-16 gun tractors and Universal tracked carriers that had not been issued.  The infantry and anti-tank 
regiments were making do with trucks instead and suffered no lack of combat capability during their 
                                                          
14 LAC RG 24 Volumes 13,663-13-665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries March-May 1945.  T-7094-7096.  31 March 
and 5 May 1945 returns.  
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dismounted operations.  The division did contain 289 Sherman, Firefly and M5 Stuart battle tanks against 
a war establishment figure of 261, placing it 11 percent over strength in this category.15  Unauthorized 
combat A vehicles held by the division at the end of April included two types of powerful flamethrower 
AFVs.  These were six Ram Badger flame throwing tanks and twelve Wasp II tracked flame thrower 
carriers.16  Non-vehicle heavy weapon returns for the division as of 30 April 1945 were just as strong as 
the previous 31 March 1945 returns.  The only shortage present was in the category of .303 Vickers 
Medium Machine Guns, which were thirteen short of their authorized number.17 
 In conclusion, the 5th Canadian Infantry Division was well supplied with both personnel and 
equipment during its brief phase of combat operations in NWE.  The division did face a challenging re-
organization and re-equipment process on arrival in the Netherlands, but carried these tasks out in a 
reasonable amount of time.  All its regiments had satisfactory personnel levels, and reinforcements were 
rapidly fed into its regiments to counter any shortage due to battle or non-battle losses.  Once it was 
deemed operational, the division performed well in combat operations against an enemy that was 
disintegrating.  During its combat deployment in April and May 1945, the division liberated large 
portions of territory throughout the eastern Netherlands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945 
report..   
16 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945 
report..   
17 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  5th Canadian Armoured 
Division 30 April 1945 return. 
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Chapter 12: The 1st & 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades:  
Major actions, casualties, reinforcements and strength returns for 
its combat arms regiments in North West Europe, June 1944-May 1945
 
 The 1st and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades were independent armoured formations consisting 
of three armoured regiments each.  While the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade served only briefly in North 
West Europe (NWE), units of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade landed on D-Day and fought until the 
end of hostilities.  The latter brigade continuously supported the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions as 
well as British Army formations in operations stretching from Normandy to Germany.  With supporting 
infantry and artillery units attached to it, the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade carried out successful 
operations during its brief operational period in the Netherlands during April 1945. 
 Organizational war establishment tables for the brigade's armoured regiments are present in 
Appendix 1.  All statistics on the six armoured regiments studied within this chapter are found in 
Appendix 7.  These include monthly battle and non-battle casualties, reinforcements and monthly field 
returns of officers and other ranks.  Following these tables, detailed vehicle and equipment charts report 
monthly armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) strength returns and delivery records for new and repaired 
AFVs.  
 Raised in 1941, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade was originally one of two armoured 
brigades that formed part of the 1st Canadian Armoured Division.  This division was subsequently 
renamed the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and deployed to the U.K. in the fall of 1941.  One of its 
three armoured regiments, The Calgary Regiment, participated in the disastrous Dieppe Raid of August 
1942.  Following a re-organization of the division in early 1943, the brigade became an independent 
formation.  In its new role its regiments were to provide support to infantry brigades in battle.  Following 
a further training period in the U.K., the brigade took part in the Sicilian campaign of July and August 
1943.  Near the conclusion of this campaign the brigade was renamed the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade.  
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Further service in Italy continued until January 1945, with the brigade successfully supporting several 
different Allied formations in multiple operations.1 
 When the brigade was given its new title in August 1943, its regiments were renamed the 11th, 
12th and 14th Canadian Armoured Regiments on top of the regimental titles already present.  At this point 
the brigade consisted of a headquarters squadron, the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three 
Rivers Regiment), the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Ontario Regiment) and the 14th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment ( The Calgary Regiment).  Like all Canadian armoured brigades, it had also had a 
Corps of Royal Canadian Mechanical and Electrical Engineer (RCEME) 2nd line armoured brigade 
workshop attached.2 
 In mid February 1945 the brigade was redeployed to Belgium with the rest of the 1st Canadian 
Corps as part of Operation "Goldflake".  Utilizing a route similar to the one used by the 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, the brigade arrived in Belgium during mid 
March 1945.3  Throughout the month of March and early April 1945, its regiments were re-equipped with 
new vehicles and reinforced with new personnel.  The brigade’s return was not included in the 31 March 
1945 A & B vehicle position report for the First Canadian Army as its re-fitting process was still 
incomplete.4  Regimental personnel field returns were recorded in the war diaries however, and these 
reflected adequate strengths on the eve of combat operations.  As an example, the 11th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment on 31 March 1945 contained thirty-nine officers and 644 other ranks, 99 percent of 
its authorized strength.5 
                                                          
1 "1st Canadian Armoured Brigade" article. Canadiansoldiers.com.  Retrieved on 5 February 2016 
from.http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/1stcanadianarmouredbrigade.htm 
2 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F Canadian Army in NWE order of battle.  Supporting the 1st Canadian 
Armoured Brigade in its operations was the RCEME 1st Armoured Brigade workshop.  Supporting the 1st Canadian Armoured 
Brigade in the tank delivery role was A Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment..   
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 529.  "Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Report No.181.  Operation 
"Goldflake", the move of the 1 Cdn Corps from Italy to North-West Europe, February-March 1945." Canadian Forces Personnel 
Headquarters.  Retrieved 2 March 2016 from http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq181.pdf 
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 March 1945 
return. 
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,240.  11th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary March 1945.  T-12705.  31 March 1945 return.  
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 Once the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade was declared operational in early April 1945, it was 
deployed along the Waal River.6  With Belgian and British units attached to it, the brigade held this line 
while other 1st Canadian Corps units cleared the water enclosed "Island" area south of the Neder Rijn 
River during Operation “Destroyer”, which took place on 2-3 April 1945.  Once this area was cleared, 
attacking Anglo-Canadian units captured a bridgehead at Arnhem and pushed north of the city.  The 11th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment participated in these operations by supporting units of the 49th British 
Infantry Division.  To facilitate the 5th Canadian Armoured Division's movement to the north of the Neder 
Rijn River, the brigade took over its positions in the "Island” in mid April.  During this phase it also 
conducted some successful minor operations with Belgian forces.  Hostilities would end with the brigade 
continuing to hold positions on the Waal River and north of it near Opheusden. 
 Casualties and equipment losses to the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade during its period of 
operations from 1 to 19 April 1945 had been extremely light.  In April and May 1945, total personnel 
losses within the regiments were eleven battle and thirty-seven non-battle casualties.7  These figures are 
small compared to the losses within some armoured regiments during the summer of 1944.  In accordance 
with the artillery based doctrine, the regiment's squadrons were parcelled off to support British and 
Belgian infantry operations.  In this supporting role AFV losses were light and any missing vehicles and 
equipment were quickly replaced.  In its brief period of operations the brigade’s regiments performed well 
against light opposition.  
 Though the regiments had begun operations in early April 1945, they were still receiving new 
combat A vehicles to bring them up to strength at the end of the month.  The three regiments in the 
brigade received a total of sixty new Firefly 17-Pounder variants in March 1945 and a further thirty-six 
battle tanks of various types in April.8  The brigade did not operate any non A vehicle heavy weapons due 
                                                          
6 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 529. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April 1945.  T-7095.  Consolidated daily casualty & 
strength returns.  
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,269.  A Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary March-April 1945.  T-
12737.  
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to all three of its regiments being armoured.  As of 30 April 1945, the brigade contained 200 battle tanks 
against its war establishment total of 226, 88 percent of its authorized strength.9  During its time in NWE, 
the brigade had not been required to fight any major tank battles, nor did its regiments regularly face a 
well-equipped enemy offering stiff resistance.   
 Any casualties that occurred within the brigade during April and May 1945 were quickly 
replaced.  During the course of the April and May 1945, eighty-three reinforcement personnel joined the 
three regiments.10  These regiments were all over strength in personnel at the end of hostilities.  As an 
example, the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment contained forty-five officers and 686 other ranks as of 5 
May 1945, 6 percent over strength.11    
 Landing on D-Day, the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade faced some of the most difficult fighting 
of the war during the Normandy Campaign.  Raised in January 1942, the 2nd Canadian Army Tank 
Brigade was established with units that were formerly part of the 4th Canadian Infantry Division.  At this 
point this division was then re-organizing itself as an armoured division, and had to shed excess units.  
Deployed to the U.K. in July 1943, it was re-named the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade shortly after its 
arrival.  Already present in the U.K. was the 3rd Canadian Army Tank Brigade, also an independent 
formation.  Concerned about the Canadian Army Overseas' (CAO) ability to sustain a third independent 
armoured brigade, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) London broke up the original three 
regiments of the 2nd Canadian Army tank Brigade for reinforcements.  The more experienced three 
regiments from the former 3rd Canadian Army Tank Brigade took their place.  From the fall of 1943 to 
spring 1944, the brigade would conduct training exercises for its upcoming amphibious role in Operation 
"Overlord".   
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945 
return. 
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096. 
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
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 As of spring 1944, the brigade consisted of a headquarters squadron and three armoured 
regiments.  These were the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The 1st Hussars), the 10th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse) and the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke 
Fusiliers).  Structured similarly to the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, the brigade also had its own 
armoured brigade workshop.12   
 AFV and personnel strengths within the brigade were satisfactory on the eve of Operation 
"Overlord".  The brigade was 23 percent over strength in AFVs, with 245 tanks on hand versus its 
authorized number of 199.13  Personnel returns for the regiments were also adequate prior to the invasion 
of the continent.  The 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment's field return of 3 June 1944 reported a strength 
of thirty-six officers and 665 other ranks, 2 percent over strength..14    
 On 6 June 1944, D-Day, elements of the brigade successfully assaulted Juno beach and drove 
inland.  Further bridgehead battles with German armoured battle groups led to heavy casualties in the 
month of June.  From 6 to 30 June 1944, battle casualties totalled 331 personnel.15  During this phase the 
brigade's three regiments were instrumental in providing armoured support to defend the bridgehead.  
This success was tempered by two significant reverses on 7 and 11 June 1944, when the regiments 
attempted to take a more forward role in offensive operations.  An operational pause in late June and early 
July 1944 allowed the regiments to receive new tanks, train and to take on reinforcements.   
 The month of July 1944 was a period of intense operations in Normandy for the brigade.  During 
this time its regiments supported both Canadian infantry divisions in their offensive operations against 
German positions.  Operations "Windsor" and "Charnwood" saw the armoured regiments support the 
eventual capture of Carpiquet airfield and the city of Caen.  Late July's Operations "Atlantic" and 
                                                          
12 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F Canadian Army in NWE order of battle.  Supporting the 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade in its operations was the RCEME 2nd Armoured Brigade Workshop.     
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 May 1944 
return. 
14 LAC, RG 254 Volume 14,233.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12697.  3 June 1944 return. 
15 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,517.  Canadian Army Casualties.  File 215A21.009. (D167).  Battle casualties 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade 6-30 June 1944. 
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"Spring" were only partial successes as the armoured regiments struggled against strong German 
positions on Verrieres Ridge.  All these operations involved costly tank engagements that resulted in large 
Canadian tank and crew losses.  As the 31 July 1944, all three regiments had been brought back up to 
strength in battle tanks, but were short of personnel.   
 The 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment's (25th CADR) C Squadron effectively carried 
out its role of re-supplying the brigade with new and repaired AFVs during the summer of 1944.  During 
June and July, the brigade received a total of 129 new and repaired battle tanks from this squadron.16  
Returns for 31 July 1944 show 295 battle tanks on strength versus its authorized total of 199, the brigade 
being 48 percent over strength in this category.17  As shown in Charts 12.1 and 12.2, the brigade's AFV 
strength remained high while a comparable German unit's strength dwindled, it being starved of new 
panzers and forced to repair damaged ones near the front lines.  It is important to note that Chart 12.1 
reflects only operational Canadian tanks.  There were others on strength that were repairable within one to 
two days by the light aid detachment in each regiment.   
 Due the intensity of combat, personnel losses had occurred very rapidly in July 1944.  The 
regiments were still combat effective, but not near their establishment strengths in personnel.  For 
example, the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment had been reduced to thirty-eight officers and 522 other 
ranks, 81 percent of its authorized strength.  The 25th CADR reinforcement organization would rectify 
these losses, but this process would take time.  Due to the losses sustained in ongoing operations, it was 
difficult to bring the regiments up to strength.  These personnel deficits would only be rectified in the fall 
of 1944 when the number of the armoured engagements receded.   
 Operation "Totalize", launched by the First Canadian Army in early August 1944, sought to break 
through German positions and advance south to Falaise.  It was only partially successful in achieving 
these goals.  This was followed by Operation "Tractable" in mid-August 1944, which sought to finally 
                                                          
16 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,276.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12747.  
17 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 July 1944 
return. 
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Chart 12.1: 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade operational Sherman, Firefly and Stuart tank 
strength in its three regiments, June-August 194418 
 
Chart 12.2: German operational Panther and Panzer IV tank strength returns for the two 
battalions of Panzer Regiment 3 in June-August 194419 
 
reach these objectives.  In each of these operations the brigade supported the dismounted infantry units of 
the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions.  Following these operations the regiments took an active role 
in the eventual capture of Falaise and the encirclement of the trapped German forces.  Large tank losses 
                                                          
18 Roman Jarymowycz,  “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign”, 336-338.  Appendix E, 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade tank states June-August 1944. 
19 Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 315.   
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occurred within the brigade during these final operations of the Normandy Campaign.  Due to a 
successful repair and replacement program, adequate tank strengths within the regiments were 
maintained.  As of 31 August 1944, the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade contained 265 tanks on strength 
in comparison to its war establishment figure of 199.  This return placed the brigade 33 percent over its 
authorized strength in this category.  As reflected by the smaller figures in Chart 12.1, not all of these 
tanks were operational, and many were being repaired by the light aid detachments or part of the 
armoured brigade headquarters squadron.  Many tanks were lost to mechanical breakdown in late August 
1944 during the rapid advances across northern France.  During this month the brigade received seventy-
three new and repaired AFVs to maintain its strength.   
 Following the conclusion of the Falaise Gap battles in late August, the 2nd Canadian Armoured 
Brigade rapidly advanced towards the Belgian border.  Operating with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 
its regiments crossed the Seine River and continued to pursue the enemy along the coast.  In early 
September this rapid advance brought Canadian forces into contact with German garrisons in French 
channel ports.  During these operations individual armoured squadrons supported infantry regiments as 
they steadily reduced these challenging fortifications.  September 1944 was not a period of intense 
armoured warfare, and the brigade's regiments accepted personnel reinforcements and new tanks without 
offsetting losses.  The three regiments took receipt of forty-four replacement battle tanks during this 
month to bring them back up to near their war establishment figures.20   
 The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade had a limited role in the Scheldt fighting of October 1944 
due to the terrain being flooded and criss-crossed with canals and dikes.  An armoured squadron would be 
parcelled off to support a battalion for a limited amount of time, then be assigned to another.  Tank and 
crew casualties were considerably lighter in this period as operations were infantry orientated.  The 
regiments lost at total of ninety-five personnel as battle casualties during this month.  A total of seventy-
                                                          
20 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,276-14,277.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary September 1944.  
T-12747-12748  
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two non-battle casualties were suffered in the same time period, illustrating the constant drain on the 
regiments even when they were not involved in combat operations.21   
 The inventories of Sherman, Firefly and Stuart tanks within the brigade were slightly weaker as 
of 31 October 1944.  The brigade had not lost many tanks during this month, but a number may have been 
in workshops due to the wear and tear involved in crossing northern France and parts of Belgium.  
Sherman, Firefly and Stuart holdings at this point stood at 161 compared to a new October war 
establishment figure of 226.  This was 71 percent of the authorized establishment.  More Firefly 17-
Pounders were to the available to the Commonwealth armies in fall 1944, and the total number within the 
brigade had grown to thirty-five by month's end.22   
 In the fall and winter period of 1944-1945 the regiments accepted personnel reinforcements as 
well as more advanced armoured vehicles.  As a result all three regiments had satisfactory personnel 
levels and sufficient quantities of new and repaired battle tanks at the end of January 1945.  The 27th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment during the three month period of November 1944 to January 1945 received 
350 personnel reinforcements.23  During the same time period the three regiments of the brigade received 
136 new and repaired Sherman, Firefly and Stuart tanks.24  
 In the spring of 1945 the brigade played a large role in supporting infantry operations during 
Operation "Veritable", the advance through the Rhineland.  This fighting was followed up by 
participation in late February and early March's Operation "Blockbuster".  In these battles the armoured 
regiments drove east through the forested areas between the Rhine and Maas Rivers, supporting battalion-
level infantry operations.  This fighting was challenging as the armoured squadrons had little room to 
maneuver.  These engagements brought some of the last armoured encounters of the war for the brigade, 
                                                          
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Consolidated daily casualty and 
strength returns.  
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  31 October 1944 
return. 
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,660-13,662.  First Canadian Army War Diary November 1944-January 1945.  T-7093-7094. 
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary November 1944-January 
1945.  T-12748  
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and it managed to inflict heavy losses on German armour.  A large number of Firefly 17-Pounder tanks 
were in action during this fighting, and this well-armed tank was effective against German armour.  The 
regiments suffered a total of 121 battle and 230 non-battle personnel casualties in the months of February 
and March 1945.25   
 Following these difficult battles in the Rhineland, during April and May 1945 the brigade 
supported units of the 2nd Canadian Corps as they drove northward across the Rhine into northern Holland 
and Germany.  These final operations of the war were mounted against disintegrating German opposition 
and casualties were lower than in previous operations.  The combined personnel losses of all three 
armoured regiments during this thirty-five day period totalled eighty-six battle casualties and 102 non-
battle losses.26  The regiments were reinforced with 282 replacements during this period, allowing them to 
remain very close to their war establishment strengths.  As an example, the 27th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment's strength on 5 May 1945 was thirty-five officers and 630 other ranks.27  These figures placed it 
at 97 percent of its authorized strength at the end of hostilities. 
 Sherman, Firefly and Stuart strength within the brigade as of 30 April 1945 amounted to 227 
vehicles against a war establishment total of 226.  This total placed the brigade at just over 100 percent of 
its authorized strength .28  These returns illustrate the constant effort that had gone into reinforcing the 
brigade in order to offset the constant drain of AFVs lost to enemy action and mechanical failure.  The 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade's three regiments ended the war in Northern Germany, supporting the 2nd 
Canadian Corps' last infantry operations of the war.   
 All six armoured regiments of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades adequately supported 
infantry operations in NWE during their service within this theatre.  During this time Canadian armoured 
                                                          
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February-March 1945.  T-7094.  Consolidated daily 
casualty & strength returns. 
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.   
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945 
return. 
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tactics evolved.  The armour squadron became an integral part of the combined arms team rather than the 
foremost echelon of the attack.  Battalion level infantry attacks were adequately supported by tank 
firepower.  In this way vehicle and tank crew losses were reduced, the infantry was adequately supported 
and the squadrons preserved their strength to fight off the inevitable German counter attack.  
 Both independent armoured brigades were constantly reinforced with new and repaired AFVs 
while they were in the field.  Sufficient reserves of replacement tanks and adequate recovery, repair and 
delivery systems allowed the regiments to maintain adequate tank strengths.  Personnel levels in the 
armoured units were rarely an issue.  Unlike the infantry, there was never a serious deficiency in the 
number of Canadian Armoured Corps reinforcement personnel.   
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Chapter 13: First Canadian Army, 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps troops: Major 
actions, casualties, reinforcements and strength returns for these combat arms 
regiments in North West Europe, June 1944-May 1945
 The First Canadian Army headquarters was formed in April 1942 due to the number of Canadian 
divisions in the U.K. reaching the strength of two corps.  It became operational in Normandy on 31 July 
1944 and the army’s commander for the duration of the campaign in North West Europe (NWE) was 
General H.D.G. Crerar.  The 2nd Canadian Corps headquarters was established in the U.K. in January 
1943 in order to command excess Canadian formations not controlled by 1st Canadian Corps, then 
destined for the Mediterranean.  On becoming active in Normandy during the first week of July 1944, its 
commander for the balance of the campaign in NWE was Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds.  The 1st 
Canadian Corps headquarters was transferred back to NWE  from the Italian front in early 1945.  It was 
operational for the final April-May 1945 phase of fighting and the corps commander was Lieutenant-
General Charles Foulkes.1   
 Corps and army level combat arms units under the command of the headquarters of the First 
Canadian Army and the 1st and 2nd  Canadian Corps were independent from Canadian divisions and 
independent brigades.  These units were made available to corps and divisional commanders so that 
commanders at those levels could have additional assets available to use at their discretion.  These units 
could increase the combat power of a division during offensive operations or could strengthen its 
defensive front.  The vast majority of these units were part of the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), and 
their indirect firepower was utilized to help implement the artillery based doctrine of the Canadian Army 
in the late war period.   
 Organizational war establishment tables for army level and corps level combat arms regiments 
are present in Appendix 1.  All statistics on the sixteen regiments featured in this chapter are found in 
Appendix 8.  Regimental data tables feature monthly battle and non-battle casualties, reinforcements and 
field returns for officers and other ranks.  Due to some casualty and reinforcement data for the RCA 
                                                          
1 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 663.  Appendix G.  Officers holding principal appointments.  
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regiments being incomplete, full data tables are present for only some regiments.  Following these tables, 
detailed vehicle and equipment charts present combat A vehicle and heavy weapons strength returns and 
delivery records for new and repaired heavy armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs).  
 The First Canadian Army in the last month of hostilities employed multiple battalion sized army 
level and corps level units.  As of April 1945, both the 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps contained one each of 
the of the following corps level units: One light anti-aircraft (LAA) regiment, one anti-tank regiment, one 
artillery survey regiment and an armoured car regiment.2  Army level units were allocated to corps 
commanders as needed, but these commanders did not have the luxury of controlling them permanently.  
These army level units consisted of six medium and two army field artillery regiments, divided evenly 
into two Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) formations.  These AGRAs were numbered the 1st and 2nd 
Canadian AGRA respectively.  The 2nd Canadian AGRA was placed in support of 2nd Canadian Corps 
operations in NWE from July 1944 onward.3  The 1st Canadian AGRA units spent the majority of their 
existence in support of 1st Canadian Corps operations in Italy.  Redeployed to NWE with the 1st Canadian 
Corps, the 1st Canadian AGRA units participated in operations during April and May 1945. 
 The four corps-level units belonging to the 1st Canadian Corps were the 1st Canadian Armoured 
Car Regiment (The Royal Canadian Dragoons), the 7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, the 1st Light Anti-
Aircraft Regiment, RCA and the 1st Survey Regiment, RCA.  These units had all arrived in NWE between 
February and March 1945 as part of Operation “Goldflake”.  Their travel route to Belgium was exactly 
the same as the other regiments of the 1st Canadian Corps.  On their arrival in Belgium they had began the 
process of re-equipping, integrating new replacements and re-organizing their regimental structures to fit 
21st Army Group standards.  They were for the most part combat ready at the beginning of April 1945.  
The one exception to this was the 1st Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, which had been re-
organized during its time in Italy as an infantry unit, The Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment of the 
                                                          
2 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F Canadian Army in NWE order of battle. 
3 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F Canadian Army in NWE order of battle.  G.W.L. Nicholson, The 
Gunners of Canada Volume II, 647 Appendix C..  RCA order of battle.   
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12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.4  It was not needed in this role on its arrival in Belgium, and began a re-
organization and re-training program to turn it back into a LAA unit.  It spent the months of April and 
May 1945 involved in this process, and would not see action in NWE.     
 All four 1st Canadian Corps level units as of 1 April 1945 contained adequate personnel levels on 
the eve of operations in the Netherlands and Germany.  As an example, the 1st Canadian Survey 
Regiment, RCA contained thirty-one officers and 546 other ranks, 92 percent of its war establishment.  
The inventories of heavy weapons and combat A vehicles for these four units were satisfactory.  The 7th 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA contained 100 percent of its war establishment of 17-Pounder anti-tank guns 
and M-10 17-Pounder self-propelled (SP) tank destroyers as of 31 March 1945.5   
 Two of the four corps units went on to be involved in 1st Canadian Corps operations on the Ijssel 
River area near Arnhem in April 1945.  The 7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA supported 1st Canadian 
Armoured Brigade operations south of the Neder Rijn River, south of Arnhem.  Some of its batteries took 
on an infantry role while its self-propelled elements supported the advance of various Canadian units to 
the north and west.6  The 1st Survey Regiment, RCA, in its artillery surveying, flash-spotting, calibration 
and sound ranging role supported all RCA regiments within the Ijssel River area of operations.7  
Operations for these two units came to a halt on 19 April 1945 with the temporary truce between German 
and Anglo-Canadian forces on the Grebbe Line.  This cease fire agreement allowed relief supplies to 
reach the Dutch civilians.   
 The 1st Canadian Armoured Car Regiment, in its role as a reconnaissance spearhead during April 
and May 1945, was placed under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps.  In its advance from the Rhine 
River to the Friesland region in the northern Netherlands, it covered large distances in a short amount of 
time against disintegrating opposition.  Operating in late April and early May 1945 with units of the 2nd 
                                                          
4 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada Volume II, 214-215.   
5 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC, RG24 Volume 
10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).   
6 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada Volume II, 430. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,646.  1st Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-17262.   
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Canadian Armoured Brigade and 4th Canadian Armoured Division, it advanced from the Kusten Canal 
north to Westerstede, Germany by the end of hostilities.8  During their period of operations, all three 1st 
Canadian Corps regiments performed to a satisfactory standard in their battlefield roles.   
  At the end of hostiles the 1st Canadian Corps level regiments continued to contain adequate 
personnel levels.  All three operational regiments had received enough replacements to keep them combat 
effective during this final phase of fighting in the Netherlands and northern Germany.  On 5 May 1945, 
the 1st Canadian Armoured Car Regiment contained eighty-one officers and 823 other ranks, making it 5 
percent over strength.9  During the month of April 1945 this regiment had received nineteen replacements 
and had recorded fourteen battle and thirteen non-battle casualties.10   
 Authorized equipment and vehicle levels were satisfactory for all 1st Canadian Corps level units 
near the end of hostilities.  Even the 1st  Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA which was in the process of 
re-training and re-equipping, recorded 100 percent of its war establishment of 40mm anti-aircraft guns 
being on strength as of 30 April 1945.11  On their arrival in Belgium and the Netherlands in the spring of 
1945, all four corps units had been adequately equipped and had no major shortages that would impair 
their combat capability.   
 Units held at the 2nd Canadian Corps level landed in Normandy during mid July 1944 and became 
operational shortly afterward.  These units consisted of the 6th Anti-tank Regiment, RCA, the 18th 
Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (The Manitoba Dragoons), the 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, 
                                                          
8 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 600. 
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  April 1945 consolidated casualty 
and strength returns.   
11 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC RG24 Volume 
10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  30 April 1945 reports.   
236 
 
and the 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA.12  All were up to strength as of mid July 1944 and contained their full 
war establishments of combat A vehicles and equipment.13  
 All four units were committed to operations shortly after their arrival in Normandy.  The 6th Anti-
Tank Regiment, RCA was involved in combat immediately, supporting Canadian forces attacking 
Verrieres Ridge in late July 1944.  Given the static nature of the fighting in July, the 18th Canadian 
Armoured Car Regiment was assigned limited mounted and dismounted reconnaissance duties, and 
suffered continuous losses.  The 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment was immediately engaged in combating 
a very active Luftwaffe.  The 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA supported all RCA units within the beachhead 
as well as British Army Royal Artillery (RA) units in its artillery survey, flash-spotting, calibration and 
sound-ranging role. 
 Casualties from the summer 1944 battles were light for the majority of the 2nd Canadian Corps 
units in comparison to those within the Canadian infantry brigades.  An unfortunate side-effect of the use 
of strategic air power as a tactical tool in Normandy were incidences of friendly fire due to inaccurate 
bombing runs.  This friendly fire caused many unnecessary losses among rear deployed 2nd Canadian 
Corps troops during operations in mid August 1944.  A type of unit which usually had very low 
battlefield casualties, the 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA suffered forty-eight battle and twenty-four non-
battle casualties during August 1944.14  The majority of these were from inaccurate Allied aerial bombing 
runs.  The 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment suffered twenty-one battle casualties in July 1944, mainly due 
to German air attack and indirect fire.15  In comparison to the low average monthly casualties in the LAA 
regiments during the September 1944 to May 1945 period, these figures are high.  
                                                          
12 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F Canadian Army in NWE order of battle. 
13 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC, RG24 Volume 
10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  
14 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-17265.  August 1944 war 
diary entries.  
15 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,601.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16753. 
237 
 
 Despite casualty rates in the summer of 1944 being the heaviest of the war for the Canadian 
Army, all four 2nd Canadian Corps level units were at adequate personnel levels as of 31 August 1944.  As 
an example, the 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment's strength was fifty-seven officers and 786 other 
ranks on 30 August 1944, 98 percent of its war establishment.16  These personnel totals were taken after 
its prominent role in pursuing the defeated German Army and Waffen SS formations across France in late 
summer.  The relatively intact personnel levels of this unit indicate that the German ground forces in late 
August 1944 were involved in an urgent withdrawal, not a fighting retreat.  The strength of the 6th Anti-
Tank Regiment, RCA, was much weaker.  It totalled thirty-seven officers and 690 other ranks present as 
of 26 August 1944.17  This regiment saw far heavier combat than the other three corps level units, and was 
reduced to 91 percent of its personnel war establishment.  This figure was still far better than the average 
2nd Canadian Corps infantry regiment in the same period during late summer 1944.  
 Following the Normandy Campaign, battle casualties within all 2nd Canadian Corps level 
regiments dropped significantly.  While these regiments had roles in the conquest of the channel ports and 
the Battle of the Scheldt in fall 1944, they did not experience the same levels of combat as they had 
previously.  Due to the opponent often being entrenched and surrounded German infantry, the operations 
of Canadian anti-tank, anti-aircraft and long-range reconnaissance forces was limited.  As shown in Chart 
13.1, the 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA's role had significantly changed due to a lack of enemy 
aircraft to shoot down.  In the fall of 1944 it was available for non-anti-aircraft tasks such as engaging 
ground targets and security sweeps for enemy stragglers.  With the enemy's ability to attack its positions 
on the battlefield significantly reduced, the 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA suffered only seven battle 
casualties in the period September to November 1944. 18 
 Personnel levels for the four 2nd Canadian Corps regiments were satisfactory at the end of 
November 1944, indicating that sufficient reinforcements had been received.  As an example, the 6th Light 
                                                          
16 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return.   
17 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16719.  26 August 1944 return. 
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary September-November 1944.  T-17266. 
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Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA's strength stood at thirty-eight officers and 746 other ranks on 25 
November 1944, 97 percent of its war establishment.  Heavy weapons and combat A vehicle inventories 
were also satisfactory.  2nd Canadian Corps troops possessed 271 out an authorized level of 278 combat A 
vehicles on 30 November 1944.  This placed the four regiments at 97 percent of their A vehicle war 
establishments.  Non-vehicle equipment levels were also satisfactory.  Eighty heavy weapons systems 
were on strength against the war establishment level of seventy-two on 30 November 1944.  
Chart 13.1: 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA war diary recorded days with enemy aircraft 
activity summer-early fall 194419 
 
 The winter months of December 1944 and January 1945 were a relatively quiet time for the corps 
level units of the 2nd Canadian Corps.  In this period they had sufficient time to absorb replacements, 
conduct training and support patrolling and artillery activity.  On the eve of the February 1945 Operation 
"Veritable" offensive into the Rhineland, all four regiments contained high personnel levels.  The 6th 
Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA possessed thirty-seven officers and 724 other ranks, 95 percent of its war 
establishment.  Combat A vehicle and equipment returns for 2nd Canadian Corps troops as of 31 January 
                                                          
19 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 14,601-14,602.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA.  T-16753.  War diary entries July-September 
1944.  
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1945 reported satisfactory inventories.  The units contained 267 combat A vehicles against their 
authorized level of 286, 93 percent of their war establishment.  The units were over strength in their non-
A vehicle weapons inventories.  A total of eighty four 40mm AA guns, 17-Pounder anti-tank guns and 2-
Inch mortars were on strength versus a war establishment total of seventy-two.  
 The 1945 fighting in the Rhineland, the Netherlands and northern Germany was often intense due 
to the German Army occasionally making a determined defensive effort.  The four corps units during this 
period were just as involved in operations as units within Canadian divisions and independent brigades.  
Casualties were heavy, but not as heavy as the fighting in Normandy.  The supply of reinforcements 
reaching the four regiments during this stage was adequate enough to keep their personnel strengths high.  
In the months February through May 1945, the 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment accepted a total of 
120 reinforcements to cover thirty-eight battle and 129 non-battle casualties.20  Reflecting the low 
casualty levels that went with its battlefield role, the 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA, received 111 
replacements against sixty non-battle and four battle casualties.21  
 The conclusion of hostilities in May 1945 found the four corps level regiments of the 2nd 
Canadian Corps in various location in northern Germany.  During April 1945 all four units had been 
involved in supporting Canadian and British forces that crossed the Rhine River and advanced through 
the northern Netherlands and Germany.  The 6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA played a significant role in 
the fighting to capture Leer, Germany in late April 1945.22  The 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment 
also took a leading role in the final stages of the fighting, advancing with the regiments of the 4th 
Canadian Armoured Division.  This regiment captured Mollberg, Germany, one the farthest points 
reached by the 2nd Canadian Corps in its advances. 
 The first army level unit to land in Normandy was the 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA.  This 
artillery unit was attached to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as a fourth self-propelled (SP) field 
                                                          
20 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,662-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries February-May 1945.  T-7094-7096.  
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary February-May 1945.  T-17266-17267.   
22 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 593-594. 
240 
 
artillery regiment from June 1944 onwards.  When the three army level RCA medium regiments forming 
the 2nd AGRA landed in mid-July 1944, the 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA was detached to join them. 
All the medium regiments were initially equipped with 5.5-Inch medium guns and the Army Field 
Regiment was equipped with M7 Priest 105mm SP artillery pieces.  These units contained a total of 
seventy-two artillery pieces, which was an equivalent amount of artillery to that contained within an 
infantry division.  The only difference being was that two thirds of those pieces in the AGRA grouping 
were the heavier medium 5.5-Inch guns.  Due to the lack of any super heavy Canadian artillery units, the 
three 5.5-Inch medium regiments were the most powerful artillery regiments in the Canadian Army.   
 The 2nd Canadian AGRA immediately became involved in the artillery programs supporting 
Anglo-Canadian offensive operations in July 1944.  Their heavy firepower was instrumental in reducing 
German defensive positions continuously until the end of the Normandy Campaign.  In the final two 
weeks of the campaign the regiments moved continuously to keep their guns in range.  During the final 
Falaise Gap battles, a large amount of damage was done to retreating German units by artillery forward 
observers directing the AGRA's heavy guns.   
 During combat operations in Normandy the four AGRA regiments suffered casualties from 
continuous German indirect fire, air strikes and friendly fire in the form of inaccurate Allied aerial 
bombing.  This changed during mid August 1944 as the German military began their withdrawal from 
France.  At this point the German ground forces and Luftwaffe's ability to attack rear deployed Allied 
heavy artillery positions was greatly reduced.  The German artillery units at this stage did not have the 
resources or the capability to engage in sustained counter battery fire.  The Allied air forces had 
simultaneously achieved such a level of air superiority that the Luftwaffe had difficulty launching ground 
attack operations.   
 As a result of this situation, the 2nd Canadian AGRA continued to be effective in the period 
September 1944 to May 1945, but with far fewer casualties.  Losses in the AGRA units during the 
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summer of 1944 had also been increased significantly by friendly fire in the way of inaccurate aerial 
bombing.  These types of operations by Allied four-engined bombers were largely concluded by 
September 1944.  Total battle casualties for all three medium regiments in NWE from 13 July to 4 
October 1944 had been 250.  Non-battle casualties totalled 115.23  Recorded monthly battle casualties for 
the remainder of the war for the three medium regiments totalled 190.  Non-battle casualties that required 
hospitalization for the same three regiments over the same October 1944 to May 1945 period was an 
astounding total of 960. 
 Personnel replacement data for AGRA units in the period June to September 1944 is inconsistent, 
but the strength returns for these regiments indicate that they were adequately resupplied with personnel.  
Due to the Canadian Army's artillery doctrine revolving around these units to a degree, it was impossible 
to allow these units to become weak due to non-reinforcement.  As of 26 August 1944, the 7th Medium 
Regiment, RCA, contained twenty-eight officers and 507 other ranks, 94 percent of its war 
establishment.24    
 The neutralization of the fortified German ports on the English Channel with their coastal gun 
emplacements was an important task for the 2nd AGRA, and it was fully engaged in these operations 
throughout late August and September 1944.   During the Battle of the Scheldt in October and early 
November 1944, the 2nd Canadian AGRA delivered effective indirect fire against entrenched German 
infantry.  The static winter period of December 1944 to January 1945 was spent accepting replacements, 
training and conducting fire missions against German positions along the Waal River.  
 Equipment challenges were not an issue for 2nd Canadian AGRA during its campaign in NWE.  
As shown in Chart 13.2, the operational equipment levels of the three 2nd Canadian AGRA medium 
regiments were always near 100 percent.  If they were to keep delivering effective indirect fire support 
that Canadian Army operations revolved around, it was necessary that this was always the case.  These 
                                                          
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.   
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-15917.  26 August 1944 return.  
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units were continuously in action virtually every day in contrast to infantry, armoured, anti-tank and anti-
aircraft units.  In a manner that was very similar to the divisional RCA field regiments, the only time they 
were not in action was when they were in transit to their next gun positions.  
 Strength returns for 2nd Canadian AGRA units on the eve of the February 1945 Rhineland battles 
illustrate that they had been constantly reinforced during the winter months.  The 7th Medium Regiment,  
Chart 13.2: Number of operational 4.5 and 5.5-inch guns within the three 2nd Canadian AGRA 
RCA medium regiments July 1944-April 1945.  War establishment for three medium regiments=48 
guns 25 
 
RCA contained twenty-eight officers and 532 other ranks on 27 January 1945, 99 percent of its war 
establishment.26  The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA was also strong, consisting of twenty-nine officers and 
516 other ranks as of 27 January 1945.  It was only 4 percent under strength compared to its war 
establishment.27   
                                                          
25 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  Canadian Army A &B vehicle positions.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC,  RG24 Volume 10,670.  
Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  July 1944-April 1945 reports. 
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-15918.  27 January 1945 return.  
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  27 January 1945 return.   
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 The First Canadian Army encountered heavy resistance during the 1945 Rhineland fighting which 
occurred during Operations "Veritable" and "Blockbuster".  Both operations were supported by 
significant artillery programs that were designed to reduce German defences and inflict a large amount of 
casualties.  The 2nd Canadian AGRA along with other British AGRA formations played a central role in 
these programs.  The fire of these regiments along with the divisional 25-Pounder field regiments was 
crucial in destroying German positions and repulsing their counter attacks.  Casualty totals for the 
February and March 1945 fighting totalled sixty-seven battle and 312 non-battle among the four 2nd 
Canadian AGRA regiments.28  The fact that the non-battle casualties outweighed the battle casualties 
illustrates the reduced German ability in spring 1945 to attack or destroy Canadian artillery positions.   
 In the final phase of the spring 1945 fighting, the four regiments of the 2nd Canadian AGRA 
followed the advancing 2nd Canadian Corps into the northern Netherlands and Germany.  Constantly 
moving from position to position, they struggled to keep up with the advances.  At this stage German 
resistance was so weak that by the time the AGRA regiments had reached a firing position, the enemy had 
been overcome.  One of the farthest advancing AGRA medium regiments was the 7th Medium Regiment, 
RCA which ended the war in Hesel, Germany, near Leer.  
 The 1st Canadian AGRA arrived in Belgium in February and March 1945.  This formation 
consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 5th Medium Regiments, RCA and the 11th Army Field Artillery Regiment, 
RCA.  These medium regiments were not equipped in the same manner as those in the 2nd Canadian 
AGRA medium regiments due to some units fielding 4.5 Inch guns.  The 11th Army Field Regiment, RCA 
was self-propelled, being equipped with the Sexton 25-Pounder SP howitzer.  The three four RCA 
regiments were deployed to support 1st Canadian Corps operations in the Netherlands during the 2 to 19 
April 1945 phase of fighting. 
                                                          
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,663.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries February-March 1945.  T-7094.   
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 In their battlefield role 1st Canadian AGRA units supported the Allied crossing of the Ijssel River 
in April 1945 and the advance to the Grebbe River line where offensive operations ceased.  Due to the 
limited combat capability of the enemy forces at this time, the 1st Canadian AGRA suffered very few 
losses during its operations with the 1st Canadian Corps.  While the 1st Canadian AGRA medium 
regiments were combat capable, they had not been reinforced to 100 percent of their war establishments 
for personnel.  As an example, the 1st Medium Regiment, RCA, contained a strength of twenty-nine 
officers and 493 other ranks as of 5 May 1945, only 92 percent of its war establishment.  The 5th Medium 
Regiment, RCA possessed a strength of twenty-nine officers and 501 other ranks at the end of hostilities, 
93 percent of its authorized personnel.  It appears neither of these regiments were a high priority for 
reinforcements due to the end of hostilities being imminent and the cease fire in the Netherlands taking 
hold on 19 April 1945.  All four 1st Canadian AGRA regiments had adequate inventories of major 
weapons systems in order to complete their missions.  The three RCA medium regiments contained all 
forty-eight of their authorized number of 4.5 and 5.5-Inch guns, and the 11th Army Field Regiment, RCA 
contained all twenty-four of its war establishment number of Sexton 25-Pounder SP artillery pieces.29  
 In conclusion, the army and corps level units of the Canadian Army in NWE were utilized in 
operations to the same degree as similar units held at the divisional level.  Since none of the units were 
infantry, and several were usually deployed to the rear, these units had on average lower levels of 
casualties.  But the casualties they did suffer were on par with other regiments of their type.  The 6h Anti-
Tank Regiment, RCA saw continuous combat in Normandy and experienced the full force of German 
armoured counterattacks on Verrieres Ridge.  Its casualties were similar to other anti-tank regiments held 
at the division level.  Though the armoured car regiments did not have prominent roles in some of the 
most difficult battles, they did lead the pursuit of the German Army across France and kept continuous 
contact with the retreating enemy.  In April and May 1945, these units again advanced over large areas of 
enemy held territory following the German disintegration in the last weeks of the war.  The firepower of 
                                                          
29 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  April 1945 reports. 
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the medium regiments of the AGRA were instrumental in gaining victory in the attritional Normandy 
Campaign and successfully supported operations to the war's conclusion.  Not being part of the a 
divisions' order of battle, corps and army level units were shuffled around between divisions to where the 
fighting was the most demanding.  Their continuous reinforcement with new personnel, combat A 
vehicles and heavy weapons kept them operating at a high level that ensured the successful completion of 
any mission given to them.  
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Chapter 14: Final thoughts on the Canadian Army’s ability to replace 
personnel and equipment during the campaign in 
North West Europe, 1944-1945 
 
 The ability of the Canadian Army to reconstitute itself was one of its greatest strengths during the 
campaign in North West Europe (NWE).  While German units became steadily weaker, Canadian combat 
arms units were continually reinforced in order to retain their combat capability.  In the event that a 
regiment suffered heavy personnel losses, it would be out of action for half a week at the most.1  Vehicle 
and equipment losses could be replaced within days.2  Though it took some time to rebuild the combat 
effectiveness of a unit's personnel, actually having the replacement soldiers quickly in place was the 
crucial first building block.  This Canadian capability could not be matched by the enemy, and was one of 
the principle reasons behind their defeat in May 1945.  German defences were continuously ground down 
by a force whose overwhelming resources were matched with an effective artillery based operational 
doctrine.  This doctrine focused on minimizing Canadian losses while maximizing the ongoing attrition of 
the enemy, a "compassionate attritionist" approach to warfare.  Without replacement resources, German 
units simply melted away. 
 While not always efficient, the Canadian Army Overseas (CAO) approach to the maintenance of 
its personnel and equipment inventories speaks of a military culture that did not view these items as 
disposable assets, but valuable tools to be maintained.  Sophisticated organizations used large amounts of 
resources to see that equipment remained operational and personnel levels remained satisfactory.  This 
was very much in contrast to the late war attitude of the German military, who ruthlessly fought complete 
formations to destruction in order to achieve dubious objectives, then replaced them with others when 
their usefulness was expended.   
                                                          
1 David O'Keefe,"“Pushing Their Necks Out”: Ultra, The Black Watch, and Command Relations, May-sur-Orne, Normandy,5 
August 1944," Canadian Military History: Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 3.  Retrieved 20 February 2016 from 
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss1/3.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada returned to the front lines on 4 August 1944, 
ten days after the battle on Verrieres Ridge which destroyed its infantry companies.   
2 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary April 1945.  T-12748.  This 
squadron delivered fifty-six new and repaired AFVs to 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade units in April 1945.  This equalled an 
average of 1.86 AFVs delivered per day to the three armoured regiments.  
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 Two organizations stood at the forefront of the CAO's effort to constantly maintain its equipment 
inventories.  The Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) recovery and 
repair processes were very effective at recovering and repairing unserviceable equipment, and the 25th 
Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th CADR) was extremely competent at delivering replacement 
armoured vehicles rapidly.  This second organization's whole purpose was to maintain the heavy 
armoured vehicle strength of all Canadian units, and nothing comparable existed in the German Army or 
Waffen SS.  The creation of RCEME in 1944 and the earlier adoption of British Army recovery and 
repair methods in 1943 illustrates the constant doctrinal evolution present in the CAO during the late war 
period.  The effective practice of using four staggered maintenance lines produced the maximum number 
of repaired vehicles and weapons possible in the shortest period of time.  Severely damaged or broken 
down vehicles and weapons were stripped from combat units quickly, leaving the light aid detachments to 
concentrate on small repairs.  This allowed Canadian combat arms units to retain their combat 
effectiveness due to their possessing close to totally serviceable inventories of weapons and vehicles.  As 
an example, by 30 April 1945 the CAO contained a total of 4,588 combat A vehicles on strength within 
its combat arms units, very close to all of which could be assessed as operational.3  On the same date the 
number of Canadian 5.5-Inch, 4.5-Inch and 25-Pounder artillery pieces in service totalled 510.4  Any 
shortages that did occur within the First Canadian Army in NWE were of a temporary nature.5   
 Though the vast majority of units contained their complete war establishment of equipment by 
war's end, it is important to note that it was of varying quality within some combat arms units.  Though 
not the responsibility of the repair and replacement organizations, a challenge that faced the CAO in 
NWE was the acquisition of effective types of weapons and armoured vehicle technology for its infantry 
and armoured units.  It is difficult to quantify the limitations inferior technology imposed on successful 
                                                          
3 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  This did not 
include vehicles in the repair or delivery systems, but only those within combat arms units. 
4 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC,  RG24 Volume 
10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  July 1944-April 1945 reports. 
5 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC,  RG24 Volume 
10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  July 1944-April 1945 reports. 
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infantry and armoured offensive tactics, but the widespread use of this equipment certainly did not aid the 
Canadian Army's performance, nor did it do much to limit casualties within the infantry. 
 This was an issue that confronted all British and Commonwealth forces, and there was very little 
the CAO could have done to improve this situation.  While the Royal Canadian Artillery's (RCA) 25-
Pounder artillery piece was a war winning piece of ordnance, the 75mm gunned Sherman tank and the 
Sten sub machine gun were average weapons systems compared to others in the Allied and German 
arsenals.  They did the job, but not as effectively as it could be done.  As was the case within all British 
and Canadian units, excellent weapons systems such as the Ram armoured personnel carrier and the Wasp 
II flame thrower carrier were rare items at the end of hostilities.6  During June and July 1944, no more 
that twenty-three Firefly 17-Pounders were available to the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, this at a time 
when they were needed the most.7 
 Having adequate personnel levels within all Canadian combat arms units was a major factor in 
the successful achievement of their missions.  For the majority of the time the First Canadian Army 
conducted combat operations in NWE, units never lacked for adequate reinforcements to replace battle 
and non-battle casualties.  Personnel strength was never a problem for artillery and armoured units, and 
this allowed them to continuously operate their large inventories of weapons and vehicles.  Throughout 
the spring of 1945, infantry regiments could take high losses one day, be rebuilt, and then be strong 
enough to conduct operations a short time later.8  But unlike the reinforcement records of the RCA and 
Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC), the history of personnel reinforcement in the Canadian Infantry Corps 
(CIC) during 1944 was not without blemish.   
                                                          
6 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st A.G. Canadian A & B Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  As of 30 April 1945 
there were 104 Ram Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers on strength within the entire CAO.  
7 Roman Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy Campaign”, 275. 
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment (The Black Watch) War Diaries July-August 1944.  After the 
complete destruction of its infantry companies on 25 August 1944, the entire battalion conducted a heavy attack on May-sur-
Orne on 5 August 1944. 
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 During August and September 1944 there were challenges in supplying infantry units with other 
ranks (non-officer) replacements.  In this two month period a shortage of infantry personnel existed 
within the reinforcement organization's holding units.9  This was only one trade out of the three combat 
arms trades, but the infantry was the spearhead of Canadian offensive operations.  The shortage lasted 
only two months out of an eleven month campaign, but for two weeks of this period it was important for 
the Canadian Army to be operating at its highest performance level.  During this time the most critical 
phase of the Normandy Campaign occurred, and each infantry company had large demands placed upon 
it. 
 While some infantry regiments during August-September 1944 were still reasonably strong, 
others faced serious shortages that reduced them to two infantry companies rather than four.  As an 
example, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal on 21 August 1944 contained a strength of thirty-seven officers and 
516 other ranks, only 65 percent of its war establishment.10  The lack of a sufficient number of 
infantrymen at this point in the Normandy Campaign arguably led to a reduction in the Canadian Army's 
military effectiveness.  It is impossible to answer to the question of whether stronger Canadian infantry 
companies could have closed the Falaise Gap sooner or broken through German defences in August more 
effectively.  What is certain is that an increased infantry capability would not have harmed the Canadian 
Army's performance.   
 A large program to re-muster excess personnel in other trades was in effect by August 1944, but 
the transformation of these personnel into other ranks infantry could not occur instantaneously.  
Significant results were not apparent in formations like the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division until late 
September.11  The majority of all deficits were made good by early October, and replacements were not 
an issue for the remainder of the campaign in NWE.  By 30 September 1944 one of the most depleted 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,669.  Report: "Deficiencies and holdings of Canadian  Infantry, Other Ranks; Northwest Europe, 27 
August, 1944-28 April 1945."   
10 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
11 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,669.  Report: "Deficiencies and holdings of Canadian  Infantry, Other Ranks; Northwest Europe, 27 
August, 1944-28 April 1945."   
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units, The South Saskatchewan Regiment, contained thirty-two officers and 703 other ranks, 86 percent of 
its war establishment.12  This number would improve further before it commenced combat operations in 
the Scheldt in early October.   
 RCA units had the least problems in maintaining their units personnel strengths.  In addition to 
having the most advanced artillery technology, RCA artillery units suffered consistently lower personnel 
casualties than armoured and infantry units.  The failure of the German Army to effectively use artillery 
counter battery fire and the inability of the German Luftwaffe to conduct regular airstrikes meant that 
RCA operations went largely unhindered.  Due to the First Canadian Army consistently holding the 
initiative, large amounts of RCA personnel were never lost due to a sudden German advance reaching 
field artillery and light anti-aircraft units.  There were instances of batteries losing guns to occasional 
German counter-battery fire, but their loss was not an everyday occurrence. 13  RCA anti-tank regiments, 
with their direct fire anti-tank guns and tank destroyers, did suffer significantly higher losses than rear-
deployed field artillery regiments who were somewhat immune to direct fire.  A greater effort had to be 
made to keep these unit's personnel levels and equipment inventories up to strength.14 
 For nine months of the eleven month campaign in NWE, the personnel reinforcement system 
operated smoothly for all trades.  In June and early July 1944 it had responded effectively to the limited 
needs of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade without difficulty.  During 
this time both units were involved in challenging combat operations against powerful German units.  
From October 1944 to May 1945 combat arms units were consistently reinforced, giving them the 
strength to overpower enemy opposition.  The introduction of NRMA conscripts in the spring of 1945 
erased any remaining shortages within the reinforcement system in NWE.  The events of August and 
September 1944 were a temporary blip on a otherwise effective record.  
                                                          
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16360.   
14 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-16449.  The regiment had forty recorded 
personnel reinforcements during April 1945. 
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 In conclusion, this study has shown that during the majority of its campaign in NWE 1944-1945, 
the Canadian Army operated effective, if not efficient systems to maintain its unit equipment inventories 
and personnel levels.  These twin systems allowed the Canadian Army to continuously maintain its 
combat effectiveness in comparison to an opponent whose units were ground down by attrition.  The 
battlefield impact of the First Canadian Army having all its combat arms units constantly at full strength 
was tremendous.  Consistently possessing a superior amount of resources gave Canadian units an 
undeniable edge before any operation began.  When this strength was matched with a superior artillery 
based doctrine that caused extreme attrition of the enemy while preserving the strength of Canadian 
forces, the First Canadian Army became unstoppable. 
 Senior leadership within the CAO in NWE always understood that there was a direct correlation 
between adequate personnel levels and combat power.  As a result CAO reinforcement organizations 
made determined efforts to constantly maintain these levels.  What temporary personnel challenges did 
occur in the late summer of 1944 were due to poor planning to accurately predict what infantry 
reinforcements were required and re-muster surplus non-infantry personnel.  In the spring of 1944 there 
was no overall shortage of reinforcement personnel, just excess numbers in the wrong army trades.  Once 
these problems were ironed out by late September 1944, infantry regiments were consistently kept at high 
personnel levels for the remainder of the war.  
  Canadian units in NWE were very well equipped with sufficient numbers of combat A vehicles 
and heavy weapons.  Only small amounts of time were needed to replace or repair what losses occurred, 
and whatever challenges were present in repair turnaround times were miniscule compared to those within 
the German military.  While these vehicles and weapons systems were effective enough to allow the 
Canadian Army to accomplish its missions, some were more effective than others.  Infantry and armoured 
forces faced challenges in this area, and the inability of the CAO to obtain quantities of the most effective 
equipment possibly influenced casualty levels and performance.  These weaknesses were more than 
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adequately compensated for by the superiority of the Canadian artillery arm.  The battlefield dominance 
of the RCA units allowed the First Canadian Army to relentlessly advance.   
 Due to the massive combat power contained within the First Canadian Army, it could only be 
slowed down or delayed, but never stopped, during 1944-1945.  In battle after battle, victory after victory 
was achieved.  Though minor tactical reverses did occur, this field army never suffered a major defeat in 
NWE.  What the enemy encountered in the last year of the war in was an invincible army, an army of 
never ending strength. 
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Appendices:
Appendix 1: War establishments of Canadian combat arms regiments in late 1944 and early 1945 
 Within Canadian regimental war diaries, official histories and operational narratives, there are 
accounts of units or sub-units being “destroyed” or “suffering large losses” in combat.  These accounts 
will often mention the total number of casualties or quantity of equipment lost in a day’s fighting.1  What 
is not presented is the actual fighting strength of the unit, allowing the reader to understand the level of 
damage done to its fighting capability and establishment.  If so many tanks or men were lost, could the 
unit continue on operations before reinforcements arrived?  To understand how these losses related to the 
unit's ability to carry out future missions, it is important to comprehend its size and organization.  The 
purpose of this first appendix is to briefly outline the structure and size of Canadian combat arms 
regiments of battalion strength.  The second half of this study is largely dedicated to the statistical records 
of these regiments, what losses they incurred and reinforcements they received.  Once these organizations 
are outlined, the reader can comprehend the significance of losses suffered, and how this damage could 
have affected its performance.   
 Each type of combat arms regiment within the Canadian Army had a different role, and was 
staffed and equipped accordingly.  These regiments were structured as battalion-sized units, with their 
role (infantry, armoured, artillery) influencing how their companies (squadrons, batteries) were titled.  
The scope of this study encompasses nineteen different types of combat arms regiments which served in 
North West Europe (NWE) during 1944-1945.  Some armour, artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
regiments had up to three different variants at the army, corps and divisional level.  Each was individual 
due to its role, equipment establishment or parent organization.  Due to these differences, I have included 
the organizations of all variants as separate tables, the exception being if the war establishments of two 
variants were identical, but they were given different titles.  As noted in Chapter 1, Canadian units serving 
within British divisions in NWE will be excluded from the study.  Prominent examples of this are the 1st 
                                                          
1 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army, 216-217.  In his description of the Moyland Wood fighting near Louisendorf in February 1945, 
Copp lists the casualties to the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s Royal Winnipeg Rifles as 100 casualties with twenty-six killed.   
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Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment and the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, both of these 
units serving within British Divisions.  Certain Canadian regiments within this study were very rare, with 
only one or two examples being raised for overseas service.  Others, such as infantry regiments, were 
plentiful.  For example, in May 1945 there were thirty-three lorried Canadian infantry regiments of 
battalion strength within the First Canadian Army. 
 The tables that follow are a basic introduction into the subject of Second World War Canadian 
unit war establishments.  The war establishment was organizational chart or table outlining exactly what 
the unit was supposed to contain in the way of personnel, vehicles and equipment in order for it complete 
its missions.  War establishment personnel and equipment tables depended on economic production 
levels, troop availability, levels of technology and fiscal policy.  How these amounts of war material and 
personnel were then organized tactically was driven by Army doctrine.2  Establishments for regiments 
changed regularly as units were re-organized to remedy a deficiency or meet new demands.  The 
regimental war establishment tables that follow are for late 1944 and early 1945, roughly the mid-point of 
the campaign in NWE.  After this point there were very little in the way of drastic organizational changes.  
Within the tables provided, the personnel, main weapons systems and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) 
of the unit are listed.  Not included due to space constraints are how the B vehicles (A vehicles for 
combat, B for non-combat) were dispersed within the A1 (fighting), A2 and B (supply and administrative) 
echelons of each of the regiments.  These vehicles were numerous and vital for the logistic, 
administrative, maintenance and liaison needs of a combat arms regiment in the field.  They consisted of 
everything from jeeps to command caravans to 6 x 4 drive wheeled recovery vehicles.  Also not included 
are the total number of small arms and how these weapons were distributed.  Of note regarding the 
following tables is that they include Royal Canadian Corps of Signals Corps (RCSS), Royal Canadian 
Army Service Corps (RCASC), Royal Canadian Pay Corps (RCPC), Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps 
(RCOC), Royal Canadian Medical Service (RCMS) personnel and others.  These personnel were integral 
                                                          
2 John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 8. 
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to the medical and administrative performance of the unit and the maintenance of its equipment, and are 
categorized as attached in the official war establishment tables.  Not included in the regimental 
establishment personnel totals are the light aid detachment (LAD) Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical & 
Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) personnel.  They were also vital to the maintenance of unit vehicles and 
AFVs, and were with the unit constantly.  Their personnel totals are listed at the end of each regiment's 
description since they were administratively separate. 
 The 1944 Canadian Armoured Regiment was a battalion sized Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) 
unit.  Its battlefield role was to use its armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to defeat the enemy through 
firepower and maneuver.  Each armoured division's armoured brigade and independent armoured brigade 
was authorized three regiments.  There were a total of twelve in NWE by spring 1945.  These regiments 
usually acted independently from one another as part of combined arms teams.  Each regiment had three 
Table A.1: CAC Armoured Regiment (Armoured Brigade or Division) as of January 19453 
Tactical Grouping Sub units  
Strength Officers & Other 
Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental HQ 5-16 4 x M4 Sherman command tanks 
Headquarters 
Squadron 
Recce troop 
Intercommunication 
troop  
Admin troop 
RCEME LAD (C) 
9-172 
11 x M3 Stuart Light tanks, 9 x Scout Cars, 1 x armoured ammunition 
carrier 
A Squadron 1 x HQ troop 
5 x tank troops 
8-153 
19 x Sherman Firefly/M4 Sherman M4 tanks, 1 x ARV tank, 2 x 
armoured ammo carriers 
 
B Squadron As Above  As above 
C Squadron  As Above As above 
Totals  38-647 61 x M4 Sherman/Sherman Firefly tanks, 9 x Scout cars. 11 x M3 
Stuart tanks, 3 x ARVs tanks, 7 x armoured ammunition carriers 
armoured squadrons and a headquarters (HQ) squadron.  These squadrons fielded the Sherman 17- 
                                                          
3 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables WWE II/151/4  CAC Armoured Regiment and Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment January 1945. 
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Pounder Firefly tank, the M4 Sherman 75mm tank and the M3 Stuart 37mm light tank in the 
reconnaissance role.  In early 1945 there was an equal mix of M4 Sherman 75mm tanks and Sherman 
Firefly 17-Pounders, totalling sixty-one cruiser tanks in all.  This total was supplemented by eleven M3 
Stuart light tanks in the reconnaissance troop and three armoured recovery vehicle (ARV) tanks.  B 
vehicles totalled twenty cars, seventy-three trucks and specialist vehicles, eight motorcycles and twelve  
trailers.  The anti-aircraft troop was deleted as of November 1944.  The RCEME type “C” LAD consisted 
of one officer and fifteen other ranks.  Identically equipped, the January 1945 Canadian armoured 
reconnaissance regiment had the role of aggressive armoured reconnaissance in force as the vanguard of 
the armoured division.  As divisional troops, there was one armoured reconnaissance regiment in each of 
the two Canadian armoured divisions. 
 The 1944 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment was a CAC unit employed at the corps level as a 
reconnaissance unit.  It was placed under the command of armoured and infantry divisions and utilized in 
this role.  As corps troops, there were only two such regiments employed in NWE by the spring of 1945, 
one for each Canadian corps.  This regiment was designed to carry out deep reconnaissance on a wide 
front during fluid operations, using the mobility of its squadrons to carry out this role.  Its organization 
consisted of four squadrons and a regimental headquarters (RHQ).  Each of the squadrons was equipped 
with a large number of armoured wheeled vehicles of various types. Due to its large pool of vehicles, this 
regiment could cover a wide area.  Armoured vehicles within the regiment consisted of Daimler and 
Humber Scout Cars, Daimler, AEC and Staghound Armoured Cars.  B vehicles within the regiment 
consisted of eight cars, twenty-eight trucks, seventeen M3 White Scout cars, thirty-seven specialist 
vehicles and twenty-three motorcycles.  The attached type “C” LAD consisted of one officer and fifteen 
other ranks.   
 The January 1945 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment was a CAC divisional reconnaissance 
asset operating within Canadian infantry divisions.  Its organization consisted of a HQ squadron and three 
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Table A.2: CAC Armoured Car Regiment (Corps Troops) October 19444 
 
Tactical Grouping Sub units  
Strength Officers & Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental HQ Signals troop 
RCEME LAD (C) 
13 x Scout Cars, 4 x Armoured Cars, 1 x Command Caravan 
A Squadron Sqn HQ troop 
Heavy troop 
Support troop 
5 x Recce troops 
13 x Scout Cars, 17 x Armoured Cars 
B Squadron As Above  As above 
C Squadron  As Above As above 
D Squadron As Above As above 
Totals  57-803 
 
72 x Armoured Cars, 65 x Scout Cars, 1 x Command Caravan 
reconnaissance squadrons.  The reconnaissance regiment was different from an armoured reconnaissance 
or armoured car regiment due to its combination of infantry heavy weapons and light wheeled armoured 
vehicles.  If need be, it could act as an additional infantry unit while at the same time conducting its 
primary role as the divisional mobile reconnaissance force.  Its AFVs and major weapons systems 
consisted of the Humber Armoured Car, the Humber Scout Car, the Universal Carrier, the T-16 (gun 
tractor) Carrier, the Universal Mortar Carrier, the 6-Pounder anti-tank gun and the 3-Inch mortar.  There 
were three such regiments raised for the Canadian Army overseas, one for each infantry division.  B 
vehicles consisted of thirty six cars, of which twenty-four were light reconnaissance vehicles and seventy-
one trucks in general service (GS) and specialist roles.  These totals were supplemented by a further fifty-
five motorcycles and ten trailers.  The type “A” LAD attached to the regiment consisted of one officer 
and fifteen other ranks. 
  The 1945 Canadian Infantry Regiment was a battalion-sized Canadian Infantry Corps (CIC) unit 
made up of a battalion headquarters and six companies as of January 1945.  These six consisted of a 
headquarters company, a support company and four rifle companies.  Three infantry regiments made up 
an infantry brigade.  Its role was to close with and destroy the enemy.  Apart from the carrier platoon, its 
                                                          
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Corps Troops War 
Establishment Staff Tables III/236/2  CAC Armoured Car Regiment October  1944.   
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Table A.3: CAC Reconnaissance Regiment (Infantry Division) January 19455 
 
Tactical Grouping Sub units  
Strength Officers & 
Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental HQ 
Squadron 
Carrier troop 
Anti-Tank troop 
Mortar troop 
RCEME LAD (A) 
1 x Armoured Cars, 9 x Universal Carriers, 6 x towed 6-Pounder A/T 
guns, 6 x 3-Inch mortars, 12 x T-16 (gun tractor) Carriers, 6 x Universal 
Mortar Carriers 
Reconnaissance A 
Squadron 
Squadron HQ 
Signal troop 
Assault troop 
3 x Scout troops 
9 x Armoured  Cars, 18 x Universal Carriers 
Reconnaissance B 
Squadron 
As Above As above 
Reconnaissance C 
Squadron 
As Above As above 
Totals  43-777 6 x 3-Inch mortars, 6 x towed 6-Pdr A/T guns, 28 x Armoured Cars, 63 x 
Universal Carriers, 6 x Universal Mortar Carriers, 12 x T-16 (gun tractor) 
Carriers 
infantry companies were lorried and went into battle dismounted.6  Major weapons systems and AFVs 
consisted of the T-16 (gun tractor) Carrier, the Universal Carrier, the Universal 3-Inch Mortar Carrier, the 
6-Pounder anti-tank gun and 3-Inch and 2-Inch mortars.  B vehicles consisted of fourteen cars and forty-
three trucks of various types designed for GS and specialist use.  These totals were supplemented by 
twenty-seven  motorcycles, fourteen trailers and thirty-three bicycles.  RCEME support for the three 
infantry regiments was held at the brigade level with a single brigade electrical & mechanical engineer 
type LAD.7   
 The 1945 Canadian Motor Infantry Battalion was a CIC regiment that was mechanized.  It was 
set up with one less company than a regular lorried infantry battalion.  In January 1945 it was equipped 
                                                          
5 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries December 1944.  T-7093.  Infantry Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Reconnaissance Regiment WE II/251/2 January 1945. 
6 As noted earlier in this study, the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment could only support a regiment or certain 
elements of a brigade at one time.  During its existence it supported as the British Army as much as the Canadian Army.  
7 Data on its composition was not found. 
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Table A.4: CIC Infantry Regiment January 19458 
Tactical 
Grouping 
Sub units  
Strength Officers & Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental 
HQ 
Scout Platoon 
Stretcher Bearer Group 
6-84 
1 x Universal Carrier  
HQ Company Company HQ  
Signals platoon 
Administration platoon 
5-94 
_ 
Support 
Company 
 
Company HQ 
3-Inch Mortar platoon 
Universal Carrier platoon 
Anti-Tank platoon 
Pioneer platoon 
7-184 
6 x 3-Inch mortars, 7x 3-Inch Mortar Carriers, 14 x Universal 
Carriers, 6 x towed 6-Pdr A/T guns, 12 x T-16 (gun tractor) 
Carriers, 10 x 2-Inch mortars 
A Rifle 
Company  
 
Company HQ, 3 x Rifle Platoon s 
and 1x Light Mortar Section 
5-120 
1 x Universal Carrier, 4 x 2-Inch mortars 
B Rifle 
Company 
As above  As above  
C Rifle 
Company 
As above  As above  
D Rifle 
Company  
As above  As above  
Totals  38-812 6 x 3-Inch mortars, 6 x towed 6-Pdr A/T guns, 26 x 2-Inch mortars, 
19 x Universal Carriers, 7 x 3-Inch Mortar Carriers, 12 x T-16 
(gun tractor) Carriers 
with armoured trucks to form a mechanized infantry force that would accompany a rapid armoured 
advance.  It consisted of three motor companies, a support company, a HQ company and a RHQ.  Its main 
role was also to close with and destroy the enemy, but use mechanized infantry tactics to do so.  Initially 
the motor companies were equipped with M3 White half-tracks, but these were replaced in mid 1944 with 
armoured trucks.  Two of these regiments were formed to serve in each of the armoured brigades within 
                                                          
8 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Infantry Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Infantry Battalion (Regiment) WE II/233/4 January 1945. 
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Table A.5: CIC Motor Battalion (Armoured Division) January 19459 
Tactical 
Grouping 
Sub units  
Strength Officers 
& Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental 
HQ 
5-28 _ 
HQ Company Company HQ 
Signals platoon 
Administration  
platoon 
RCEME LAD (B) 
6-96 
_ 
Support 
Company 
 
Company HQ 
3 x Anti-Tank 
platoons 
 2 x Medium MG 
platoons 
1 x Mortar 
platoon 
7-190 
1 x Scout Car, 12 x towed 6-Pdr A/T guns, 24 x T-16 (gun tractor) Carriers, 16 x 
MMG (medium machine gun) Carriers, 6 x 3-Inch Mortars, 6 x Universal 3-Inch 
Mortar Carriers 
A Motor 
Company  
 
Company HQ,  
Motor platoons 1-
3 
Scout carrier 
platoon 
7-168 
 2 x Scout Cars, 12 x Universal Carriers  
B Motor 
Company 
As above  As above  
C Motor 
Company 
As above  As above 
Totals 39-818 30 x 2-Inch Mortars, 6 x 3-Inch Mortars, 6 x Universal 3-Inch Mortar Carriers, 12 
x towed 6-Pdr A/T guns, 36 x Universal Carriers, 16 x MMG (medium machine 
gun) Carriers, 24 x T-16 (gun tractor) Carriers 
the two Canadian armoured divisions.  Motor battalions were not present in Canadian independent 
armoured brigades.  Its major weapons systems and AFVs consisted of the Daimler Scout Car, the 6-
Pounder anti-tank gun, 3-Inch and 2-inch mortars, the Universal Carrier, the Universal 3-inch Mortar 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Motor Battalion (Regiment) WE II/231/3 January 1945. 
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Carrier, the T-16 (gun tractor) Carrier and the MMG (machine gun) Carrier.  B vehicles consisted of 
eleven cars and ninety-one trucks that were armoured, GS or specialist types.  This vehicle pool was 
supplemented by forty-nine motorcycles and ten trailers.  Unlike non-mechanized infantry regiments, they 
did have an RCEME LAD attached.  The attached LAD type “B” totalled one officer and thirteen other 
ranks. 
 The Canadian Machine Gun Battalion as of January 1945 was an independent battalion-sized CIC 
support regiment.  There was one raised for each of the three overseas infantry divisions.  As a divisional 
unit, this regiment could be split up to support individual infantry regiments within a brigade.10  The 
battalion consisted of a regimental headquarters, three medium machine gun companies and a mortar 
company.  The Machine Gun Battalion’s battlefield role was that of a combat force multiplier for an 
Table A.6: CIC Machine Gun Battalion January 194511 
 
Tactical Grouping Sub units  
Strength Officers &Other 
Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
Regimental HQ Administration platoon 
Signals platoon 
RCEME LAD (B) 
_ 
Mortar Company Company HQ 
2 x Mortar platoons 
14 x 4.2-Inch mortars, 32 x T-16 4.2-Inch Mortar Carriers 
Medium Machine 
Gun Company  
Company HQ 
Carrier platoon 
3 x MMG (medium 
machine gun) Platoons 
12 x Universal Carriers, 12 x MMG (medium machine gun) Carriers, 
12 x .303 Medium Machine Guns 
Medium Machine 
Gun  
As above As above 
Medium Machine 
Gun Company  
As above As above 
Totals: 37-701 14 x 4.2-Inch mortars, 32 x T-16 4.2-Inch Mortar Carriers, 36 x 
Universal Carriers, 36 x MMG (medium machine gun) Carriers, 36 x 
.303 Medium Machine Guns 
                                                          
10 Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 657.  Appendix F.  Canadian Army Order of Battle in NWE 1944-1945.  The Canadian 
armoured division overseas had an independent machine gun company, but because of its non-battalion strength status it will not 
be included in this study. 
11 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1945.  Infantry Division War Establishment 
Staff Tables Machine Gun Battalion (Regiment) WE II/240/1 January 1945. 
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infantry brigade or regiment in attack or defence.  Major weapons systems apart from its 303 medium 
machine guns were 4.2-Inch mortars, Universal Carriers, MMG (machine gun) Carriers and T-16 Carriers 
modified to carry the 4.2-Inch Mortar and also act as ammunition carriers.  B Vehicles consisted of eleven 
cars and seventy-two trucks of various types in the GS and specialist role.  This vehicle pool was 
supplemented by fifty-two motorcycles and nine trailers.  The attached RCEME LAD type “B” had the 
strength of one officer and thirteen other ranks. 
 The January 1945 Canadian towed RCA Field Regiment infantry division variant was a divisional 
artillery asset.  It consisted of three batteries and a RHQ.  Its batteries were equipped with the towed 25- 
Pounder howitzers rather than self-propelled variants.  There were three field regiments within each 
infantry division for a total of nine infantry division variants in NWE by spring 1945.  This regiment 
contained a different war establishment than the self-propelled and towed field regiments within 
armoured divisions or held at the army level.  The most notable difference was the lack of artillery 
observation post (OP) tanks.  The Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) of a towed regiment went 
forward with infantry battalion HQs and were equipped with Universal Carriers.  The primary role of the 
towed field regiment was to provide powerful indirect fire support at the divisional level.  It could also 
provide direct fire support against infantry or armoured targets by firing over open sights.  The regiment 
also had a troop of 20mm anti-aircraft (AA) guns.  B vehicles as of January 1945 were twenty-one cars 
and 103 trucks of GS and specialist designs, including thirty-six artillery tractors.  Supplementing this 
pool were twenty-six motorcycles and twenty-two trailers.  The RCEME LAD type “B” had a total 
strength of one officer and thirteen other ranks. 
 The Canadian self-propelled (SP) RCA Field Regiment armoured division variant as of January 
1945 contained a very different war establishment from a towed field regiment in an armoured or infantry 
division.  The main differences were that all of its 25-Pounder howitzers were self-propelled and it 
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Table A.7: Towed RCA Field Artillery Regiment, (Infantry Division variant) January 194512  
 
Company or 
Platoon 
Sub units  
Strength Officers &Other 
Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  Anti-Aircraft troop 
RCEME LAD (B) 
8-62 
8 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft guns  
 
 A Battery  2 x Field Artillery troops 
10-192 
8 x towed 25-Pdr howitzers  
3 x Universal Carriers 
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery  As above As above 
Totals 38-638 24 x towed 25-Pdr howitzers, 8 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft  guns, 9 x 
Universal Carriers 
operated a large number of artillery observation post (OP) tanks.  The regiment had a total of thirteen OP 
tanks and also a troop of 20mm anti-aircraft guns.  The OP tanks allowed the FOOs to keep up with the 
armoured squadrons.  This type of regiment consisted of three batteries and a RHQ.  It was a divisional 
artillery asset, whose role was to provide mobile powerful indirect fire support.  It could also provide 
mobile direct fire support against infantry or armoured targets by firing over open sights.  The two SP 
RCA Field Regiment’s held at the army level Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) groupings had 
identical war establishment tables to the SP armoured division variant.  In late 1944 there was one within 
each Canadian armoured division and one per each army level AGRA grouping, for a total of four self-
propelled regiments.  B vehicles as of late 1944 were thirteen cars and ninety-two trucks of GS and 
specialist types, including thirty-six artillery tractors and thirty-four M-14 half-tracks.  Supplementing 
this pool was thirty-two motorcycles and twenty-four trailers.  The attached RCEME LAD type “D” 
strength was one officer and thirty-seven other ranks.    
 The 1944 armoured division variant of the towed Canadian RCA Field Regiment was a divisional 
artillery asset.  Like other field regiments, it consisted of three batteries and a RHQ.  The regiment’s 
primary role was providing indirect fire support at the divisional level.  It could also provide direct fire 
                                                          
12 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries.  January 1944.  Infantry Division War Establishment 
Staff Tables Field Artillery Regiment, towed WE   II/190B/1 Effective 30. 11.44. T-7093. 
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Table A.8: Self Propelled (SP) RCA Field Artillery Regiment, (Armoured Division) January 194513  
 
Company or 
Platoon 
Sub units  
Strength Officers 
&Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  Anti-Aircraft troop 
RCEME LAD (D) 
9-60 
1 x RCA Observation Post (OP) tank, 8 x towed 20mm AA guns  
 
 A Battery  2 x SP Field Artillery 
troops 
10-183 
8 x SP 25-Pdr Sexton howitzers 
4 x Observation Post (OP) tanks 
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery  As above As above 
Totals 38-609 24 x SP 25-Pdr Sexton howitzers, 8 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft guns, 13 x 
Observation Post (OP) tanks 
support against infantry or armoured targets by firing over open sights.  There was one regiment of this 
type established for each Canadian armoured division, for a total of two.  These operated in conjunction 
with the SP RCA field regiments within armoured divisions.  The towed field regiment within an 
armoured division contained a different war establishment than that of a towed field regiment in an 
infantry division. The most notable difference was a limited allocation of OP tanks, as its FOOs were 
required to go forward with the armoured squadrons.  It only had six OP tanks on its establishment versus 
the thirteen of the SP field regiment.  It also had a limited number of Universal tracked carriers, having 
only three.  Like all field regiments, its batteries were equipped with a total of twenty-four 25-Pounder 
towed howitzers and the RHQ contained a troop of towed 20mm anti-aircraft guns.  B vehicles as of 
January 1945 consisted of twenty-one cars and 103 trucks of GS and specialist design, including thirty-six 
artillery tractors.  The regiment also contained twenty-six motorcycles and twenty-two trailers.  The 
RCEME LAD type “B” was one officer and thirteen other ranks. 
 The Canadian Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) towed RCA Medium Regiment as of 
October 1944 was an army level artillery asset.  It consisted of two batteries of eight 4.5 or 5.5-Inch 
towed guns each for a total of sixteen guns per regiment.  Each battery was divided into two troops of 
                                                          
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Field Artillery Regiment, self-propelled WE II/190A/2 January 1945. 
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Table A.9: Towed RCA Field Artillery Regiment, (Armoured Division) January 194514  
 
Company or 
Platoon 
Sub units  
Strength Officers 
&Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  Anti-Aircraft troop 
RCEME LAD (B) 
8-62 
8 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft (AA) guns towed 
 
 A Battery  2 x towed Field 
Artillery troops 
10-192 
8 x towed 25-Pdrs howitzers  
2 x Observation Post (OP) tanks. 1 x Universal Carrier 
B Battery As above As above  
C Battery  As above As above 
Totals 38-638 24 x towed 25-Pdr howitzers, 8 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft guns, 6 x 
Observation Post (OP) tanks, 3 x Universal Carriers  
four guns each.  The medium regiments were held at the AGRA level and controlled by the army level 
AGRA artillery command structure.  The primary role of these regiments were to provide flexible heavy 
indirect fire support wherever it was needed, working in close cooperation with field artillery regiments at 
the divisional level.  The Canadian Army in NWE had no super-heavy artillery regiments, and these 
regiments were the most powerful indirect assets the First Canadian Army possessed.     
 A total of six RCA medium regiments were raised to establish both the 1st and 2nd Army Group 
Royal Canadian Artillery (AGRA) formations.  These regiments served in both Italy and NWE, three to 
an AGRA.  All six were to come together in spring 1945 due to the redeployment of the 1st Canadian 
Corps to NWE.  Three were equipped with 5.5-Inch guns, and the other three with 4.5-Inch variants due 
to a shortage of 5.5-Inch artillery pieces.  These regiments did not have an anti-aircraft troop.  B vehicles 
consisted of eleven cars and eighty-four trucks of various types, including eighteen artillery tractors.  This 
vehicle pool was supplemented by sixteen trailers and nineteen motorcycles. The RCEME light aid 
detachment type “B” consisted of one officer and thirteen other ranks.  As noted previously, there was 
also one self-propelled field regiment allocated to each of the 1st  and 2nd Canadian AGRA organizations.  
These regiments, designated Army Field Artillery Regiments, worked in conjunction with the medium 
                                                          
14 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables Field Artillery Regiment, towed WE  II/190B/1 January 1945. 
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regiments to supplement divisional artillery assets.  The self-propelled AGRA field regiments were 
equipped identically to that of the self-propelled regiments attached to the armoured divisions.15 
Table A.10: AGRA RCA Medium Regiment (Army Troops) October 194416 
 
Company or Platoon Sub units  
Strength Officers & Men 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  RCEME LAD (B) - 
A Battery 2 x towed Medium Artillery troops  8 x towed 5.5 or 4.5-Inch howitzers  
B Battery  As above As above  
Totals: 28-540 16 x towed 5.5 or 4.5-Inch howitzers, 6 x Universal Carriers. 
 At the corps level as of October 1944 there were two RCA Survey Regiments of battalion 
strength, each consisting of two batteries.  The battlefield roles of these units were artillery flash-spotting, 
sound ranging and survey duties.  They worked closely with army level AGRA and divisional artillery 
assets to allow indirect fire to be as accurate as possible.  In this role they operated close to the front lines 
within armoured and infantry division’s areas of operation.  These regiments did not have any major 
weapons systems past small arms, and operated sophisticated non-gun artillery equipment to accomplish 
their tasks.  B vehicles consisted of thirty-nine cars and 117 trucks, of which twelve were M-14 half 
tracks.  Additional vehicles and trailers consisted of forty-five motorcycles and thirty-four  trailers.  The 
attached LAD type “A” consisted of one officer and fifteen other ranks.  
Table A.11: RCA Survey Regiment (Corps Troops) October 194417 
 
Company or Platoon Sub units Strength Officers & Men Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  RHQ Airburst ranging troop 
RCEME LAD (A) 
_ 
A Battery Flash spotting troop 
Sound ranging troop 
Survey troop 
_ 
B Battery  As above - 
Totals: 34-589 - 
 The corps level RCA Anti-Tank Regiment as of October 1944 was an anti-tank unit whose 
primary role was to compliment divisional anti-tank units.  It could be deployed at the divisional level 
                                                          
15 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  AGRA War Establishment 
Staff Tables AGRA RCA Field Artillery Regiment, self-propelled WE II/190A/2 October 1944. 
16 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  AGRA War Establishment 
Staff Tables AGRA RCA Medium Artillery Regiment, towed WE II/10/3 October 1944. 
17 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944. T-7092.  Corps Troops War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Survey Regiment, WE III/13/5 October 1944. 
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where needed.  It contained four batteries in late 1944.  Two batteries operated towed 17-Pounder anti- 
tanks guns and two batteries were self-propelled, operating M-10 3-Inch gunned tank destroyers.  In the 
spring of 1945 these were exchanged for Valentine Archer 17-Pounder tank destroyers.  It was a very rare 
unit in that it also operated turret less tank chassis artillery towers, Universal Carriers and Valentine 
Charger artillery command tanks.  It also did not have any anti-aircraft guns attached to it.  B vehicles 
consisted of twenty-two cars and ninety-four trucks.  Of this latter number twenty-four were artillery 
tractors and four were M-14 half tracks.  This vehicle total was supplemented by twenty-five trailers and 
twenty motorcycles.  The RCEME LAD type “D” strength was one officer and forty-two other ranks.  
This high number of personnel in this LAD was due to the large number of specialist vehicles and 
weapons systems present within the regiment. 
Table A.12: RCA Anti-Tank Regiment (Corps Troops) October 194418  
 
Tactical 
Grouping  
Sub units Strength 
Officers & Men 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ RCEME LAD (D) - 
A Battery 3 x SP A/T troops 12 x M-10 3-Inch Tank Destroyers, 6 x 2-Inch mortars, 3 x Universal Carriers, 4 x 
Valentine Charger Command tanks 
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery 3x towed A/T troops 12 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 6 x 2-Inch mortars, 3 x Universal Carriers, 14 x 
armoured towers  
D Battery As above As above 
Totals:  38-765 24 x M-10 3-Inch Tank Destroyers, 24 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 24 x 2-Inch 
mortars, 12 x Universal Carriers, 8 x Valentine Charger Command tanks, 28 x 
artillery towers 
 The armoured division variant of the RCA Anti-Tank Regiment as of January 1945 was a 
divisional anti-tank asset.  It could be deployed where needed to bolster an infantry or armour brigade’s 
anti-tank capability.  It contained four batteries in early 1945.  Two batteries operated towed 17-Pounder 
anti-tanks guns and two batteries were self-propelled, operating the M-10 17-Pounder tank destroyers.  It 
also operational Universal Carriers, 20mm anti-aircraft guns and 2-Inch mortars.  B vehicles consisted of 
twenty-eight cars and 103 trucks.  Of this latter number twenty-six were artillery tractors.  This vehicle 
total was supplemented by twenty-six  trailers and twenty motorcycles.  The RCEME LAD type “D” 
strength was one officer and forty-two other ranks.   
                                                          
18 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries.  October 1944.  Corps Troops War Establishment 
Staff Tables RCA Anti-Tank Regiment, WE III/308/1, III/309/1, III/310/10  Effective 23.10.44. T-7092. 
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Table A.13: RCA Anti-Tank Regiment (Armoured Division) January 194519 
 
Tactical 
Grouping  
Sub units Strength 
Officers & Men 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ RCEME LAD (D) 
Anti-Aircraft troop 
9-57 
5 x towed 20mm anti-aircraft guns  
A Battery 3 x SP A/T troops 
7-169 
12 x M-10 Achilles 17-Pdr Tank Destroyers 
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery 3x towed A/T troops   
7-173 
12 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 3 x 2-Inch mortars, 9 x Universal Carriers 
D Battery As above As above 
Totals:  37-741 24 x M-10 17-Pdr Tank Destroyers, 24 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 12 x 2-Inch 
mortars, 18 x Universal Carriers, 5 x towed 20mm AA guns  
 The infantry division variant of the RCA anti-tank regiment as of January 1945 was a divisional 
anti-tank asset that was deployed to support the infantry brigades.  As a divisional unit, this regiment was 
designed to work in conjunction with the anti-tank platoons at the infantry regiment level.  Unlike other 
anti-tank regiments, it contained only three batteries in early 1945, the first being equipped with towed 
17-Pounder anti-tank guns.  The second battery operated self-propelled Valentine Archer 17-Pounder tank  
Table A.14: RCA Anti-Tank Regiment (Infantry Division) January 194520 
 
Tactical 
Grouping  
Sub units  
Strength Officers 
& Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ RCEME LAD 
(D) 
1 x towed 20 mm anti-aircraft gun  
A Battery 3 x SP A/T troops  12 x Valentine Archer 17-Pdr Tank Destroyers 
B Battery 3 x towed A/T 
troops 
12 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 24 x T-16 (gun tractor) Carriers 
C Battery 4 x towed A/T 
troops 
16 x towed 6- Pdr A/T guns towed, 3 x 2-Inch mortars, 16 x Universal Carriers 
Totals:  35-614 12 x Valentine Archer 17-Pdr Tank Destroyers, 12 x towed 17-Pdr A/T guns, 16 x 
towed 6- Pdr A/T guns, 24 x 2-Inch mortars,  16 x Universal Carriers, 24 x T-16 (gun 
tractor) Carriers, 1 x 20mm AA gun towed 
anti-tank regiment variant was unique as it contained the only heavy AFVs within a 1945 Canadian  
destroyers.  The third battery contained four troops equipped with 6-Pounder towed anti-tank guns.  This  
infantry division.  The regiment also operated Universal Carriers, T-16 (gun tractor) Carriers, 2-Inch 
                                                          
19 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Anti-Tank Regiment (Armoured Division) WE II/181/186/188/2 Effective January 1945. 
20 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Infantry Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Anti-Tank Regiment (Infantry Division) WE II/181/186D/1 January 1945. 
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mortars and a single 20mm anti-aircraft gun.  B vehicles consisted of twenty-six cars and ninety-one 
trucks of GS and specialist types, sixteen of which were artillery tractors.  This vehicle count was 
supplemented by four trailers and twenty motorcycles.  The attached RCEME LAD type “D” consisted of 
one officer and forty-six other ranks. 
 The Canadian corps level light anti-aircraft (LAA) role was filled by the October 1944 RCA LAA 
Regiment corps troops variant.  There were two of these regiments established, one in each Canadian 
corps overseas.  This regiment could have its assets deployed at critical points on the battlefield to bolster 
the anti-aircraft defences of any front line unit.  It could also be deployed to protect line of 
communication rear area units, headquarters, supply dumps, bridges and other vital points.  As of October 
1944 this regiment contained three batteries, each with two troops.  One troop was equipped with SP 
truck-mounted 40mm anti-aircraft guns and the other was towed.  B vehicles consisted of twenty-six cars 
and ninety-five trucks, of which eighteen were the self-propelled mounts for 40mm anti-aircraft guns and 
eighteen were light artillery tractors.  This vehicle pool was supplemented by twenty-six trailers and 
thirty-eight motorcycles.  The RCEME LAA type “A” workshop personnel consisted of one officer and 
seventeen other ranks. 
Table A.15: RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Corps Troops) October 194421 
 
Tactical 
Grouping  
Sub units  
Strength Officers & Other Ranks 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  RCEME Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (A) - 
A Battery  1 x SP anti-aircraft troop, 1 x towed anti-
aircraft troop 
6 x SP 40 mm AA guns, 6 x towed 40mm AA guns  
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery As above As above 
Totals: 34-551 18 x SP 40mm anti-aircraft guns, 18 x towed 40mm 
anti-aircraft guns  
 The LAA role within a Canadian infantry division as of January 1945 was filled by the RCA 
LAA Regiment infantry division variant.  This type of light anti-aircraft regiment contained three 
batteries, each with two troops.  Both were equipped with 40mm anti-aircraft guns.  One troop was SP 
with their AA guns mounted on trucks and the other was towed.  There were three of these regiments 
                                                          
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Corps Troops War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, WE III/12C/3 III/12A/3 October 1944. 
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established, one for each Canadian infantry division.  This regiment could have its assets deployed at 
critical points on the battlefield to provide effective anti-aircraft defence.  It could also be deployed to 
protect headquarters, assembly areas and other areas of importance.  B vehicles consisted of twenty-nine 
cars and 110 trucks, of which eighteen were 3-ton self-propelled mounts for 40mm AA guns and twenty-
four were light artillery tractors.  Also attached were thirty trailers and thirty-eight motorcycles.  The 
RCEME LAA workshop type “A” consisted of one officer and seventeen other ranks.  
Table A.16: RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Infantry Division) January 194522 
 
Tactical 
Grouping  
Sub units  
Strength Officers & Men 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  RCEME Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (A)  
A Battery  1 x SP troop of anti-aircraft  guns, 1 x troop of 
towed anti-aircraft guns  
6 x SP 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 6 x towed 40mm 
anti-aircraft guns 
B Battery As above As above 
C Battery As above As above 
Totals: 34-551 18 x SP 40mm anti-aircraft guns, 18 x towed 
40mm anti-aircraft guns. 
 Anti-aircraft assets at the armoured division level were provided by the late 1944 RCA LAA 
Regiment armoured division variant.  There were two of these regiments established, one for each 
Canadian armoured division.  This regiment was entirely self-propelled and consisted of three batteries 
mounted on 3-ton trucks.  Each battery had two troops, both equipped with SP 40mm AA guns.  This 
regiment would be deployed to provide effective light-anti aircraft defence for the divisional area of 
operations.  It could also be deployed to protect headquarters, assembly areas and other points of 
importance.  B vehicles consisted of twenty-nine cars and 128 trucks, of which thirty-six were the self-
propelled mounts for 40mm AA guns and twelve were light artillery tractors.  This total was 
supplemented by thirty trailers and thirty-eight motorcycles.  The attached LAA workshop type "A" 
consisted of one officer and twenty-eight other ranks.   
 In conclusion, the tables supplied in this appendix illustrate how Canadian combat arms 
regiments appeared on paper as of October 1944 at the corps level and January 1945 at the divisional and 
independent brigade level.  These war establishment organizational tables set out what they were 
                                                          
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Infantry Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Infantry Division) WE II/179/180A/1 January 1945. 
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Table A.17: RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Armoured Division) January 194523 
 
Tactical Grouping  Sub units  
Strength Officers & Men 
Total heavy weapons & AFVs 
RHQ  RCEME Light Anti-Aircraft Workshop (A)  
A Battery  2 x SP Troop of anti-aircraft guns 12 x SP 40 mm anti-aircraft guns,  
B Battery  As above as above 
C Battery As above as above 
Totals: 34-551 36x SP 40mm anti-aircraft guns 
authorized to contain under 21st Army Group regulations.  Reality in the field could be different, but for 
the majority of cases the organization tables were adhered to.  Combat losses often caused temporary 
organizational changes, such as the reduction of a squadron to three troops or the disbandment of an 
infantry company.  Also, command decisions to replace unit’s vehicles and equipment in the field were 
often taken before war establishment  tables could be amended.  This practice often left units with items 
that they were not officially authorized.  By reviewing the above war establishment tables, the reader can 
appreciate the significance or lack thereof of unit losses  presented within later appendices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  Armoured Division War 
Establishment Staff Tables RCA Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Armoured Division) WE II/179/3 & 180/2 January 1945. 
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Appendix 2: The 1st Canadian Infantry Division statistics March-May 1945
Table B.1: The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Royal Canadian Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month1 
Personnel 
reinforcements2 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 43-81 109 35-7783 
05.05.45 0-3 9  35-7814 
Totals  43-84 (127) 118 _ 
 
Table B.2: The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment  
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for  
given month5  
Personnel  
reinforcements6  
Strength O-ORs end of  
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 50-19 144 39-7767 
05.05.45 0-7 32 38-8318 
Totals  50-26 (76) 176 _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
1LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
2 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,655.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
3 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
4 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
5LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
7 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.3: The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade: The 48th Highlanders of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for  
given month 9  
Personnel  
reinforcements10 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 62-61 103 38-78611 
05.05.45 0-1 25 38-79312 
Totals  62-62 (124 ) 128 _ 
 
Table B.4: The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for  
given month 13  
Personnel reinforcements14 Strength O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 55-43 126 38-82715 
05.05.45 0-7 6 38-78816 
Totals  55-50 (105) 132 _ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
11LAC , RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
14 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
16 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.5: The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month17  
Personnel 
reinforcements18 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 45-23 154 39-85319 
05.05.45 0-10 1 39-79620 
Totals  45- 33 (78) 155 _ 
 
Table B.6: The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Loyal Edmonton Regiment: 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month 21  
Personnel 
reinforcements22 
Strength O-ORS end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 97-27 160 36-82523 
05.05.45 0-7 20 41-80724 
Totals  97-34 ( 131) 180 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096 .  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
19 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
20 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
21LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
23 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
24 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.7: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade: Le Royal 22e Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month25  
Personnel 
reinforcements26 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 67-25 153 37-80727 
05.05.45 0-6 34 36-80228 
Totals  67- 31 (98) 187 _ 
 
Table B.8: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Carlton and York Regiment: 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month29  
Personnel 
reinforcements30 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 63-27 101 36-81531 
05.05.45 0-6 26 37-79032 
Totals  63-33 (96) 127 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties.  
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
27 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
28 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
30 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements.   
31 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April, 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
32 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.9: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade: The West Nova Scotia Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month33  
Personnel 
reinforcements34 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_   _ 38-812 
30.04.45 33-25 93 37-80135 
05.05.45 1-7 35 39-81836 
Totals  34- 32 (66) 128 _ 
 
Table B.10: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: The Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine Gun) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month37  
Personnel 
reinforcements38 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 37-701 
30.04.45 10-32 14 37-69239 
05.05.45 0-1 4 37-66640 
Totals  10- 33 (43) 18 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
34 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
36 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
39 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
40 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.11: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: The 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month41  
Personnel 
reinforcements42 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 43-777 
30.04.45 2-19 10 40-76143 
05.05.45 0-2 0 36-75844 
Totals  2-21 (23) 10 _ 
 
Table B.12: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month45  
Personnel 
reinforcements46 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month  
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 35-614 
30.04.45 1- 3 40 35-57847 
05.05.45 0-1 0 35-54948 
Totals  1-4 (5) 40 _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13, 665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,205.  4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-12649.  Battle and non-battle 
casualties. 
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,205.  4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-12649.  Reinforcements. 
43 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
44 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-18,863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-16449.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-16449.  Reinforcements. 
47 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
48 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.13: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 1st Field Regiment, RCHA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month49  
Personnel 
reinforcements50 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month  
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-638 
30.04.45 10-10 13 38-61351 
05.05.45 0-3 13 37-59652 
Totals  10-13 (23) 26 _ 
 
Table B.14: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 2nd Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month53  
Personnel 
reinforcements54 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month  
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-638 
30.04.45 2-3 17 37-61855 
05.05.45 0-0 0 39-59956 
Totals  2-3 (5) 17 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,412.  1st Field Regiment, RCHA, War Diaries April-May 1945  T-15928.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
50 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,412.  1st RCHA Field Regiment War Diary April-May 1945.  T-15928.  Reinforcements. 
51 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
52 LAC, RG 24, Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
53  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May, 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,419.  2nd Field Regiment, RCA, War Diary April-May 1945.  T-15936.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
54 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,419.  2nd Field Regiment RCA, War Diary April-May 1945.  T-15936.  Reinforcements. 
55 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
56 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.15: The 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 3rd Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month57  
Personnel 
reinforcements58 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-638 
30.04.45 0-11 13 35-60759 
05.05.45 0-17 12 34-60760 
Totals  0-28 (28) 25 _ 
 
Table B.16: 1st Canadian Infantry Division: 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month61  
Personnel 
reinforcements62  
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 34-551 
30.04.45 4-0 14 33-54263 
05.05.45 0-0 0 28-51964 
Totals  4-0 (4) 14 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,437.  3rd Field Regiment, RCA, War Diary April-May 1945.  T-15956.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
58 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,437.  3rd Field Regiment, RCA, War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-15956.  Reinforcements. 
59 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
60 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
61 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708, 13, 709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May, 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,589.  2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1639.  Battle and non-battle casualties  
62LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708-13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1862-1863.  LAC, RG24 
Volume 14,589.  2nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-1639.  Reinforcements. 
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
64 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table B.17: A vehicle/weapons state: 1st Canadian Infantry Division March-April 194565 
A Vehicle/weapons 
system 
17-Pdr Valentine 
Archer SP 
Valentine 
Charger 
6-Pdr A/T 
guns 
 17-Pdr A/T 
guns 
25-Pdr 
towed  
WE 30.04.45 18 11 62 18 72 
31.03.45 18 No data 62 17 0 
30.04.45 18 0 57 19 71 
Monthly averages 18 0 60 18 36 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2: 
A Vehicle/weapons 
system 
20 mm 
AA Quad 
40 mm 
AA towed 
40 mm 
AA SP 
4.2-Inch 
mortar 
2-Inch 
mortar 
3-Inch 
mortar 
.303 Vickers 
MMG 
WE 30.04.45 12 12 12 16 283 60 40 
31.03.45 0 18 18 16 252 54 35 
30.04.45 0 12 18 16 279 60 39 
Monthly averages 0 15 18 16 266 57 37 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 3: 
A Vehicle/weapons 
system 
Universal 
Carriers 
T-16 (gun 
tractor) 
Carriers 
Wasp II 
Carriers 
MMG (Medium 
Machine Gun) 
Carriers 
4.2 & 3-Inch 
Mortar 
Carrier 
WE 30.04.45 277 120 0 36 69 
31.03.45 No data No data No data No data No data 
30.04.45 255 0 24 23 56 
Monthly averages 255 0 24 23 56 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 4; 
A Vehicle/weapons 
system 
4.2-Inch Mortar 
Carrier 
Windsor 
Carrier 
AOP Carriers Scout Cars all 
makes 
Armd Cars all 
makes 
WE 30.04.45 32 0 9 24 31 
31.03.45 No data No data No data No data No data 
30.04.45 0 12 0 13 24 
Monthly averages 0 12 0 13 24 
 
Table B.18: 1st Canadian Infantry Division heavy AFV deliveries  by the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment, 
March-April 1945 
Month 17-Pdr Valentine Archer SP 
deliveries 
Valentine Charger  
deliveries 
03.45 0 0 
04.45 1866 0 
Totals 18 0 
 
                                                          
65 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6). LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  1st Canadian Corps were not included in 
the 31 March 1945 Equipment State report.  The 4th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment did not report A vehicle data for the 30 
April 1945 A and B Vehicle Position Report.  This regiment was training and re-equipping in the March-May 1945 period, and 
saw limited if any action. 
66 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,556.  1st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April, 1945.  T-16449.  Eighteen 17-Pounder Valentine 
Archer tank destroyers were delivered by 10 April 1945. 
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Appendix 3: The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division statistics July 1944-May 1945
Table C.1: The 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Royal Regiment of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month1 
Personnel 
reinforcements2  
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
29.07.44 387-583 334 35-6224 
30.08.44 250-975 199 26-5236 
30.09.44 144-847 102 37-7048 
31.10.44 150-419 323 35-77210 
30.11.44 16-65 104 35-76911 
31.12.44 26-55 130 40-79512 
31.01.45 7-71 100 39-80713 
28.02.45 144-73 198 38-77414 
31.03.45 142-113 274 40-79815 
30.04.45 123-88 140 40-77516 
05.05.45 0-9 69 41-83417 
Totals  1,389-754 (2,143) 1,973 _ 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  Months July-September 1944.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 
(D203).  Return showing battle and non battle in NWE.  June-September 1944 by week. 
2 LAC, RG24 Volumes 7091-7096.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG24 Volume 
15,226.  Royal Regiment of Canada War Diaries July-September 1944.   
3 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non 
battle NWE June-September 1944 by week.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944.  
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,226.  The Royal Regiment of Canada War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non 
battle NWE June-September 1944 by week.  3- 30 August 1944 total. 
6 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non 
battle NWE June-September 1944 by week.  31 August-4 October 1944 total. 
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659. First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
9 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659. First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October, 1944. T-7092.  Minus totals 1-4 October, 1944.  
16 battle, 6 non-battle. 
10 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
13 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
14 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
16 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
17 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.2: The 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month18  
Personnel 
reinforcements19 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
29.07.44 219-2620 298 32-77021 
30.08.44 285-7622 83 35-62023 
31.09.44 112-7824 87 31-58725 
31.10.44 310-1326 427 27-75627 
30.11.44 45-58 102 37-78328 
31.12.44 35-61 133 36-81329 
31.01.45 1-63 107 39-81830 
28.02.45 191-66 267 35-83731 
31.03.45 217-109 281 38-80432 
30.04.45 112-133 210 36-77733 
05.05.45 10-17 46 36-79634 
Totals  1,537-700 (2,237) 2,041 _ 
 
                                                          
18 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties in NWE.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
19 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volumes 15,216.  The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry War Diaries July-September 1944.    
20 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,216.  The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry War Diary July 1944.  Field return 29 July 1944. 
22 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
23 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009.(D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August -4 October 1944.   
25 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,216.  The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return. 
26 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.   Minus totals 1-4 October 1944.  
58 battle, 5 non-battle. 
27 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
28 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
29 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
30 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
31 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
32 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
33 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
34 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.3: The 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Essex Scottish Regiment  
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given month 35  
Personnel reinforcements36 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
28.07.44 348-3437 215 39-73538 
30.08.44 265-8639 340 30-54640 
30.09.44 169-5341 320 35-70542 
31.10.44 216-4843 240 29-75744 
30.11.44 41-33 114 38-81845 
31.12.44 7-52 98 39-81846 
31.01.45 22-68 78 39-80147 
28.02.45 288-53 360 38-82648 
31.03.45 249-86 322 38-81549 
30.04.45 74-99 159 34-80950 
05.05.45 8-5 11 31-81151 
Totals  1,687-617 (2,304) 2,257 _ 
 
 
                                                          
35 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009(D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
36 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volumes 15,061.  The Essex Scottish War Diaries July-September 1944 for reinforcement data.  
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,061.  The Essex Scottish Regiment War Diary July 1944.  28 July 1944 return. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944.  
40 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
42 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
43 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus totals 1-4 October 1944.  
13 battle, 6 non-battle. 
44 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October, 1944.  T-7092  31 October 1944 return. 
45 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
46 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
47 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
48 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
49 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
50 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
51 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.4: The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch)  
Date Total battle and non-battle 
casualties for given month 52  
Personnel reinforcements53 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
27.07.44 291-6554 251 32-41555 
30.08.44 406-8556 473 35-61957 
30.09.44 236-9758 400  29-71859 
31.10.44 280-8960 480 32-78061 
30.11.44 52-41 112 39-80862 
31.12.44 65-32 115 39-81763 
31.01.45 16-50 79 38-81764 
28.02.45 81-31 119 36-77665 
31.03.45 191-34 211 43-81766 
30.04.45 143-44 217 37-75367 
05.05.45 0-6 84 38-82868 
Totals  1,761-574 (2,335) 2,541 _ 
 
                                                          
52LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
53 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (The Black Watch) War Diaries July-September 1944.  Pt I orders. 
54 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
55 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,009.  The Royal Highland Regiment of Canada(The Black Watch) War Diary July 1944.  27 July 
1944 return.  
56 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944.  
57 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
58 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
59 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
60 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-4 
October 1944.  71 battle and 11 non-battle.  
61 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
62 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return.   
63 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
64 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
65LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
66 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
67 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
68 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.5: The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade: Le Regiment de Maisonneuve  
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given month69  
Personnel reinforcements70 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
29.07.44 192-5571 137 36-69072 
30.08.44 259-12073 248 30-53074 
30.09.44 93-5575 226 38-63176 
31.10.44 25-5077 146 38-67478 
30.11.44 1-38 124 38-73079 
31.12.44 13-41 115 43-76980 
31.01.45 2-31 102 45-80881 
28.02.45 95-50 114 39-76982 
31.03.45 102-84 246 42-80783 
30.04.45 168-49 197 37-77584 
05.05.45 2-10 112 37-85085 
Totals  952-583 (1,535) 1,767 _ 
                                                          
69 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945 for battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
70 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,188.  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve War Diaries July-September 1944.  July-September figures are estimates 
calculated by comparing losses against strength reports.  Pt I orders are missing.  
71 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
72 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,188.  Le Regiment de Maisonneuve War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
73 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944.  
74 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A &Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
75 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October, 1944.  
76 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
77 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-4 
October 1944.  17 battle and 1 non-battle. 
78 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
79 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
80 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
81 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
82 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
83 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
84 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
85 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.6: The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Calgary Highlanders 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given month86  
Personnel reinforcements87 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
25.07.44 230-3388 163 41-74689 
30.08.44 458-14590 499 29-48391 
30.09.44 319-11692 617 38-70393 
31.10.44 269-3394 213 30-72495 
30.11.44 23-3696 162 39-81497 
31.12.44 36-75 108 36-79998 
31.01.45 21-74 139 39-81299 
02.28.45 123-110 242 35-784100 
31.03.45 94-104 226 39-805101 
30.04.45 57-52 152 39-783102 
05.05.45 3-1 50 39-834103 
Totals  1,633-779 (2,412) 2,571 _ 
                                                          
86 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945 for battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
87 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,020.  The Calgary Highlanders War Diaries July-September 1944.  These are estimates as Pt I orders are missing.  
88 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August, 1944. 
89 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,020.  The Calgary Highlanders Regiment War Diary July 1944.  25 July 1944 return. 
90 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  The Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
91 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091. 30 August 1944 return. 
92 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
93 LAC RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries. September-October, 1944. T-7092.  30 September 
1944 return. 
94 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October, 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-4 
October 1944.  20 battle and 8 non-battle. 
95 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
96 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10516.  2nd Canadian Infantry Division Daily Casualty Log. File 215A21.009 (D146).  Battle casualties.   
LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  Non-battle losses. 
97 LAC,RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
98 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
99 LAC,RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
100 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
101 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
102 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
103 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  Canadian First Arm(y A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.7: The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade: Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given 
month104 
Personnel reinforcements105 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
15.07.44 273-27106 232 36-791107 
30.08.44 271-80108 105 37-485109 
30.09.44 101-35110 292 37-534111 
31.10.44 127-40112 248 37-638113 
30.11.44 47-60 186 36-696114 
31.12.44 28-67 127 37-707115 
31.01.45 31-64 149 38-735116 
28.02.45 63-46 126 37-763117 
31.03.45 79-69 187 42-816118 
30.04.45 112-63 83 40-786119 
05.05.45 16-9 45 38-808120 
Totals  1,148-560 (1,708) 1,780 _ 
 
                                                          
104 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  
105 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,065.  Les Fusilier Mont Royal War Diaries July-September 1944.  Pt I orders for reinforcement data. 
106 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
107 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,065.  Les Fusilier Mont Royal War Diary July 1944.  15 July 1944 return..  29 July 1944 is missing. 
108 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
109 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
110 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
111 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
112 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October, 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-
4 October 1944.  6 battle and 2 non-battle.  15 missing personnel rejoined the regiment.   
113 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
114 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
115 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December, 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return.  
116 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
117 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February  1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
118 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
119 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
120 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.8: The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada  
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given 
month121  
Personnel reinforcements122  Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
31.07.44 251-13123 226 35-778124 
30.08.44 335-75125 336 34-535126 
30.09.44 255-117127 421 38-631128 
31.10.44 133-72129 235 25-793130 
30.11.44 32-89 132 36-771131 
31.12.44 37-71 172 39-823132 
31.01.45 22-54 79 38-819133 
28.02.45 72-53 101 34-797134 
31.03.45 118-55 191 36-806135 
30.04.45 104-26 84 37-828136 
05.05.45 6-1 21 40-828137 
Totals  1,365-626 (1,991) 1,998 _ 
                                                          
121LAC, RG 24, Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
122LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries September 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,162.  The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada War Diaries July-September, 1944.  These are estimates 
calculated by comparing given unit strength returns and casualty figures on certain dates.  Pt I orders are missing.   
123LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
124LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,065.  The Queens Own Cameron Highlanders Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return..   
125LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
126LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
127 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
128 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
129 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-4 
October.  74 battle. 
130 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659. First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
131 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return.  
132 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
133 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
134 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
135 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return.  
136 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
137 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
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Table C.9: The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The South Saskatchewan Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given 
month138  
Personnel reinforcements139 Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
31.07.44 300-17140 252 34-741141 
30.08.44 282-110142 270 25-488143 
30.09.44 345-77144 752 32-703145 
31.10.44 157-102146 235 31-734147 
30.11.44 53-53 74 39-791148 
31.12.44 38-42 131 39-817149 
31.01.45 24-52 92 34-814150 
28.02.45 40-63 118 38-821151 
31.03.45 74-49 134 38-807152 
30.04.45 94-40 109 43-786153 
05.05.45 9-5 56 41-801154 
Totals  1,416-610 (2,026) 2,223 _ 
                                                          
138LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
139 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,262-15,263.  The South Saskatchewan Regiment War Diaries July-September, 1944.  These are estimates calculated 
by comparing given unit strength returns and casualty figures on certain dates.  Part I orders are missing. 
140 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
141  LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,262.  The South Saskatchewan Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return.  
142  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
143 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
144 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
145 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
146 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-4 
October, 1944.   29 battle and 10 non-battle. 
147 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
148 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
149 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December, 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
150 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
151 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
152 LAC, RG24  Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
153 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
154 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.10: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: Toronto Scottish Regiment (Machine Gun) 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given 
month155  
Personnel reinforcements156 Strength O-ORs end of 
month  
WE 01.45 _ _ 36-711 
28.07.44 117-25157 33 34-635158 
30.08.44 73-57159 115 37-679160 
30.09.44 54-33161 36 36-640162 
31.10.44 39-24163 168 37-724164 
30.11.44 8-38 35 37-677165 
31.12.44 2-33 66 36-701166 
31.01.45 0-32 89 38-719167 
28.02.45 23-33 61 36-718168 
31.03.45 11-44 108 44-720169 
30.04.45 19-53 77 40-698170 
05.05.45 0-4 18 43-704171 
Totals  346-376 (722) 806 _ 
 
                                                          
155 LAC, RG 24, Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and 
non-battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week.  
156 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,277.  The Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG) War Diaries July-September 1944.  Part I orders. 
157 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 29 June-2 August 1944. 
158 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,277.  The Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG) War Diary July 1944.  28 July 1944 return.  
159 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.   Totals 3-30 August 1944. 
160 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
161 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.  
162 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
163 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle 1-
4 October 1944.  10 battle and 4 non-battle.  
164 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October, 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
165 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
166 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
167 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
168 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
169 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
170 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
171 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.11: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: The 8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given 
month 172 
Personnel 
reinforcements173  
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 41-755 
28.07.44 39-17174 46 44-757175 
30.08.44 68-No data176 No data 35-695177 
30.09.44 32-8178 34 37-695179 
31.10.44 62-36 114 40-726180 
30.11.44 11-37 81 42-752181 
31.12.44 4-15 10 42-739182 
31.01.45 18-32 65 40-742183 
28.02.45 5-29 69 46-779184 
31.03.45 25-47 50 49-773185 
30.04.45 40-30 79 47-751186 
05.05.45 5-11 12 40-740187 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
                                                          
172 LAC, RG 24, Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945 for battle and non-
battle.  LAC, RG 24, Volume 14,225.  8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12688-12689.  Pt I 
orders battle and non-battle.   Complete War Diary for August 1944 is missing.   
173 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A& Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 14,225.  8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary July and September 1944.  T-12688-12689.  Pt I Orders. 
174 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,225.  8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary July 1944.  Part I Orders for battle and non-
battle.  
175 LAC RG 24, Volume 14,225.  8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12688.  28 July 1944 return. 
176 LAC, RG 24, Volume13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  12 August 1944 onward only 
for battle casualties only. 
177 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
178 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,225.  8th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary September 1944.  T-12689.  Pt I Orders for 
battle and non-battle. 
179 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
180 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
181 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
182 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
183 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
184 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
185 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
186 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
187 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.12: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given month 
188  
Personnel reinforcements189 
 
Strength O-ORs date given 
WE 01.45 _ _ 35-614 
29.07.44 117-26 52 33-585190 
26.08.44 70-19 157 33-664191 
30.09.44 6-1 21 32-672192 
28.10.44 48-11 17 35-639193 
25.11.44 2-6 5 34-657194 
30.12.44 5-2 12 35-654195 
27.01.45 0-5 3 36-646196 
24.02.45 8-4 0 36-620197 
31.03.45 7-0 7 36-605198 
28.04.45 6-3 No data 37-600199 
05.05.45 3-1 0 34-590200 
Totals  272-78 (350) Incomplete _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
188 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diaries July 1944-May 1945.  T-16452.  Pt I orders do not 
contain SOS strength lists.  All data is from war diary entries.  
189 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diaries July 1944-May 1945.  T-16452.  Pt I orders do not 
contain TOS strength lists.  All data is from war diary entries.  
190 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16452.  29 July 1944 return. 
191 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16452.   26 August 1944 return. 
192 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16452.  30 September 1944 
return. 
193 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16452.  28 October 1944 return. 
194 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16452.   25 November 1944 
return.. 
195 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16452.  30 December 1944 return 
196 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16452.  27 January 1945 return.. 
197 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16452.  24 February 1945 return. 
198 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16452.  31 March 1945 return. 
199 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16452.  28 April 1945 return. 
200 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,559.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16452.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.13: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: 4th Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength O-ORs End of 
Month 
WE 01.45 38-638 
15.07.44 38-633201 
26.08.44 38-615202 
30.09.44 36-626203 
28.10.44 38-626204 
25.11.44 37-616205 
30.12.44 38-622206 
27.01.45 35-621207 
24.02.45 35-603208 
31.03.45 38-612209 
28.04.45 37-603210 
05.05.45 38-612211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
201 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,441.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  15 July 1944 return. 
202 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,441.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  26 August 1944 return. 
203 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return. 
204 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  28 October 1944 return. 
205 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  25 November 1944 return. 
206 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.   4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  30 December  1944 return. 
207 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  27 January 1945 return. 
208 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  24 February 1945 return. 
209 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  31 March 1945 return. 
210 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.   4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  28 April 1945 return. 
211 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,442.  4th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.14: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: 5th Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 38-638 
29.07.44 37-609212 
26.08.44 37-631213 
30.09.44 39-626214 
28.10.44 37-639215 
25.11.44 38-625216 
30.12.44 37-615217 
27.01.45 37-623218 
24.02.45 38-602219 
30.03.45 37-610220 
27.04.45 37-601221 
04.05.45 38-585222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
212 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
213 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  26 August 1944 return. 
214 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return. 
215 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  28 October 1944. Return. 
216 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944. 25 November 1944 return.  
217 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  30 December 1944 return. 
218 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  27 January 1945 return. 
219 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  24 February 1945 return. 
220 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  30 March 1945 return. 
221 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  27 April 1945 return. 
222 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,445.  5th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  4 May 1945 return. 
306 
 
Table C.15: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: 6th Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 38-638 
29.07.44 36-609223 
26.08.44 35-600224 
30.09.44 38-623225 
28.10.44 38-619226? 
25.11.44 36-624227 
30.12.44 38-625228 
27.01.45 38-629229 
24.02.45 37-620230 
31.03.45 35-620231 
28.04.45 37-612232 
05.05.45 35-608233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
223 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14, 448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16144.  29 July 1944 return. 
224 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16144.  26 August 1944 return. 
225 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16144.  30 September 1945 return. 
226 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16144.  28 October 1944 return. 
227 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16144.  25 November 1944 return. 
228LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16144.  30 December 1944 return. 
229LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16144.   27 January 1945 return. 
230 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16144.  24 February 1945 return. 
231 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16144.  31 March 1945 return. 
232 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16144.  28 April 1945 return. .  
233 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,448.  6th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16144.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.16: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division: 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for given 
month234 
Personnel reinforcements235 
 
Strength O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 34-551 
29.07.44 14-5 28 41-799236 
26.08.44 13-6 No data 43-825237 
30.09.44 3-5 2 37-535238 
28.10.44 4-6 1 38-516239 
25.11.44 0-6 12 34-578240 
30.12.44 7-3 9 34-527241 
24.01.45 0-20 26 34-533242 
24.02.45 11-9 9 30-516243 
24.03.45 0-10 30 34-544244 
28.04.45 3-19 13   32-547245 
05.05.45 2-3 3 30-537246 
Totals  57-92 (149) 133 _ 
 
                                                          
234 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  16, 17 and 38 Batteries 3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diaries July 1944-May 
1945.  T-16741.  Battle and non-battle.  38 Battery war diary reports rarely mention battle or non-battle casualties July-August 
1944 .  This data is incomplete. 
235LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  16,17 and 38 Batteries 3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diaries July 1944-May 
1945.  T-16741.  Reinforcement data.   
236 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16741.  29 July 1944 return. 
237 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16741.  26 August 1944 
return. 
238 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-1674130.  30 September 
1944 return. 
239 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16741.  28 October 1944 
return. 
240LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16741.  25 November 
1944 return.  
241LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16741.  30 December 
1944 return. 
242LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1944.  T-16741.  27 January 1945 
return. 
243 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1944.  T-16741.  24 February 1945 
return. 
244 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1944.  T-16741.  24 March 1945 
return. 
245LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16741.  28 April 1945 return. 
246LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,591.  3rd Light-Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16741.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table C.17: A vehicle/weapons state 2nd Canadian Infantry Division July 1944-April 1945247 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Valentine -
Archer 17-
Pdr SP 
Valentine 
Charger 
6-Pdr A/T Guns 17-Pdr A/T 
Guns 
25-Pdr towed 
WE 30.04.45 18 11 62 18 72 
31.07.44 0 0 80 35 72 
31.08.44 0 0 77 32 72 
30.09.44 0 No data 78 32 72 
31.10.44 0 0 78 33 71 
31.11.44 0 0 78 32 72 
31.12.44 0 0 78 32 72 
31.01.45 6 0 78 12 72 
28.02.045 11 No data 78 12 72 
31.03.45 20 7 62 18 72 
30.04.45 19 6 62 19 72 
Monthly Averages 6 2 75 26 72 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2. 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
20mm 
AA 
Quad 
40mm AA 
towed 
40mm AA 
SP 
4.2-Inch 
mortar 
2-Inch 
mortar 
3-Inch 
mortar 
.303 
Vickers 
MMG 
WE 30.04.45 12 12 12 16 283 60 40 
31.07.44 0 36 18 16 226 55 No 
data 
31.08.44 0 36 18 14 259 60 No 
data 
30.09.44 0 18 17 17 271 59 No 
data 
31.10.44 0 18 18 17 259 60 No 
data 
31.11.44 0 18 18 17 277 61 No 
data 
31.12.44 0 18 18 17 277 61 No 
data 
31.01.45 0 18 18 18 283 60 45 
28.02.045 0 18 18 18 294 61 43 
31.03.45 0 18 18 19 291 57 44 
30.04.45 0 18 18 19 288 61 44 
Averages 0 22 18 17 273 60 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
247 LAC RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report .  File 215C1.083 (D6).  LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1) 
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A vehicle/weapons state part 3. 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Universal 
Carriers 
T-16 (gun tractor) 
Carriers 
MMG Carriers Mortar 3-Inch & 4.2-
Inch Carriers 
combined 
WE 30.04.45 241 120 0 69  
31.07.44 383 102 44 101 
31.08.44 319 124 40 61 
30.09.44 No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 278 138 3 69 
30.11.44 304 163 40 86 
31.12.44 303 170 46 91 
31.01.45 312 185 108 95 
28.02.45 No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 297 185 26 88 
30.04.45 255 149 0 67 
Monthly Averages 306 152 38 82 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 4. 
Vehicle/Weapons System AOP Carriers Scout Cars all makes Armd Cars all makes 
WE 30.04.45 9 23 31 
31.07.44 0 0 28 
31.08.44 0 0 25 
30.09.44 No data No data No data 
31.10.44 0 4 37 
30.11.44 0 3 40 
31.12.44 0 3 40 
31.01.45 0 8 30 
28.02.45 No data No data No data 
31.03.45 0 6 29 
30.04.45 0 20 25 
Monthly Averages 0 6 32 
 
Table C.18: 2nd Canadian Infantry Division heavy AFV deliveries248  
Month Valentine 
Archer 17-Pdr 
SP Deliveries 
Valentine 
Charger 
Deliveries 
07.44 0 0 
08.44 0 0 
09.44  0 0 
10.44 0 0 
11.44 0 0 
12.44 0 0 
01.45 6 0 
02.45 5 0 
03.45 10 7 
04.45 0 0 
Totals 21 7 
 
 
 
                                                          
248 LAC RG 24 Volume 14,560.  2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary.  T-16453.  January-April 1945. 
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Appendix 4: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division Statistics June 1944-May 1945
Table D.1: The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Royal Winnipeg Rifles 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for given month1 Personnel reinforcements2 Strength O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
30.06.44 436-353 449* 37-7904 
29.07.44 244-505 301* 29-8056 
30.08.44 137-777 22* 33-6098 
30.09.44 161-1079 300* 34-64010 
31.10.44 254-96 360 33-72511 
30.11.44 28-92 156 38-81812 
31.12.44 4-78 40 36-79813 
31.01.45 11-84 127 38-83714 
28.02.45 182-54 182 36-80515 
31.03.45 46-64 81 34-78016 
30.04.45 189-65 246 34-77617 
05.05.45 6-7 49 36-79318 
Totals  1,698-809 (2,507)  2,313 _ 
 
 
                                                          
1LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle.  1-4 October figures subtracted from 
October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
2LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944 – May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
3 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,233.  The Royal Winnipeg Rifles War Diary June 1944.  30 June 1944 strength return. 
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,233.  The Royal Winnipeg Rifles War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 strength return. 
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3 August-30 August1944. 
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
10 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
13 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
14 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February1945 return. 
16 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
17 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
18 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.2: The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Regina Rifle Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 19 
Personnel 
reinforcements20 
Strength: O-ORS end of 
month: 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 348-3321 347* 38-77822 
29.07.44 267-6623 301* 36-74824 
30.08.44 175-3325 88* 37-62726 
30.09.44 137-4927 231* 39-67028 
31.10.44 384-74 387 36-76629 
30.11.44 74-103 169 40-82030 
31.12.44 13-88 119 38-79231 
31.01.45 7-73 101 40-81532 
28.02.45 171-29 245 39-80933 
31.03.45 57-111 20 36-76734 
30.04.45 106-45 158 40-79035 
05.05.45 8-3 300 38-80936 
Totals  1,747-707 (2,454) 2,466 _ 
                                                          
19 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944 – May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle.  1-4 October figures subtracted from 
October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
20 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944 – May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
21 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
22LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,198.  The Regina Rifle Regiment War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
23 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
24LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,199.  The Regina Rifle Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3 August-30 August 1944. 
26 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A and Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
28 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September1944 return. 
29 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
30 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
31 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December1944 return. 
32 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
33 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
34 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
35 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
36 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.3: The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Canadian Scottish Regiment  
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 37 Personnel reinforcements38 Strength: O-ORs end of month: 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 294-5239 341* 33-81240 
29.07.44 160-8041 253* 39-81942 
30.08.44 192-10043 113* 36-64344 
30.09.44 37-9845 242* 37-74946 
31.10.44 217-70 216 34-72447 
30.11.44 35-76 148 40-80548 
31.12.44 3-129 141 39-80549 
31.01.45 5-81 97 41-81150 
28.02.45 196-85 309 36-79951 
31.03.45 65-88 131 36-76452 
30.04.45 182-61 265 34-76153 
05.05.45 8-10 42 35-78154 
Totals  1,394-930 (2,3240) 2,298 _ 
 
 
                                                          
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944 – May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle 1-4 October figures subtracted from 
October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
38 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944 – May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
40 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,036.  The Canadian Scottish Regiment War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
41LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,036.  The Canadian Scottish Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
43 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3 August-30 August 1944. 
44 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
46 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
47 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
48 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
49 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
50 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
51 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
52 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return 
53 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return 
54 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return 
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Table D.4: The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Queens Own Regiment of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 55 Personnel reinforcements56 Strength: O-ORs end of month: 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 257-2657 254* 37-78458 
31.07.44 240-7659 248* 35-71860 
30.08.44 167-4961 299* 35-80162 
30.09.44 122-4863 123* 37-75264 
31.10.44 146-29 222 34-72165 
30.11.44 20-27 79 38-81066 
31.12.44 48-52 63 31-76667 
31.01.45 6-75 173 40-80368 
28.02.45 103-49 66 35-73869 
30.03.45 58-69 214 36-82070 
30.04.45 110-36 104 39-79771 
05.05.45 7-6 33 41-81472 
Totals  1,284-542 (1,826) 1,878 _ 
 
 
                                                          
55 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
56 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
57 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
58 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,168.  The Queens Own Rifle Regiment of Canada War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
59LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
60 LAC , RG 24 Volume 15,169.  The Queen’s Own Rifle Regiment of Canada War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
61 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
62 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
64 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
65 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
66 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
67 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
68 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January1945 return. 
69 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
70 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
71 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
72 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.5: The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade: Le Regiment de la Chaudière 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 73 Personnel reinforcements74 Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 154-5575 139* 35-74576 
29.07.44 307-18177 509* 35-76678 
30.08.44 94-7979 181* 36-77380 
30.09.44 71-8781 167* 38-78082 
31.10.44 152-45 69 37-64883 
30.11.44 18-68 18984 39-76085 
31.12.44 9-43 94 37-78586 
31.01.45 22-65 127 43-79587 
28.02.45 89-53 99 39-73888 
31.03.45 56-76 219 42-81589 
30.04.45 94-30 98 43-80690 
05.05.45 10-4 28 41-79191 
Totals  1,076-786 (1,862) 1,919 _ 
 
 
                                                          
73 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October)  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
74 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
75 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
76LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,180.  Le Regiment de la Chaudière War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
77 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
78LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,180.  Le Regiment de la Chaudière War Diary July1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
79 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
80 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
81 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
82 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
83 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
84 Included in reinforcements are 75 missing rejoined personnel.  
85 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
86 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
87 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
88 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
89 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  30 March 1945 return. 
90 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
91 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.6: The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The North Shore Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 92 Personnel reinforcements93 Strength: O-ORs end of month: 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 191-5594 230* 37-79795 
29.07.44 415-10096 467* 36-75097 
30.08.44 215-7898 267* 35-72599 
30.09.44 101-75100 225* 36-773101 
31.10.44 105-112 188 35-726102 
30.11.44 9-46 70 38-806103 
31.12.44 9-63 69 38-796104 
31.01.45 19-77 116 38-811105 
28.02.45 104-61 100 35-748106 
31.03.45 88-58 195 38-785107 
30.04.45 70-28 118 39-802108 
05.05.45 3-10 51 42-827109 
Totals  1,329-763 (2,092) 2,096 _ 
 
 
                                                          
92 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
93 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
94 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
95 LAC , RG 24 Volume 15,127.  The North Shore Regiment War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
96 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
97 LAC , RG 24 Volume 15,127.  The North Shore Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
98LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
99 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658  First Canadian Army, A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
100LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
101 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army, A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
102 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
103 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army, A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
104 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
105 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army, A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
106 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February  1945 return. 
107 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
108 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
109 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May  1945 return. 
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Table D.7: The 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Highland Light Infantry of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for 
month given 110 
Personnel reinforcements111 Strength: O-ORs 
end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 71-19112 77* 37-800113 
31.07.44 348-35114 381* 37-798115 
30.08.44 79-53116 84* 37-750117 
30.09.44 132-53118 169* 36-735119 
31.10.44 179-50 189 33-777120 
30.11.44 27-54 90 40-807121 
31.12.44 12-59 98 37-813122 
31.01.45 10-94 98 37-807123 
28.02.45 34-50 98 43-810124 
31.03.45 166-114 203 33-787125 
30.04.45 61-37 54 39-812126 
05.05.45 3-4 24 41-847127 
Totals  1,122-622 (1,744) 1,565 _ 
                                                          
110LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-7096. Battle and non-battle. 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
111 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
112LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
113 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,076.  The Highland Light Infantry of Canada War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
114 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
115LAC , RG 24 Volume 15,076.  The Highland Light Infantry of Canada War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
116LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
117 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
118LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
119 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 August 1944 return. 
120 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
121 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
122 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
123 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
124 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
125 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
126 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
127 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.8: The 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 128 Personnel reinforcements129 Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
30.06.44 136-50130 163* 38-789131 
28.07.44 298-47132 279* 34-727133 
30.08.44 97-97134 237* 39-765135 
30.09.44 122-91136 189* 40-740137 
31.10.44 183-30 165 36-774138 
30.11.44 43-63 132 40-781139 
31.12.44 3-43 87 38-802140 
31.01.45 7-91 114 37-804141 
28.02.45 30-50 69 40-797142 
31.03.45 130-85 195 37-803143 
30.04.45 44-44 187 40-811144 
05.05.45 65-14 4 38-795145 
Totals  1,158-705 (1,863) 1,821 _ 
 
 
                                                          
128 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle. 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
129 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-T-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
130 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
131 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,270.  The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders War Diary  June 1944.  30 June 1944 return. 
132 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
133 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,270.  The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders War Diary July 1944.  28 July 1944 return. 
134 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
135 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return.   
136 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
137 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
138 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
139 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
140 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
141 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
142 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
143 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945  return. 
144 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
145 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May1945  return. 
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Table D.9: The 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given 146 Personnel reinforcements147  
 
Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 38-812 
24.06.44 354-77148 392* 38-773149 
29.07.44 344-68150 202* 29-572151 
30.08.44 183-96152 475* 40-757153 
30.09.44 136-91154 168* 36-702155 
31.10.44 173-49 225 37-726156 
30.11.44 12-61 177 37-826157 
31.12.44 8-66 72 34-819158 
31.01.45 16-78 135 42-802159 
28.02.45 67-65 106 37-803160 
31.03.45 216-80 185 38-812161 
30.04.45 49-56 108 40-811162 
05.05.45 18-9 35 40-829163 
Totals  1,576-796 (2,372) 2,280 _ 
 
 
                                                          
146 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week.  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War 
Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle. 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted from October 1944 
total battle and non-battle.  
147 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
148 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1 June-28 June 1944. 
149 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,122.  The North Nova Scotia Highlanders War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
150 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
151 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,122.  Nova Scotia Highlanders War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
152 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
153 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091. 30 August 1944 return.  
154 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 31 August-4 October 1944. 
155 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
156 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
157 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
158 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return.  
159 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
160 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
161 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
162 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
163 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
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Table D.10: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 164 
Personnel reinforcements for month 
given165 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 36-711 
30.06.44 107-13166 69* 35-661167 
28.07.44 73-33168 136* 36-690169 
30.08.44 54-33170 98* 35-702171 
30.09.44 44-36172 61* 37-681173 
31.10.44 30-33 231 37-719174 
30.11.44 4-37 21 37-694175 
31.12.44 0-35 44 37-710176 
31.01.45 1-44 54 37-794177 
28.02.45 4-24 16 40-724178 
31.03.45 10-50 49 42-718179 
30.04.45 12-57 50 41-716180 
05.05.45 2-9 2 42-703181 
Totals  341-404 (745) 831 _ 
 
 
                                                          
164LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September, 1944 totals by week.  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War 
Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-7096. Battle and non-battle. 1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted from October 1944 
total battle and non-battle.  
165 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945. T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months June-September 1944. 
166 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 1-28 June 1944. 
167 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,026.  The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) War Diary June 1944.  30 June 1944 return. 
168 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 29 June-2 August 1944. 
169 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,026.  The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG) War Diary July 1944.  28 July 1944 return. 
170 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 3-30 August 1944. 
171 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091. 30 August 1944 return. 
172 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Total 30 August – 4 October 1944. 
173 LAC RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
174 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
175 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
176 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
177 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
178 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
179 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
180 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
181 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.11: The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: The 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment  
(17th Duke of York Royal Canadian Hussars) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for 
month given 182* 
Personnel 
reinforcements183 
 
Strength: O-ORS end of 
month 
WE 01.45   41-755 
30.06.44 No data No data 40-770184 
29.07.44 No data No data 40-753185 
30.08.44 No data No data 43-722186 
30.09.44 60-No data No data 43-738187 
31.10.44 39-33 83 42-742188 
30.11.44 10-25 15 43-707189 
31.12.44 9-40 39 39-771190 
31.01.45 2-47 47 43-766191 
28.02.45 4-36 26 45-765192 
31.03.45 8-72 67 47-757193 
30.04.45 22-40 45 42-745194 
05.05.45 1-11 18 40-744195 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
 
                                                          
182LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Battle and non-battle figures.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,217.  7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diaries June-
September 1944.  T-12660.  *Accurate June-September 1944 non-battle and battle figures were not found and information is only 
partly available in the war diary. 
183 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096. 
184LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,217.  7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12660.  30 June 1944 return. 
185 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,217.  7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12660.  29 July 1944 return. 
186 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
187 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
188 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
189 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
190 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A &Q War Diary December 1944. T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
191 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A &  Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1944 return. 
192 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1944 return.  
193 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
194 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
195 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.12:3rd Canadian Infantry Division: 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA196 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 37-741 
30.06.44 36-645197 
29.07.44 33-630198 
25.08.44 36-603199 
29.09.44 35-653200 
27.10.44 37-640201 
24.11.44 36-613202 
29.12.44 36-624203 
26.01.45 36-632204 
23.02.45 33-605205 
30.03.45 35-603206 
30.04.45 35-599207 
04.05.45 35-624208 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
196 For this RCA regiment, only partial information was located for battle and non-battle casualties.  A partial accurate summary 
of all 3rd Canadian Infantry Division RCA casualties and reinforcements is located in Table D.17. 
197 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  T-16455.  30 June 1944 return. 
198 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16455.  28 July 1944 return. 
199 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd  Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16455.  25 August 1944 return. 
200 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16455.  29 September 1944 
return. 
201 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16455.  27 October 1944 return. 
202 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16455.  24 November 1944 
return.. 
203 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16455.  29 December 1944 
return. 
204 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16455.  26 January 1945 return. 
205 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16455.  23 February 1945 return. 
206 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd  Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16455.  30 March 1945 return. 
207 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16455.  27 April 1945 return. 
208LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,562.  3rd  Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16455.  4 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.13: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: 12th Field Regiment, RCA. 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 38-638 
24.06.44 42-633209 
29.07.44 39-636210 
26.08.44 38-627211 
30.09.44 38-628212 
28.10.44 38-626213 
25.11.44 38-630214 
30.12.44 38-628215 
27.01.45 38-626216 
24.02.45 36-605217 
31.03.45 39-620218 
25.04.45 37-626219 
05.05.45 39-631220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
209LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  T-16360.  24 June 1944 return. 
210 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16360.  29 July 1944 return. 
211 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16360.  26 August 1944 return. 
212 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September1944.  T-16360.  30 September 1944 return 
213 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16360.  28 October 1944 return 
214 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16360.  25 November 1944 return 
215 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16360.  30 December 1944 return 
216 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,461.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16360.  27 January 1945 return 
217 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,541.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16437.  24 February 1945 return. 
218 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,541.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16437.  31 March 1945 return. 
219 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,541.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16437.  25 April 1945 return. 
220 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,541.  12th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16437.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table D.13: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: 13th Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 38-638 
24.06.44 40-628221 
30.07.44 36-632222 
08.44 No data 
30.09.44 37-638223 
28.10.44 38-629224 
25.11.44 36-630225 
30.12.44 37-626226 
27.01.45 38-630227 
24.02.45 38-612228 
31.03.45 37-613229 
28.04.45 36-603230 
05.05.45 37-619231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
221 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  T-16363.  24 June 1944 return. 
222 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16363.  30 July 1944 return. 
223 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16363.  30 September 1944 return. 
224 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16363.  28 October 1944 return. 
225 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16364.  28 November 1944 return. 
226 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16364.  30 December 1944 return. 
227 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16364.  27 January 1945 return. 
228 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16364.  24 February 1945 return. 
229 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16364.  31 March 1945 return 
230 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16364.  28 April 1945 return 
231 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,465. 13th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16364.  5 May 1945 return 
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Table D.14: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: 14th Field Regiment, RCA. 
Date Strength: O-ORS for date given 
WE 01.45 38-638 
24.06.44 41-594232 
27.07.44 39-634233 
26.08.44 38-625234 
30.09.44 38-622235 
28.10.44 38-628236 
25.11.44 37-621237 
30.12.44 34-631238 
27.01.45 38-620239 
24.02.45 37-613240 
24.03.45 36-616241 
28.04.45 38-616242 
05.05.45 38-605243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
232 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,471.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  T-16371.  24 June 1944 return. 
233 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,471.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16371.  27 July 1944 return. 
234 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,471.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16371.  26 August 1944 return. 
235 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,471.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16371.  30 September 1944 return. 
236 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16372.  28 October1944 return. 
237 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16372.  25 November 1944 return. 
238 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16372.  30 December 1944 return. 
239 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16372.  27 January 1945 return. 
240 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16372.  24 February 1945 return. 
241 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,473.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16373.  24 March 1945 return. 
242 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,473.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16373.  28 April 1945 return 
243 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,473.  14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16373.  5 May 1945 return 
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Table D.16: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs 
for date given 
WE 01.45 34-551 
24.06.44 43-726244 
29.07.44 52-980245 
26.08.44 42-829246 
30.09.44 32-551247 
28.10.44 33-547248 
25.11.44 34-537249 
30.12.44 33-544250 
27.01.45 34-546251 
24.02.45 32-533252 
31.03.45 34-552253 
28.04.45 34-542254 
05.05.45 30-541255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
244 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
245 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
246 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  26 August 1944 return 
247 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  30 September 1944 return 
248 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  28 October 1944 return 
249 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  25 November 1944 return 
250 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  30 December 1944 return 
251 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,594.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  27 January 1945 return 
252 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,595.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  24 February 1945 return 
253 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,595.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  31 March 1945 return 
254LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,595.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  28 April 1945 return 
255 LAC, RG 24 volume 14,595.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  5 May 1945 return 
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Table D.17: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: Total divisional RCA battle and non-battle casualties & reinforcements by 
month June 1944- May 1945:256 
 
Date Battle-non-battle casualties for month given Personnel reinforcements for month given 
 
06.44 225- No data No data 
07.44 197- No data No data 
08.44 139- No data No data 
09.44 No data No data 
10.44 48-60 127 
11.44 40-94 105 
12.44 No data No data 
01.45 3-156 146 
02.45 44-108 116 
03.45 No data No data 
04.45 No data No data 
05.45 1-37 53 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
256 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,776-13,779.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division A & Q War Diaries.  6 June 1944 - 5 May 1945.  T-
10533-10537.  All RCA personnel for all five divisional RCA regiments combined. 
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Table D.18: A vehicle/weapons state 3rd Canadian Infantry Division June 1944–April 1945257 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Valentine 
Archer 
17-Pdr 
SP  
Valentine  
Charger  
M-10 3 -
Inch SP 
M7 
105mm 
SP  
6-Pdr A/T 
guns 
 17-Pdr 
A/T guns 
25-Pdr 
towed 
WE 30.04.45 18 11 0 0 62 18 72 
31.07.44 0 0 15 101 95 0 0 
31.08.44 0 0 15 52 96 0 72 
31.09.44 No data No data No data No data 94 0 72 
31.10.44 0 0 12 17 95 0 72 
31.11.44 0 0 9 0 94 0 72 
31.12.44 0 0 11 0 94 0 72 
31.01.45 12 0 0 0 78 12 72 
28.02.045 No data No data No data No data 78 12 72 
31.03.45 12 3 0 0 62 18 72 
30.04.45 14 3 0 0 61 17 72 
Monthly averages 5 1 8 21 85 6 65 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2. 
Vehicle/ 
Weapons 
System 
20mm 
AA Quad 
40mm AA 
towed 
40mm AA 
SP 
4.2 inch 
Mortar 
2 Inch 
mortar 
3 Inch 
mortar 
.303 
Vickers 
MMG 
WE 30.04.45 12 12 12 16 283 60 40 
31.07.44 0 0 54 16 269 63 No data 
31.08.44 0 0 36 18 286 61 No data 
31.09.44 0 0 36 16 275 61 No data 
31.10.44 0 0 36 16 257 60 No data 
31.11.44 0 18 18 16 266 61 No data 
31.12.44 0 18 18 18 292 60 No data 
31.01.45 0 18 18 18 290 61 36 
28.02.045 0 18 18 18 290 61 36 
31.03.45 0 18 18 18 308 60 36 
30.04.45 0 18 18 18 285 61 36 
Monthly 
averages 
0 11 27 17 282 61 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
257 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10553 File 215A21.085 (D1) 21st AG. 21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  LAC 
RG24 Volume 10,670 File 215C1.083 (D6). Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report (Non-Vehicle/AFV) 
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A vehicle/weapons state part 3. 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Universal 
Carriers 
T-16 (gun 
tractor) 
Carriers 
Wasp II MMG Carriers Mortar 3-Inch & 
4.2-Inch Carriers 
combined 
WE 30.04.45 313 120 0 72 133 
30.06.44 No data No data No data No data No data 
31.07.44 361 9 0 70 168 
31.08.44 349 13 1 67 170 
30.09.44 No data No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 351 24 6 55 158 
30.11.44 315 26 4 56 152 
31.12.44 331 28 15 64 154 
31.01.45 296 37 19 2 122 
28.02.45 No data No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 331 72 12 59 118 
30.04.45 362 100 36 88 125 
Monthly Averages 337 39 12 58 146 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 4. 
Vehicle/Weapons System AOP Carriers Scout Cars all makes Armd Cars all makes 
WE 30.04.45 9 25 31 
30.06.44 No data No data No data 
31.07.44 0 6 31 
31.08.44 0 5 31 
30.09.44 No data No data No data 
31.10.44 2 8 40 
30.11.44 0 14 37 
31.12.44 0 14 36 
31.01.45 1 14 36 
28.02.45 No data No data No data 
31.03.45 1 15 34 
30.04.45 1 28 30 
Monthly Averages 1 13 34 
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Table D.18: 3rd Canadian Infantry Division: New or repaired heavy AFVs delivered258 
Month Valentine 
Archer 17-Pdr 
SP 
Deliveries 
M-10 3-Inch SP 
Deliveries 
Valentine 
Charger 
Deliveries 
Month 0 0 0 
06.44 0 0 0 
07.44 0 3 0 
08.44 0 0 0 
09.44  0 0 0 
10.44 0 0 0 
11.44 0 0 0 
12.44 0 2 0 
01.45 12 0 0 
02.45 1 0 0 
03.45 1 0 3 
04.45 2 0 0 
Totals 16 5 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
258 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,652.  3rd Anti-Tank Regiment RCA War Diaries June 1944-May 1945.  T-16455.  All deliveries 
mentioned of heavy AFVs.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 
(D1) 
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Appendix 5: The 4th Canadian Armoured Division statistics August 1944-May 1945
Table E.1: The 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Governor General’s Foot 
Guards) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given1 
Personnel 
reinforcements2 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month: 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.08.44 124-Not reported 46 28-5513 
30.09.44 31-Not reported 63 36-5634 
31.10.44 28-27 161 37-5355 
30.11.44 15-36 158 37-5806 
31.12.44 0-33 54 39-5807 
31.01.45 0-24 83 37-5718 
28.02.45 12-26 125 35-5969 
31.03.45 23-41 180 38-63110 
30.04.45 39-16 98 36-64511 
05.05.45 7-6 18 37-64812 
Totals  279-Incomplete  986 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 LAC, Volumes 13,659 – 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries September 1944-May 1945.  Consolidated daily 
casualty and strength returns.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,255.  21st Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diaries August-September 
1944.  Pt I orders for August-September 1944. 
2 LAC, Volumes 13,659 – 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Consolidated daily 
casualty and strength returns.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,255.  21st Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diaries August-September 
1944.  Pt I orders for August-September 1944. 
3 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
4 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
5 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October  1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
6 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November,1944 return. 
7 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
9 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
10 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
11 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A &  Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
12 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
331 
 
Table E.2: The 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Canadian Grenadier 
Guards). 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given13 
Personnel 
reinforcements14 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.08.44 140-17 210 30-52615 
30.09.44 41-16 74 34-51116 
31.10.44 22-39 129 37-57717 
30.11.44 13-66 102 36-59618 
31.12.44 1-28 62 36-60419 
31.01.45 1-31 52 36-58920 
28.02.45 21-15 85 30-58321 
31.03.45 28-34 184 38-65622 
30.04.45 36-23 79 36-64723 
05.05.45 11-3 24 36-64824 
Totals 314-272 (586) 1,001 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 LAC, Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q  War Diaries September 1944-May 1945.  Consolidated daily 
casualty and strength returns for battle and non-battle.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,260.  22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment War 
Diaries August-September 1944.  T-12727.  Pt I Orders for August-September 1944. 
14 LAC, Volumes 13,659 – 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q  War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  Consolidated daily 
casualty and strength returns.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,260-14,261.  22nd Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary August-
September 1944.  T-12727.  Pt I Orders for August-September 1944. 
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
16 LAC RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
17 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092  31 October 1944 return. 
18 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
19 LAC, RG24  Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
20 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
21 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
22 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
23 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
24 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.3: The 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia 
Regiment)  
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given25 
Personnel reinforcements 
26 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
  38-647 
30.08.44 171-Not reported 121 36-58927 
30.09.44 20-Not reported 51328* 39-58429 
31.10.44 25-19 104 35-59430 
30.11.44 0-27 85 38-60431 
31.12.44 2-59 65 37-60732 
31.01.45 0-41 65 37-60833 
28.02.45 12-34 95 36-63134 
31.03.45 57-34 170 38-65935 
30.04.45 63-21 51 36-65836 
05.05.45 4-4 11 37-65137 
Totals 354-Incomplete 1,280 _ 
 
 
                                                          
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries September 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Daily consolidated casualty and strength returns.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured  Regiment War Diary 
August 1944.  T-12764.  Pt I Orders. Appendix 6 Casualty list August 1944.   
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries September 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Daily consolidated casualty and strength returns.  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured  Regiment War Diaries 
August-September 1944.  T-12764-12765.  War Diary and Pt I orders 10-11 August 1944, War Diary and Pt I Orders September 
1944.  Total combined figure for postings to regiment for  August-September 1944 is 634 officers and other ranks.   .   
27 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
28 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292.  28th Canadian Armoured  Regiment War Diaries August-September 1944.  T-12764-12765.   Pt I 
orders.  During this month the Regiment attached a large number of personnel to the 25th Canadian Armoured Delver Regiment 
for training and to receive new AFVs.  The Pt I orders reflect a large number of personnel being posted in that may have already 
been in the regiment. 
29 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
30 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
31 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
32 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
33 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
34 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945. 
36 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
37 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.4: The 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 38 
Personnel 
reinforcements39 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 39-818 
30.08.44 184-4740 148* 32-74041 
30.09.44 96-4742 164* 38-73143 
31.10.44 100-5444 174 33-76245 
30.11.44 43-54 186 38-80346 
31.12.44 8-47 60 40-80647 
31.01.45 14-45 105 36-80148 
28.02.45 45-43 59 33-81049 
31.03.45 131-66 218 39-80750 
30.04.45 157-49 165 32-80451 
05.05.45 19-4 57 34-83052 
Totals  797-456 (1,253) 1,336 _ 
 
 
                                                          
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week (to 4 October 1944).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First 
Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October  1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle.  1-4 October 1944 figures 
subtracted from October 1944 total battle and  non-battle.  
39 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months August-September 1944. 
39LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months August-September 1944. 
40 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 27 July-30 August 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
41 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
43 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A &  Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
44 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle for 
1-4 October 1944 which was included in the September 1944 return due to the weekly reporting practice. 
45 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944. T-7092.  31 October 1944 return.  
46 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
47 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944. T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
48 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
49 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
50 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
51 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
52 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.5: The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Lincoln and Welland Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 53 
Personnel 
reinforcements54  
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.08.44 258-7155* 101* 33-58956 
30.09.44 166-4257 408* 37-78558 
31.10.44 210-2659 117 31-61660 
30.11.44 64-42 335 37-80461 
31.12.44 14-49 89 37-81662 
31.01.45 176-77 248 28-76463 
28.02.45 65-90 217 29-81864 
31.03.45 146-96 318 39-80365 
30.04.45 301-36 273 38-81666 
05.05.45 73-4 18 37-77667 
Totals  1,473-533 (2,006) 2,124 _ 
 
 
                                                          
53 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203.  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  June-September 1944 totals by week (to 4 October 1944).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First 
Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944- May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle.  1-4 October 1944 figures 
subtracted from  October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
54 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months August-September 1944. 
55 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 27 July-30 August 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
56 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
57 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
58 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September  1944 return.  
59 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle for 
1-4 October 1944 included in the September 1944 return due to weekly reporting practice. 
60 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
61 LAC RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
62 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
63 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
64 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
65 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
66 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
67 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
335 
 
Table E.6: The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Algonquin Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 68 
Personnel 
reinforcements69 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.08.44 244-2070 21* 36-57171 
30.09.44 261-2972 519* 36-80073 
31.10.44 180-5874 164 33-67075 
30.11.44 83-89 278 38-78776 
31.12.44 9-74 108 37-80577 
31.01.45 15-75 114 37-81278 
28.02.45 37-29 77 38-80379 
31.03.45 325-90 336 36-82080 
30.04.45 230-46 214 30-79981 
05.05.45 11-13 41 32-84582 
Totals  1,395-523 (1,918) 1,872 _ 
 
 
                                                          
68 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  August-September 1944 totals by week (to 4 October 1944).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First 
Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and non-battle.  1-4 October 1944 figures 
subtracted from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
69 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months August-September 1944. 
70 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 27 July-30 August 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
71 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
72 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
73 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
74 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle for 
1-4 October 1944.  These numbers included in the September return due to weekly reporting practice. 
75 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return.  
76 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary  November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
77 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
78 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
79 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary. February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
80 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
81 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
82 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.7: The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's) of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 83 
Personnel 
reinforcements84* 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month: 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.08.44 218-6185* 24 24-52886 
30.09.44 222-3887* 579* 37-83488 
31.10.44 186-6489 118 29-64990 
31.11.44 16-77 259 38-80891 
31.12.44 3-55 61 36-80792 
31.01.45 50-73 82 33-76993 
28.02.45 60-54 150 28-80394 
31.03.45 171-101 288 37-80895 
30.04.45 167-50 269 40-85496 
05.05.45 32-10 0 38-83797 
Totals  1,144-583 (1,727) 1,806 _ 
 
                                                          
83 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203).  Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties.  August-September 1944 totals by week (to 4 October).  LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian 
Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944–May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Battle and  non-battle.  1-4 October 1944 figures subtracted 
from October 1944 total battle and non-battle.  
84 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
*Estimated figures taking strengths at certain dates and subtracting casualties for months August-September 1944.  LAC, RG 24 
Volume 15,005.  The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada War Diary August 1944.  Pt I orders for reinforcement data for 
August 1944. 
85 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 27 July-30 August 1944.* The reported figure is too These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on 
a weekly basis. 
86 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
87 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,527.  File 215.921.009 (D203) Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon.  Return showing battle and non-
battle casualties. Totals 31 August-4 October 1944.* These totals were reported by the Canadian Army on a weekly basis. 
88 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
89 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  Minus battle and non-battle for 
1-4 October 1944 included in the September 1944 return due to weekly reporting practice. 
90 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A and Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
91 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
92 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
93 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
94 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
95 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
96 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
97 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.8: The 4th Canadian Armoured Division: The 29th Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta 
Regiment) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 98 
Personnel 
reinforcements99 
 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
  38-647 
30.08.44 Total August-November100  
220-89 
Total: August-
November101 
 
340 
33-584102 
30.09.44 40-592103 
31.10.44 32-626104 
30.11.44 30-630105 
31.12.44 4-33 66   39-656106 
31.01.45 3-38 32 36-636107 
28.02.45 18-40 58 35-639108 
31.03.45 23-44 118 38-669109 
30.04.45 19-18 29 38-649110 
05.05.45 3-0 0 36-643111 
Totals 290-262 (552) 643 _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Battle and non-battle casualties. 
99 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.   
100 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,295 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary December 1944.  T-12767.  5 
December 1944 entry summary of August-November 1944 casualties. 
101 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,295 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment War Diary December 1944.  T-12767.  5 
December 1944 entry summary of August-November 1944 reinforcements.  
102 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
103 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
104 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
105 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
106 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,661.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
107 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return. 
108 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
109 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
110 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
111 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table E.9: 4th Canadian Armoured Division: 5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA112 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given: 
WE 01.45 37-741 
26.08.44 34-634 
30.09.44 33-722 
28.10.44 36-718 
25.11.44 36-710 
30.12.44 35-695 
27.01.45 30-670 
24.02.45 33-686 
31.03.45 35-700 
28.04.45 33-680 
05.05.45 32-687 
 
Table E.10: 4th Canadian Armoured Division: 15th Field Regiment, RCA113 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 38-638 
26.08.44 37-585 
30.09.44 36-621 
28.10.44 38-636 
26.11.44 38-627 
30.12.44 38-625 
27.01.45 37-615 
24.02.45 37-618 
31.03.45 37-626 
28.04.45 38-628 
05.05.45 38-627 
 
                                                          
112 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,567-14,568.  5th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944-May 1945.  T-16717-16718.  
Weekly field returns for officers and other ranks. 
113 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,526.  15th Field Regiment, RCA War Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-16424.  Weekly returns for 
officers and other ranks 
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Table E.11: 4th Canadian Armoured Division: 23rd Field Regiment, RCA (Self-Propelled)114 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 38-609 
26.08.44 38-584 
30.09.44 42-603 
28.10.44 38-587 
25.11.44 38-595 
30.12.44 36-597 
27.01.45 37-582 
24.02.45 38-602 
31.03.45 38-599 
28.04.45 37-601 
05.05.45 37-591 
 
Table E.12: 4th Canadian Armoured Division: 8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA115 
Date Strength: O-ORs for date given 
WE 01.45 34-551 
26.08.44 40-821 
30.09.44 36-561 
28.10.44 35-559 
25.11.44 35-551 
30.12.44 35-551 
27.01.45 33-546 
24.02.45 34-551 
31.03.45 33-546 
28.04.45 34-543 
05.05.45 33-540 
 
                                                          
114 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,536.  23rd Field Regiment (Self-Propelled), RCA War Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-16434.  
Weekly field returns for officers and other ranks. 
115 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,609.  8th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-16761-16762.  
Weekly field returns of officers and other ranks.   
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Table E.13: 4th Canadian Armoured Division: Total divisional RCA battle and non-battle casualties & reinforcements by 
month August 1944- May 1945:116 
 
Date Battle-non-battle casualties for month given Personnel reinforcements for month given 
 
08.44 257-Not reported Not reported 
09.44 48-No reported Not reported 
10.44 36-49 102 
11.44 29-74 111 
12.44 3-120 149 
01.45 20-143 148 
02.45 21-122 161 
03.45 51-103 264 
04.45 40-157 205 
05.45 23-19 22 
Totals  528-Incomplete Incomplete 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,793.  4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-10551.  All 
RCA personnel for all four divisional RCA regiments combined. 
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Table E.14: A vehicle/weapons state: 4th Canadian Armoured Division August 1944-April 1945117 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Sherman 
75mm All 
Marks 
Firefly 
17-Pdr 
All Marks 
M3 
Stuart 
All 
Marks 
M-10 
17-
Pdr 
SP 
M-10 
3-Inch 
SP 
25-Pdr 
Sexton 
SP  
RCA OP 
tanks all 
marks 
RCA 
Ram  
GPO 
Veh 
WE  
30.04.45 
141 96 44 24 0 48 34 12 
31.08.44 175 27 35 22 2 23 18 0 
31.09.44 No data No data No data No 
data 
No 
data 
No data No data No 
data 
31.10.44 184 39 30 23 1 22 17 0 
30.11.44 151 67 44 20 1 24 17 0 
31.12.44 169 92 46 21 1 25 21 0 
31.01.45 169 81 46 23 2 25 25 0 
28.02.45 No data No data No data No 
data 
No 
data 
No data No data No 
data 
31.03.45 147 86 46 24 0 62 24 0 
30.04.45 169 80 41 24 2 50 22 12 
Monthly Average 166 67 41 22 1 33 21 2 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
17 
Pdr 
A/T 
Guns 
6-Pdr 
A/T 
Guns 
25-Pdr 
Towed 
40mm 
AA SP 
40mm 
AA 
towed  
4.2-Inch 
Mortars 
2-Inch 
Mortars 
3-Inch 
mortars 
.303 
MMG 
WE 30.04.45 24 30 24 12 12 4 132 24 21 
31.08.44 25 31 25 18 36 4 132 24 No 
data 
31.09.44 24 31 25 18 18 4 138 28 No 
data 
31.10.44 24 31 26 30 6 4 142 25 No 
data 
30.11.44 24 30 24 36 0 4 121 26 No 
data 
31.12.44 24 30 24 36 0 4 137 25 No 
data 
31.01.45 24 30 24 36 0 4 138 26 18 
28.02.045 24 30 24 36 0 4 130 26 19 
31.03.45 24 30 24 36 0 4 121 24 17 
30.04.45 24 30 26 24 0 4 126 24 19 
Monthly Average 24 30 25 30 7 4 132 25 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC, RG24 
Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).   
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A vehicle/weapons state part 3. 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Valentine 
Bridge 
layer 
Wasp II Universal 
Carriers 
T-16 (gun 
tractor) 
Carriers 
MMG Carriers 
WE 30.04.45 0 0 120 60 28 
31.08.44 3 0 162 55 22 
30.09.44 No data No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 0 1 200 100 58 
30.11.44 0 2 152 67 24 
31.12.44 0 3 143 67 28 
31.01.45 0 4 144 70 28 
28.02.45 No data No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 0 3 144 69 26 
30.04.45 0 13 177 71 27 
Monthly Averages 0 4 160 71 30 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 4. 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Mortar 3-Inch & 4.2-Inch 
Carriers combined 
AOP Carriers Scout Cars all 
makes 
Armd Cars all 
makes 
WE 30.04.45 27 35 77 3 
31.08.44 21 0 119 69 
30.09.44 No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 30 0 88 1 
30.11.44 30 0 87 1 
31.12.44 31 0 89 1 
31.01.45 28 0 93 1 
28.02.45 No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 24 0 86 1 
30.04.45 26 0 96 2 
Monthly Averages 27 0 94 11 
 
Table E.15; 4th Canadian Armoured Division total recorded AFV Replacements of major types (Shermans, Fireflies and 
Stuarts) via D Squadron, 25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (Forward Delivery Squadron)118  
Month M4 Sherman 75mm all 
.marks 
deliveries 
Firefly 17-Pdr all marks 
deliveries 
M3 Stuart all marks deliveries 
Month    
08.44 107 8 8 
09.44  56 19 4 
10.44 30 29 46 
11.44 29 32 2 
12.44 24 10 2 
01.45 29 10 8 
02.45 31 35 7 
03.45 54 30 11 
04.45 56 38 16 
05.45 4 4 0 
Totals 421 215 105 
 
 
                                                          
118 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,276.  File 10/43 – 07/45, 944/E.  D Squadron 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War 
Diaries August 1944-May 1945.  T-12748.   
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Table E.16: 4th Canadian Armoured Division CAC operational “Fit” tank strengths reported on given dates (Shermans, 
Fireflies and Stuart tanks for date given)119 
Date Operational heavy AFVs of all makes 
31.07.44 350* 
31.08.44 239* 
31.10.44 254* 
30.11.44 262* 
01.12.44 249 
01.01.45 236 
01.02.45 276 
02.03.45 330 
01.04.45 283 
01.05.45 254 
Average 273 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
119 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,940.  4th Canadian Armoured Division tank states December 1944-May 1945.  File 245C4.85 (D1-
D2).  LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  *The months 
July-November, 1944 are taken from this second source and reflect CAC fit tanks of the three main types on strength with the 
division.  Broken down vehicles not immediately repairable would be TOS to the brigade level 2nd line workshops or 25th 
Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment’s D Squadron.  The division was significantly over strength in AFVs during the month 
of July 1944.   
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Appendix 6: The 5th Canadian Armoured Division: Statistics March-May 1945
Table F.1: The 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 2nd Canadian Armoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
(Royal Canadians)) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 1 
Personnel 
reinforcements2 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.04.45 37-20 51 33-6403 
05.05.45 0-7 5 34-6304 
Totals 37-27(64) 56 _ 
 
Table F.2: The 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade; The 5th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The 8th Prince’s Louise’s (New 
Brunswick) Hussars)  
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 5 
Personnel 
reinforcements6 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.04.45 27-28 44 36-6427 
05.05.45 10-13 1 31-6148 
Totals:  37-41(78) 45 _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
2 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
3 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
4 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
5 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
6 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
7 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
8 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table F.3: The 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment: (The British Columbia 
Dragoons) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 9 
Personnel 
reinforcements10 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_  38-647 
04.04.45 13-12 41 37-65211 
05.05.45 9-14 6 36-63512 
Totals 22-26 (48) 47 _ 
 
Table F.4: The 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade: The Westminster Regiment (Motor) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 13 
Personnel 
reinforcements14 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_  38-818 
30.04.45 41-15 27 36-82415 
05.05.45 8-2 9 35-81216 
Totals 49-17 (66) 36 _ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties April and May 1945. 
10 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements for April and May 1945. 
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return.  
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945. T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
13 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
14 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
15 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
16 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table F.5: The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Perth Regiment: 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 17 
Personnel 
reinforcements18 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 65-49 34 29-77419 
05.05.45 20-4 31 32-76720 
Totals 85-53 (138) 65 _ 
 
Table F.6: The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Cape Breton Highlanders 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 21 
Personnel 
reinforcements22 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-812 
30.04.45 10-23 25 36-83523 
05.05.45 62-8 29 35-77624 
Totals 72-31 (103) 54 _ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
18 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
19 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
20 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
21 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
22 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
23 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
24 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table F.7: The 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade: The Irish Regiment of Canada 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 25 
Personnel 
reinforcements26 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
  38-812 
30.04.45 44-16 43 37-82127 
05.05.45 42-5 2 36-79428 
Totals 86-21 (107) 45  
 
Table F.8: 5th Canadian Armoured Division: 3rd Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The Governor General’s 
Horse Guards) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 29 
Personnel 
reinforcements30 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_  38-647 
30.04.45 10-26 35 39-68531 
05.05.45 0-10 3 38-67932 
Totals 10-36 (46) 38 _ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
26 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
27 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
28 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
29 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April -May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
30 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  T-7095-7096.  
Reinforcements. 
31 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
32 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table F.9: 5th Canadian Armoured Division: 17th Field Regiment, RCA, 1-21 April 1945 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 33 
Personnel 
reinforcements34 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _  38-638 
21.04.45 21-19 25 38-60735 
Totals  21-21 (42) 26 _ 
 
Table F.10: 5th Canadian Armoured Division: 8th Field Regiment (Self-Propelled), RCA, 1-21 April 1945 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given 36 
Personnel 
reinforcements37 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _  38-609 
21.04.45 7-27 37 39-59838 
Totals  7-27 (34) 37 _ 
 
Table F.11: 5th Canadian Armoured Division: 4th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, 1-21 April 1945 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for 
month given 39 
Personnel 
reinforcements40 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 34-741 
27.04.45 2-19 59 35-70041 
Totals  2-19 (21) 59 _ 
 
                                                          
33 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Battle and non-battle casualties.  
These are only for the period 1-21 April 1945.  Later  records have not been found. 
34 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Reinforcements for 1-21 April 
1945.  
35 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  21 April 1945 return for RCA 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division. 
36 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Battle and non-battle casualties.  
These are only for the period 1-21 April 1945.  Later  records have not been found. 
37 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Reinforcements for 1-21 April 
1945.  
38 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  21 April 1945 return for RCA 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division. 
39 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Battle and non-battle casualties.  
These are only for the period 1-21 April 1945.  Later records have not been found. 
40 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps  A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Reinforcements for 1-21 April 
1945.   Later  records have not been found. 
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,565.  4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16715.  27 April 1945 field 
return.  
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Table F.12: 5th Canadian Armoured Division: 5th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA, 1-21 April 1945 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for 
month given 42 
Personnel 
reinforcements43 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 01.45 _ _ 34-551 
28.04.45 0-19 25 35-54044 
Totals  0-19 25 _ 
 
Table F.13: A vehicle/weapons state: 5th Canadian Armoured Division March-April 194545 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Sherman 
75mm all 
marks 
Firefly 
17-Pdr 
all 
marks 
M5 
Stuart 
all 
marks 
M-10 
17 -
Pdr 
SP 
25-Pdr 
Sexton 
SP 
M7 
Sherman  
105mm 
RCA OP tanks 
all marks 
RCA Ram 
GPO 
vehicle 
WE 30.04.45 141 96 44 24 24 24 24 6 
30.04.45 165 97 28 24 27 27 18 6 
Monthly Average 165 97 28 24 27 27 18 6 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
17-Pdr 
A/T 
guns 
6 Pdr 
A/T 
Guns 
25-Pdr 
howitzer 
towed 
40mm 
AA SP 
40mm 
AA 
towed 
4.2-Inch 
mortars  
2-Inch 
mortars 
3-Inch 
mortars 
.303 
Vickers 
MMG  
WE 30.04.45 24 30 24 12 12 4 132 24 21 
31.03.45 24 30 No Data 36 0 6 140 18 21 
30.04.45 24 30 24 24 0 6 142 24 8 
Monthly Average 24 30 24 30 0 6 141 21 14.5 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 3 
Vehicle/Weapons System Valentine bridge 
layer 
Wasp II  Universal 
Carriers 
T-16 (gun 
tractor) 
Carriers 
MMG  Carriers 
WE 30.04.45 3 0 120 60 28 
30.04.45 3  97 0 1 
Monthly Averages 3  97 0 1 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Battle and non-battle casualties.  
These are only for the period 1-21 April 1945.  Later records have not been found. 
43 LAC, RG24 Volumes 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  Reinforcements for 1-21 April 
1945.  Later  records have not been found. 
44 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,599.  5th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16749.  28 April 1945 return.  
45 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  LAC RG24 
Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6).   
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A vehicle/weapons state part 4 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Mortar 3-Inch & 4.2-Inch Carriers 
combined 
AOP 
Carriers 
Scout Cars all 
makes 
Armoured Cars all 
makes 
WE 30.04.45 35 19 142 76 
30.04.45 16 1 156 74 
Monthly Averages 16 1 156 74 
 
Table F.14: 5th Canadian Armoured Division heavy AFV deliveries by G Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment to 5th Canadian Armoured Division regiments:46  
Month M4 Sherman 75mm All 
Marks 
Deliveries 
17-Pdr Firefly 
Deliveries 
M5 Stuart 
Deliveries  
M7 Sherman 105mm 
Month     
03.45 13 1 5 6 
04.45  20 14 10 Nil 
05.45 1 1 0 Nil 
Totals 34 16 15 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,280.  G Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary March-May 1945.  T-1275. 
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Appendix 7: The 1st & 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigades statistics June 1944-May 1945
 
Table G.1: The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Governor General's Horse 
Guards) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given1  
Personnel 
reinforcements2 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _  
30.04.45 7-13 47 43-7903 
05.05.45 0-2 2 41-7774 
Totals 7-15 (22) 49 _ 
 
Table G.2: The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Three Rivers Regiment)   
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given5  
Personnel 
reinforcements6 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_   
30.04.45 0-4 6 43-6357 
05.05.45 0-3 4 45-6868 
Totals 0-7 (7) 10  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
2  LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
3 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
4 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.. 
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
6  LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
7 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return.. 
8 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table G.3: The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given9  
Personnel 
reinforcements10 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ _ 
30.04.45 4-14 24 38-64911 
05.05.45 0-1 0 36-65112 
Totals 4-15 (19) 24 _ 
 
Table G.4: A vehicle/weapons state 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade April 194513 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Sherman 75mm all 
marks 
Sherman I b 
105mm 
Firefly 17-Pdr all 
marks 
M3-M5 Stuart all 
marks 
WE 30.04.45 103 18 72 33 
30.04.45 115 18 34 33 
Averages 115 18 34 33 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2: 
Vehicle/Weapons System OP/Command tanks all 
marks 
Valentine Bridge Layer Scout Cars all makes  
WE 30.04.45 8 3 35 
30.04.45 9 4 50 
Averages  9 4 50 
 
Table G.5: 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade heavy AFV deliveries to its armoured regiments by A Squadron, 25th 
Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Forward Delivery Squadron) March-May 194514 
Month Sherman all 
marks 
Deliveries 
Sherman 17-Pdr 
Firefly Deliveries 
M3 Stuart 
Deliveries 
Month    
03.45 0 60 0 
04.45 15 5 16 
05.45 0 0 0 
Totals 15 65 16 
 
                                                          
9 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,664-13,665.  First Canadian Army & Q War Diaries April-May 1945.  Battle and non-battle casualties. 
10 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
13 LAC RG24 Volume 10,553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  30 April 1945. 
14 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,269.  A Squadron 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diaries March-May 1945.  T-
12737. 
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Table G.6: The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The 1st Hussars) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given15  
Personnel 
reinforcements16 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
24.06.44 No data No data 37-67017 
29.07.44 No data No data 38-52218 
30.08.44 No data No data 34-61019 
30.09.44 No data No data 34-56420 
31.10.44 2-50 83 37-56421 
30.11.44 2-118 199 36-63822 
31.12.44 0-94 87 37-63723 
31.01.45 1-105 88 32-61924 
28.02.45 37-86 119 30-61525 
31.03.45 15-27 121 36-63726 
30.04.45 36-39 108 39-63027 
05.05.45 0-6 11 37-62428 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Battle and non-battle casualties October 1944-May 1945. 
16 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
17 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213.  6th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12657.   24 June 1944 return.   
18 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213.  6th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12657.   29 July 1944 return.   
19 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
20 LAC RG24, Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944. T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
21 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return.  
22LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944. T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
23 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944. T-7093.  31 December 1945 return. 
24 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7093.  31 January 1945 return. 
25 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
26 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
27 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
28 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table G.7: The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 10th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Fort Garry Horse)  
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given29  
Personnel 
reinforcements30 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.06.44 No data No data 38-64631 
29.07.44 No data No data 33-59732 
30.08.44 No data No data 33-55533 
30.09.44 22-No data No data 34-52734 
31.10.44 51-5 111 39-54635 
30.11.44 3-22 116 38-60836 
31.12.44 0-17 45 34-62837 
31.01.45 0-22 78 36-60738 
28.02.45 28-24 112 36-63339 
31.03.45 11-25 71 37-64540 
30.04.45 20-16 63  38-64641 
05.05.45 2-4 4 37-63642 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Battle and non-battle casualties October 1944-May 1945. 
30 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
31 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,233.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary June 1944.  T-12697.  24 June 1944 return. 
32 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,234.  10th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12697.  29 July 1944 return. 
33 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
34 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return.  
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return.  
36 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
37 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return.  
38 LAC RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7093.  31 January 1945 return.  
39 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary  February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
40 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary  March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
41 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
42 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return.  
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Table G.8: The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade: The 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers) 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given43  
Personnel 
reinforcements44 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
01.45 
_ _ 38-647 
30.06.44 165-No data45 
 
No data 37-65146 
29.07.44 No data 39-65047 
30.08.44 No data No data 38-60848 
30.09.44 7-No data No data 37-59049 
31.10.44 42-17 85 40-59950 
30.11.44 4-44 135 33-64151 
31.12.44 0-31 113 35-65052 
31.01.45 0-48 102 35-64853 
28.02.45 4-33 123 34-63854 
31.03.45 26-35 89   36-64055 
30.04.45 28-33 90 37-62856 
05.05.45 0-4 6 35-63057 
Totals Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
 
 
                                                          
43  LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Battle and non-battle casualties October 1944-May 1945.  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armoured Regiment War 
Diary July 1944.  31 July 1944 entry mentioning battle casualties.  
44 LAC, RG 24 Volumes 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  
Reinforcements October 1944-May 1945. 
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  31 July 1944 entry mentions total 
casualties from 6 June to 31 July 1944. 
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  24 June 1944 return. 
47 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287.  27th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary July 1944.  29 July 1944 return. 
48 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A  & Q War Diary August 1944.  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return.  
49 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return.  
50 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944.  T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
51 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A &  Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
52 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
53 LAC RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7093.  31 January 1945 return. 
54 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945.  T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
55 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary. March 1945.  T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
56 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
57 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary. May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table G.9: The 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade: Total battle casualties for 6 June-17 August 194458 
 Killed  Died of wounds Wounded  Missing  Missing Rejoined  
Totals 192 30 528 122 33 
 
Table G.10: A vehicle/weapons state: 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade June 1944-April 194559 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Sherman 75mm 
all marks 
Firefly 17- 
Pdr all 
marks 
M3-M5 Stuart 
all marks 
OP/Command 
tanks all marks 
WE 30.04.45 103 72 33 8 
30.06.44 No data No data No data No data 
31.07.44 240 24 31 2 
31.08.44 211 27 27 6 
31.09.44 No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 115 35 11 8 
31.11.44 120 55 29 7 
31.12.44 113 70 33 7 
31.01.45 114 67 33 9 
28.02.045 No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 119 67 32 5 
30.04.45 136 58 33 5 
Averages  146 50 29 6 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
Crusader AA 
tanks 
Valentine Bridge 
Layer 
Humber Scout Cars 
WE 30.04.45 0 3 35 
30.06.44 No data No data No data 
31.07.44 19 3 42 
31.08.44 15 3 43 
31.09.44 No data No data No data 
31.10.44 6 0 39 
31.11.44 2 0 40 
31.12.44 2 1 39 
31.01.45 1 2 39 
28.02.045 No data No data No data 
31.03.45 1 0 35 
30.04.45 1 0 39 
Averages  6 1 39 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,517.  File 215A21-009 (D167).  Canadian Army Casualties. 
59 LAC RG24 Volume 10, 553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position.  File 215A21.085 (D1)  A vehicles that 
were authorized under the war establishment but never issued are not listed, such as M7 Sherman 105mm tanks.  Unauthorized 
vehicles the brigade had under strength are not listed.  
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Table G.11: 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade total recorded Sherman, Firefly and Stuart replacements via C Squadron, 
25th  Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (Forward Delivery Squadron)60 to the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade61 
Month Sherman all marks 
deliveries 
Firefly 17-Pdr all 
marks deliveries 
M3/M5 Stuart all 
marks deliveries 
Month    
06.44 862 0 4 
07.44 116 1 0 
08.44 57 15 1 
09.44  44 4 0 
10.44 40 10 15 
11.44 23 37 19 
12.44 21 11 0 
01.45 17 8 0 
02.45 26 14 1 
03.45 35 22 4 
04.45 44 10 2 
Totals 431 132 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 RG24, Volumes 14,276-14,277.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diaries June 1944-April 1945.  
Files 10/43 – 12/44, 944/D, 01/45 – 05/45, 944/D.  T-1274-12748.   
61 John Marteinson, Michael McNorgan, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An illustrated History (Toronto: Robin Brass 
Studio.  2000.), 244.  On 10 June 1944 British Army forward delivery squadrons delivered twenty-six AFVs to the 1st Hussars, 
twenty-one to the Fort Garry Horse and twenty-seven to the Sherbrooke Fusiliers.  These AFVs were delivered via British means 
and no specific types are mentioned. 
62 RG24, Volume 14,276.  C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment War Diary June 1944.   File 10/43 – 12/44, 
944/D.  T-12747.  8 June 1944 entry states the eight tanks went forward as replacements, but no data is listed as to type.. 17 June 
1944 entry records tank replacements, but no type is listed. 
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Appendix 8: 1st Canadian Corps, 2nd Canadian Corps and First Canadian Army troops statistics 
July 1944-May 1945
1st & 2nd Canadian Corps troops:  
Table H.1:1st Canadian Corps: 1st Canadian Armoured Car Regiment(The Royal Canadian Dragoons) 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 57-803 
30.04.45 58-8211 
05.05.45 81-8232 
 
Table H.2: 1st Canadian Corps: 7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 38-765 
27.04.45 37-6733 
04.05.45 38-6594 
 
Table H.3: 1st Canadian Corps: 1st Survey Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 34-589 
30.04.45 32-5455 
05.05.45 32-5436 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG24, Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return.. 
2 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945. T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
3 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,573.  7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16723.  27 April 1945 return. 
4 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,573.  7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16723.  4 May 1945 return, 
5 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
6 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.4: 1st Canadian Corps: 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 34-551 
30.04.45 33-5517 
05.05.45 33-5478 
 
Table H.5:A vehicle/weapons state: 1st Canadian Corps troops March-April 19459 
Vehicle/Weapons System M-10 17-Pdr SP 17-Pdr A/T Gun 
WE 30.04.45 24 24 
31.03.45 24 24 
30.04.45 24 23 
Averages 24 23.5 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2. 
Vehicle/Weapons System 40mm 
towed 
AA 
40mm SP AA 2-Inch mortar 
WE 30.04.45 12 12 24 
31.03.45 18 18 24 
30.04.45 12 18 24 
Averages 15 18 24 
 
Table H.6: 25th CADR deliveries of new and repaired AFVs to 1st Canadian Corps units10 
Month M-10 17-Pdr SP deliveries 
03.45 24 
04.45 0 
Totals 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,587.  1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16736.  27 April 1945 return. 
8 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,587.  1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16737.  5 May 1945 return. 
9 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State of Canadian Army in NWE.  File 215C1.083 (D6). 
10 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,573.  7th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16723.  An entire new complement of 
M-10 17-Pounder tank destroyers is recorded as being issued.   
360 
 
Table H.7: 2nd Canadian Corps troops: The 18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment 
Date Battle and non-battle 
casualties for month given11  
Personnel reinforcements12 Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 10.44 _ _ 57-803 
29.07.44 Not Reported Not Reported 57-79713 
30.08.44 No Reported Not Reported 54-78614 
30.09.44 14-Not Reported Not Reported 55-79115 
31.10.44 9-12 26 56-79216 
30.11.44 Not Reported Not Reported 57-78617 
31.12.44 0-6 15 35-80018 
31.01.45 5-39 45 54-78619 
28.02.45 5-22 35 51-79720 
31.03.45 11-92 49 55-78421 
30.04.45 21-14 31 56-77722 
05.05.45 1-1 5 55-77223 
Totals Incomplete Incomplete _ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Consolidated 
casualty & strength returns for battle and non-battle casualties. 
12 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diaries October 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7096.  Consolidated 
casualty & strength returns for reinforcements. 
13 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,248.  18th Canadian Armoured Car Regiment War Diary July 1944.  T-12714.  29 July 1944 return.  
14 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,658.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary August 1944,  T-7091.  30 August 1944 return. 
15 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944.  T-7092.  30 September 1944 return. 
16 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,659.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary October 1944. T-7092.  31 October 1944 return. 
17 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
18 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,660.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 1944. T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
19 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7093.  31 January 1945 return.  
20 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary February 1945. T-7094.  28 February 1945 return. 
21 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary March 1945. T-7094.  31 March 1945 return. 
22 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,664.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary April 1945. T-7095.  30 April 1945 return. 
23 LAC, RG24 Volume 13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary May 1945.  T-7096.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.8: 2nd Canadian Corps troops: 6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 38-765 
29.07.44 37-71824 
26.08.44 37-69025 
30.09.44 37-75526 
28.10.44 35-75227 
25.11.44 38-74628 
30.12.44 38-72629 
31.01.45 37-72430 
24.02.45 37-70031 
31.03.45 38-71032 
21.04.45 38-70933 
05.05.45 37-69934 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16719.  29 July 1944 return. 
25 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16719.  26 August 1944 return. 
26 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16719.  30 September 1944 
return 
27 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16719.  28 October 1944 return 
28 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16719.  25 November 1944 
return. 
29 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16719.  30 December 1944 return. 
30 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16719.  27 January 1945 return. 
31 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16719.  24 February 1945 return. 
32 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16719.  31 March 1945 
33 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16720.  21 April 1945 return. 
34 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary May1945.  T-16720.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.9: 2nd Canadian Corps troops: 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month 
given35  
Personnel 
reinforcements36 
Strength: O-ORs end of 
month 
WE 
10.44 
_ _ 34-589 
29.07.44 6-13 3 32-56237 
30.08.44 48-24 70 32-55238 
30.09.44 2-15 23 28-54639 
31.10.44 5-12 47 32-56540 
25.11.44 0-21 32 32-54341 
31.12.44 7-16 22 31-54142 
31.01.45 1-17 52 28-56543 
24.02.45 0-29 20 26-55044 
31.03.45 2-10 61 31-58145 
30.04.45 2-20 18 30-56146 
05.05.45 0-1 12 31-56047 
Totals: 73-178 (251) 360 _ 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,648-14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944-May 1945.  T-17265-17266.  Battle and 
non-battle casualties. 
36 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,648-14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944-May 1945.  T-17265-17266.  
Reinforcements. 
37 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,648.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-17265.  29 July 1944 return. 
38 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-17265.  26 August 1944 return. 
39 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-17266.  30 September 1944 return. 
40 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-17266.  28 October 1944 return 
41 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-17266.  25 November 1944 return 
42 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-17266.  30 December 1944 return. 
43 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-17266.  27 January 1945 return 
44 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-17266.  24 February 1945 return 
45 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-17266.  31 March 1945 return 
46 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-17267.  28 April 1945 return 
47 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,649.  2nd Survey Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-17267.  5 May 1945 return 
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Table H.10: 2nd Canadian Corps troops: The 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,601.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16753.  29 July 1944 return. 
49 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,602.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16753.  24 August 1944 
return. 
50 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,602.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16753.  30 September 
1944 return. 
51 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,602.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16753.  28 October 1944 
return. 
52 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,660..  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary November 1944.  T-7093.  30 November 1944 return. 
53 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661..  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December1944.  T-7093.  31 December 1944 return. 
54LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,662.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary January 1945.  T-7094.  31 January 1945 return 
55 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,603.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16754.  24 February 1945 
return. 
56 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,603.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16755.  31 March 1945 
return. 
57 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,603.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16755.  24 April 1945 return. 
58 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,603.  6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA War Diary May1945.  T-16755.  5 May 1945 return. 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 34-551 
29.07.44 42-81948 
24.08.44 44-81249 
30.09.44 43-63850 
28.10.44 34-54851 
30.11.44 34-57852 
31.12.44 35-57553 
31.01.45 35-57054 
28.02.45 35-53255 
31.03.45 33-54356 
30.04.45 34-54457 
05.05.45 34-55258 
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Table H.11: A vehicle/weapons state 2nd Canadian Corps troops: July 1944-April 194559 
Vehicle/
Weapons 
System 
M-10 3-
Inch SP 
M-10 17-
Pdr SP 
Sherman 
command/OP 
tanks all makes 
25-Pdr 
Sexton SP 
Armd Cars 
all makes  
AA Armd 
Cars all 
makes 
Scout Cars 
all makes 
WE 
30.04.45 
0  0 0 81 0 71 
31.07.44 27 0 0 0 81 0 69 
31.08.44 25 0 0 0 3 0 3 
30.09.44 No data No data No data No data No data No data No data 
31.10.44 14 12 9 24 68 7 65 
30.11.44 11 11 9 25 74 0 72 
31.12.44 11 12 11 24 74 0 65 
31.01.45 8 16 8 25 75 0 71 
28.02.045 No data No data No data No data No data No data No data 
31.03.45 2 23 0 0 74 0 70 
30.04.45 1 25 0 0 79 0 70 
Average 12 12 5 12 66 1 61 
 
A vehicle/weapons state part 2. 
Vehicle/We
apons 
System 
Universal 
Carriers 
Ram 
towers 
AOP 
Carriers 
17-Pdr A/T 
Gun 
40mm 
towed AA 
40mm SP 
AA 
2-Inch 
mortar 
WE 
30.04.45 
23 24 6 24 12 12 24 
31.07.44 30 0 0 24 36 18 32 
31.08.44 29 0 0 24 36 18 24 
30.09.44 No data No data No data 23 18 18 23 
31.10.44 43 22 1 24 18 18 22 
30.11.44 41 23 1 24 18 18 20 
31.12.44 34 26 0 24 18 18 24 
31.01.45 33 26 0 24 18 18 24 
28.02.045 No data No data No data 24 18 18 24 
31.03.45 30 24 0 24 18 18 24 
30.04.45 31 24 0 23 18 18 23 
Averages 34 18 0 24 22 18 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army monthly report.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10, 553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1).  
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Table H.12: 2nd Canadian Corps troops: Deliveries of new and repaired heavy AFVs by 25th Canadian Armoured 
Delivery Regiment60 
Month M-10 3-Inch SP 
Deliveries  
M-10 17-Pdr 
SP Deliveries 
07.44 2 0 
08.44 0 12 
09.44  0 0 
10.44 0 2 
11.44 0 0 
12.44 0 1 
01.45 0 4 
02.45 0 0 
03.45 0 7 
04.45 0 2 
Totals 2 26 
 
First Canadian Army troops: 1st and 2nd Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) 
Table H.13: First Canadian Army troops: 1st AGRA: 11th Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 01.45 38-638 
29.04.45 39-60861 
05.05.45 36-60662 
 
Table H.14: First Canadian Army troops: 1st AGRA: 1st Medium Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
30.04.45 29-48863 
05.05.45 29-49364 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,570.  6th Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944-April 1945.  T-16719-16720. 
61 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,458.  11th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16155.  29 April 1945 return.  
62 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,458.  11th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16155.  5 May 1945 return. 
63 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
64 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945. T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.15: First Canadian Army troops: 1st  AGRA: 2nd Medium Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
30.04.45 25-48565 
05.05.45 25-47966 
 
Table H.16: First Canadian Army troops: 1st AGRA: 5th Medium Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
30.04.45 30-49667 
05.05.45 29-50168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
66 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945. T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
67 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,708.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary April 1945.  T-1862.  30 April 1945 return. 
68 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,709.  1st Canadian Corps A & Q War Diary May 1945. T-1863.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.17: First Canadian Army troops: 2nd AGRA: 19th Army Field Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 38-609 
24.06.44 38-64669 
29.07.44 38-63970 
26.08.44 34-62171 
30.09.44 38-60572 
28.10.44 37-60273 
30.11.44 37-60474 
30.12.44 39-59875 
27.01.45 38-59476 
24.02.45 38-55777 
31.03.45 38-58878 
28.04.45 41-58579 
05.05.45 36-57780 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,530.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary June 1944.  T-16428.  24 June 1944 return. 
70 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,530.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-16428.  29 July 1944 return. 
71 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,530.  19th Army Field Regiment , RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-16428.  26 August 1944 return. 
72 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,530.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-16428.  30 September 1944 
return. 
73 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-16428.  28 October 1944 return. 
74 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-16428.  25 November 1944 
return. 
75 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-16428.  30 December 1944 
return. 
76 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-16428.  27 January 1945 return. 
77 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment , RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-16428.  24 February 1945 
return. 
78 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th  Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-16429.  31 March 1945 return. 
79 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-16429.  28 April 1945 return. 
80 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,531.  19th Army Field Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-16429.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.18: First Canadian Army troops: 2nd AGRA: 3rd Medium Regiment. RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
29.07.44 28-50681 
26.08.44 26-51782 
28.09.44 28-53483 
28.10.44 28-54584 
28.11.44 28-53985 
30.12.44 27-52686 
27.01.45 29-51687 
24.02.45 29-50588 
31.03.45 28-52089 
28.04.45 26-51290 
05.05.45 27-51191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-15904.  29 July 1944 return. 
82 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-15904.  26 August 1944 return. 
83 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-15905.  30 September 1944 return. 
84 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-15905.  28 October 1944 return. 
85 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-15905.  28 November 1944 return. 
86 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-15905.  28 December 1944 return. 
87 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,389.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-15905.  27 January 1945 return. 
88 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,390.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-15906.  24 February 1945 return. 
89 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,390.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-15906.  31 March 1945 return. 
90 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,390.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-15906.  28 April 1945 return. 
91 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,390.  3rd Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-15906.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.19: First Canadian Army: 2nd AGRA units: 4th Medium Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
07.44 No data 
08.44 No data 
09.44 No data 
10.44 No data 
11.44 No data 
12.44 No data 
01.45 No data 
02.45 No data 
03.45 No data 
04.45 No data 
05. 45: No data 
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Table H.20: First Canadian Army: 2nd AGRA: 7h Medium Regiment, RCA 
Date Strength: O-ORs end of month 
WE 10.44 28-540 
29.07.44 27-51492 
26.08.44 28-50793 
30.09.44 28-51194 
28.10.44 28-52895 
25.11.44 28-53596 
30.12.44 28-52897 
27.01.45 28-53298 
24.02.45 27-49099 
31.03.45 27-515100 
28.04.45 28-515101 
05.05.45 26-512102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary July 1944.  T-15917.  27 July 1944 return. 
93 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary August 1944.  T-15917.  26 August 1944 return.   
94 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary September 1944.  T-15917.  30 September 1944 return.   
95 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary October 1944.  T-15917.  28 October 1944 return 
96 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary November 1944.  T-15918.  25 November 1944 return. 
97 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary December 1944.  T-15918.  30 December 1944 return. 
98 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary January 1945.  T-15918.  27 January 1945 return. 
99 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary February 1945.  T-15918.  24 February 1945 return. 
100 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary March 1945.  T-15919.  31 March 1945 return. 
101 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary April 1945.  T-15919.  28 April 1945 return. 
102 LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,401.  7th Medium Regiment, RCA War Diary May 1945.  T-15919.  5 May 1945 return. 
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Table H.21: First Canadian Army 2nd AGRA total battle and non-battle casualties, reinforcements July 1944-May 1945103 
Date Battle and non-battle casualties for month given  Personnel reinforcements 
07.44 No data No data 
08.44 No data No data 
09.44 12-Not Data No data 
10.44 72-116 210 
11.44 41-136 145 
12.44 5-219 229 
01.45 4-132 97 
02.45 26-134 88 
03.45 41-178 231 
04.45 1-44 21 
05.45 0-1 0 
Totals  Incomplete Incomplete 
 
Table H.22: A vehicle/weapons state: First Canadian Army troops: July 1944-May 1945104 
Vehicle/Weapons 
System 
25-Pdr Sexton SP M7 105mm Priest 
SP  
5.5 Inch howitzer 4.5 Inch Howitzer 
 
WE 30.04.45 24 0 48 0 
31.07.44 24 No data 47 0 
31.08.44 No data No data 47 0 
31.09.44 No data No data 48 0 
31.10.44 24 No data 48 0 
31.11.44 25 No data 32 14 
31.12.44 24 No data 32 16 
31.01.45 25 No data 32 16 
31.02.045 No data No data 32 16 
31.03.45 No data No data 32 16 
30.04.45 No data No data 48 64 
Averages 24 Incomplete 40 24 
 
 
                                                          
103 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary September 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7095.  
Consolidated casualty and strength returns for battle and non-battle. LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,659-13,665.  First Canadian Army 
A & Q War Diary September 1944-May 1945.  T-7092-7095.  Consolidated casualty and strength returns for reinforcements. 
104  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670.  Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report.  File 215C1.083 (D6).  LAC, RG 24 Volume 
10, 553.  21st AG. Canadian A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report.  File 215A21.085 (D1). 30 April 1945 report.   
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Appendix 9: 2nd Canadian Corps Reinforcement Company as an additional rehabilitation tool for 
Neuro-Psychiatric (Battle Exhaustion) casualties
 
Table I.1: Neuro-Psychiatric (NP) Cases October 1944 within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division after the Scheldt 
Estuary battles.1 
Total N.P. Casualties - 295 Total reported Casualties – 1957 percent of NP Casualties – 15 percent  
N.P Casualties Infantry – 268 Total Infantry Casualties - 1626 percent NP Casualties – 16.4 percent  
N.P Casualties RCA -  3 Total Casualties RCA- 93 percent NP Casualties  3.2 percent  
N.P Casualties Divisional Troops - 
24 
Total Casualties Divisional Troops 
-238 
percent NP Casualties – 10 percent  
 
Table I.2: Treatment options that were utilized for NP casualties: 
Corps Reinforcement 
Centre/Company 
199 67.5 percent  
Reboard and Reallocation 52 17.6 percent  
Further rehabilitation 28 9.5 percent  
General hospital 16 5.4 percent  
Totals 295 100 percent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army.  Appendix E, 308.  LAC.  3rd Canadian Infantry Division Psychiatric Report, October 1944.  
LAC, ADMS 3rd Canadian Infantry Division War Diary, November 1944.  These numbers do not include killed and missing 
casualties, as they are deemed irreversible total losses in personnel.  
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Appendix 10: Infantry other ranks shortages in North West Europe 1944-1945
 
Table J.1: Infantry other ranks shortages by division 27 August 1944-28 April 1945 in NWE.1 
Date 1st Canadian 
Infantry 
Division 
2nd Canadian 
Infantry 
Division 
3rd Canadian 
Infantry 
Division 
4th Canadian 
Armoured 
Division 
5th Canadian 
Armoured 
Division 
Total No.2 
CBRG 
holdings  
27.08.44 - 1,999 604 522 - 3,125 1,726 
29.08.44 - 2,495 836 846 - 4,177 1,306 
30.08.44 - 2,522 878 846 - 4,246 1,231 
31.08.44 - 2,612 875 831 - 4,318 1,354 
3.09.44 - 2,645 752 761 - 4,158 876 
4.09.44 - 1,960 736 755 - 3,451 731 
5.09.44 - 1,960 737 761 - 3,458 1,785 
6.09.44 - 1.450 630 706 - 2,786 954 
7.09.44 - 1,478 666 706 - 2.850 882 
8.09.44 - 1,478 770 715 - 2,963 987 
11.09.44 - 1,794 741 872 - 3,407 1,841 
12.09.44 - 1,727 759 865 - 3,351 1,317 
13.09.44 - 1,727 788 729 - 3,244 1,141 
14.09.44 - 1,550 806 719 - 3,075 1,781 
16.09.44 - 1,495 733 713 - 2,941 1,829 
18.09.44 - 1,482 814 641 - 2,937 1,710 
19.09.44 - 1,553 783 641 - 2,977 2,746 
20.09.44 - 1,523 711 707 - 2,941 2,227 
22.09.44 - 1,464 621 624 - 2,709 2,492 
23.09.44 - 1,299 602 629 - 2,503 1,535 
26.09.44 - 1,408 673 282 - 2,363 2,363 
27.09.44 - 1,452 802 318 - 2,572 2,363 
28.09.44 - 1,442 809 324 - 2,575 2,288 
29.09.44 - 1,470 761 180 - 2,411 2,053 
02.10.44 - 1,267 816 125 - 2,208 2,814 
5.10.44 - 1,165 552 106 - 1,823 2,028 
7.10.44 - 1,224 540 112 - 1,876 1,889 
10.10.44 - 1,058 464 161 - 1,683 1,160 
11.10.44 - 973 624 182 - 1,779 2,124 
12.10.44 - 934 646 179 - 1,759 3,053 
13.10.44 - 979 749 150 - 1,878 2,181 
14.10.44 - 869 851 94 - 1,814 2,234 
16.10.44 - 753 747 119 - 1,619 1,947 
17.10.44 - 820 793 103 - 1,716 1,858 
18.10.44 - 852 548 119 - 1,519 3,512 
19.10.44 - 681 566 131 - 1,378 1,985 
20.10.44 - 652 415 141 - 1,208 2,735 
23.10.44 - 478 410 288 - 1,176 2,419 
24.10.44 - 474 385 274 - 1,133 2,352 
25.10.44 - 548 426 294 - 1,268 2,476 
26.10.44 - 657 533 285 - 1,475 2,042 
30.10.44 - 679 670 554 - 1,903 1,921 
31.10.44 - 679 724 557 - 1,960 1,949 
1.11.44 - 755 768 571 - 2,094 2,064 
2.11.44 - 815 787 635 - 2,237 2,070 
3.11.44 - 858 776 615 - 2,249 2,358 
                                                          
1 LAC, RG24, Volume 10,699.  Infantry other ranks shortages in NWE 1944-1945 Report.  
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4.11.44 - 798 805 697 - 2,300 2,398 
6.11.44 - 803 678 635 - 2,116 2,748 
7.11.44 - 803 519 639 - 1,961 2,754 
8.11.44 - 803 424 127 - 1,354 2,000 
9.11.44 - 632 424 227 - 1,283 2,153 
10.11.44 - 530 278 262 - 1,070 1,325 
11.11.44 - 579 278 188 - 1,045 1,456 
13.11.44 - 424 90 134 - 648 2,323 
30.11.44 - 325 125 40 - 490 0 
29.12.44 - 205 182 36 - 423 20 
06.01.45 - 123 104 57 - 284 3,131 
13.01.45 - 65 173 51 - 289 3,414 
20.01.45 - 105 169 211 - 385 2,650 
27.01.45 - Nil Nil 95 - 95 2,537 
3.02.45 - Nil Nil 210 - 210 2,608 
10.02.45 - Nil Nil Nil - Nil 2,516 
17.02.45 - Nil Nil 49 - 49 3,768 
24.02.45 - Nil 334 Nil - 334 4,221 
03.03.45 - 244 72 105 - 421 3,704 
10.03.45 - 371 62 254 - 687 2,715 
17.03.45 - 4 Nil 86 - 90 2,193 
24.03.45 132 9 54 8 28 231 3,979 
31.03.45 156 48 191 34 Nil 429 5,476 
07.04.45 Nil 75 Nil 55 Nil 130 4,036 
14.04.45 74 17 50 14 Nil 155 4,022 
21.04.45 72 64 25 30 Nil 191 3,473 
28.04.45 23 193 225 89 108 638 3,728 
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